US rhetoric on South Sudan may prove hollow

Subject US policy towards South Sudan Significance Senior US officials have recently taken a harder line with South Sudan’s leaders over the country’s civil war, having resolved that President Salva Kiir’s government is principally to blame for the ongoing conflict and the collapse of a 2015 peace deal. After two senior US officials visited Juba to make it clear that “a serious re-examination” of US policy was underway, the administration announced a new round of sanctions designations and more public condemnation. Washington has hinted that further pressure is to come, but the spike in rhetoric may be more indicative of frustration than of a new strategy. Impacts The HLRF is unlikely to rescue the peace agreement, setting the stage for more violence as the dry season approaches. The government’s already low levels of popular legitimacy will further erode amid conflict and economic decay. Absent US leadership, Europe and the UN are unlikely to forge new initiatives without a clear request from the region. Further US sanctions may bar US oil companies from entering the South Sudan market and deter other investors.

Subject The performance and prospects of South Sudan’s oil sector. Significance The signing in September of a notional peace agreement has raised the question of whether South Sudan’s authorities can now boost oil production and revenues -- and whether they will use any new revenues to support peace. Impacts Output is unlikely to rise far above 130,000-150,000 b/d in 2019. Details about oil revenues and their distribution will remain largely hidden. Major oil companies will continue to shun South Sudan as an investment destination.


Significance The current government’s mandate was meant to end this year. Instead, elections prescribed for 2021 have been delayed to 2023, ostensibly to allow more time to implement the 2018 peace agreement that ended the country’s civil war. Even with such a delay, the path to elections is likely to be littered with challenges. Impacts Few new opposition groups will consider forming political parties, as military strength is still viewed as the only viable route to power. Opposition groups may form alliances to boost their bargaining power, but talking with government is seen as more viable than toppling it. The post-election period will also be volatile, amid likely rejections of results or attempts to negotiate access to non-elected posts.


Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 ended over two decades of civil war and led to South Sudan’s independence. Peacemaking that brought about the agreement and then sought to sustain it involved, alongside the Sudanese, an array of regional and western states as well as international organisations. This was a landmark effort to create and sustain peace in a war-torn region. Yet in the years that followed, multiple conflicts continued or reignited, both in Sudan and in South Sudan. Peacemaking attempts multiplied. Authored by both practitioners and scholars, this volume grapples with the question of which, and whose, ideas of peace and of peacemaking were pursued in the Sudans and how they fared. From the 2005 agreement and various attempts to make peace in Darfur, to renewed peacemaking attempts in border regions between the two countries and finally efforts to resolve the civil war in South Sudan, understandings of peace have been contested, and different modalities of peacemaking have both gone hand in hand and have competed with each other. Bringing together economic, legal, anthropological and political science perspectives on over a decade of peacemaking attempts in the two countries, it provides insights for peacemaking efforts to come, in the Sudans and elsewhere.


Significance South Sudan’s civil war is now in its fourth year, during which the intensity and extent of fighting has fluctuated. Despite the notional maintenance of the August 2015 peace agreement, security has deteriorated in the past year. The spread of violence has produced waves of displacement, with hundreds of thousands of South Sudanese fleeing to Uganda. Impacts The government’s fiscal position will not improve in the near term. Army units, as well as pro- and anti-government militias, will continue to be predatory towards aid. International assistance for South Sudan will overwhelmingly centre on humanitarian activities rather than longer-term development.


Subject South Sudan's budget and reform outlook. Significance Relative to other underdeveloped countries, oil wealth has given South Sudan potential economic advantages. However, an entrenched system of financial patronage and embezzlement has persistently undermined official budget targets. Despite occasional promises, President Salva Kiir’s government has never made a firm priority of development or public financial management reform. It has not even made good on its pledge to allocate 100 million dollars to finance the 2018 peace agreement that nominally ended its five-year civil war. Impacts Significant public financial management reform will not happen until there is a real change of government, starting with Kiir. Major new oil investments will not materialise, despite some purported plans. External initiatives to improve public financial management will only have marginal impact.


2007 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 489-516 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew B. Arnold

ABSTRACTDespite stipulations in the Sudan's 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that all ‘other armed groups’ be demobilised by January 2006, the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) continued to maintain a significant armed presence in South Sudan. This paper analyses the dynamics of the organisation, the impact of its ongoing presence on the security situation and reconstruction efforts, and attempts by the government of South Sudan to counteract the SSDF from January to August 2006. It argues that the strategies implemented by the government to counter the SSDF were fairly successful in that there was no major return to conflict. However, it concludes that the SSDF's continued presence, while hindered, has the potential to spark a return to civil war.


Subject Uganda's regional policy. Significance Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni on September 16 attended a series of meetings in Khartoum with incoming South Sudanese First Vice-President Riek Machar. Machar's spokesperson said that the main outcome was Uganda's assurance that it will withdraw its military (UPDF) from South Sudan as per the recent South Sudan peace agreement. The development reflects a wider context in which Uganda's regional clout is under strain. Impacts Military intervention in Somalia will exacerbate that country's spillover effects for insecurity in the wider region. The UPDF's role in AMISOM heightens Uganda's vulnerability to al-Shabaab attacks. However, Uganda will manage these better than Kenya, partly due to its long-term character as a security state.


Significance His comments are optimistic. The other two rival administrations that are based in Libya have resisted efforts to form a unified government, while armed groups (some associated with the administrations, others independent) compete for local dominance. As a result, intermittent escalations in fighting and sporadic attacks by fringe militias continue to occur in parts of the country. Concern has grown about the impact on civilians. Impacts Bombings and outbreaks of intense fighting will remain a risk in key contested locations in the north. Clashes between militias will recur sporadically in the south. The number of migrants working in Libya and seeking to travel to Europe may increase again.


Significance As Angola struggles to cope with its deepest financial crisis since the end of the civil war in 2002, Sonangol profits have fallen dramatically from 2.4 billion dollars in 2009 to 276 million dollars in 2015. The company's new management team, led by Isabel dos Santos, daughter of long-serving President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, is overseeing a necessary shake-up of the traditionally opaque parastatal. Impacts A probe by US regulators into a 350-million-dollar payment made by BP and Cobalt to Sonangol could implicate ruling party officials. Isabel dos Santos will face renewed pressure to sell shares or controlling interests in corporate entities linked to the state. New investment decisions could largely depend on ongoing negotiations with international oil companies (IOCs) over tax terms.


Significance A ‘framework agreement’ reached between President Salva Kiir and opposition leader Riek Machar in Khartoum on June 27 had been billed as a breakthrough in efforts to end South Sudan’s four-and-a-half-year civil war, but progress since then has been mired by infighting, especially around power-sharing formulas. Impacts Sudan and Uganda’s involvement as ‘guarantors’ could constrain would-be spoilers but will be deeply divisive. The several dozen other armed factions will fight to secure their place at the table. Already-dire humanitarian conditions will worsen without local-level security improvements.


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