China will focus on Middle East energy, not politics

Significance A significant proportion of imports come from the Middle East, where security-driven supply risks -- and Saudi Arabia’s production restraint -- are also helping to drive up oil prices. The region is also an important staging post for the Belt and Road Initiative. Despite this, Beijing’s Middle East policy remains largely hands-off when it comes to political issues. Impacts China will avoid engaging in entrenched quarrels between Saudi Arabia and other regional energy producers. Traditional Western suppliers of arms to the Middle East will face increasing competition from China. Gulf instability would force China to seek more oil elsewhere and further boost its rapid development of renewables and electric vehicles.

Significance The Middle East has long been polarised between US allies and enemies, while Beijing has historically retained a comparatively smaller footprint and rejected taking sides in regional political and security disputes. However, its economic interests are increasing. Impacts The United States will maintain a comparative advantage from its long history of political, military and economic cooperation in the region. Beijing could leverage its control over large industrial conglomerates in key sectors such as energy, infrastructure and biotechnology. The Belt and Road Initiative will be an attractive project for all Middle Eastern countries, maximising their geographical advantages.


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Enderwick

Purpose The continuation of China’s belt and road initiative (BRI) is assumed in most analyses. Yet, recent events have created significant reputational damage for China and Chinese businesses. With a trade war evolving into a hegemonic struggle, there are a number of potential developments that could derail the BRI. This paper aims to provide a contemporary review of the factors that could negatively impact its continuation, and what China has done to mitigate the risks. Design/methodology/approach A descriptive paper that groups possible disruptive factors into three groups: internal weaknesses of the BRI and its design; those related to China’s implementation of the BRI and external concerns and pressures. Findings China has actively reviewed and refined the BRI to reduce its perceived weaknesses and increase its attractiveness to potential participants, focussing on debt dependency, transparency and governance. However, this has occurred at the same time as growing concerns regarding China’s international assertiveness, the hegemonic challenge and recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. Research limitations/implications These changes are occurring within an extremely dynamic environment and any analysis at one point in time is subject to considerable limitations. However, the paper brings together a range of disparate perspectives in a structured manner. Originality/value The classification of possible threats to the BRI is original and provides insights into the relative significance of the diverse challenges that China faces. The paper concludes that while China’s operational focus on the mechanics of the BRI process is necessary, it may not be sufficient to ensure its continuing development. The paper identifies the next step which is conceptualisation of these ideas and of the BRI. Some guidance as to how this might be done is provided.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-36
Author(s):  
Ye Liangying

Abstract The Arabic language is the common official language for the Arab nation, and one of the most important components of its identity, and it is also the link that connects the past of the Arabs with their present and their future, as it recorded the historical changes of the Arab nation over the course of the development extending for more than 1,600 years, and embodied its characteristics and preserved its culture and civilization through time. Arabic is one of the oldest foreign languages taught in China, and it played a pivotal role in promoting exchanges between China and Arab countries in various fields, politically, economically and culturally. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Arabic language teaching in Chinese universities achieved a remarkable development under the enlightened educational guidance, and succeeded in preparing batches of distinguished people who contributed and are contributing to the development of relations between Arab countries and China. After entering the 21st century and with the establishment of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum and the consolidation of Sino-Arab strategic cooperation relations, especially with the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative and the concept of “One Community with a Shared Future for Mankind”, the cooperation relations between China and the Arab countries have reached a new threshold on various levels. Simultaneously, Arabic teaching in Chinese universities has entered the path of rapid development and achieved unparalleled remarkable results.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 629-650 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yilin Zhang ◽  
Zhenyu Cheng ◽  
Qingsong He

Purpose For the developing countries involving in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with China as the main source of foreign development investment (FDI) and development as the top priority, it appears to attract more and more attention on how to make the best use of China’s outward foreign development investment. However, the contradictory evidence in the previous studies of FDI spillover effect and the remarkable time-lag feature of spillovers motivate us to analyze the mechanism of FDI spillover effect. The paper aims to discuss this issue. Design/methodology/approach The mechanism of FDI spillovers and the unavoidable lag effect in this process are empirically analyzed. Based on the panel data from the Belt and Road developing countries (BRDCs) and China’s direct investments (CDIs) from 2003 to 2017, the authors establish a panel vector autoregressive model, employing impulse response function and variance decomposition analysis, together with Granger causality test. Findings Results suggest a dynamic interactive causality mechanism. First, CDI promotes the economic growth of BRDCs through technical efficiency, human capital and institutional transition with combined lags of five, nine and eight years. Second, improvements in the technical efficiency and institutional quality promote economic growth by facilitating the human capital with integrated delays of six and eight years. Third, China’s investment directly affects the economic growth of BRDCs, with a time lag of six years. The average time lag is about eight years. Originality/value Based on the analysis on the mechanism and time lag of FDI spillovers, the authors have shown that many previous articles using one-year lagged FDI to examine the spillover effect have systematic biases, which contributes to the research on the FDI spillover mechanism. It provides new views for host countries on how to make more effective use of FDI, especially for BRDCs using CDIs.


