False equivalencies: Online activism from left to right

Science ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 369 (6508) ◽  
pp. 1197-1201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deen Freelon ◽  
Alice Marwick ◽  
Daniel Kreiss

Digital media are critical for contemporary activism—even low-effort “clicktivism” is politically consequential and contributes to offline participation. We argue that in the United States and throughout the industrialized West, left- and right-wing activists use digital and legacy media differently to achieve political goals. Although left-wing actors operate primarily through “hashtag activism” and offline protest, right-wing activists manipulate legacy media, migrate to alternative platforms, and work strategically with partisan media to spread their messages. Although scholarship suggests that the right has embraced strategic disinformation and conspiracy theories more than the left, more research is needed to reveal the magnitude and character of left-wing disinformation. Such ideological asymmetries between left- and right-wing activism hold critical implications for democratic practice, social media governance, and the interdisciplinary study of digital politics.

Author(s):  
Boris I. Kolonitskii

The article examines the cultural forms of legitimation / delegitimation of authority of the Provisional Government. Particular attention is paid to the personal authority of Alexander Kerensky, including rhetorical (persuasive) devices and visual images which underlay the tactics of praising or condemning him. As the main source, the article uses the newspapers of A.A. Suvorin, namely Malen'kaya gazeta [Little newspaper], Narodnaya gazeta [People’s newspaper], Rus' [Rus], Novaya Rus' [New Rus]. These newspapers are compared with resolutions, letters and diaries, and with publications in other periodicals. The study clarifies some aspects of political isolation of the Provisional Government in the fall of 1917. By this time, the propaganda attack on Kerensky was conducted not only by the Bolsheviks and other left-wing groups but also by the right-wing and conservative publications. The propaganda of the left- and right-wing opponents was significantly different but they had a point of contact: both of them created the image of the “traitor” who was unworthy to remain in power.


2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1407-1429 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Bernardi ◽  
James Adams

Issue ownership theory posits that when social welfare is electorally salient, left-wing parties gain public support by rhetorically emphasizing social welfare issues. There is less research, however, on whether left-wing governing parties benefit from increasing social welfare spending. That is, it is not known whether leftist governments gain from acting on the issues they rhetorically emphasize. This article presents arguments that voters will not react to governments’ social welfare rhetoric, and reviews the conflicting arguments about how government support responds to social welfare spending. It then reports time-series, cross-sectional analyses of data on government support, governments’ social welfare rhetoric and social welfare spending from Britain, Spain and the United States, that support the prediction that government rhetoric has no effects. The article estimates, however, that increased social welfare spending sharply depresses support for both left- and right-wing governments. These findings highlight a strategic dilemma for left-wing governments, which lose public support when they act on their social welfare rhetoric by increasing welfare spending.


2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 43-60
Author(s):  
Yechiam Weitz

This article examines the major changes in the Israeli political arena, on both the left and right, in the two years before the 1967 War. The shift was marked by the establishment in 1965 of the right-wing Gahal (the Herut-Liberal bloc) and of the Labor Alignment, the semi-merger of Israel’s two main left-wing parties, Mapai and Ahdut HaAvodah. Some dissatisfied Mapai members broke away from the Alignment and formed a new party, Rafi, under the leadership of David Ben-Gurion. They did not gain nearly enough Knesset seats to take power in the November 1965 election, but Rafi did become part of the emergency national unity government that was formed in June 1967, due largely to the weak position of Levi Eshkol as prime minister. This enabled Rafi’s Moshe Dayan to assume the minister of defense position on the eve of the Six-Day War, which began on 5 June 1967.


Author(s):  
Andrej Zaslove

The success of radical right, anti-immigrant political parties and the recent riots in France are only two of the more publicized examples of how volatile the issue of immigration has become across Western Europe. It is often believed that the dichotomy between racism and anti-racism is quite clear. Right-wing and center-right parties and their electoral constituencies are less accepting of immigrants, while center-left and left-wing political parties and their supporters are more accommodating. In this paper, however, I argue that this distinction is not as clear as it is often perceived. Using Italy as my case study, I outline the various ideological positions on the left and the right, and within the left and right, vis-à-vis immigration legislation and important related issues such as integration and multiculturalism. In the second section, I then examine how these ideological positions respond to the realities of immigration and to new pressures from voters within civil society. The question is whether immigration has created a new electoral dilemma for both sides of the political spectrum. I examine whether: 1) left-wing parties are experiencing pressures from their traditional working class constituencies to be tougher on immigration and issues of law-and-order. How does this mesh with more liberal attitudes regarding policies that permit immigrants to enter, find work, and integrate into society? 2) The question is whether right-wing political forces are also experiencing an electoral dilemma between center-right voters who support less liberal immigrant legislation and their traditional business constituency who support center-right economic policy but also realize that they require immigrant labour. In the conclusion, I, briefly, examine whether this new electoral dilemma experienced by the Italian left and right is consistent with other West European countries such as Germany, Austria, Demark, the United Kingdom, and France.


