South Sudan faces a rocky road to first elections

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
South Sudan ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Military Strength

Significance The current government’s mandate was meant to end this year. Instead, elections prescribed for 2021 have been delayed to 2023, ostensibly to allow more time to implement the 2018 peace agreement that ended the country’s civil war. Even with such a delay, the path to elections is likely to be littered with challenges. Impacts Few new opposition groups will consider forming political parties, as military strength is still viewed as the only viable route to power. Opposition groups may form alliances to boost their bargaining power, but talking with government is seen as more viable than toppling it. The post-election period will also be volatile, amid likely rejections of results or attempts to negotiate access to non-elected posts.

US rhetoric on South Sudan may prove hollow

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
South Sudan ◽  
Dry Season ◽  
The South ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Oil Companies ◽  
New Strategy ◽  
Low Levels ◽  
To Come

Subject US policy towards South Sudan Significance Senior US officials have recently taken a harder line with South Sudan’s leaders over the country’s civil war, having resolved that President Salva Kiir’s government is principally to blame for the ongoing conflict and the collapse of a 2015 peace deal. After two senior US officials visited Juba to make it clear that “a serious re-examination” of US policy was underway, the administration announced a new round of sanctions designations and more public condemnation. Washington has hinted that further pressure is to come, but the spike in rhetoric may be more indicative of frustration than of a new strategy. Impacts The HLRF is unlikely to rescue the peace agreement, setting the stage for more violence as the dry season approaches. The government’s already low levels of popular legitimacy will further erode amid conflict and economic decay. Absent US leadership, Europe and the UN are unlikely to forge new initiatives without a clear request from the region. Further US sanctions may bar US oil companies from entering the South Sudan market and deter other investors.

South Sudan’s government will hinder aid efforts

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
South Sudan ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
Content Type ◽  
International Assistance ◽  
The Past ◽  
South Sudanese ◽  
Near Term

Significance South Sudan’s civil war is now in its fourth year, during which the intensity and extent of fighting has fluctuated. Despite the notional maintenance of the August 2015 peace agreement, security has deteriorated in the past year. The spread of violence has produced waves of displacement, with hundreds of thousands of South Sudanese fleeing to Uganda. Impacts The government’s fiscal position will not improve in the near term. Army units, as well as pro- and anti-government militias, will continue to be predatory towards aid. International assistance for South Sudan will overwhelmingly centre on humanitarian activities rather than longer-term development.

South Sudan will get a larger budget but not reforms

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Financial Management ◽  
South Sudan ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Management Reform ◽  
Underdeveloped Countries ◽  
Public Financial Management ◽  
Real Change ◽  
Oil Wealth

Subject South Sudan's budget and reform outlook. Significance Relative to other underdeveloped countries, oil wealth has given South Sudan potential economic advantages. However, an entrenched system of financial patronage and embezzlement has persistently undermined official budget targets. Despite occasional promises, President Salva Kiir’s government has never made a firm priority of development or public financial management reform. It has not even made good on its pledge to allocate 100 million dollars to finance the 2018 peace agreement that nominally ended its five-year civil war. Impacts Significant public financial management reform will not happen until there is a real change of government, starting with Kiir. Major new oil investments will not materialise, despite some purported plans. External initiatives to improve public financial management will only have marginal impact.

Uganda regional agenda may face setback

2015 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Regional Policy ◽  
South Sudan ◽  
Vice President ◽  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
Content Type ◽  
South Sudanese ◽  
Regional Agenda ◽  
Better Than

Subject Uganda's regional policy. Significance Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni on September 16 attended a series of meetings in Khartoum with incoming South Sudanese First Vice-President Riek Machar. Machar's spokesperson said that the main outcome was Uganda's assurance that it will withdraw its military (UPDF) from South Sudan as per the recent South Sudan peace agreement. The development reflects a wider context in which Uganda's regional clout is under strain. Impacts Military intervention in Somalia will exacerbate that country's spillover effects for insecurity in the wider region. The UPDF's role in AMISOM heightens Uganda's vulnerability to al-Shabaab attacks. However, Uganda will manage these better than Kenya, partly due to its long-term character as a security state.

South Sudan peace talks may fail to bridge reality gap

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Local Level ◽  
South Sudan ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Framework Agreement ◽  
Content Type

Significance A ‘framework agreement’ reached between President Salva Kiir and opposition leader Riek Machar in Khartoum on June 27 had been billed as a breakthrough in efforts to end South Sudan’s four-and-a-half-year civil war, but progress since then has been mired by infighting, especially around power-sharing formulas. Impacts Sudan and Uganda’s involvement as ‘guarantors’ could constrain would-be spoilers but will be deeply divisive. The several dozen other armed factions will fight to secure their place at the table. Already-dire humanitarian conditions will worsen without local-level security improvements.

