Idealization and Abstraction in Models of Injustice

Hypatia ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 329-346
Author(s):  
Leif Hancox‐Li

Charles Mills has argued against ideal theory in political philosophy on the basis that it contains idealizations. He calls for political philosophers to do more nonideal theory, namely political theory that pays more attention to the most visible oppressions in society, such as those based on race, gender, and class. Mills's argument relies on a distinction between idealization and abstraction. Idealizations involve adding false assumptions to one's model, which is unacceptable, whereas abstractions merely leave out details without undermining descriptive power. By studying formal models of injustice, I argue that the idealization/abstraction distinction is unhelpful. Either the distinction exists only relative to one's modeling purposes, or all models in political theory contain idealizations. Either way, the distinction does not help Mills's cause. Furthermore, there are arguments from philosophy of science for the epistemic benefits of idealizations. However, Mills's call for greater emphasis on the most visible mechanisms of oppression can be supported without relying on an idealization/abstraction distinction. I provide three alternative reasons for why we should prefer political theories that place more emphasis on race‐, class‐, and gender‐based oppression.

1998 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 276-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wayne Norman

This article attempts two parallel tasks. First, it gives a sympathetic explication of the implicit working methodology (‘Methodological Rawlsianism’) of mainstream contemporary political theory in the English-speaking world. And second, principally in footnotes, it surveys the recent literature on justification to see what light these debates cast on the tenets of this methodology. It is worth examining methodological presuppositions because these can have a profound influence on substantive theories: many of the differences between philosophical traditions can be traced to their methodologies. My aim is to expose the central features of methodological Rawlsianism in order to challenge critics of this tradition to explain exactly where and why they depart from the method. While I do not defend it at length, I do suggest that methodological Rawlsianism is inevitable insofar as it is basically a form of common sense. This fact should probably lower expectations about the amount of progress consistent methodological Rawlsians are likely to make in grounding comprehensive normative political theories.


Author(s):  
Nancy J. Hirschmann

The topic of feminism within the history of political philosophy and political theory might seem to be quite ambiguous. Feminists interested in the history of political philosophy did not urge the abandonment of the canon at all, but were instead protesting the way in which political philosophy was studied. They thus advocated “opening up” the canon, rather than its abolishment. There have been at least five ways in which this “opening” of the canon has been developed by feminists in the history of political philosophy. All of them do not only demonstrate that the history of political philosophy is important to feminism; they also demonstrate that feminism is important to the history of political philosophy. A two-tiered structure of freedom, with some conceptualizations of freedom designated for men and the wealthy, and other conceptualizations designated for laborers and women, shows that class and gender were important dimensions to be explored when examining the history of political philosophy. One way in which feminism has opened up the canon is its relevance to contemporary politics.


2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 122-154
Author(s):  
James Woodward

Abstract:This essay discusses and criticizes the claim that normative political theory can be (justifiably and fruitfully) divided into two parts—a part having to do with ideal theory which assumes full compliance and abstracts away from issues having to do with implementation and, contrasting with this, a nonideal part having to do with implementation and with rules and institutions appropriate for conditions of partial compliance. On this conception of ideal theory, empirical facts about human behavior and motivation, connected to issues surrounding compliance and implementation, are irrelevant to ideal theory, although such facts can be relevant to the nonideal part of normative theory. I argue against this conception, holding instead that such empirical facts are relevant to most or all of normative political theory, including “fundamental” normative principles.


2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 148
Author(s):  
Elijah Okon John ◽  
Joseph Ajuluchukwu Uka

<p><em>Aristotle’s socio-political theory emphasizes the belief that human beings are naturally political. Aristotelian ideals that the political life of a free citizen is a sovereign state which provides for the well-being of the citizenry is the highest form of life. Thus, his idea of free citizenship immediately introduces the concept of limitations between citizens—the free and the not free, the masters and the slave. The consequence of his political theory is the introduction of inequality among the members of the society but the question is: was Aristotle right in justifying social inequality? The answer to it embodies the major issues of this work. How we can evaluate Aristotle’s positive and negative socio-political theories is one of the concerns of this paper. Effort will be made to critically explicate the good aspects of his theory as well as drawing a synthesis from the critique of the condemnable aspects of Aristotle’s political philosophy in fashioning out a formidable route for African political leaders.</em><em></em></p>


