The South Sudan Defence Force: patriots, collaborators or spoilers?

2007 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 489-516 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew B. Arnold

ABSTRACTDespite stipulations in the Sudan's 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that all ‘other armed groups’ be demobilised by January 2006, the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) continued to maintain a significant armed presence in South Sudan. This paper analyses the dynamics of the organisation, the impact of its ongoing presence on the security situation and reconstruction efforts, and attempts by the government of South Sudan to counteract the SSDF from January to August 2006. It argues that the strategies implemented by the government to counter the SSDF were fairly successful in that there was no major return to conflict. However, it concludes that the SSDF's continued presence, while hindered, has the potential to spark a return to civil war.

Significance His comments are optimistic. The other two rival administrations that are based in Libya have resisted efforts to form a unified government, while armed groups (some associated with the administrations, others independent) compete for local dominance. As a result, intermittent escalations in fighting and sporadic attacks by fringe militias continue to occur in parts of the country. Concern has grown about the impact on civilians. Impacts Bombings and outbreaks of intense fighting will remain a risk in key contested locations in the north. Clashes between militias will recur sporadically in the south. The number of migrants working in Libya and seeking to travel to Europe may increase again.


2019 ◽  
Vol 60 (01) ◽  
pp. 87-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
ØYSTEIN H. ROLANDSEN ◽  
NICKI KINDERSLEY

AbstractIn 1963, unrest in Sudan's three southern provinces (today's South Sudan) escalated into a civil war between the government and the Anya-Nya rebellion. The subsequent eight years of violence has hitherto largely escaped scrutiny from academic researchers and has remained a subject of popular imagination and politicised narratives. This article demonstrates how this history can be explored with greater nuance, thereby establishing a local history of a postcolonial civil war. Focusing on the garrison town of Torit, our research reveals a localised and personalised rebellion, made up of a constellation of parochial armed groups. This new history also demonstrates how these parties built upon experiences from imperial conquest and colonial rule when entrenching violent wartime practices such as mass displacement and encampment, the raising of local militias and intelligence networks, and the deliberate starvation of civilians — all common methods in subsequent wars.


2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 414-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kuyang Harriet Logo Mulukwat

The conflict in South Sudan became the only viable violent way of expressing underlying discontentment with the style of governance adopted by the incumbent government and unresolved issues from the 1991 split which occurred when Dr. Riak Machar, one of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (splm/a) leaders at the time, now turned rebel leader, fell out with Dr. John Garang, the chairman of the splm/a. The split, notably referred to as the “Nassir split”, led communities from both the Dinka and Nuer tribes to turn against each other. The referendum, a consequence of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (cpa) between the government in Khartoum, Sudan, and the splm/a, led to an overwhelming vote for secession, later paving way for the subsequent independence of South Sudan in 2011. The existing tension took on a violent expression. The article analyses occurrences the splm/a command pursued on a secessionist agenda in the 21 years of armed struggle and the attainment of independence on the 9 July 2011. It further denotes the insurgents’ pursuit of armed confrontation and the government’s response to the belligerents’ actions, while providing a genesis of the belligerence and laws governing non–international armed conflicts.


Subject US policy towards South Sudan Significance Senior US officials have recently taken a harder line with South Sudan’s leaders over the country’s civil war, having resolved that President Salva Kiir’s government is principally to blame for the ongoing conflict and the collapse of a 2015 peace deal. After two senior US officials visited Juba to make it clear that “a serious re-examination” of US policy was underway, the administration announced a new round of sanctions designations and more public condemnation. Washington has hinted that further pressure is to come, but the spike in rhetoric may be more indicative of frustration than of a new strategy. Impacts The HLRF is unlikely to rescue the peace agreement, setting the stage for more violence as the dry season approaches. The government’s already low levels of popular legitimacy will further erode amid conflict and economic decay. Absent US leadership, Europe and the UN are unlikely to forge new initiatives without a clear request from the region. Further US sanctions may bar US oil companies from entering the South Sudan market and deter other investors.


2015 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 410-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Naomi Pendle

Armed, cattle-herding men in Africa are often assumed to be at a relational and spatial distance from the ‘legitimate’ armed forces of the government. The vision constructed of the South Sudanese government in 2005 by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement removed legitimacy from non-government armed groups including localised, armed, defence forces that protected communities and cattle. Yet, militarised cattle-herding men of South Sudan have had various relationships with the governing Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army over the last thirty years, blurring the government – non government boundary. With tens of thousands killed since December 2013 in South Sudan, questions are being asked about options for justice especially for governing elites. A contextual understanding of the armed forces and their relationship to government over time is needed to understand the genesis and apparent legitimacy of this violence.


