Murder under duress and judicial decision-making in the House of Lords

Legal Studies ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-73
Author(s):  
Lynden Walters

While finding fault with House of Lords’ decisions in the field ofcriminal law is by no means a new academic sport, the present decade is proving particularly fruitful for the critic. The precise ramifications of Caldwelll and Lawrence are still being thrashed out. seymour, on manslaughter, was unforgiveably ambiguous. Moloney and Hancock and Shankland left the mental element in murder hopelessly opaque. In impossible attempts Anderton v Ryan revealed a degree of ineptitude which even the House of Lords had to recognise in overruling itselfonly a year later in Shivpuri.It is not simply a questionofacademics taking issue with the outcomeof a particular decision. The further, and in some respects even more worrying, aspect of many of these decisions is the quality of the legal reasoning they embody.

Author(s):  
Linda Tvrdíková

If we look at the literature about judicial decision-making and interpretation of law, we can find many texts which are dedicated to legal arguments, logic and legal reasoning – in those texts the rationality, analytical and logical thinking is glorified and an interpretation seems ‘just’ as a logical operation where judges subsume certain facts under general legal norm or norms, those norms are formulated linguistically, so it seems that the whole job of judges is to analyze texts. What we can see more rarely are discussions and texts exploring the role of intuitions, feelings and emotions and their role in judicial decision-making – at least in the Czech Republic. Those of our faculties are seen as the source of bias and distortion. Even if we look to the past, those themes are not so common among legal theorists and philosophers – especially in our tradition where we are still influenced by Hans Kelsen and František Weyr and their normative theory – but we can find exceptions and those are the American legal realists. In this paper, we will show that their observations and insights seem to be right. How can we know it? Because in last decades cognitive scientists have made big progress in the area of decision-making and it seems that we are not so rational as we thought us to be. They have explored that our thinking does not take place only through the deliberative system but, surprisingly, there is also another one system which influences our decisions. This system is automatic, fast, and intuitive – some call this system S1, Seymour Epstein an experiential system. This automatic system is more influential than our deliberative system because it is always heard – we can use Jonathan Haidt’s metaphor of an elephant and a rider. S1, the intuitive, experiential system, is an elephant and S2, the deliberative, analytical system is the rider – in legal theory, we have talked about the rider a lot but we do not explore the elephant sufficiently. This paper will try to uncover the nature of the elephant.


Author(s):  
Eileen Braman

This chapter critically evaluates how experiments are used to study cognitive processes involved in legal reasoning. Looking at research on legal presumptions, heuristic processing, and various types of bias in judicial decision-making, the analysis considers how experiments with judges, lay participants, and other legally trained populations have contributed to our understanding of the psychological processes involved in fact-finding and legal decision-making. It explores how behavioral economics, dual process models, cultural cognition, and motivated reasoning frameworks have been used to inform experimental research. The chapter concludes with a discussion of what findings add to our normative understanding of issues like accuracy and neutrality in decision-making and a call to better integrate knowledge gained through experimental methods across disciplinary boundaries.


Author(s):  
Francisco Javier EZQUIAGA GANUZAS

LABURPENA: Erabaki judizialak ez dira jarduera mental hutsak, badute argudiozko osagai bat ere, eta hura kontuan hartzeak hobetu egin dezake erabakia. Aurkikuntzaren testuingurua kontuan hartzen duen argudio juridiko batean errazago zehaztu ahal dira epai baten motibazioa legala, arrazionala, nahikoa eta osoa izateko baldintzak. Sarritan, motibazioak ez ditu kontuan hartzen erabilitako argudioen hautaketa, haien erabilera, alderdien edo beste magistratuen argudioen aurkezpena eta debatea, eta horiek, era honetan, epaia motibatzen duten baldintzen artean leudeke. RESUMEN: La toma de decisión judicial no es sólo una actividad mental, sino que tiene un componente argumentativo que tomado en cuenta puede mejorar la decisión. Una teoría de la argumentación jurídica que se ocupe del contexto de descubrimiento permite determinar de una manera más precisa los requisitos de una motivación legal, racional, suficiente y completa de la sentencia y, en consecuencia, su control. Aspectos que frecuentemente escapan del contenido de una adecuada motivación, como la selección de los argumentos interpretativos empleados, la forma de su uso, la presentación y debate de los argumentos de las partes o de otros magistrados, quedarían incluidos de este modo entre los requisitos motivatorios de la sentencia. ABSTRACT: The judicial decision making is not only a mental activity but it has an argumentative part that if it is taken into account can improve the decision. A theory about the legal reasoning that deals with the context of discovery allows to establish in a more precise way the requirements for a legal, rational, sufficient and complete reasoning and accordingly its control. Aspects that do often elude the content of an appropriate motivation, as the choice of the used interpretative arguments, the form of its use, the introduction and debate of the arguments by the parts or other judges, which would in this way be included among the motivating requisites of the judgment.


