The persistence and transition of multiple public goods games resolves the social dilemma

2022 ◽  
Vol 418 ◽  
pp. 126858
Author(s):  
Jialu He ◽  
Jianwei Wang ◽  
Fengyuan Yu ◽  
Wei Chen ◽  
Wenshu Xu
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
The Social

REDUCED ENTANGLEMENT FOR QUANTUM GAMES

2003 ◽  
Vol 01 (03) ◽  
pp. 321-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
LI ZHANG ◽  
TAD HOGG
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Entangled States ◽  
Improve Performance ◽  
Quantum Games ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Social Dilemma Games ◽  
Unique Nash Equilibrium

Quantum generalizations of conventional games exploit entangled states to improve performance. With many players, quantum games can require entangling many states. Such entanglement is difficult to implement, especially if the states must be communicated over some distance. To simplify possible implementations, we examine some quantum versions of social dilemma games and show their use of entanglement can be substantially reduced by randomly replacing some of the entangled states by unentangled ones. For the example of public goods games, we identify a unique Nash equilibrium invariant with respect to the amount of this replacement. We also show players obtain no advantage from adding more entanglement to states which they control. With many players, a fairly small number of entangled states can give nearly as good performance as using the full number of such states.

Gossip and Reputation in Social Dilemmas

2019 ◽  
pp. 192-213
Author(s):  
Manfred Milinski
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Interaction Partner ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Trust Games ◽  
The Individual

In a social dilemma the interest of the individual is in conflict with that of the group. However, individuals will help their group, if they gain in reputation that pays off later. Future partners can observe cooperative or defective behavior or, more likely, hear about it through gossip. In Indirect Reciprocity games, Public Goods games, and Trust games gossip may be the only information a participant can use to decide whether she can trust her interaction partner and give away her holdings hoping for reciprocation. Even the mere potential for gossip can increase trust and trustworthiness thus promoting cooperation. Gossip is a cheap mechanism for disciplining free riders, potentially even extortioners. The temptation for manipulative gossip defines the gossiper’s dilemma. Psychological adaptations for assessing gossip veracity help to avoid being manipulated. The danger of false gossip is reduced when multiple gossips exist.

scholarly journals Group Formation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: a Survey and Meta-Analytic Evidence

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Guido ◽  
Andrea Robbett ◽  
Rustam Romaniuc
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Meta Analysis ◽  
Group Formation ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Common Pool Resources ◽  
Sorting Method ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Highly Sensitive ◽  
Social Dilemma Games

We survey the growing literature on group formation in the context of three types of social dilemma games: public goods games, common pool resources, and the prisoner’s dilemma. The 62 surveyed papers study the effect of different sorting mechanisms – endogenous, endogenous with the option to play the game, and exogenous – on cooperation rates. Our survey shows that cooperators are highly sensitive to the presence of free-riders, independently of the sorting mechanism. We complement the survey with a meta-analysis showing no difference in terms of cooperation between studies implementing an endogenous and exogenous sorting. What is more, we find that it is no more likely for a cooperator to be matched with like-minded partners in endogenously formed groups than in exogenously formed groups. These observations are related. As we show in the survey, the success of a sorting method in matching like-minded individuals and the levels of cooperation are closely interlinked.

Individuele verschillen in sociale dilemma’s : Het effect van vertrouwen op straffen in een publiekgoedspel

2020 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-53
Author(s):  
Esmee Bosma ◽  
Vincent Buskens
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Research Question ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Individual Characteristics ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Multilevel Regression ◽  
Public Goods Games

Summary Individual differences in social dilemmas: the effect of trust on costly punishment in a public goods gameThe establishment of cooperation in public goods dilemmas is important to real life problems such as improving the environment. Cooperation is facilitated when people are able to punish uncooperative behavior. Individual characteristics of persons, however, can affect cooperation and punishment behaviour. This study focuses on individual differences in trust and investigates the effect of trust on cooperation and punishment behaviour in a linear public goods game with peer punishment opportunities. The research question is: ‘What is the effect of individual differences in trust on cooperation and on the likelihood of punishing non-cooperative behaviour of fellow players in public goods games with punishing possibilities?’ Experimental data of 148 participants is used to research their cooperation and punishment behaviour. Multilevel regression is used to analyse the data. The results demonstrate a positive effect of trust on cooperation. We do not find an effect of trust on punishment. Further suggestions are provided for future research on how individual motivations still might affect behaviour in a social dilemma with punishment opportunities.

Endogenous Authority and Enforcement in Public Goods Games

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wooyoung Lim ◽  
Jipeng Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Cost ◽  
Large Degree ◽  
Social Benefits ◽  
Efficiency Gain ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Efficient Outcome ◽  
The Social

AbstractThis paper investigates theoretically and experimentally the social benefits and cost to have an endogenous punishment-enforcing authority in public goods game. An authority is chosen among members of a society via an imperfectly discriminating contest prior to a public goods game. Once chosen the authority has a large degree of discretion to inflict punishment. Our theoretical result shows that an efficiency gain from having the endogenous authority always comes with a social cost from competing for being the authority. The larger the society is, however, the bigger the efficiency gain and the smaller the rent dissipation. The completely efficient outcome can be approximated as the size of society tends to infinity. The experimental results confirm that the presence of endogenous authority for a given group size increases the public goods contributions and the efficiency gain is significantly bigger in a larger group.

