Political crisis threatens Brazil's tentative recovery

Significance The requests are based on plea bargains from former executives of construction company Odebrecht. While the names in ‘Janot’s list’ have not been disclosed, several of them have leaked to the media. They include six ministers in the government of President Michel Temer, two former presidents, ten state governors, and the heads of both houses of Congress. If confirmed, this would make the list a potent bombshell for the Brazilian political class. Impacts The corruption scandal looks set to disrupt next year’s presidential election. Politicians’ disdain for accountability will fuel outrage with the political class. The ground could be fertile for a candidate claiming to be an ‘outsider’.

Significance After releasing 1 billion dollars in April, the IMF is urging Ukraine to implement land and pension reforms to make it eligible for further lending tranches. The government is finding it hard to pursue controversial changes opposed by many voters and taken up as causes by the political opposition. Gontareva's resignation reflects a lack of government support and is a setback for the reformist camp. Impacts The 'economic war' emerging alongside armed conflict in the east will dent prospects for growth and reform. Failure to secure further IMF financing could accelerate the planned return to international capital markets, perhaps in the third quarter. Attempts to push through reforms such as land sales may lead to increased political strife but not a full-blown political crisis.


Significance Economic weakness plus popular resentment of an elite seen as corrupt creates potential for mass demonstrations by pro- and anti-EU factions. Russia's importance as an economic partner is waning but it retains substantial influence through sympathetic political parties. A presidential election this October will be coloured by the unresolved bank fraud scandal, which has created a gulf between the political establishment and the electorate. Impacts Mainstream politicians will be find it hard to shake off perceived links to corruption. Prominent figures, whether oligarchs or pro-Russian politicians, may therefore avoid standing as presidential candidates. Lack of systemic reforms is a constraint on Moldova's ability to engage with EU economies. Domestic turmoil makes the government less likely to challenge Transnistria, which will remain a conduit for Russian pressure.


Subject A profile of Pedro Castillo. Significance Pedro Castillo has emerged as the unexpected winner of Peru’s 2021 presidential election. A schoolteacher far removed from the political establishment, his victory had led to concerns about what his presidency would look like and, indeed, whether it would last a full term. His challenge to the status quo has the political class deeply rattled. Impacts A Castillo government can be expected to increase company taxation, especially in the all-important mining sector. Most businessmen will prefer to wait and see what his government will bring before seeking to subvert it. If he moves far to the centre, Castillo will open up space for criticism on the left, not least from his own party.


Author(s):  
Martin C. Njoroge ◽  
Purity Kimani ◽  
Bernard J. Kikech

The way the media processes, frames, and passes on information either to the government or to the people affects the function of the political system. This chapter discusses the interaction between new media and ethnicity in Kenya, Africa. The chapter investigates ways in which the new media reinforced issues relating to ethnicity prior to Kenya’s 2007 presidential election. In demonstrating the nexus between new media and ethnicity, the chapter argues that the upsurge of ethnic animosity was chiefly instigated by new media’s influence. Prior to the election, politicians had mobilized their supporters along ethnic lines, and created a tinderbox situation. Thus, there is need for the new media in Kenya to help the citizens to redefine the status of ethnic relationships through the recognition of ethnic differences and the re-discovery of equitable ways to accommodate them; after all, there is more strength than weaknesses in these differences.


