MERGERS, ANTITRUST LAW ENFORCEMENT AND STOCKHOLDER RETURNS

1976 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 715-732 ◽  
Author(s):  
James C. Ellert
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Stockholder Returns

Empirical analysis of market boundaries in telecommunications

2019 ◽  
pp. 90-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Natalia S. Pavlova ◽  
Andrey Е. Shastitko
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Mass Distribution ◽  
End Users ◽  
Economic Modeling ◽  
Empirical Approach ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Technological Changes ◽  
Loss Analysis ◽  
E Mail

The article deals with the problem of determining market boundaries for antitrust law enforcement in the field of telecommunications. An empirical approach has been proposed for determining the product boundaries of the market in the area of mass distribution of messages, taking into account the comparative characteristics of the types and methods of notification (informing) of end users; the possibilities of switching from one way of informing to another, including the evolution of such opportunities under the influence of technological changes; switching between different notification methods. Based on the use of surveys of customers of sending SMS messages, it is shown that the product boundaries should include not only sending messages via SMS, but also e-mail, instant messengers, Push notifications and voice information. The paper illustrates the possibilities of applying the method of critical loss analysis to determining the boundaries of markets based on a mixture of surveys and economic modeling.

Monopoly and corporate innovation: evidence from antitrust law

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Minggui Yu ◽  
Yujing Huang ◽  
Huijie Zhong ◽  
Qing Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Private Enterprises ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Innovation Activities ◽  
Corporate Innovation ◽  
The Impact

Purpose There are two opposite views about whether the Antitrust Law is conducive to the development of the economy. One view is that the Antitrust Law can restrain monopoly, maintain market competition and benefit economic growth. The other view is that the Antitrust Law inhibits innovation by monopolistic firms and fosters rent-seeking, which is bad for economic growth. To provide a possible perspective for clarifying the controversy, this paper aims to answer the following two questions: first, will the Antitrust Law inhibit corporate innovation? Second, does the antitrust enforcement agency discriminate against private enterprises? Design/methodology/approach Based on the samples of A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2013, the authors use the implementation of China’s Antitrust Law in 2008 as a policy shock, take the monopoly enterprises in each industry as the treatment group and competitive enterprises as the control group, using the difference-in-differences method to test the impact of the implementation of the Antitrust Law on corporate innovation activities. Findings The results show that compared with competitive enterprises, the patent output of monopolistic enterprises was significantly reduced after the implementation of the Antitrust Law, which indicates that the Antitrust Law does inhibit the innovation activities of monopolistic enterprises. Further research finds that the innovation suppression effect of the Antitrust Law is more prominent in state-owned enterprises, which means that the government does not have “selective law enforcement” against private enterprises in the process of law enforcement. Therefore, the results provide evidence for the idea that government intervention is neutral. Originality/value First, the paper enriches and expands the research on the factors affecting corporate innovation from the perspective of market structure. Second, it enriches and expands relevant research on the consequences of implementing the Antitrust Law from the perspective of corporate innovation. Third, it not only provides the relevant empirical evidence for clarifying the dispute about the Antitrust Law but also is helpful to clarify whether the Chinese Government has “selective law enforcement” against private enterprises.

scholarly journals FUNCTION OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE SUPERVISION OF BUSINESS COMPETITION AND THE PROHIBITION OF MONOPOLY PRACTICES

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Berli Yudiansah
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Antimonopoly Law ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Making ◽  
Research Show

Nowadays, the law enforcement of prohibition monopolistic practices by KPPU is quite effective. But it is cannot be done optimally. This is influenced by the limited authority possessed by KPPU as regulated in Law No. Law. 5 of 1999 concerning the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition or the Antitrust Law, making it difficult to enforce the law. The problem in this paper is how the KPPU functions in law enforcement prohibiting monopolistic practices. The method used in this paper is a method with a normative and empirical juridical approachThe results of the research show that to maximize the KPPU's function in carrying out their duties, it is necessary to make improvements to the Antimonopoly Law, such as the loading of the KPPU's authority and duties to make it clearer. The establishment of special regulations for KPPU that are more technical in the context of applying the substance of the Antimonopoly Law.

EFFORTS TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A HEALTHY COMPETITION

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-32
Author(s):  
J Jopie Gilalo
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Economic System ◽  
Government Policy ◽  
Unfair Competition ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Business People ◽  
Dynamic Economy ◽  
Basic Framework ◽  
The Government ◽  
Business Person

ABSTRACTFair business competition is expected to grow and thrive in the dynamic economy in Indonesia. In accordance with the mandate of the Constitution of 1945 with the characteristics of the economic system in Indonesia is Pancasila which is the basic framework of the government policy to foster and develop the Indonesian economy. The existence of Act No. 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Competition Antitrust Law, provides boundaries for businesses (Enterprises) are prohibited to carry out business activities that are not in accordance with the law. Business Competition Supervisory Commission (KPPU) as the supervisory agency of the implementation of Anti-Monopoly Law provide effectiveness of law enforcement for the business person who violates this law. Although the implementation of the Commission are still many obstacles of some decisions decided by the Commission against business people who commit fraud are not in accordance with the Anti-Monopoly Law, but the decision of the Commission at least be able to provide a deterrent for business people who commit fraud. Keywords : Business Competition, Democracy, Economy

Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics-2014: Jean Tirole

2015 ◽  
pp. 5-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Avdasheva ◽  
A. Shastitko
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Industrial Organization ◽  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Nobel Prize ◽  
Real World ◽  
New Economy ◽  
Chicago School ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Optimal Regulation ◽  
Systematic Knowledge

Jean Tirole’s Nobel Prize-winning research is described within the context of practical issues for economic policy and taking into account the relevance of his results for the real world. The paper considers how Tirole contributed to the resolution of “Chicago school paradoxes” in industrial organization and to explaining antitrust law enforcement in the new economy. We also emphasize specific features of Tirole’s textbook on industrial organization and demonstrate its significance for systematic knowledge of markets organization. The main elements of Tirole’s approach to optimal regulation are also discussed.

Stackelberg on the Danube: Games in the Anticommons

2013 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong J. Yoon ◽  
William F. Shughart
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
The Road ◽  
Price Leader ◽  
Static Version ◽  
Regulatory Institutions ◽  
On The Road

Abstract We model the tragedy of the anticommons - the underutilization of a resource in the presence of multiple rights to exclude - as a Stackelberg price-leader game. We show that the equilibrium outcomes when the players move sequentially are more inefficient than when they move simultaneously in a ‘static’ version of the game. The results have important implications for the design of modern regulatory institutions, including the appointment of ‘super-bureaucrats’ or regulatory ‘czars’, the emergence of so-called patent trolls, tribal toll-collectors on the road from Pakistan to Afghanistan, climbing Mt. Everest, rent seeking contests, and antitrust law enforcement.

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