South Sudan's multiple conflicts will not subside

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
South Sudan ◽  
Humanitarian Aid ◽  
Economic Conditions ◽  
Political Crisis ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Past ◽  
South Sudanese ◽  
The Government ◽  
Sudanese Refugees

Significance South Sudan is facing severe conflict and insecurity, a prolonged political crisis, and dire economic conditions. A peace agreement signed in August 2015 is falling apart, and fighting and violence during the past year has caused the number of South Sudanese refugees in Uganda to rise to 900,000 -- with a further 375,000 in Sudan and 287,000 in Ethiopia. Earlier this year, aid agencies declared a famine situation in several counties, and appealed for more humanitarian aid and improved access. Impacts Oil output is likely to remain at, or near, 130,000-160,000 barrels per day. Juba’s fiscal situation will remain precarious, with the government unable to secure loans from donors. Unrest and limited strikes over salary arrears could increase.

New states in South Sudan could entrench patronage

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
South Sudan ◽  
National Unity ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
Content Type ◽  
New States ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Security Concerns

Subject Governance in South Sudan. Significance In late 2015, President Salva Kiir ordered that the country’s ten states be redrawn to create 28 states. In January, he then ordered the creation of four more states, taking the total to 32. This is unfolding against limited outbreaks of fighting around the country, sometimes in areas which were more stable in past periods of insecurity. Kiir is trying to keep alive the Transitional Government of National Unity, formed out of the 2015 peace agreement but jeopardised by the crisis in mid-2016. Impacts Localised upsurges of fighting will continue, risking a larger crisis. Juba will watch for evidence of Sudanese or Ethiopian support for Machar that may exacerbate security concerns. No one has the power to topple Kiir, except potentially for a senior military figure in Juba. The creation of new states will do little for the prospects of needed investment and development.

South Sudan oil sector optimism is premature

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
South Sudan ◽  
Oil Production ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Oil Companies ◽  
Oil Sector ◽  
Oil Revenues

Subject The performance and prospects of South Sudan’s oil sector. Significance The signing in September of a notional peace agreement has raised the question of whether South Sudan’s authorities can now boost oil production and revenues -- and whether they will use any new revenues to support peace. Impacts Output is unlikely to rise far above 130,000-150,000 b/d in 2019. Details about oil revenues and their distribution will remain largely hidden. Major oil companies will continue to shun South Sudan as an investment destination.

Abyei, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the War in Sudan’s New South

2020 ◽  
pp. 62-77
Author(s):  
Douglas H. Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
New South ◽  
South Sudan ◽  
Border Region ◽  
Cultural Issues ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Common ◽  
Political Economic ◽  
Political Question

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement succeeded in resolving Sudan’s oldest political question regarding the future of South Sudan, but its most obvious failure was the immediate resumption of war inside Sudan’s ‘New South’ along its border with South Sudan before the latter’s formal independence in July 2011. By focusing on resolving ‘the Southern Problem’ only, the international mediators failed to recognize the common political, economic, and cultural issues of marginalisation that linked large parts of the border region to the wider war. Conflict in Abyei preceded the outbreak of the second civil war in 1983, but the Abyei Protocol was largely an afterthought that inadequately addressed the main issues confronting the peoples of the area. The CPA as a whole failed to include robust monitoring instruments to enforce compliance, enabling Khartoum to refuse to accept any resolution to the Abyei conflict on anything but its own terms.

Challenges of Regulating Non-International Armed Conflicts – an Examination of Ongoing Trends in South Sudan’s Civil War

2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 414-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kuyang Harriet Logo Mulukwat
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
South Sudan ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
Armed Struggle ◽  
Liberation Movement ◽  
The Government

The conflict in South Sudan became the only viable violent way of expressing underlying discontentment with the style of governance adopted by the incumbent government and unresolved issues from the 1991 split which occurred when Dr. Riak Machar, one of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (splm/a) leaders at the time, now turned rebel leader, fell out with Dr. John Garang, the chairman of the splm/a. The split, notably referred to as the “Nassir split”, led communities from both the Dinka and Nuer tribes to turn against each other. The referendum, a consequence of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (cpa) between the government in Khartoum, Sudan, and the splm/a, led to an overwhelming vote for secession, later paving way for the subsequent independence of South Sudan in 2011. The existing tension took on a violent expression. The article analyses occurrences the splm/a command pursued on a secessionist agenda in the 21 years of armed struggle and the attainment of independence on the 9 July 2011. It further denotes the insurgents’ pursuit of armed confrontation and the government’s response to the belligerents’ actions, while providing a genesis of the belligerence and laws governing non–international armed conflicts.

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