Uganda-Congo offensive hints at gradual re-engagement

Subject Ugandan military engagement in eastern Congo. Significance On December 22, Ugandan forces launched an attack into eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) targeting the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) armed group. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni claimed that the ADF -- an Islamist group of Ugandan origin but currently based in eastern DRC -- once again posed a direct threat to his nation and hinted that the Ugandan army was ready to play a wider role in military operations against the group. Impacts DRC’s ongoing political upheaval will both complicate, and be complicated by, insecurity in the east. Deep divisions within the Congolese army will further complicate the region’s already fragmented security landscape. The UN Security Council may face calls to expand or revise the UN peacekeeping mission’s mandate when this comes up for renewal in March.

Author(s):  
Haidi Willmot ◽  
Ralph Mamiya

This chapter focuses on the conception and evolution of the UN Security Council mandate to protect civilians during peacekeeping operations from 1960 to the present. The chapter examines the normative and legal framework of the use of force to protect civilians in UN peacekeeping operations, with reference to Security Council resolutions and other bodies of international law such as humanitarian and human rights law. It considers Security Council practice between 1960 and 1999 and its emphasis on the concept of self-defence; Security Council practice from 1999 to 2007 regarding the inception and development of the explicit ‘protection of civilians’ mandate by the Council; Security Council practice from 2007 to 2011; and prioritization of the mandate in certain peacekeeping missions, specifically UNAMID (Sudan (Darfur)), MONUC (Democratic Republic of the Congo), UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire), and UNMISS (South Sudan). Finally, the chapter describes Security Council practice from 2011 onwards and draws conclusions on impact that the protection of civilians mandate in peacekeeping operations has had on the evolution of the legitimate use of force under the UN Charter.


2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diana Kearney

Fed up with the decades-old violence plaguing the DRC, the UN Security Council broke new ground by granting peacekeepers an offensive mandate to pursue rebels rather than waiting to react in self-defence. This transformation in UN military operations alarmed several States, concerned over a perceived loss of sovereignty and a weakening of the principle of non-intervention. To allay these fears, Resolution 2098’s drafters incorporated a provision expressly assuring Member States that offensive peacekeeping tactics in the DRC would not generate precedent for future UN action. However, examining past UN practice and ‘slippery slope’ theory alike reveals that explicit disavowal of precedent cannot guarantee that offensive peacekeeping will not be used as a template for future UN action. In fact, the incorporation of such language may foster the generation of a slippery slope in UN peacekeeping, ultimately paving the way for increased scope of UN intervention in situations of gross human rights violations. The article concludes by proposing a framework for how actors can manipulate slopes to generate or slow precedent for future UN action.


Subject Syria and international norms of war. Significance The Syrian conflict has prompted intervention by a number of states, both directly and by proxy. The participation of all but one of the five UN Security Council permanent members (except China) in military operations in Syria raises questions over whether the norms of legal and ethical grounds for intervention have changed as a result of the conflict. Impacts Justifications will include broad interpretation of 'humanitarian intervention' to conceal real intentions. The UN will have less ability to assert itself when the leading powers choose to ignore, or interpret selectively, international standards. Collective international action against Islamic State group in Syria may build.


Significance The resulting reputational damage will heap additional pressure on the mission, which is grappling with an upsurge in violence in the eastern provinces. Its mandate was extended by one year by the UN Security Council on March 31. Impacts MONUSCO will be ineffective at containing violence during the upcoming general elections since its mandate is limited to eastern security. Use of surveillance drones, some operated by US military contractor Selex ES, will increase local communities' distrust of MONUSCO. Problems with MONUSCO could mar perceptions of other interventions, since it is considered a template for UN peacekeeping.


Significance The attack is just the latest in a long series of massacres in the region but comes almost four months into a ‘state of siege’ established by President Felix Tshisekedi to put an end to armed violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Impacts The security situation in eastern DRC remains precarious and could deteriorate further. A failure to stabilise eastern DRC will weigh on Tshisekedi’s re-election prospects. Entrenched national, local and cross-border political tensions will provide fertile ground for continued armed-group evolution in the east.


Subject Eastern DRC violence outlook. Significance By late August, nearly 192,000 people were internally displaced in the North Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). High levels of violence and attacks on civilians are in part driving these displacements. As the DRC heads towards a political crisis, opportunities to leverage violence in pursuit of political gains raises the risk of greater unrest in the east of the country. Impacts Divisions in the FDLR raises the risk of Rwandan intervention in the DRC. The presence of Burundian rebels in South Kivu could regionalise the DRC's instability. The UN peacekeeping mission will struggle to manage smaller, more fragmented groups and will appear unfit for purpose.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Cornelia Klocker

This article examines European Union (EU) military operations from the perspective of the United Nations (UN) Security Council and UN collective security. The EU has supported UN peacekeeping missions through its own military operations within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), based on the authorisation of these operations by the UN Security Council. However, the EU’s military operation on the Mediterranean Sea, Operation Sophia, was established in 2015 without such prior UN Security Council authorisation. Although the UN Security Council authorised the operation subsequently, it was received in a less positive light than previous operations and was criticised not only for the way in which it was established, but also for its performance. The article argues that this break with prior practice does not indicate a new direction being taken by the EU as it has retreated from this approach and established a new military operation in the Mediterranean (Operation Irini), again firmly in line with a mandate issued by the UN Security Council in 2020. The assessment of EU military operations can be complex as there might be other EU agencies involved in the process such as Frontex, and their role in future operations, in particular in the field of migration, should be monitored. Yet this internal complexity does not alter their evaluation under international law. As soon as EU military operations are conducted on the territory of a third State, the EU needs to secure either a UN Security Council authorisation or State consent. Looking at this process from the perspective of the UN Security Council sheds light on the complexity of EU military operations and their position within UN collective security.


Author(s):  
Adekeye Adebajo

Egyptian scholar-diplomat Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s relationship with the UN Security Council was a difficult one, resulting eventually in him earning the unenviable record of being the only Secretary-General to have been denied a second term in office. Boutros-Ghali bluntly condemned the double standards of the powerful Western members of the Council—the Permanent Three (P3) of the US, Britain, and France—in selectively authorizing UN interventions in “rich men’s wars” in Europe while ignoring Africa’s “orphan conflicts.” The Council’s powerful members ignored many of his ambitious ideas, preferring instead to retain tight control of decision-making on UN peacekeeping missions. Boutros-Ghali worked with the Security Council to establish peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Cambodia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia.


Significance The assassination follows months of political turmoil and rising gang violence and comes just weeks before elections, scheduled for September 26. Interim Prime Minister Claude Joseph, who has taken charge of the country, said yesterday that measures were being taken “to guarantee the continuity of the state and to protect the nation". Impacts Further political assassinations would exacerbate unrest. The Dominican Republic has closed its border, fearing a migrant surge; the situation will bolster public support there for a border wall. The UN Security Council meets today and may authorise emergency action in Haiti; any substantial redeployment, however, would take time.


Significance Russia on June 28 rejected as “lies” similar allegations by the United States, United Kingdom and France at the UN Security Council. The exchanges come against the backdrop of rising diplomatic tensions between Russia and France in CAR. Impacts Touadera’s ongoing offensive against rebel forces threatens to deliver a fatal blow to the peace deal he struck with them in 2019. Expanding Russian control over key mining sites could be a persistent source of frictions absent sophisticated local arrangements. Human rights concerns will deter some African leaders from engaging with Russia, but not all.


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