Russian-US arms treaties erode in new era of mistrust

Significance The likely end of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty will be an important marker in the decline of international stability and a particular blow to long-held assumptions about European security. It comes at a time when US-Russian dialogue has stalled and uncertainties about intentions and evolving technologies abound. Impacts The INF issue will feed Moscow's narrative about encirclement by hostile forces. Despite delays to arms programmes, Russia has proved adept at developing and adapting smaller missile types. President Donald Trump is unlikely to engage meaningfully with Russia on the detail of arms control.

Subject Prospects for nuclear arms control in 2019-23. Significance Russia and the United States have reached an apparent impasse on nuclear weapons. Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin warn of the dangers of a new nuclear arms race, but neither appears ready to make the concessions necessary to salvage the current arms control and non-proliferation regime. Attending a NATO foreign ministers' meeting yesterday, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo set a 60-day deadline for Russia to comply with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty.


Subject The Pentagon's recent Missile Defense Review. Significance President Donald Trump this month unveiled the first major review of US missile defence policy since 2010. Trump and his vice president have become staunch missile defence advocates, championing expansion in conjunction and coordination with efforts to create a Space Force. The ambitious effort outlined in the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Review this month would take the current, regionally focused missile defence programme and expand it so that it can, according to Trump, protect US nationals from missile attack, "anywhere, anytime, anyplace". Impacts US advances in defensive capabilities will trigger technological escalation as China and Russia move to improve offensive capabilities. Washington likely cannot afford to keep pace with potential adversaries' offensive capabilities because defensive capabilities cost more. If the United States overtly ‘weaponises’ space, other countries will follow. The demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty will bring a whole class of destabilising missiles back into the equation.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron Berliner ◽  
Jake Hecla ◽  
Michael Bondin ◽  
Austin Mullen ◽  
Kelsey Amundson ◽  
...  

On February 1, 2019, the United States and Russia withdrew from the three-decades old Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. Events precipitating the withdrawal were allegations by both the United States and Russia of a variety of treaty violations. Until that point, the treaty had been a centerpiece of arms control and a key agreement of the global security architecture. The absence of such a pillar has the potential destabilize the status quo of arms control, creating significant uncertainty in global nuclear stability and security. In this paper, we present a historical review as overture to an analysis on the impacts of this development on force structure. This analysis examines the changes in U.S., Russian, and Chinese nuclear forces which may occur as a result of the treaty's demise. The article concludes with commentary on potential actions to preserve stability in a post-INF world.


Significance Washington has previously accused Russia of violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. Russia has responded angrily to Trump's announcement. As both countries consider intermediate-range missile programmes, Russia's arms development methods place it ahead; it reportedly has an operational missile. Impacts Complex and frosty US-Russia relations make concessions less feasible. German-US divisions will be exacerbated by a US withdrawal from INF. The prospect of US missile deployments will add a new dimension to populist opposition across Europe.


Significance Soon after Biden's inauguration as president tomorrow, US and Russian diplomats are expected to discuss an extension to New START, the only remaining major agreement regulating their nuclear forces. This can be done quickly; the main outstanding question is whether to prolong it for the maximum five years permitted or settle on a shorter extension. Impacts With New START renewed, Washington and Moscow will seek clarity on next steps in nuclear threat reduction and arms control. This could be a lengthy process, requiring internal reviews of nuclear policy, force posture, arms control and bilateral relations. The alternative is an increase in mutual suspicions of force plans, further erosion of trust and pressure to enlarge nuclear budgets. COVID-19 management will consume government attention to and budgets for defence and diplomacy.


Subject Uncertainty around the future of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty. Significance The future of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty is in doubt as the US Congress considers plans to produce a new ground-launched intermediate-range missile in response to evidence of Russian violations. Active verification has lapsed, and the weapons covered by the treaty are in practice the hardest to distinguish from conventionally armed equivalents. A US congressional initiative to plan for an intermediate-range missile is meant to ensure Russian treaty compliance but Moscow's response is defiant. Impacts Moscow and Washington are focused on other foreign policy issues that may push the INF treaty to the back burner. The multiplication of missile variants makes it harder to tell whether a particular model breaches the INF treaty. Russia's military campaign in Syria has allowed it to test, under live conditions, missiles that could be adapted for ground launch.


Author(s):  
Zheng Cui ◽  
Yajie Wang

The “Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles” (after this referred to as the “Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces — INF Treaty”), was an arms control treaty. This Treaty was abandoned after being extended for more than three decades. In the current context of competition among great powers, its abolition not only affects the military designs of the two countries but also impacts the reconstruction of regional and global strategic layouts, as well as the future of the global armament system. Against the background of significant changes in Russia’s strategic security environment during the post-INF Treaty period, Russia’s policy behaviour has exhibited a strong “security orientation”. That is, at the military level, it updates and upgrades its nuclear arsenals and continuously expands its deterrence options; at the diplomatic level, it has broken through the Western blockade by expanding Russia’s partner circle. In explanation of the reasons for the emergence of “security-oriented” behaviour characteristics in Russia, this paper argues that geopolitical narration plays a role in shaping Russia’s behaviour. On the other hand, the inertia of Russia’s policy behaviour is explained from the perspective of Russia’s national characteristics, primarily as defined by its national identity. Finally, this paper gives a brief prediction of the future trend of Russia’s behaviour and the arms control system in the post-INF Treaty period.


Significance Russia and China have several hypersonic weapons in service or near readiness. This class of weapon is raising concerns in the conventional and strategic realms, where security tensions are already high. A Chinese weapon tested this year created new concerns by reportedly spending time in near-earth orbit. Impacts Governments will review the survivability of their nuclear forces as a hypersonic arms race develops. The reported Chinese test of an orbital system will increased US call to bring hypersonic technologies into arms control discussions. Chinese advances will spur Washington and some of its regional allies to develop defensive and offensive options to counter such systems.


Author(s):  
Vipin Narang

The world is in a second nuclear age in which regional powers play an increasingly prominent role. These states have small nuclear arsenals, often face multiple active conflicts, and sometimes have weak institutions. How do these nuclear states—and potential future ones—manage their nuclear forces and influence international conflict? Examining the reasoning and deterrence consequences of regional power nuclear strategies, this book demonstrates that these strategies matter greatly to international stability and it provides new insights into conflict dynamics across important areas of the world such as the Middle East, East Asia, and South Asia. The book identifies the diversity of regional power nuclear strategies and describes in detail the posture each regional power has adopted over time. Developing a theory for the sources of regional power nuclear strategies, the book offers the first systematic explanation of why states choose the postures they do and under what conditions they might shift strategies. It then analyzes the effects of these choices on a state's ability to deter conflict. Using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, the book shows that, contrary to a bedrock article of faith in the canon of nuclear deterrence, the acquisition of nuclear weapons does not produce a uniform deterrent effect against opponents. Rather, some postures deter conflict more successfully than others. This book considers the range of nuclear choices made by regional powers and the critical challenges they pose to modern international security.


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