Whiplash: Donald Trump and NATO

2020 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 65-70
Author(s):  
Daniel S. Hamilton

U.S. President Donald Trump has flip-flopped on NATO’s relevance, harangued allies about unfair burden-sharing, and threatened to condition U.S. support for other allies based on their level of defense spending. Trump’s erratic approaches to Russia, Ukraine, nuclear arms control, and the Middle East have further exacerbated allied anxieties. Militarily, the Trump administration has strengthened and extended U.S. commitments to NATO. Politically, the Alliance is in sad shape. The deeper challenge for Europe, however, is not U.S. abandonment, it is that the United States is drifting from being a European power to a power in Europe.

Author(s):  
Alexander Savelyev

Beijing explains its firm unwillingness to join the United States and Russia in nuclear arms control talks by the fact that China’s nuclear arsenal is incomparable with respective potentials of the world’s two leading nuclear powers. China urges Russia and the U.S. to go ahead with the nuclear disarmament process on a bilateral basis, and promises it will be prepared to consider the possibility of its participation in the negotiations only when its counterparts have downgraded their arsenals approximately to China’s level. Washington finds this totally unacceptable and demands that China either join the existing Russian-U.S. strategic New START treaty right away or agree to enter into a trilateral nuclear arms control format. This article studies the prospects of China’s involvement in nuclear arms talks and analyzes the true reasons behind Beijing’s desire to avoid any nuclear disarmament deals at this point. The working hypothesis of this paper is that China’s stance on the above issue is by no means far-fetched or propagandistic, and that it is driven by fundamental political, military and strategic considerations. Disregard for this factor and further forceful efforts to bring China to the negotiating table to discuss nuclear arms control will lead to failure.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Hunt

The development of military arms harnessing nuclear energy for mass destruction has inspired continual efforts to control them. Since 1945, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and South Africa acquired control over these powerful weapons, though Pretoria dismantled its small cache in 1989 and Russia inherited the Soviet arsenal in 1996. Throughout this period, Washington sought to limit its nuclear forces in tandem with those of Moscow, prevent new states from fielding them, discourage their military use, and even permit their eventual abolition. Scholars disagree about what explains the United States’ distinct approach to nuclear arms control. The history of U.S. nuclear policy treats intellectual theories and cultural attitudes alongside technical advances and strategic implications. The central debate is one of structure versus agency: whether the weapons’ sheer power, or historical actors’ attitudes toward that power, drove nuclear arms control. Among those who emphasize political responsibility, there are two further disagreements: (1) the relative influence of domestic protest, culture, and politics; and (2) whether U.S. nuclear arms control aimed first at securing the peace by regulating global nuclear forces or at bolstering American influence in the world. The intensity of nuclear arms control efforts tended to rise or fall with the likelihood of nuclear war. Harry Truman’s faith in the country’s monopoly on nuclear weapons caused him to sabotage early initiatives, while Dwight Eisenhower’s belief in nuclear deterrence led in a similar direction. Fears of a U.S.-Soviet thermonuclear exchange mounted in the late 1950s, stoked by atmospheric nuclear testing and widespread radioactive fallout, which stirred protest movements and diplomatic initiatives. The spread of nuclear weapons to new states motivated U.S. presidents (John Kennedy in the vanguard) to mount a concerted campaign against “proliferation,” climaxing with the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Richard Nixon was exceptional. His reasons for signing the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) with Moscow in 1972 were strategic: to buttress the country’s geopolitical position as U.S. armed forces withdrew from Southeast Asia. The rise of protest movements and Soviet economic difficulties after Ronald Reagan entered the Oval Office brought about two more landmark U.S.-Soviet accords—the 1987 Intermediate Ballistic Missile Treaty (INF) and the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)—the first occasions on which the superpowers eliminated nuclear weapons through treaty. The country’s attention swung to proliferation after the Soviet collapse in December 1991, as failed states, regional disputes, and non-state actors grew more prominent. Although controversies over Iraq, North Korea, and Iran’s nuclear programs have since erupted, Washington and Moscow continued to reduce their arsenals and refine their nuclear doctrines even as President Barack Obama proclaimed his support for a nuclear-free world.