Author(s):  
Olaiya Olajumoke Olufunmilola

The journey towards social ordering and the need to make life much better than it used to be is one of the principal motivations for political philosophy. Hence, there are as much political theories to this effect as there are political philosophers and scientists. Whereas the aim of the present research is to consider what kind of political theory can assist in social ordering, it does this, taking cognizance of the pedagogical postulates of the political scholar, Plato. In other words, this research reconsiders the educational underpinning of Plato’s political philosophy for use in the quest toward the agenda of attaining nationhood in Nigeria. This comes as a consequence of the urgency to correct the ugly trend(s) that have greeted the educational system of the country as well as the failure of the social sciences to provide the much sought succor. This approach is sacrosanct because of the undue but accentuated emphases that have been given to the social sciences as the domain from which development and nationhood can spring. Incidentally, the journey toward nationhood for Nigeria, continues to be one of the most disturbing dilemmas that continues to haunt the country. Via the method of critical analysis, this essay argues that Plato’s political philosophy has some educational ideals that present implications for contemporaneous nature or character of contemporary Nigeria. By giving emphasis on his reflections on the principle of specialization, this study is able to argue that the spirited application of this ideal for contemporary Nigeria via pedagogy will go a long way to birth the much sought nationhood. Political philosophy needs pedagogy to be able to realize its ideals. Unless this initiative is underscored, this essay submits, the quest for nationhood will continue to lament in the labyrinth of folly and backwardness.


2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (7) ◽  
pp. 795-818 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen Ng

This article explores objections made against ideal theorizing in political philosophy by two prominent contemporary critical theorists: Axel Honneth and Charles Mills. In Freedom’s Right, Honneth situates his neo-Hegelian analysis of social freedom in opposition to contemporary political philosophy that has become ‘decoupled from an analysis of society’. Across many works, Mills has argued that ideal theorizing in political theory is not only ineffectual, but more problematically, that it is ideological in nature and serves the interests of privileged groups. I suggest that whereas Honneth’s objection to ideal theorizing hearkens back to Hegel’s critique of Kant, Mills’ objection that ideal theory is ideology hearkens back to Marx’s critique of bourgeois political philosophy in general, and Hegel’s political philosophy in particular. Against the background of these debates, I assess Honneth’s theory of social freedom according to Mills’ Marxian inspired ideology critique. I argue that while in some respects, Honneth’s theory of social freedom is a defensible project, in other respects, Mills’ critique remains instructive and allows us to see the ways in which aspects of Honneth’s theory could serve ideological functions, and thus, is not entirely successful, either as a piece of critical theory or as an alternative to ideal theory.


2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 11-31
Author(s):  
Jenann Ismael

Abstract:Rawls ignited a debate in political theory when he introduced a division between the ideal and nonideal parts of a theory of justice. In the ideal part of the theory, one presents a positive conception of justice in a setting that assumes perfect compliance with the rules of justice. In the nonideal part, one addresses the question of what happens under departures from compliance. Critics of Rawls have attacked his focus on ideal theory as a form of utopianism, and have argued that political theory should be focused instead on providing solutions to the manifest injustices of the real world. In this essay, I offer a defense of the ideal/nonideal theory distinction according to which it amounts to nothing more than a division of labor, and explore some scientific analogies. Rawls’s own focus on the ideal part of the theory, I argue, stems from a felt need to clarify the foundations of justice, rather than a utopian neglect of real world problems.


1979 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 561-577
Author(s):  
Miriam Galston

The legitimate goals of political communities and the proper objectives of law have been themes of political philosophy since its inception. Philosophers' disagreements about the nature of political life and law have occasioned divergent accounts of the best or ideal government and have generated an even deeper controversy as to whether the best case should be the measure of political phenomena in the first place. For the purpose of analysis, three kinds of political theories can be distinguished. Characteristic of the first kind is the belief that people can attain a wide range of excellences and that the function of a political community is to foster in a direct manner the best or most complete form of human excellence, regardless of how rare the individuals who profit from this guidance. Accordingly, a central concern of “idealistic” or “utopian” political philosophy is elaborating the nature of the absolutely best political order and the conditions of its emergence. Among the central activities of governments so conceived are moral and intellectual education, as presented, for example, in the works of Plato and Aristotle. A second kind of political theory shares the belief in a multiplicity of hierarchically ranked human ends but denies that the highest possibility for human development should serve as the foremost principle determining political institutions and governing political decisionmaking.


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