Prospects for nuclear arms control in 2019-23

Subject Prospects for nuclear arms control in 2019-23. Significance Russia and the United States have reached an apparent impasse on nuclear weapons. Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin warn of the dangers of a new nuclear arms race, but neither appears ready to make the concessions necessary to salvage the current arms control and non-proliferation regime. Attending a NATO foreign ministers' meeting yesterday, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo set a 60-day deadline for Russia to comply with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty.

Author(s):  
Jonathan Hunt

The development of military arms harnessing nuclear energy for mass destruction has inspired continual efforts to control them. Since 1945, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and South Africa acquired control over these powerful weapons, though Pretoria dismantled its small cache in 1989 and Russia inherited the Soviet arsenal in 1996. Throughout this period, Washington sought to limit its nuclear forces in tandem with those of Moscow, prevent new states from fielding them, discourage their military use, and even permit their eventual abolition. Scholars disagree about what explains the United States’ distinct approach to nuclear arms control. The history of U.S. nuclear policy treats intellectual theories and cultural attitudes alongside technical advances and strategic implications. The central debate is one of structure versus agency: whether the weapons’ sheer power, or historical actors’ attitudes toward that power, drove nuclear arms control. Among those who emphasize political responsibility, there are two further disagreements: (1) the relative influence of domestic protest, culture, and politics; and (2) whether U.S. nuclear arms control aimed first at securing the peace by regulating global nuclear forces or at bolstering American influence in the world. The intensity of nuclear arms control efforts tended to rise or fall with the likelihood of nuclear war. Harry Truman’s faith in the country’s monopoly on nuclear weapons caused him to sabotage early initiatives, while Dwight Eisenhower’s belief in nuclear deterrence led in a similar direction. Fears of a U.S.-Soviet thermonuclear exchange mounted in the late 1950s, stoked by atmospheric nuclear testing and widespread radioactive fallout, which stirred protest movements and diplomatic initiatives. The spread of nuclear weapons to new states motivated U.S. presidents (John Kennedy in the vanguard) to mount a concerted campaign against “proliferation,” climaxing with the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Richard Nixon was exceptional. His reasons for signing the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) with Moscow in 1972 were strategic: to buttress the country’s geopolitical position as U.S. armed forces withdrew from Southeast Asia. The rise of protest movements and Soviet economic difficulties after Ronald Reagan entered the Oval Office brought about two more landmark U.S.-Soviet accords—the 1987 Intermediate Ballistic Missile Treaty (INF) and the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)—the first occasions on which the superpowers eliminated nuclear weapons through treaty. The country’s attention swung to proliferation after the Soviet collapse in December 1991, as failed states, regional disputes, and non-state actors grew more prominent. Although controversies over Iraq, North Korea, and Iran’s nuclear programs have since erupted, Washington and Moscow continued to reduce their arsenals and refine their nuclear doctrines even as President Barack Obama proclaimed his support for a nuclear-free world.


2020 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 65-70
Author(s):  
Daniel S. Hamilton

U.S. President Donald Trump has flip-flopped on NATO’s relevance, harangued allies about unfair burden-sharing, and threatened to condition U.S. support for other allies based on their level of defense spending. Trump’s erratic approaches to Russia, Ukraine, nuclear arms control, and the Middle East have further exacerbated allied anxieties. Militarily, the Trump administration has strengthened and extended U.S. commitments to NATO. Politically, the Alliance is in sad shape. The deeper challenge for Europe, however, is not U.S. abandonment, it is that the United States is drifting from being a European power to a power in Europe.


Subject The US arms control agenda. Significance Despite having less than a year in office, President Barack Obama's administration is sustaining a high-profile arms control agenda in 2016. The administration wants to restore several damaged treaties with Russia, broaden Russia-China-US cooperation on various non-proliferation issues and leave Obama's successor a firm nuclear security architecture. Arms control is a consultative, long-term diplomatic process, and is susceptible to the political imperatives of more immediate regional crises. Impacts Tacit US support of Israeli nuclear opacity will undermine arms control efforts in the Middle East. Post-Obama arms control efforts are likely to focus on the security of nuclear material, rather than strategic arms reductions. Senate retirements will undermine US arms control advocacy in Congress. The United States will retain its nuclear arsenal indefinitely despite criticism from its allies.


Subject The Pentagon's recent Missile Defense Review. Significance President Donald Trump this month unveiled the first major review of US missile defence policy since 2010. Trump and his vice president have become staunch missile defence advocates, championing expansion in conjunction and coordination with efforts to create a Space Force. The ambitious effort outlined in the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Review this month would take the current, regionally focused missile defence programme and expand it so that it can, according to Trump, protect US nationals from missile attack, "anywhere, anytime, anyplace". Impacts US advances in defensive capabilities will trigger technological escalation as China and Russia move to improve offensive capabilities. Washington likely cannot afford to keep pace with potential adversaries' offensive capabilities because defensive capabilities cost more. If the United States overtly ‘weaponises’ space, other countries will follow. The demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty will bring a whole class of destabilising missiles back into the equation.