Legal Studies ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. H. Andrews

An efficient system of law reporting is beneficial in a number of ways. First, accurate reports are necessary if the principle that like cases should be decided alike is to be achieved. Secondly and relatedly, a strict system of precedent, which renders most decisions binding on courts, requires all decisions which have precedential value to be recorded. Thirdly, full reports of what judges say, including dissents, enable subsequent courts to consider the complex of normative and practical arguments which has been articulated in previous decisions. This both adds to the richness of material guiding lawyers and citizens at large and improves the quality of judicial decision-making. Fourthly, reporting courts’ reasons for reaching a decision is important since it exposes judges to scrutiny by fellow judges, practitioners, academics and the public at large. Reporting therefore serves the principle of accountability.


2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-122
Author(s):  
Katarína Šipulová ◽  
Marína Urbániková ◽  
David Kosař

Establishment of the judicial council has been debated for decades in Czechia. However, we still miss a comprehensive understanding of the positions and arguments of key actors involved in judicial governance: judges, politicians and lawyers. This article fills this gap and maps the existing arguments in favour and against a judicial council. It poses three research questions: (1) Do elites support the establishment of a judicial council and how do they justify their position? (2) What form of judicial governance do they perceive as ideal? (3) What are their expectations from the judicial council? Judges, politicians and lawyers identify the same two core challenges of the current system: The ministry of justice lacks the vision and capacity to govern the courts, and thus it informally delegates majority of its competences on court presidents. Too strong court presidents in turn make the system fragmented and endanger internal independence of rank-and-file judges. Elites however disagree whether the establishment of a judicial council can solve these issues. Majority of judges support the judicial council and hope for the unification of judicial governance across the country. Some politicians are willing to accept a weak model of judicial council if the ministry of justice can still determine the contours of judicial governance. At the same time, politicians consider the current fragmented system of judicial governance as more resistant against the capture of the judiciary. Lawyers see judicial council as a risky model which might encapsulate the judiciary. The key solution of the current problems, according to lawyers, rests in the reform of legal education and enhancing the quality of the judicial decision-making. Unfortunately, the neither recent policy debates nor the pending bills on the Law on Courts and Judges have addressed the key challenges raised by our interviewees.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (9) ◽  
pp. 1215-1223
Author(s):  
Linda L. Berger ◽  
Bridget J. Crawford ◽  
Kathryn M. Stanchi

This collection of essays is the product of the workshop Feminist Judgments: Comparative Socio-Legal Perspectives on Judicial Decision Making and Gender Justice held at the International Institute for the Sociology of Law (Oñati, Spain) in May, 2017. The papers explain and explore the multiple global projects that attempt to rewrite judicial opinions by incorporating feminist legal reasoning or methods. Each essay grows out of the authors’ experiences working with projects based in a particular socio-political, geographical, historical and jurisprudential context: Canada, England, Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, Scotland, and a multi-jurisdictional international law project. Collectively, the essays bring new insights, methods and challenges to the study of the feminist project of equal justice across the boundaries of culture, race, nation and gender. Esta colección de artículos es producto del seminario Feminist Judgments: Comparative Socio-Legal Perspectives on Judicial Decision Making and Gender Justice, que tuvo lugar en el Instituto Internacional de Sociología Jurídica (Oñati, España), en mayo de 2017. Los artículos explican y exploran los múltiples proyectos globales que intentan reescribir opiniones judiciales incorporando razonamientos o métodos jurídicos feministas. Cada artículo proviene de las experiencias de las autoras en su trabajo con proyectos basados en un contexto sociopolítico, geográfico, histórico y jurisprudencial concreto: Canadá, Inglaterra, Australia, Irlanda, Nueva Zelanda, Escocia y un proyecto jurídico internacional multijurisdiccional. En conjunto, los artículos aportan nuevos enfoques, métodos y desafíos al estudio del proyecto feminista de justicia igualitaria, más allá de los límites de culturas, razas, países y géneros.