Author(s):  
Uliana Birina ◽  
Yegor Malashichev

Motor asymmetries are wide spread among vertebrate and invertebrate animals. More frequently asymmetries in the use of paired appendages and turns of the body in space become the subject of research. Unpaired organs, positioned along the long axis of the body become the subjects of investigation of the functional asymmetries less often. Here we performed a preliminary estimation of populational characteristics of asymmetry in the turn of the head while resting in Mallards (Anas platyrynchos) from two distinct wintering groups. On tracks along the banks of rivers and channels in the center of Saint-Petersburg, Russia, and along the Buksnesfjord at the Vestvagøy island (Lofoten Islands, Norway Sea, Norway), we recorded the position of the head (under the left wing, or under the right wing) in resting birds ones for each individual. Totally we recorded head position in 151 individuals from Saint-Petersburg and in 77 individuals at Vestvagøy. Individuals keeping heads under the right wing were predominant in Saint-Petersburg, while at Vestvagøy the proportion of «left» and «right» individuals did not differ significantly from 1:1. Difference between the populations was significant, while sex differences in both populations were not found. We discuss possible reasons for the differences in population characteristics of asymmetry in the head position («head-under-wing»), particularly conditions of wintering, birds behaviour. We conclude that the study of different wintering groups of mallards can be possibly perspective for estimation of population status by assessment of relative proportion of «left» and «right» birds.


Author(s):  
Andrej Zaslove

The success of radical right, anti-immigrant political parties and the recent riots in France are only two of the more publicized examples of how volatile the issue of immigration has become across Western Europe. It is often believed that the dichotomy between racism and anti-racism is quite clear. Right-wing and center-right parties and their electoral constituencies are less accepting of immigrants, while center-left and left-wing political parties and their supporters are more accommodating. In this paper, however, I argue that this distinction is not as clear as it is often perceived. Using Italy as my case study, I outline the various ideological positions on the left and the right, and within the left and right, vis-à-vis immigration legislation and important related issues such as integration and multiculturalism. In the second section, I then examine how these ideological positions respond to the realities of immigration and to new pressures from voters within civil society. The question is whether immigration has created a new electoral dilemma for both sides of the political spectrum. I examine whether: 1) left-wing parties are experiencing pressures from their traditional working class constituencies to be tougher on immigration and issues of law-and-order. How does this mesh with more liberal attitudes regarding policies that permit immigrants to enter, find work, and integrate into society? 2) The question is whether right-wing political forces are also experiencing an electoral dilemma between center-right voters who support less liberal immigrant legislation and their traditional business constituency who support center-right economic policy but also realize that they require immigrant labour. In the conclusion, I, briefly, examine whether this new electoral dilemma experienced by the Italian left and right is consistent with other West European countries such as Germany, Austria, Demark, the United Kingdom, and France.   Full text available: https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v2i3.172


2019 ◽  
Vol 70 (1) ◽  
pp. 233-244
Author(s):  
Mario Amatria ◽  
Rubén Maneiro Dios ◽  
José Antonio Pérez-Turpin ◽  
María José Gomis-Gomis ◽  
Carlos Elvira-Aranda ◽  
...  

Abstract In today's soccer, teams are increasingly better trained both physically and tactically, hence different game styles can be identified and differences between them reduced. However, without an exhaustive analysis of reality, the view can lead to the extraction of erroneous conclusions, and what seems to be a team with a marked offensive profile is a mere illusion, resulting to be a team that develops a perfectly balanced game. In this paper, an analysis of technical-tactical performance of players who occupied both wings in an elite team was made, taking as reference the Spanish national soccer team as the model of international game to imitate in the last decade. The development of this paper was located within the observational methodology, using the polar coordinates technique for the analysis of the obtained data. The results showed how, despite identifying offensive profiles within technical-tactical performance of players that occupied the outer wings or lanes of the playing field, their tactical means and orientations diverged from each other. The results showed a more offensive profile and with higher technical complexity of players that occupied the left wing, while players that held the right wing showed a more defensive and recuperative profile, indicating a less vertical and complex style of play at a technical level with the forward as an offensive reference.