Author(s):  
Alexander Savelyev

Beijing explains its firm unwillingness to join the United States and Russia in nuclear arms control talks by the fact that China’s nuclear arsenal is incomparable with respective potentials of the world’s two leading nuclear powers. China urges Russia and the U.S. to go ahead with the nuclear disarmament process on a bilateral basis, and promises it will be prepared to consider the possibility of its participation in the negotiations only when its counterparts have downgraded their arsenals approximately to China’s level. Washington finds this totally unacceptable and demands that China either join the existing Russian-U.S. strategic New START treaty right away or agree to enter into a trilateral nuclear arms control format. This article studies the prospects of China’s involvement in nuclear arms talks and analyzes the true reasons behind Beijing’s desire to avoid any nuclear disarmament deals at this point. The working hypothesis of this paper is that China’s stance on the above issue is by no means far-fetched or propagandistic, and that it is driven by fundamental political, military and strategic considerations. Disregard for this factor and further forceful efforts to bring China to the negotiating table to discuss nuclear arms control will lead to failure.


Significance The meeting has been trailed in the media as a watershed moment, yet addressing the bilateral relationship is not the highest priority for Trump as he builds his administration and battles with Congress, or for Putin as he looks ahead to his re-election next March. The dysfunction in relations prevents effective international responses to the ongoing crises in Syria and Ukraine and exacerbates other problems. Impacts Trump and Congress will wrangle over the basic facts about alleged Russian interference in the 2016 election and appropriate responses. Ukraine will press for further US support, including lethal military equipment. Obstacles to resuming bilateral nuclear arms control will impede efforts to manage the North Korean crisis.


Significance The likely end of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty will be an important marker in the decline of international stability and a particular blow to long-held assumptions about European security. It comes at a time when US-Russian dialogue has stalled and uncertainties about intentions and evolving technologies abound. Impacts The INF issue will feed Moscow's narrative about encirclement by hostile forces. Despite delays to arms programmes, Russia has proved adept at developing and adapting smaller missile types. President Donald Trump is unlikely to engage meaningfully with Russia on the detail of arms control.


Subject US-ASEAN relations. Significance A US-ASEAN summit, proposed late last year by US President Donald Trump, is tentatively scheduled to be held in March in Las Vegas. After an ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat in Vietnam earlier this month, the South-east Asian regional bloc issued a statement welcoming the summit. However, only a few member states have formally signalled their intention to participate. Impacts For ASEAN leaders that attend, the summit may compensate for Trump’s likely absence from the 2020 East Asia Summit in Vietnam. The United States is unlikely to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership. Any violence in South-east Asia sponsored by Iran or its proxies will strengthen US cooperation with the region on counterterrorism.


Author(s):  
A. Arbatov

The article is addressed to an unprecedented crisis of the system and process of nuclear arms control – including nuclear arms reduction and non-proliferation. During a half century history of the practical nuclear disarmament (counting from the 1963 partial nuclear tests ban treaty – PTB) this process has had many ups and downs, but never has it been so deeply deadlocked. Although the two main nuclear treaties are still implemented: the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) of 2010 and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) of 1987, their future is increasingly uncertain and their validity is eroding, just as that of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 and other agreements in this crucial sphere. For the first time in the last fifty years the world is facing a real threat of totally loosing control over the most destructive weapons created in the history of mankind. What is the most amazing – this is happening half a century after the end of the Cold War, when the hopes emerged that nuclear disarmament would finally become a realistic proposition. Dramatic events in and around Ukraine are badly exacerbating the crisis of nuclear arms control, but they are not its original cause. The article is analyzing the principal reasons of the present crisis: the transforming post-post Cold War world order; Russia’s position and role in the new international environment; the military-strategic, economic and technological developments, which are leading to disintegration of former conceptual premises and mechanisms of nuclear arms control and which are not adapted to the changing objective realities. In conclusion some general proposals are provided with the aim of saving, adopting and enhancing nuclear arms limitation and non-proliferation.


Significance The dialogue process was agreed at the June 16 meeting between Presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin, and reflects the same cautious but constructive tone. It is an opportunity to discuss the most comprehensive arms treaty yet, including long- and short-range weapons and new technologies that provide an asymmetric and hence destabilising advantage. Impacts Russia's testing of non-nuclear components of nuclear munitions will only add to uncertainty about intentions. US policymakers will scrutinise Russia's statements for its evolving view of the threshold for nuclear arms use. European states will seek a place in US-Russian arms control and seek their own accommodations with Moscow.


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