2021 ◽  
Vol 101 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-15
Author(s):  
Yuri Goloub ◽  
◽  
Sergei Shenin ◽  

The article analyzes the perception in the United States of the Trump administration‟s policy regarding NATO, the role of European countries, and the possibility of reforming the alliance. In the context of comparing this policy with the efforts of previous administrations, the authors study the attitudes of the most active political expert groups (liberals, realists, conservatives, and neoconservatives). It is concluded that the vast majority of the expert community considers it necessary to transform relations with the allies in the context of the ongoing bipartisan strategy of “pivot to Asia”, which implies an increase in European countries‟ defense spending with the EU being responsible for the security on the continent. All leading political expert groups agree that Trump‟s policy is generally consistent with this strategy, but its effectiveness is evaluated differently. It is assumed that the presidential victory of J. Biden will mean accelerating the implementation of the strategy of “pivot to Asia” and an autonomizaton of the defense potential of Europe.


Subject Prospects for nuclear arms control in 2019-23. Significance Russia and the United States have reached an apparent impasse on nuclear weapons. Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin warn of the dangers of a new nuclear arms race, but neither appears ready to make the concessions necessary to salvage the current arms control and non-proliferation regime. Attending a NATO foreign ministers' meeting yesterday, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo set a 60-day deadline for Russia to comply with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (4) ◽  
pp. 1027-1035

In June 2017, President Donald Trump announced a plan to roll back various steps taken by his predecessor toward normalizing relations between the United States and Cuba. A senior official for the administration announced the plan in a White House press briefing:The President vowed to reverse the Obama administration policies toward Cuba that have enriched the Cuban military regime and increased the repression on the island. It is a promise that President Trump made, and it's a promise that President Trump is keeping.With this is a readjustment of the United States policy towards Cuba. And you will see that, going forward, the new policy under the Trump administration, will empower the Cuban people. To reiterate, the new policy going forward does not target the Cuban people, but it does target the repressive members of the Cuban military government.


Subject China's options for retaliating against US firms during trade tensions. Significance US President Donald Trump tweeted yesterday that he is working with China's President Xi Jinping to get China's telecoms giant, ZTE, "back in business, fast" -- even though it was penal US sanctions that forced the company to announce last week that it was stopping operations. The Trump administration is divided on whether its objective in threatening imports tariffs on Chinese goods worth 50 billion dollars, effective May 22, is to strike a deal to cut China's trade surplus with the United States or to change China's industrial practices. Impacts Compliance costs will rise even if trade tensions subside. Investors in industries that China sees as strategic (eg, semiconductors and integrated circuits) may face unwritten screening rules. Investors in automobile, aircraft and shipping manufacturing and finance may find new opportunities to enter the market.


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 31
Author(s):  
Karina Utami Dewi ◽  
Desti Putri Cahyani

Kebijakan imigrasi Zero Tolerance merupakan salah satu bentuk kebijakan yang diformulasikan oleh pemerintahan Donald Trump dengan tujuan untuk mengurangi jumlah imigran tanpa dokumen yang memasuki wilayah Amerika Serikat. Kebijakan imigrasi ini menjadi isu yang mendapat sorotan dari dunia internasional karena sarat dengan pelanggaran hak-hak asasi manusia, dan memosisikan imigran tanpa dokumen serta anak-anak dalam keadaan yang rentan. Tulisan ini mengelaborasi bahwa kebijakan ini mengindikasikan kekerasan struktural pada penerapannya, dengan menggunakan konsep Kekerasan Struktural yang ditulis oleh Johan Galtung, dan mencoba membuktikan terjadinya kekerasan struktural serta alasan mengapa kebijakan ini dilakukan oleh Amerika Serikat. Terdapat tiga argumen utama pada tulisan ini; pertama, kekerasan struktural terbukti telah dilakukan oleh Amerika Serikat dapat dilihat melalui subjek, objek, serta tindakan dalam konsep Kekerasan Struktural. Kedua, terdapat faktor pendorong yang sifatnya sengaja dan tidak sengaja dalam melakukan kebijakan yang mengakibatkan kekerasan struktural. Yang ketiga, Amerika Serikat menjalankan kebijakan ini dengan menggunakan pendekatan yang menekankan pada reward dan punishment. Kata-kata kunci: imigrasi, kekerasan struktural, Amerika Serikat  Zero Tolerance Immigration Policy is one form of policy formulated by the Donald Trump administration to reduce undocumented immigrants entering the United States. This immigration policy has become an issue of international attention because it is full of human rights violations, and places the undocumented immigrants and children in an unsafe condition. This paper describes that the policy mentioned above indicates structural violence in its implementation, employs the concept of Structural Violence written by Johan Galtung, and tries to prove the occurrence of structural violence and the reasons why this policy was carried out by the United States. There are three main arguments in this paper; first, there is indeed structural violence that has been committed by the United States as observed in the object, subject, and actions in the concept of Structural Violence. Second, there are intended and unintended motivations in implementing this policy, which encouraged structural violence. Third, The United States carries out this policy by using an approach that emphasizes reward and punishment. Keywords: immigration, structural violence, United States


