Washington may eventually compromise with Pyongyang

Subject North Korea's nuclear weapons programme. Significance North Korea crossed a threshold this month with the successful test of what is believed to be its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a weapon capable of hitting Alaska. Within the next five years, the country will probably develop and deploy a missile capable of hitting anywhere in the US mainland with a nuclear warhead. Impacts Washington will expand secondary sanctions on firms and people that deal with North Korea, most of which are Chinese. North Korea's economic growth is likely to continue despite incremental tightening of Chinese sanctions, due to internal market reforms. Even comprehensive Chinese sanctions may not break Pyongyang's resolve; it may prefer famine to disarmament. A collapse of the North Korean regime would pose a physical threat to neighbouring countries.

Subject Developments in North Korean politics and foreign policy following the Party Congress. Significance On May 6-9, the ruling Workers' Party of Korea held its Seventh Congress, 36 years after the sixth in 1980. Kim Jong-un gained a new title as Party chairman; hitherto he was 'first secretary'. Stage-managed in typical Pyongyang fashion, the Congress reaffirmed pursuit of both nuclear weapons and economic development. A new five-year plan was announced, but no details were given, nor any hint of market reforms. Impacts Kim Jong-un's position as leader is now both fully formalised and more firmly secured. The Party's leading role has been reaffirmed, while the military's power is being reined in. Despite some promotions of new blood, North Korea remains a gerontocracy (Kim aside). Nuclear defiance apart, few concrete policy clues were offered in any direction.


Significance South Korea's defence ministry said today that a sixth test is possible at any time, with one tunnel at the North's Punggye-ri test site still unused. Yesterday, Seoul's semi-official news agency Yonhap quoted a military source in Seoul as threatening to "raze" Pyongyang pre-emptively, should the North show any sign of planning a nuclear attack. Impacts In the immediate future the US presidential election creates a policy vacuum. In Seoul calls will grow for South Korea to have its own nuclear weapons, or host US ones. If the North keeps testing, it will grow harder for Washington to head off such demands. Beijing, which has always insisted that sanctions must be backed up by diplomacy, is now pressed to produce concrete proposals. Violent Southern language reflects the humiliation of Park Geun-hye's administration, whose time is running out -- another risk factor.


2020 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 1051-1068
Author(s):  
Edward Howell

Abstract Existing scholarship on North Korea's nuclear programme remains overwhelmingly centred around questions of containment or engagement with the North Korean regime-state, amid international calls for denuclearization. Yet, scholarship has rarely interrogated the precise value of nuclear weapons to the regime-state. This article develops a new theoretical framework of nuclear ideology to explore the puzzle of the survival of North Korea. This framework aims to show how the North Korean nuclear programme is deeply entrenched within the state ideology of juche, as one device for continued regime-state survival. Through interviews with elite North Korean defectors and textual analysis of North Korean and international sources, I show that North Korea's nuclear ideology has been constructed according to different frames of meaning, targeting referent actors of international ‘enemy’ powers and domestic audiences. This article concludes that nuclear ideology functions primarily as a tool to arouse domestic legitimacy for the North Korean regime-state, by targeting elite actors within the highly stratified domestic population. From an international perspective, perception of North Korea's survival remains tied largely to the regime-state's physical possession of nuclear weapons. This article has extremely timely theoretical and policy implications given the current ‘dialogue’ between US and North Korean leaders. First, it opens up fruitful avenues of inquiry surrounding questions of the legitimacy of rogue states within international relations. Secondly, this article calls for a more robust understanding of the domestic-level politics of North Korea, in order to understand the regime-state's foreign policy decisions vis-à-vis its nuclear programme.


2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 293-311
Author(s):  
Sang-Jin Han

This dialogue addresses the global risk that broke out of the North Korean development of nuclear weapons and missiles. It starts from the brutal consequences of the national division for Korea and asks why North Korea has been so preoccupied with nuclear projects as has been found to be the case since the 1990s, and how much and why Kim Jung-un today differs from his father in terms of his future, and where the fundamental limit lies in Moon Jae-In’s as well as Trump’s approaches to Korean denuclearization and peace. The highlight of this dialogue is to explain the intrinsic difficulties for Donald Trump and Kim Jung-un in finding a reasonable solution to their respective demands for denuclearization and regime security, and explore the likely future of the Korean Peninsula from the vantage point of Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy and metamorphosis.


