Regulation of Crypto: Who Is the Securities and Exchange Commission Protecting?

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 643-705
Author(s):  
Carol R. Goforth
Keyword(s):  
Securities And Exchange Commission

Relationship between Code of Corporate Governance and Corporate Financial Performance (An Empirical Study of Food Companies Listed on KSE)

GIS Business ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 01-09
Author(s):  
Asma Rafique Chughtai ◽  
Afifa Naseer ◽  
Asma Hassan
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Executive Directors ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Return On Equity ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
Code Of Corporate Governance ◽  
The Impact

The crucial role that implementation of Code of Corporate Governance plays on protecting the rights of minorities, shareholders, local as well as foreign investors cannot be denied. Companies all over the world are required to implement their respective Code of Corporate Governance for avoiding agency conflicts between companies management and stakeholders and for assuring transparency in accountability. This paper aims at exploring the impact of implementation of corporate governance practices (designed by Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan) have on the financial position of companies. For explanatory variables of the study, composition of the board as per the Code of Corporate Governance that comprises of presence of independent, executive and non-executive directors has been taken into consideration. Return on equity has been taken as an indicator of firms profitability i.e. the dependent variable. For this study, companies listed on food producing sector of Karachi Stock Exchange have been screened for excogitation of the relationship. It is an empirical research based on nine years data from 2007–2015. Using Hausman Test for selecting the data analysis technique between Fixed or Random, Fixed Cross Sectional Panel Analysis has been used for analysis of the data collected. Findings indicate that presence of independent, executive and non-executive directors as per the code requirements levies a significant impact on the profitability of companies indicated by return on equity. It is, thus concluded that companies should ensure compliance with code of governance practices to reduce not only the agency issues but also to increase their profitability.

FUNDS STATEMENTS: THE ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD WAS TWICE BEHIND THE CURVE

2015 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 91-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen A. Zeff
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
New York Stock Exchange ◽  
Accounting Principles ◽  
York Stock Exchange

This paper discusses the circumstances in which the Accounting Principles Board (APB) issued Opinions 3 and 19, in 1963 and 1971, respectively, when the Board encouraged and then required companies to publish a statement of source and application of funds, known as the funds statement. In doing so, the Board both times lagged behind company practice and the views of influential organizations, including the New York Stock Exchange and the Securities and Exchange Commission.

THE SEC PREEMPTS THE ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD IN 1965: THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE DEFERRED TAX CREDIT RELATING TO INSTALLMENT SALES

2007 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen A. Zeff
Keyword(s):  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Accounting Practice ◽  
Slow Pace ◽  
Accounting Principles ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
Deferred Tax ◽  
Accounting Procedure ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Do So

In 1959, the Accounting Principles Board (APB) replaced the Committee on Accounting Procedure because the latter was unable to deal forthrightly with a series of important issues. But during the APB's first half-dozen years, its record of achievement was no more impressive than its predecessor's. The chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Manuel F. Cohen, criticized the APB's slow pace and unwillingness to tackle difficult issues. This article discusses the circumstances attending the SEC's issuance of an Accounting Series Release in late 1965 to demonstrate forcefully to the APB that, when it is unable to carry out its responsibility to “narrow the areas of difference” in accounting practice, the SEC is prepared to step in and do so itself. In this sense, the article deals with the tensions between the private and public sectors in the establishment of accounting principles in the U.S. during the mid-1960s. The article makes extensive use of primary resource materials in the author's personal archive, which have not been used previously in published work.

Fraud Risk Awareness and the Likelihood of Audit Enforcement Action

2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 379-392 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jared Eutsler ◽  
Erin Burrell Nickell ◽  
Sean W. G. Robb
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Professional Community ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Counterfactual Reasoning ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Enforcement Action ◽  
Fraud Risk ◽  
Regulatory Perspective ◽  
Going Concern Opinion

SYNOPSIS Prior research indicates that issuing a going concern opinion to financially stressed clients generally reduces the risk of litigation against the auditor following a bankruptcy (Kaplan and Williams 2013; Carcello and Palmrose 1994). However, we propose that a going concern report may indicate prior knowledge of financial distress, an important fraud risk factor, and this may have repercussions for the auditor if a fraud is subsequently uncovered. Consistent with counterfactual reasoning theory, experimental research suggests that a documented awareness of fraud risk actually increases the likelihood of litigation against the auditor following a fraud (Reffett 2010). This concern has been echoed by the professional community (AICPA 2004; Golden, Skalak, and Clayton 2006) and may be exacerbated by the current outcome-based regulatory environment (Peecher, Solomon, and Trotman 2013). To examine this issue we review Auditing and Accounting Enforcement Releases (AAERs) issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for alleged financial reporting frauds between 1995 and 2012. Results suggest that going concern report modifications accompanying the last set of fraudulently stated financials are associated with a greater likelihood of enforcement action against the auditor. This finding is consistent with counterfactual reasoning theory and suggests that, from a regulatory perspective, auditors may be penalized for documenting their awareness of fraud risk when financial statements are later determined to be fraudulent.