Author(s):  
Marcello Benegiamo ◽  
Paola Nardone

<p>Uscito a pezzi dalla pesante crisi finanziaria e industriale del 1907, che aveva messo a nudo i limiti della struttura economica del Paese, il capitalismo industriale italiano elaborò un programma, portato avanti fino al primo dopoguerra, che prevedeva l’instaurazione di un governo di tecnocrati. Questo avrebbe dovuto trainare il Paese fuori dalla crisi, pianificarne l’economia e trasformarlo in una grande potenza industriale, con forti connotazioni imperialistiche. Segnali in tale direzione si erano registrati anche nei decenni precedenti, tra fine Ottocento e inizi Novecento, quando ebbe inizio un processo di concentrazione nel settore siderurgico e meccanico. Un percorso peraltro stimolato dalle commesse statali sempre più consistenti (Galli Della Loggia, 1970; Battilossi, 1999; Amatori e Colli, 1999; Bolchini, 2002). La crisi industriale e finanziaria del 1907 e la recessione a livello mondiale che ne seguì, accelerarono la soluzione tecnocratica, che prevedeva un’alleanza, più o meno stretta, con una parte della classe politica e l’entrata in guerra. Negli anni immediatamente seguenti il conflitto, il potere dei tecnocrati sulla scena politica italiana sembrò accrescersi notevolmente, soprattutto quando il governo progettò un programma di espansione economica nelle regioni del Caucaso, nei Balcani e nel Levante ex ottomano, territori in grado di fornire materie prime e di assorbire la produzione italiana in eccesso rispetto alle richieste di un mercato interno asfittico. La collaborazione tra mondo imprenditoriale, bancario e politico non produsse il risultato sperato. La caduta del governo Nitti e il ruolo destabilizzante e filotedesco della Banca Commerciale Italiana nell’Est europeo e nel Caucaso furono tra le cause principali che impedirono il decollo del progetto tecnocratico,<strong> </strong>provocando una dura reazione da parte dei fratelli Perrone alla guida del gruppo Ansaldo.</p><p>Heavily Weakened by the financial and industrial crisis of 1907, which showed all the limits of the economic structure of Italy, the Italian industrial capitalism developed a program that continued until the early after World War, which was taking into account the establishment of a government of technocrats.</p><p>This should had to take the country out of crisis, establish an economical plan and turn it into a major industrial power, with strong imperialist characteristics.  Signals in this direction were also recorded in the previous decades, from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when a process of concentration of the main groups of entrepreneurs and capitalists began in the steel and mechanical industry. A path anyway enhanced by more and more orders from the government (Galli Della Loggia, 1970; Battilossi, 1999; Amatori and Colli, 1999; Boldrini, 2002). The industrial and financial crisis of 1907 and the global recession that followed, accelerated the technocratic solution, which were looking for a more or less closer alliance, with a part of the political class and going into war. Soon after the war, the political power of the technocrats in Italy seemed to grow significantly, especially when the Government developed a program of economic expansion in the regions of the Caucasus, Balkans and on the countries of the ex East Ottoman, these territories could provide raw materials and, with respect of an internal market completely saturated, to absorb the exceeding Italian production. The collaboration within the world of business, banking and politics did not produce the desired result. The fall of the Nitti´s Government and the pro German and destabilizing role of the Italian Commercial Bank in Eastern Europe and on the Caucasus were the major drivers against the launch of the technocratic project, inducing a though reaction by the Perrone brothers leading the group Ansaldo.</p>


Significance Crackdowns against the political opposition have increased as the government tries to stifle political dissent. The constitution mandates presidential and national assembly elections by late November, but the incumbent, President Joseph Kabila, appears unwilling to leave office despite reaching his term limit. Impacts Tshisekedi's return will raise the stakes in the country's political crisis. Instability or political violence risks shattering DRC's fragile economic recovery. The UN could expand the mandate of its mission in the DRC depending on the outcome of the political process.


Subject Kosovo's temporary political truce. Significance The political crisis has calmed following nine months of steadily escalating unrest, marked by violent street demonstrations and the use of tear-gas in parliament. However, the underlying issues that provoked the unrest -- devolution to Kosovo's various ethnic Serb enclaves and a border treaty that cedes 2,500 hectares of disputed land to Montenegro -- are far from resolved. Accordingly, there is a high risk of a return to unrest in the near future. Impacts Failure to agree a common border with Montenegro will complicate bilateral relations at a time of growing regional instability. Unilateral devolution of power to Serb-majority municipalities risks creating a disputed breach in Kosovo's territorial integrity. Under EU pressure, the government will try to resolve the two key political issues, but with only limited success. Resumed violence will have damaging consequences for the economy, implementing the Brussels Agreement and Kosovo's passage towards the EU.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 30-36
Author(s):  
Pavel Kandel ◽  

The subject of the article is repeat parliamentary elections in two countries by mere chance run on the same date. The external parallels of both election campaigns, such as the low turnout and the importance of voters from abroad, the continuing relevance of the agenda of toplevel corruption, the electoral failure of the socialists in both rounds are striking, and are scrutinized in the article. However, the outcomes of the campaigns are very different. In Bulgaria, even the second attempt to renew the government and the political class ended with an uncertain intermediate result, and its main triumphant Slavi Trifonov’s standing is far from looking encouraging. The success of the new counter-elite force and its leader is not promising to end the political crisis and is remindful of the previous scenarios already seen twice in Bulgaria: the unexpected rise of political psychics and the subsequent shift of sympathies to the next idol of the masses. In Moldova, the renovators succeeded in consolidating their grip on power and securing impressive credit of popular trust thus making a credible step towards implementation of their promises. It remains to keep track of who will be more successful.


Subject The prospects for the Libyan economy. Significance Prior to 2011, Libya's oil and gas wealth and its proximity to Europe drew major energy companies and provided large business opportunities in other sectors. The conflict in 2011 and collapse of the government led many foreign companies to freeze their activities in the country. The political crisis and conflict since 2014 have compounded business and economic difficulties, with the rival political blocs also competing for control of public finances and national institutions and companies. Impacts Demand for migrant workers in Libya will remain steady. Infrastructure spending is unlikely to return to pre-2011 levels before 2017. Growth and investment will be concentrated in the private sector.


Significance The government is facing increasingly bitter schisms within the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) as it goes into a presidential election year. The holiday period saw street protests from traditionally loyal constituencies amid intensifying food and medical shortages. November inflation reportedly reached 56.7%, with accumulated eleven-month inflation estimated at 1,370.0%. Impacts There is little to unify the PSUV’s disparate constituencies, opening the prospect of intense conflict on the political left. Grassroots protests indicate dissatisfaction but not necessarily disaffection with the government. Despite a hyperinflationary spiral, no immediate change in economic policy is expected.


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