China-EU 'Silk Road' railways bring new advantages

Subject Development of trans-Eurasian railways under China's 'One Belt, One Road' initiative. Significance China's 'One Belt, One Road' initiative envisages the creation of new China-Europe railway connections and modernisation of existing ones. Railway transport between China and its second-largest trading partner is becoming a viable alternative to sea and air transportation, especially for high-value-added products which require timely deliveries but have insufficient profit margins to warrant substantial air transportation fees. Impacts Flows of Chinese investment into Central Asian countries along the main rail routes will contribute to economic and political stability. Industrial centres will emerge in special economic zones along the railway routes, such Khorgos-East Gate on the China-Kazakhstan border. Improved connections between inland Chinese industrial cities and their European customers will stimulate export flows from China. Demand for rails, steel, logistics, locomotives and wagons will receive a boost from trans-Eurasian railway investment. A new maritime link across the Caspian Sea will reduce Russia's ability to impose transit restrictions.

Subject Special Economic Zones in South-east Asia. Significance South-east Asian countries have committed to further expansion of special economic zones (SEZs), despite a mounting toll on local communities, especially in developing countries, and doubts that some SEZs will realise their objectives. Investment is being driven by intra-regional rivalries and competition between China, India and Japan. Impacts Few SEZs are generating strong economic benefits as they lack links to broader growth objectives. Limited intra-ASEAN cooperation is clouding regional industrial integration. Regional projects such as China's 'One Belt, One Road' will increasingly drive SEZ growth. Foreign countries and firms investing in SEZs could develop local political influence, stoking local unease and suspicion.


Significance Russia's deepening ties with China over the last four years reflect Moscow's isolation from the West. Despite Moscow's efforts, the pace of Chinese investment in Russia has been slower than anticipated, but Russian oil and food exports are rising. Impacts Continued US and EU sanctions heighten the importance of attracting Chinese funding for Russian corporates. Russia will compete with Central Asian states for energy and OBOR-related investment. Attempts will be made to tap into a larger pool of Chinese private investors. The Russian Far East will benefit from Chinese industrial and infrastructure investment. Exchange programmes will improve understanding of legislative, business, educational and cultural contexts in both countries.


Significance The security of high-profile and sensitive processes such as elections is particularly significant as it has implications for both government legitimacy and political stability. Impacts Pandemic-related economic strain could shrink necessary spending on cybersecurity. Skills shortages will remain a major impediment to boosting cybersecurity. Chinese investment in African IT infrastructure will rise.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel T. Kodzi Jr

PurposeThis paper aims to explore whether increasing Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) is associated with rising contributions of local industry in African countries connected to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The existence of cooperative industry linkages between Chinese investments and local businesses is a necessary condition for achieving the mutual benefits asserted by the BRI.Design/methodology/approachUnder growing FDI, the authors framed increasing local industry contribution as indicative of existing industry linkages. Using principal component analysis and multiple regression on collated country-level data, the authors examined relationships between key industry output variables and several independent variables representing Chinese investment and economic activity in a contiguous three-country region, over two investment periods.FindingsIncreasing Chinese FDI was associated with positive economic outcomes including decreasing unemployment; however, it did not appear to support local industry participation. The authors identified a “China effect” that hampered industry contribution to gross domestic product. The authors found that attempting to counterbalance this effect through direct exports to China was not strategically sound. Similarly, export-focused clusters in special zones may not foster industry linkages if they result in isolationism. Rather, host countries have an opportunity to enhance local industry contribution through leveraging interconnectivity factors under increasing FDI.Research limitations/implicationsSmall sample size of the study has implications for the predictive power of the model and for the complete explanation all the emerging findings. However, the authors presented compelling arguments for selecting the specific three countries. By conducting robustness checks on a separate region, findings of this study were substantially corroborated.Practical implicationsInstead of exporting directly to China as a way to mitigate local industry contraction, host countries need to thoughtfully pursue opportunities that present the greatest value-added export advantages. Proposed Chinese-funded infrastructure projects must be negotiated with a goal to strategically reduce interconnectivity barriers and achieve broader logistics improvements in the host countries.Social implicationsThe study provides a tool for proponents of local industry growth to present clearer frameworks in their advocacy. The social tensions around Chinese dominance in the host countries can be reduced by understanding and pursuing levers that enhance industry contribution in those contexts.Originality/valueThis study takes a different approach to examining the professed win-win proposition of the BRI in Africa. It uncovers important effects of increasing Chinese FDI and addresses viable host country responses, including a clear pathway for forging the cooperative industry linkages needed for inclusive growth and sustainable development.


