STRATEGIC CORES IN A PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMY

2004 ◽  
Vol 06 (04) ◽  
pp. 509-524
Author(s):  
YUKIHISA UTSUMI ◽  
MIKIO NAKAYAMA
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Strategic Game ◽  
The Core ◽  
Production Technologies ◽  
Core Allocations

In a public goods economy with linear production technologies, we consider a strategic game with coalitions in which each player is required as a strategy to reallocate his or her own initial endowments for exchange and production. Allowing negative strategies, i.e., reallocations with negative amount, we show that the core of this economy can be characterized as the set of allocations corresponding to strategy profiles for which no coalition has a self-supporting deviation, i.e., a deviation that is not free-riding on the allocations made by the complementary coalition. Moreover, restricting strategies to be nonnegative, the classical β-core and α-core both generate precisely the core allocations of the economy.

China, the UN, and Human Protection

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosemary Foot
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
World Order ◽  
Active Engagement ◽  
Fair Share ◽  
Global Order ◽  
The Core ◽  
Short Period ◽  
The Future ◽  
The United Nations

Over a relatively short period of time, Beijing moved from passive involvement with the UN to active engagement. How are we to make sense of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) embrace of the UN, and what does its engagement mean in larger terms? Is it a ‘supporter’ that takes its fair share of responsibilities, or a ‘spoiler’ that seeks to transform the UN’s contribution to world order? Certainly, it is difficult to label it a ‘shirker’ in the last decade or more, given Beijing’s apparent appreciation of the UN, its provision of public goods to the organization, and its stated desire to offer ‘Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind’. This study traces questions such as these, interrogating the value of such categorization through direct focus on Beijing’s involvement in one of the most contentious areas of UN activity—human protection—contentious because the norm of human protection tips the balance away from the UN’s Westphalian state-based profile, towards the provision of greater protection for the security of individuals and their individual liberties. The argument that follows shows that, as an ever-more crucial actor within the United Nations, Beijing’s rhetoric and some of its practices are playing an increasingly important role in determining how this norm is articulated and interpreted. In some cases, the PRC is also influencing how these ideas of human protection are implemented. At stake in the questions this book tackles is both how we understand the PRC as a participant in shaping global order, and the future of some of the core norms that constitute global order.

scholarly journals Cheater-altruist synergy in immunopathogenic ecological public goods games

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryce Morsky ◽  
Dervis Can Vural
Keyword(s):  
Immune System ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Average Growth ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Cheating Behavior ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Population Dynamics Models ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Dynamics Models

AbstractMuch research has focused on the deleterious effects of free-riding in public goods games, and a variety of mechanisms that suppresses cheating behavior. Here we argue that under certain conditions cheating behavior can be beneficial to the population. In a public goods game, cheaters do not pay for the cost of the public goods, yet they receive the benefit. Although this free-riding harms the entire population in the long run, the success of cheaters may aid the population when there is a common enemy that antagonizes both cooperators and cheaters. Here we study models in which an immune system antagonizes a cooperating pathogen. We investigate three population dynamics models, and determine under what conditions the presence of cheaters help defeat the immune system. The mechanism of action is that a polymorphism of cheaters and altruists optimizes the average growth rate. Our results give support for a possible synergy between cooperators and cheaters in ecological public goods games.

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Liesbet Hooghe ◽  
Tobias Lenz ◽  
Gary Marks
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
International Organization ◽  
International Governance ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
The Core ◽  
Set Up

Chapter 1 sets out the core puzzle of international governance, introduces postfunctionalist theory, and situates it in relation to realism, liberal institutionalism, and constructivism. Postfunctionalism theorizes how conceptions of community constrain the functional provision of public goods across territorial scale. It hypothesizes that international organization is social as well as functional and provides a precise and falsifiable explanation of the institutional set-up of an IO, including its membership, contractual basis, policy portfolio, and the extent to which an IO pools authority in collective decision making and delegates authority to independent actors.

Blocking Coalitions and Fairness in Asset Markets and Asymmetric Information Economies

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anuj Bhowmik ◽  
Maria Gabriella Graziano
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Asset Markets ◽  
The Core ◽  
Information Models ◽  
The Status ◽  
Initial Improvement ◽  
Core Allocations ◽  
Asymmetric Information Economies

AbstractThis paper analyses two properties of the core in a two-period exchange economy under uncertainty: the veto power of arbitrary sized coalitions; and coalitional fairness of core allocations. We study these properties in relation to classical (static) and sequential (dynamic) core notions and apply our results to asset markets and asymmetric information models. We develop a formal setting where consumption sets have no lower bound and impose a series of general restrictions on the first period trades of each agent. All our results are applications of the same lemma about improvements to an allocation that is either non-core or non-coalitionally fair. Roughly speaking, the lemma states that if all the members of a coalition achieve a better allocation in some way (for instance, by blocking the status quo allocation or because they envy the net trade of other coalitions) then an alternative improvement can be obtained through a perturbation of the initial improvement.

scholarly journals Free Riding without Dead Weight Losses

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (19) ◽  
pp. 5168
Author(s):  
Kwon-Sik Kim ◽  
Seong-ho Jeong
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Weight Loss ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Dead Weight ◽  
Policy Choices ◽  
Weight Losses

Traditional economic theory assumes that dead weight loss due to free riding on public goods is inevitable. This study demonstrates that free riding without dead weight losses can theoretically exist through Bowen’s model. To this end, this study uses the consumer surplus analysis to present the conditions for free-riding that do not involve dead weight losses, as well as to demonstrate that policy choices that satisfy both the value of efficiency and equity in the supply of public goods are possible. This article formularizes the conditions under which such exceptional cases occur and examines what policy implications the presence of such conditions have in making decisions about the provision of public goods. The discussion of possibility and conditions for free-riding without dead weight losses is significant in that it suggests theoretical and policy implications for policies to raise equity as another important value, not just providing a solution to market failure.

Political Solutions to the Collective Action Problem

1980 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Laver
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
The Core ◽  
Political Entrepreneurs ◽  
Production Problems

This paper juxtaposes two important political solutions to the collective action problem in the context of a common set of core assumptions. Once the core assumptions have been discussed, the distinction between the consumption and the production problems associated with public goods provision is elaborated. These assumptions and this distinction are applied to a comparison between a theory of individualistic anarchy, and a theory of competitive political entrepreneurs. Revisions of both are required to enable them to be placed within this framework. While the two theories are neither exclusive nor exhaustive they can, between them, be used to understand public goods provision in a number of different circumstances.

scholarly journals Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments

2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (1) ◽  
pp. 541-556 ◽  
Author(s):  
Urs Fischbacher ◽  
Simon Gächter
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Real World ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Voluntary Contributions ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Individual Preferences ◽  
D 83 ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Voluntary Cooperation

One lingering puzzle is why voluntary contributions to public goods decline over time in experimental and real-world settings. We show that the decline of cooperation is driven by individual preferences for imperfect conditional cooperation. Many people's desire to contribute less than others, rather than changing beliefs of what others will contribute over time or people's heterogeneity in preferences makes voluntary cooperation fragile. Universal free riding thus eventually emerges, despite the fact that most people are not selfish. (D12, D 83, H41, Z13)

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