2017 ◽  
Vol 03 (01) ◽  
pp. 39-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liangxiang Jin

There are two prevailing arguments among international observers about China’s role in the Middle East. One is that China has been a “security free-rider;” the other is that China is fundamentally a business-seeker. Yet neither of the two is well-grounded. If viewed comprehensively rather than in terms of military engagement alone, China’s contribution to stability and security of the region is enormous, and its role in the Middle East can be described as a combination of a major economic partner, a low-profile mediator and a modest but important provider of security public goods. As China has proposed various new concepts and initiatives as guidelines of its foreign policy, its future policy toward the Middle East can be best understood through its increasing efforts to promote the “Belt and Road” initiative, to develop a new-type major-power relationship, and to uphold justice and pursue shared interests with all related countries. With ever more Chinese engagement in the region, China’s Middle East policy is expected to be delivered in a more comprehensive way. However, China is not likely to seek dominant presence in the region in the foreseeable future.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shen Kunrong ◽  
Jin Gang

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to comprehensively examine the influence of formal and informal institutional differences on enterprise investment margin, mode and result. Design/methodology/approach This paper is based on 2,440 micro samples of large-scale outbound investment from 609 Chinese enterprises from the years 2005 to 2016. Findings The study has found that formal institutional differences have little impact on investment scale, but significantly affect investment diversification. In order to avoid the management risks brought by formal institutional differences, enterprises tend to a full ownership structure. However, the choice between greenfield investment and cross-border mergers and acquisitions is not affected by formal institutional differences. In contrast, the impact of informal institutional differences is more extensive. Both formal and informal institutional differences significantly increase the probability of investment failure. Further research found that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) bridges the formal institutional differences. Originality/value The study concludes that developing the BRI, especially cultural exchanges with countries alongside the Belt and Road, will help enterprises to “go global” faster and better.


Subject The future of China's One Belt One Road initiative. Significance China convened the first summit of the Belt and Road Initiative (previously known as 'One Belt One Road', OBOR) on May 14-15. With this major diplomatic event, President Xi Jinping aimed to showcase and buttress international support for his central foreign policy initiative, the success of which will hinge on the participation of other countries, regional organisations and international financial institutions. Their contribution, or lack thereof, will affect the nature of OBOR and determine the impact of the Chinese initiative on Asia’s infrastructure connectivity and economic system, as well as on the international order. Impacts Cooperation between China and multilateral development banks may increase the number of OBOR projects with competitive procurement. Plans for OBOR’s corridors may be altered to accommodate competing visions for Asia’s connectivity, such as Russia’s. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank may more formally align its mandate with OBOR’s.


Significance In October, Netanyahu travelled to Oman -- the first visit there by an Israeli premier in decades. In the past few years, relations between Israel and most of the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states have warmed, but this has not been publicised. More recently, GCC states have become less concerned whether their relations with Israel become public knowledge. Meanwhile, the United States is encouraging rapprochement as one of the anchors of its Middle East policy. Impacts Netanyahu may soon visit Bahrain, the first public visit by an Israeli leader to the country. Relations with Qatar will follow a separate track to other Gulf states. A political opening would create economic opportunities.


Significance The senior leadership seeks to defend its position within China, first and foremost by preserving and strengthening the power of the Party through which it rules. China’s growing wealth and power create new opportunities for the Party to bolster its power -- and give rise to new threats that could undermine it. Impacts China’s ambitions centre on itself; they do not involve remaking the world in China’s image. China’s interests converge with other states' on climate change and economic cooperation; disputes concern how gains and costs are shared. China’s pursuit of its self-interest may sometimes have positive spill-overs, such as when it shares innovations, freely or otherwise. Despite controversies and setbacks, the Belt and Road will provide infrastructure critical for economic development globally. Beijing, long a practitioner of commercial espionage, is becoming bolder in its use of cyber operations to pursue its foreign policy agenda.


Significance Senior US officials see Communist-led China as the foremost threat to the United States. The Trump administration’s campaign against it spans the spectrum of government actions: criticism; tariffs; sanctions; regulatory crackdowns; military intimidation; support for Taiwan; and restrictions on imports, exports, investment and visas. Impacts Beijing will have little success in driving a wedge between Washington and its major Western allies. The West is unlikely to produce a convincing alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Negative public views of China incentivise China-bashing by politicians, which in turn feeds negative public opinion in a downward spiral. Beijing will persist in its efforts to encourage a more positive view of China among Western publics.


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