Viewing the 1996 FAF Restructuring as Policy Making without a Formal Due Process

2002 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 199-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul B. W. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Due Process ◽  
Accounting Standards ◽  
Sole Source ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Financial Accounting ◽  
Perceived Threat ◽  
Financial Accounting Standards Board ◽  
Public Accounting

In 1996, a major financial reporting controversy emerged, escalated, and was resolved without substantial exposure or a formal due process. Specifically, a committee of the Financial Executives Institute (FEI) sent a letter to the chair of the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) asserting that the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) “process is broken and in need of substantive repair.” When Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chair Arthur Levitt determined that neither FAF nor public accounting leaders were dealing with the FEI proposals to his satisfaction, he acted to defeat this perceived threat to FASB's independence, focusing on the composition of the FAF. In response, the FAF trustees resisted because they viewed his intervention as a threat to FASB's independence. When the trustees did not voluntarily change, Levitt proposed reconsidering Accounting Series Release No. 150, which designates FASB as the sole source of GAAP for SEC filings. Eventually, Levitt prevailed. This paper describes this intervention as a case of policy making without a formal due process and adds to the already weighty evidence that accounting standards are political.

SEC Division of Corporation Finance Monitoring and CEO Power

2013 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoyan Cheng ◽  
Lei Gao ◽  
Janice E. Lawrence ◽  
David B. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Governance Structure ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Theoretical Research ◽  
Ceo Power ◽  
Power Struggle

SUMMARY Section 408 requires the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to review the filings of all SEC registrants every three years. Our study investigates this SEC monitoring role and differs from past SEC research by focusing on the SEC Division of Corporation Finance (DCF) rather than the Division of Enforcement and specifically on DCF's “review and comment” monitoring role. We rely on past theoretical research in management, finance, and accounting that provides us with arguments suggesting the DCF may target companies with strong CEOs and weak monitoring. Our findings cast light on the power struggle between the board and CEO by suggesting that the CEO's influence over the board may adversely affect board oversight. In addition, our results indicate that the DCF-prompted restatements lead companies to re-evaluate their governance structure.

The SEC's Revolving Door: Insights from Boards of Directors

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juliane B. Wutzler
Keyword(s):  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Revolving Door ◽  
Regulatory Capture ◽  
Accounting Quality ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
The U.S

This study aims to shed light on the determinants and consequences of the revolving door at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). While revolvers may be good monitors due to their SEC experience and, thus, continuously create benefits for the economy ("schooling"), it is possible that they exploit their insights into the enforcement process and private connections to undermine enforcement ("regulatory capture"). Using a newly created dataset of revolvers who moved from the SEC to company boards, this study shows that not all revolvers are appointed for the same reasons and create the same benefits for their new employers. I demonstrate that those revolvers most closely involved in the enforcement process are associated with fewer future enforcement actions while accounting quality does not improve. Contrarily, external revolvers seem to use their monitoring and advising duties to improve accounting quality.

Factors Associated with the Early Adoption of the SEC's Revised Auditor Fee Disclosure Rules

2006 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 41-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sharad Asthana ◽  
Jayanthi Krishnan
Keyword(s):  
Audit Fees ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Factors Associated ◽  
Disclosure Requirements ◽  
Early Adoption ◽  
Disclosure Rules ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Auditor Fees ◽  
Considerable Concern

Corporate disclosures of auditor fees (beginning in February 2001) caused considerable concern among regulators and investors about auditor independence because they revealed that nonaudit fees were a substantial proportion of total auditor fees. However, in 2003 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced revised disclosure requirements, specifying a broader definition of audit fees, and additional fee categories (SEC 2003). About 31 percent of our sample firms adopted the new rules in advance of the required date. We investigate the pattern of early adoption of the new fee disclosure rules by companies. Our results indicate that companies with greater nonaudit fee ratios during the prior year, companies that could show a greater decline in nonaudit fee ratios due to reclassification under SEC (2003), and companies that had greater audit-related fees after the reclassification were likely to adopt the new rules early. We conjecture that companies that had the most to gain from reclassifying fees—possibly by reducing negative investor perceptions about nonaudit services—adopted the new rules earlier than required.

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