1985 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 329-363 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert McClosky ◽  
Dennis Chong

Although some scholars have argued that authoritarianism is characteristic only of the right and not of the left, persuasive reasons exist for doubting this claim. Intuitive observation of left-wing and right-wing regimes as well as radical political movements of the left and right reveals striking parallels in their styles of political engagement, their reliance upon force, their disdain for democratic ideals and practices and their violations of civil liberties. In addition, systematic inquiry into the similarities and differences between far-left and far-right radicals in the United States has been hampered by various methodological difficulties. One can list, among these, such problems as the obvious inappropriateness of the F scale (owing to its strong right-wing content) as a measure for identifying left-wing authoritarians; the difficulty of obtaining adequate samples of true believers of the extreme left and right; the self-image of the American left as a persecuted minority which, for reasons of self-interest, spuriously inflates the degree of support expressed by its members for individual rights and liberties; and the exposure of both extreme camps to the liberal democratic values dominating American political culture, which unmistakably colours their political rhetoric.We have reason to think that a similar study conducted in some – perhaps many – European countries would reveal even greater similarities between the far left and far right than we have turned up in the United States. Unlike the United States, which has enjoyed a strong liberal democratic tradition that has served to weaken and soften the intensity of its radical movements, a number of European countries, less wedded to liberal democratic principles, have developed a more vigorous, less diluted tradition of radical politics. These nations have long had to contend with powerful extremist movements actively and significantly engaged in the political struggles of their respective nations. The radical movements of Europe have been more extreme and zealous – more unequivocally revolutionary and reactionary – than the radical movements of the United States. The sustained confrontation of these extremist movements, in our view, is likely to have intensified the authoritarian propensities of each.In the present article, through a series of surveys in which we have tried to idenify, as best we can, supporters of the far left and far right, we have systematically compared the two camps on a variety of political and psychological characteristics. We find, in keeping with the conventional view, that the far left and the far right stand at opposite end of the familiar left–right continuum on many issues of public policy, political philosophy and personal belief. They hold sharply contrasting views on questions of law and order, foreign policy, social welfare, economic equality, racial equality, women's rights, sexual freedom, patriotism, social conventions, religion, family values and orientations towards business, labour and private enterprise.Nevertheless, while the two camps embrace different programmatic beliefs, both are deeply estranged from certain features of American society and highly critical of what they perceive as the spiritual and moral degeneration of American institutions. Both view American society as dominated by conspiratorial forces that are working to defeat their respective ideological aims.The degree of their alienation is intensified by the zealous and unyielding manner in which they hold their beliefs. Both camps possess an inflexible psychological and political style characterized by the tendency to view social and political affairs in crude, unambiguous and stereotypical terms. They see political life as a conflict between ‘us’ and ‘them’, a struggle between good and evil played out on a battleground where compromise amounts to capitulation and the goal is total victory.The far left and the far right also resemble each other in the way they pursue their political goals. Both are disposed to censor their opponents, to deal harshly with enemies, to sacrifice the well-being even of the innocent in order to serve a ‘higher purpose’, and to use cruel tactics if necessary to ‘persuade’ society of the wisdom of their objectives. Both tend to support (or oppose) civil liberties in a highly partisan and self-serving fashion, supporting freedom for themselves and for the groups and causes they favour while seeking to withhold it from enemies and advocates of causes they dislike.In sum, when the views of the far left and far right are evaluated against the standard left–right ideological dimension, they can appropriately be classifled at opposite ends of the political spectrum. But when the two camps are evaluated on questions of political and psychological style, the treatment of political opponents, and the tactics that they are willing to employ to achieve their ends, the display many parallels that can rightly be labelled authoritarian.


This volume seeks to initiate a new interdisciplinary field of scholarly research focused on the study of right-wing media and conservative news. To date, the study of conservative or right-wing media has proceeded unevenly, cross-cutting several traditional disciplines and subfields, with little continuity or citational overlap. This book posits a new multifaceted object of analysis—conservative news cultures—designed to promote concerted interdisciplinary investigation into the consistent practices or patterns of meaning making that emerge between and among the sites of production, circulation, and consumption of conservative news. With contributors from the fields of journalism studies, media and communication studies, cultural studies, history, political science, and sociology, the book models the capacious field it seeks to promote. Its contributors draw upon a variety of qualitative and quantitative research methods—from archival analysis to regression analysis of survey data to rhetorical analysis—to elucidate case studies focused on conservative news cultures in the United States and the United Kingdom. From the National Review to Fox News, from the National Rifle Association to Brexit, from media policy to liberal media bias, this book is designed as an introduction to right-wing media and an opening salvo in the interdisciplinary field of conservative news studies.


2021 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 163-185
Author(s):  
Sung Min Han ◽  
Mi Jeong Shin

AbstractIn this article, we argue that rising housing prices increase voter approval of incumbent governments because such a rise increases personal wealth, which leads to greater voter satisfaction. This effect is strongest under right-wing governments because those who benefit from rising prices—homeowners—are more likely to be right-leaning. Non-homeowners, who are more likely to vote for left-leaning parties, will view rising housing prices as a disadvantage and therefore feel the government does not serve them well, which will mitigate the advantage to left-wing governments. We find support for our arguments using both macro-level data (housing prices and government approval ratings in 16 industrialized countries between 1960 and 2017) and micro-level data (housing prices and individuals’ vote choices in the United Kingdom using the British Household Panel Survey). The findings imply that housing booms benefit incumbent governments generally and right-wing ones in particular.


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