Sadism, the Intuitive System, and Antisocial Punishment in the Public Goods Game

2017 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 337-346 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Pfattheicher ◽  
Johannes Keller ◽  
Goran Knezevic
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Aggressive Behavior ◽  
Crucial Role ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Destructive Behavior ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
The Social ◽  
Basic Characteristics ◽  
Reflective Processes

In public goods situations, a specific destructive behavior emerges when individuals face the possibility of punishing others: antisocial punishment, that is, costly punishing cooperative individuals. So far, little is known about the (intuitive or reflective) processes underlying antisocial punishment. Building on the Social Heuristics Hypothesis and arguing that antisocial punishment reflects the basic characteristics of sadism, namely, aggressive behavior to dominate and to harm other individuals it is assumed that everyday sadists intuitively engage in antisocial punishment. Two studies document that activating (Study 1) and inhibiting (Study 2) the intuitive system when a punishment option can be realized in one-shot iterated public goods games increased (Study 1) and reduced (Study 2) antisocial punishment, in particular among individuals who reported a proneness to sadism. In sum, the present research suggests that sadistic tendencies executed intuitively play a crucial role regarding antisocial punishment in public goods situations.

scholarly journals Do Economists Punish Less?

Games ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 75
Author(s):  
Jonas Kaiser ◽  
Kasper Pedersen ◽  
Alexander Koch
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
The Public ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
The Social ◽  
Economics Students

A number of studies discuss whether and how economists differ from other disciplines in the amount that they contribute to public goods. We view this debate as incomplete because it neglects the willingness to sanction non-cooperative behavior, which is crucial for maintaining social order and for sustaining the provision of public goods. We study the decision whether to engage in costly punishment of a free rider in a survey-based experiment with 1423 students from seven study areas in the social sciences, as well as medicine at Aarhus University, Denmark. Using a dictator game and a social dilemma game, that captures essential features of the public goods game, we replicate previous findings that economics students give significantly less than students from other disciplines. However, when subjects decide whether or not to punish a free rider, we find that economics students are just as likely to punish as students from other disciplines.

scholarly journals Institution Formation in Public Goods Games

2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (4) ◽  
pp. 1335-1355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Kosfeld ◽  
Akira Okada ◽  
Arno Riedl
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Formation Process ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Institution Formation ◽  
Group Welfare ◽  
Endogenous Formation

Sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-riding tendencies and enforcing outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations. We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, the endogenous formation of institutions in public goods provision. Our theoretical analysis shows that players may form sanctioning institutions in equilibrium, including those governing only a subset of players. The experiment confirms that institutions are formed and that it positively affects cooperation and group welfare. However, the data also shows that success is not guaranteed. Players are unwilling to implement equilibrium institutions in which some players have the opportunity to free ride. Our results emphasize the role of fairness in the institution formation process. (JEL C72, D02, H41)

scholarly journals Noncompliance With Safety Guidelines as a Free-Riding Strategy: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Approach to Cooperation During the COVID-19 Pandemic

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jose C. Yong ◽  
Bryan K. C. Choy
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Psychological Mechanisms ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
The Social ◽  
Evolved Psychological Mechanisms ◽  
Game Theoretic

Evolutionary game theory and public goods games offer an important framework to understand cooperation during pandemics. From this perspective, the COVID-19 situation can be conceptualized as a dilemma where people who neglect safety precautions act as free riders, because they get to enjoy the benefits of decreased health risk from others’ compliance with policies despite not contributing to or even undermining public safety themselves. At the same time, humans appear to carry a suite of evolved psychological mechanisms aimed at curbing free riding in order to ensure the continued provision of public goods, which can be leveraged to develop more effective measures to promote compliance with regulations. We also highlight factors beyond free riding that reduce compliance rates, such as the emergence of conspiratorial thinking, which seriously undermine the effectiveness of measures to suppress free riding. Together, the current paper outlines the social dynamics that occur in public goods dilemmas involving the spread of infectious disease, highlights the utility and limits of evolutionary game-theoretic approaches for COVID-19 management, and suggests novel directions based on emerging challenges to cooperation.

EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENT KNOWLEDGE ON AGGLOMERATION AND COOPERATION IN SPATIAL PUBLIC GOODS GAMES

2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (supp01) ◽  
pp. 1250056 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHENG-YI XIA ◽  
SANDRO MELONI ◽  
YAMIR MORENO
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Competitive Environments ◽  
The Social ◽  
Standing Problem

Nowadays, our society is characterized by high levels of social cohesion and cooperation that are in contrast with the selfish nature of human beings. One of the principal challenges for the social sciences is to explain the emergence of agglomeration and cooperative behavior in an environment characterized by egoistic individuals. In this paper we address this long standing problem with the tools given by evolutionary game theory. Specifically, we explore a model in which selfish individuals interact in a public goods creation environment. As a further ingredient each agent is characterized by an individual expectation and, if unsatisfied, can change its location. In this scenario we study the effects of the knowledge of other players' performances on both cooperation and agglomeration and discuss the results in the context of previous and related works. Our results show that cooperation and agglomeration are generally robust against the inclusion of different information on other player performances and, in some cases, it can produce an enhancement of the cooperative behavior. Moreover, our results demonstrate that only in extreme and very competitive environments cooperation and agglomeration are lost.

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