Author(s):  
Patrick McEachern

After a year of trading colorful barbs with the American president and significant achievements in North Korea’s decades-long nuclear and missile development programs, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared mission accomplished in November 2017. Though Kim's pronouncement appears premature, North Korea is on the verge of being able to strike the United States with nuclear weapons. South Korea has long been in the North Korean crosshairs but worries whether the United States would defend it if North Korea holds the American homeland at risk. The largely ceremonial summit between US president Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, and the unpredictability of both parties, has not quelled these concerns and leaves more questions than answers for the two sides' negotiators to work out. The Korean Peninsula’s security situation is an intractable conflict, raising the question, “How did we get here?” In this book, former North Korea lead foreign service officer at the US embassy in Seoul Patrick McEachern unpacks the contentious and tangled relationship between the Koreas in an approachable question-and-answer format. While North Korea is famous for its militarism and nuclear program, South Korea is best known for its economic miracle, familiar to consumers as the producer of Samsung smartphones, Hyundai cars, and even K-pop music and K-beauty. Why have the two Koreas developed politically and economically in such radically different ways? What are the origins of a divided Korean Peninsula? Who rules the two Koreas? How have three generations of the authoritarian Kim dictatorship shaped North Korea? What is the history of North-South relations? Why does the North Korean government develop nuclear weapons? How do powers such as Japan, China, and Russia fit into the mix? What is it like to live in North and South Korea? This book tackles these broad topics and many more to explain what everyone needs to know about South and North Korea.


Significance Tokyo had prepared for a Hillary Clinton victory, and is alarmed by comments during Trump's election campaign that raise doubts over the US-Japan defence alliance and raise fears that economic cooperation will give way to conflict. Impacts As Abe diverts resources into stabilising US ties, other policy areas may receive less attention. Exchange rate policy could re-emerge as a point of tension in Japan-US relations. With the Trans-Pacific Partnership likely to collapse, Japan may inject fresh energy into the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. US 'abandonment' would force Japan to strengthen its independent defence capabilities, sparking a destabilising arms race with China. The idea of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons is a non-starter.


Significance South Korea’s unification minister (MOU) warned on April 10 that any US strike on North Korea would put “the safety of the public” at risk. A day later, Seoul’s defence (MND) and foreign (MFA) ministries dismissed rumours on local social media of an imminent war crisis as “overblown” and “groundless”, respectively. Moon Jae-in, the liberal opposition candidate whom most polls predict will win the May 9 snap presidential election, said he does not expect a US pre-emptive strike on the North. However, Moon also warned Washington that South Korea is “the concerned party” which “owns” peninsula-related matters, including the nuclear issue. Impacts Experienced military professionals in Trump’s cabinet and National Security Council are a restraining influence. South Korea and Japan, being in the front line, will counsel their US protector against any action that might imperil their security. If Moon Jae-in is elected, his desire to re-engage the North will clash with Trump’s hard-line attitude and narrow nuclear focus. After his smooth -- if insubstantial -- summit with Xi, Trump’s threatened unilateralism on North Korea is likely to stop at sanctions.


Significance Taiwan-US relations got a symbolic boost when the US government opened a new 250-million-dollar institute to house the de facto embassy in Taipei, Taiwan's capital, on June 12. President Tsai Ing-wen, and a US delegation that included representatives from Congress and the State Department, attended the opening ceremony. It may have received greater attention and perhaps higher-ranking US representation had the first US-North Korea summit not been scheduled for the same day. Impacts Taiwan's president will be constrained from improving China ties by anti-China sentiment at home. More businesses could come under Chinese pressure as cross-Strait relations deteriorate further. Taiwan-US military cooperation will prompt more aggressive Chinese efforts to diminish Taiwan's standing and increase military intimidation.


Significance The standoff with North Korea has led the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to hold a hearing on the president’s authority to order a nuclear first strike. This is the first such formal examination of the executive branch’s nuclear prerogatives and procedures by Congress since 1976. Meanwhile, President Donald Trump’s administration is planning on upgrades to the US arsenal to boost Washington’s ability to wage a nuclear war and has raised the spectre of nuclear conflict with North Korea in its public remarks. Impacts The probable US deployment of new tactical nuclear weapons will not carry over to delegating attack authority to commanders in a crisis. Chinese and Russian anti-access/area-denial systems may trigger more US reliance on nuclear deterrence in the Baltics and North-east Asia. Improved weapons technology convincing policymakers that first strikes are prudent pose greater risks than unbalanced political leadership.


Significance This comes as the US Congress is finalising a bill, the Caesar Act, that would substantially increase the sanctions pressure on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government. As Washington’s military footprint in the Syrian theatre shrinks, it is reprioritising the use of economic tools. Impacts With no exposure to the United States, Iranian and Russian companies doing business with Syria will not be significantly affected. The main losers could be US partners, who had hoped that a Syrian recovery would aid their own economies and regional integration. Black market activity may proliferate in the Levant as criminal groups help establish alternative mechanisms to supply goods and services. Sanctions will make life more difficult for the average Syrian, restricting economic growth and reconstruction.


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