1992 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inge Tvedten

It is generally agreed that the battle of Cuito Cuanavale in March 1988 marked the final attempt to secure a military solution to the Angolan conflict. Thereafter, in December 1988, South Africa, Cuba, and Angola signed the so-called ‘New York accord’ that included a timetable for the phased withdrawal of the South Africans and the Cubans from Namibia and Angola, respectively; in June 1989, the Gbadolite agreement initiated African attempts to end the continuing armed struggle in Angola; and in March 1990, Namibia achieved its long-awaited independence. But despite these efforts and developments, the war continued between the Government that had been established in Luanda by the Movimento Popular de Libertacão de Angola (M.P.L.A.) in November 1975 and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (Unita), with devastating implications for the country's estimated ten million inhabitants. Not before May 1991 was a final peace agreement signed in Portugal, and then with considerably poorer options for political stability and economic recovery than would have been the case after the original accord in New York.


Author(s):  
Alison Giffen

Two years and five months following the country’s independence from Sudan, a political crisis in South Sudan quickly devolved into a civil war marked by violence that could amount to atrocities. At the time, a United Nations peacekeeping operation, UNMISS, was the principal multinational intervention in South Sudan. UNMISS was explicitly mandated to assist the government of South Sudan to fulfil its responsibility to protect and was also authorized to protect civilians when the government was unable or unwilling to do so. Despite this role, UNMISS’s Special Representative of the Secretary-General said that no one could have predicted the scale or speed at which the violence unfolded. This chapter explores whether the atrocities could have been predicted by UNMISS, why UNMISS was unprepared, and what other peacekeeping operations can learn from UNMISS’s experience.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 166
Author(s):  
Don Charles

The year 2017 had a very active season for hurricanes and extreme weather conditions. Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria did damage to several Caribbean islands. Even Trinidad and Tobago (T&T), a country which rarely experiences extreme weather conditions, was affected by Tropical Storm Bret. Tropical Storm Bret caused flooding in T&T, especially in the low lying South Oropouche River Basin.There is a dearth of research conducted in T&T about the impact of extreme weather conditions and flooding on communities and families. Thus, this study sought to conduct a community base vulnerability assessment (CBVA) of the impact of the Tropical Storm Bret induced flooding upon the residents of the South Oropouche River Basin.Primary data was collected via semi-structured interviews and questionnaires to conduct the CBVA. Furthermore, this study introduced a Modal Community Based Vulnerability Assessment Index (MCBVAI) to help determine which factors the residents South Oropouche River Basin are most vulnerable to.This study found that the most vulnerable residents were vulnerable largely to their building of structures at locations unsuitable for housing. Moreover, the most vulnerable residents also built structures that were not resilient to flooding and was elevated less than 4 feet (ft) off the ground. The appropriate policy response for the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (GORTT) would be to i) establish building codes, ii) develop a comprehensive spatial planning strategy which prohibits people from building structures in unsuitable areas, and iii) implement disaster risk reduction programmes which focus on improving pre-event disaster preparedness, improving the national and local response, and promoting educational awareness.


Significance South Sudan is facing severe conflict and insecurity, a prolonged political crisis, and dire economic conditions. A peace agreement signed in August 2015 is falling apart, and fighting and violence during the past year has caused the number of South Sudanese refugees in Uganda to rise to 900,000 -- with a further 375,000 in Sudan and 287,000 in Ethiopia. Earlier this year, aid agencies declared a famine situation in several counties, and appealed for more humanitarian aid and improved access. Impacts Oil output is likely to remain at, or near, 130,000-160,000 barrels per day. Juba’s fiscal situation will remain precarious, with the government unable to secure loans from donors. Unrest and limited strikes over salary arrears could increase.


Significance The agreement has formally held, but implementation is well behind schedule and shows no sign of accelerating. Moreover, there still appears to be little prospect that the agreement will resolve the deeper political ills that have kept South Sudan embroiled in conflict for most of its history. Impacts Rhetorical commitments to institutional reform will translate into changes that are symbolic at best. Escalating armed conflict between the army and other armed groups is still a risk. The economy will remain stagnant.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document