Author(s):  
Bruno Meneses Lorenzetto ◽  
Letticia De Pauli Schaitza

DELIBERAÇÃO INTERNA E LEGITIMAÇÃO DAS CORTES SUPREMAS  INTERNAL DELIBERATION AND SUPREME COURTS’ LEGITIMACY   Bruno Meneses Lorenzetto*Letticia de Pauli Schaitza**  RESUMO: O artigo parte da superação da concepção estática de separação de poderes e critica os argumentos normalmente utilizados para justificar a legitimidade das Cortes Supremas para rever atos do Poder Legislativo por ignorarem que os juízes não decidem em um vácuo institucional e que a interação com seus pares influencia na tomada da decisão. Dessa forma, através da exposição dos modelos legal, atitudinal e estratégico, explicativos da tomada de decisão judicial, apresenta as Cortes não apenas como interlocutoras externas, mas sobretudo como tribunais colegiados deliberativos, a fim de enfatizar a importância da deliberação colegiada para a legitimidade da jurisdição constitucional e a qualidade da sua performance. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Legitimação Jurisdicional. Deliberação. Cortes Supremas. ABSTRACT: The article assumes the overcoming of the static conception of the separation of powers and criticizes the arguments normally used to justify the legitimacy of the Supreme Courts to review acts of the Legislative Power to the extand that they ignore that the judges do not decide in an institutional vacuum and that the interaction with their peers influences in the decision making process. Thus, through the exposition of legal, attitudinal and strategic judicial decision-making models, it presents the Courts not only as external interlocutors, but above all as collegiate deliberative tribunals, in order to emphasize the importance of collegial deliberation to constitutional jurisdiction legitimacy and the quality of its performance. KEYWORDS: Jurisdictional Legitimacy. Deliberation. Supreme Courts.  SUMÁRIO: Introdução. 1 A Nova Configuração do Princípio da Separação dos Poderes e a Legitimação da Corte Constitucional. 2 Cortes Supremas como “Deliberadores Internos”: a Deliberação em um Tribunal Colegiado. Considerações Finais. Referências. _________________________* Doutor em Direito pela Universidade Federal do Paraná (UFPR). Professor de Direito da Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná (PUC-PR). Coordenador do Programa de Mestrado em Direito e Professor da Graduação do Centro Universitário Autônomo do Brasil (UniBrasil), Paraná. Visiting Scholar na Columbia Law University, Estados Unidos.** Mestranda em Direito das Relações Sociais pelo Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direito da Universidade Federal do Paraná (UFPR). Integrante do Núcleo de Pesquisa em Direito Processual Civil Comparado da Universidade Federal do Paraná (UFPR).    


Author(s):  
Jean-Paul Costa

The chapter first gives several examples of where ‘dignity’ (or ‘a person’s dignity’, or ‘human dignity’) has been a central element in the reasoning of the Court, or in the arguments advanced by judges in separate opinions. Based on this analysis, the principal question addressed is why the Court draws on ‘dignity’, a word neither explicitly nor, implicitly mentioned in the text of the Convention or the Protocols. What are the reasons for having—or not having—recourse to the concept of dignity in judicial decisions? Is there any objective reason for such choice? Or does it depend on the subjective preferences of the judges sitting on the bench? Is ‘dignity’ necessary for judicial decision-making in order to reach a specific conclusion in a case? Or does ‘dignity’ simply reinforce the legal reasoning of the Court, enabling the Court to give more weight to the arguments of one of the parties in the case? Finally, the chapter looks for a possible conceptual link between human dignity and human rights, insofar as this arises from the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court.


Legal Studies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-94
Author(s):  
Gregory Davies

AbstractThis paper examines the aims and challenges of ‘judicial diplomacy’ in the form of bilateral meetings between UK and supranational judges. Drawing from in-depth interviews, extra-judicial writings and other documentary sources, it argues that judicial diplomacy has become an important feature of the work of senior judges in the UK, allowing them to pursue jurisprudential and strategic aims. In jurisprudential terms, the judges have sought to improve the quality of judicial decision-making at the domestic and supranational levels. Strategically, they have striven to maintain robust inter-institutional relations and maximise their influence at the supranational level. The pursuit of these aims has taken on renewed significance in the context of Brexit but may raise questions for the protection of judicial independence and impartiality. The judiciaries should therefore consider steps to improve the visibility of these interactions and their value.


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