2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 90-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart John Barton

Purpose – This paper aims to establish the level (if any) of Chinese State influence on setting the terms of Foreign Direct Investment in Zambia, specifically their influence on improving access for Chinese investors through the establishment of Special Economic Zones. Design/methodology/approach – The paper presents a process trace to test primary archival data and elite interviews against growing academic and popular “China in Africa” literature. Findings – After examining primary data, existing academic and popular literature is found to poorly describe China’s economic influence in Zambia, primarily by largely speculating on non-evident coercive investment practices. Instead, the paper concludes that similarities between new Chinese investment and retreating Western sources in Africa can better be described as “Sino-Substitution”. Research limitations/implications – The primary research has focused on English language Zambian sources; access to further Chinese sources would improve the breadth of the study. Practical implications – The study has found the terms of new Chinese investment in Zambia to be far more calculated, consensual and symbiotic than described in the existing literature. This more balanced view of Chinese investment is important if other foreign investors are to retain or regain competitive advantage in the region. Originality/value – No existing research has traced empirically the process through which the Zambian Government developed Special Economic Zones into the country’s largest investment vehicle, or how Chinese investment came to dominant capital flows within them. As investment in these zones grows, a better understanding of the Zambia–China relationship should help other investors compete, and improve Zambia’s access to capital.


2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (7) ◽  
pp. 106-115
Author(s):  
D. Malysheva

The article analyzes the innovations that determine the main directions and specific characteristics of international political competition in Central Asia. Particular attention is paid to political alternatives presented by the leading partners of the Central Asian countries – Russia, China, Turkey and Iran. In the context of the rivalry unfolding in the post-Soviet Central Asian space, the multi-vector policy of the five Central Asian states opens up a “window of opportunity” for various external forces to influence political and economic processes in the region in such a way that its states become objects of multilateral contention. Russia, which has the most powerful economic and military-political resource in the CIS, has a serious potential to promote its interests in Central Asia. They are primarily aiming at maintaining political stability in the Asian part of the post-Soviet space. Russia is also initiating many integration innovations in Central Asia, developing military cooperation with the countries of the region. At the same time, in Central Asia, Russia is confronted by rival forces. In the forefront is China. This great power has significantly expanded its influence in Central Asia, especially within the framework of the One Belt, One Road initiative. Economic, political, and cultural structures operating in Central Asia under the aegis of Turkey act often as alternatives to Russian integration projects. But Turkey, like Iran, has restrictions on its activities in Central Asia. Therefore, the effectiveness of the policy of these large Middle Eastern states is lower than that of Russia and China. China, Russia, and Iran are motivated to limit US influence in Eurasia, which occasionally drives them closer. In a sense, Turkey agrees with the idea of reducing the political presence of non-regional states in Central Asia. But when the US ceases to be a priority in the foreign policy of all four states, the rivalry between them may re-emerge. This will inevitably lead to a clash of interests, an increase in competition of ideas, integration projects, political and military strategies.


Subject Political and economic outlook. Significance The national unity government of President Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe completed its first year in July. After a phase of poor cohesion and unpopular decisions, the government is regaining public support. Sirisena, leader of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), and Wickremesinghe, leader of the United National Party (UNP), have extended their alliance to 2020, boosting political stability. Yet significant economic and political challenges remain. Impacts Dependence on Chinese investment is unavoidable, but Colombo will seek new partners. Rajapaksa will remain the most important political challenge for the government. Ethnic reconciliation is a distant dream, but overt tensions are subsiding.


Subject Prospects for One Belt, One Road in 2017. Significance The One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative, launched in 2013, consists of Chinese investment in land-based infrastructure linking China with Europe across Central Asia, and in shipping and port infrastructure around South-east Asia and the Indian Ocean rim; both branches also involve development of energy networks. 2017 will be a critical year as some projects near completion and spending on others ramps up sharply.


Significance Development of a China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is dominating the bilateral agenda along with security. Expectations are that some 46 billion dollars will be invested in infrastructure in what is a substantial component within Xi's 'One Belt, One Road' vision for international trade connectivity. Impacts High levels of investment over the construction period of major projects will boost Pakistan's economy. Other countries will court China for inclusion in Xi's plans for economic engagement as they see funds flowing to Pakistan. Increased Chinese investment into Pakistan would help reduce Pakistan's reliance on US aid.


Subject Chinese investments into ASEAN countries. Significance Beijing's 'One Belt One Road' (OBOR) summit concluded on May 15; leaders from 28 countries attended. China's government will now inject another 124 billion dollars into the OBOR initiative. Much will flow into services and infrastructure in ASEAN countries, but there is unease in some quarters over the region's growing dependency on Chinese money. Impacts Chinese investments into ASEAN countries will likely face increasing scrutiny. Therefore, Chinese firms face making extra provision for corporate social responsibility. ASEAN host governments could be politically vulnerable if the flow of Chinese money shifts or reduces.


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