Significance Though the United States and South Sudan have a long history, the surprise election of Donald Trump could shift Washington’s posture towards Juba. The deepening crisis there has soured a a once-close relationship. Impacts US Africa policy may be determined in large part by Trump’s personnel picks for senior Africa posts. As observers warn of possible genocide, a US government in transition will find itself ill-prepared to respond. The proposed 4,000-strong Regional Protection Force may find less support from the new administration. US humanitarian funding levels should remain high despite potential policy changes.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (04) ◽  
pp. 19-27
Author(s):  
Weixing CHEN

The rise of China has shaken, to some extent, the pillars sustaining the US dominance in the world. Facing structural challenges from China, the United States has responded on three levels: political, strategic and policy. The Donald Trump administration has adopted a hard-line approach while attempting to engage China at the structural level. The China–US relationship is entering uncertain times, and the reconstruction of the relationship could take a decade.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 131-170
Author(s):  
V. I. Bartenev

This paper identifi es and explains key changes in the U.S. aid policies towards Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) under Donald Trump. It seeks to validate two widespread arguments — the one about the current administration’s revision of pivotal principles of providing foreign assistance, and the other one — about an accelerated disengagement of the United States from the MENA region since 2017. The paper consists of four sections. The fi rst section explores the transformation of the U.S. strategic thinking and regional context under the Trump administration and then posits fi ve hypotheses about possible changes in the volume and composition of the U.S. assistance to the MENA region (in comparison with the fi nal two years of the Obama administration), as well as the diff erences in the executive branch and the Congress’s positions. The second section explains particularities of the statistical data and the methods of its exploration, the third section presents the results of hypothesis testing using aggregated data on aid fl ows to the region, and the fi nal section explains these results, sometimes unexpected, using the data disaggregated by country. Three of fi ve hypotheses proved wrong based on the aggregate data. First, the Trump administration did not cut assistance to the MENA more substantially than to other regions of the globe. Second, it did not ringfence aid accounts which helped yield direct dividends to the U.S. businesses. Third, the Republican Congress was clearly less willing to support the executive’s aid chocies under a new Republican President than during the last years of a Democrat Barack Obama’s second term. Only two hypotheses proved correct — one about a prioritization of security and military assistance under Donald Trump and the other one — about disproportionate cuts of democracy promotion assistance. Such an unexpected result calls for refi ning both aforementioned arguments and taking into account the dissimilarities in the dynamics of assistance to diff erent countries. The United States tends to practice a diff erentiated approach in dealing with two largest Arab aid recipients (Egypt and Jordan) and with other Arab countries. The assistance to Cairo and Amman is ringfenced and protected, while aid to other recipients, including security assistance and FMF grants, is prone to quite drastic cuts. This diff erentiation is explained by the fact that cooperation with Egypt and Jordan rests not only on more solid strategic foundations but also on a strong support within the United States — both from the defense contractors interested in large export contracts and from an infl uential pro-Israel lobby. The U.S. will not abandon this highly diff erentiated approach after the 2020 elections but the structure of assistance to the MENA region might undergo quite a dramatic transformation.


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