scholarly journals Modeling Adoption Behavior of Prefabricated Building with Multiagent Interaction: System Dynamics Analysis Based on Data of Jiangsu Province

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Zhen Li ◽  
Shaowen Zhang ◽  
Qingfeng Meng
Keyword(s):  
System Dynamics ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Quality Factors ◽  
Acceptance Probability ◽  
Construction Enterprise ◽  
Construction Enterprises ◽  
The Government ◽  
Government Construction ◽  
Prefabricated Building

In recent years, the development of prefabricated building (PB) mode in China has gradually attracted the attention of stakeholders. It is of great significance to explore the adoption behavior of PB mode by Chinese construction enterprises. Using the method of combining evolutionary game theory with system dynamics and considering the multiagent interaction of the government, construction enterprises, and consumers, as well as the influence of multiple factors, this paper constructs a model of construction enterprises' adoption behavior of PB mode. The purpose is to clarify the mechanism of Chinese construction enterprises' adoption behavior of PB mode and the evolution law of market share. The research results show the following. Firstly, government subsidy plays an important role in promoting the maturity of PB market, but it plays a relatively small role in the more mature and stable market. Secondly, the higher the initial acceptance probability of the construction enterprise, the greater the peak of the PB market share and the greater the volatility, but it has no differential impact on the balance of the PB market in the later stage. Thirdly, price factors and quality factors, respectively, have an important impact on the increase of the PB market share in the early and late stages of the formation of the PB market, but the delivery waiting time factor has no significant impact on the PB market share.

scholarly journals Discussion on Implementation and Supervision of Safety Production Responsibility of Construction Engineering Enterprises

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Production Management ◽  
Work Behavior ◽  
Construction Enterprise ◽  
Construction Engineering ◽  
Construction Enterprises ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Management Ability ◽  
Safety Production ◽  
The Government ◽  
Production Problems

 In order to improve the safety production management ability of construction enterprises in an all-round way and implement the main responsibility of enterprise safety production, the government supervision department should play its own important role, adhere to the implementation of system requirements and supervision work principles according to the safety production responsibility, carry out overall planning and reasonable deployment for the safety production problems of construction engineering enterprises in many aspects. Through the continuous standardization of construction enterprise safety production work behavior, to curb the occurrence of all kinds of safety production accidents. This paper mainly stands in the perspective of the supervision department, studies and analyzes the implementation of safety production responsibility and supervision measures of construction engineering enterprises, for reference only.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Simulation on Government Incentive Strategies of Prefabricated Construction: A System Dynamics Approach

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baoquan Cheng ◽  
Yuhu Wei ◽  
Wei Zhang ◽  
Xintao Zhou ◽  
Huihua Chen ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
System Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Environmental Benefits ◽  
Construction Technology ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Incentive Strategies ◽  
Game Simulation ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Rational Range

Prefabricated construction is a state-of-the-art construction technology of both socio-economic and environmental benefits, but sometimes, it is not welcome due to its high cost. Governments play an important role in deeply promoting prefabricated construction, but its effects are not clear. This paper developed a system dynamics model for investigating and simulating the impacts of government incentive strategies on prefabricated construction by considering the evolutionary game process between the government and contractors. Data of Shanghai, China, is collected for demonstration and validation of the developed simulation model. Results show that (1) the evolutionary stable strategy does not exist in static game process; (2) the rate of adopting prefabricated construction is affected by the level of penalties and subsidies; (3) dynamic incentive strategies can better improve the stability of the evolutionary game process; and (4) the rational range of incentive rate can be obtained. Findings of this study facilitate governments to formulate and improve the incentive strategies of prefabricated construction, thus boosting the development of construction industrialization.

scholarly journals System Dynamics Analysis of Evolutionary Game Strategies between the Government and Investors Based on New Energy Power Construction Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) Project

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 2533 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Gao ◽  
Zhen-Yu Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
System Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
System Evolution ◽  
Power Construction ◽  
New Energy ◽  
The Government

The public-private-partnership (PPP) is a new mode for the government and social capital to jointly invest in public infrastructure projects. In particular, PPP projects for new energy power construction have been strongly supported in some countries in recent years, because it can not only reduce financial pressure on the government, but also promote the development of new energy. Current scholars study the economic benefits of PPP projects for new energy power construction from a macro perspective, and they rarely study behavioral strategies of the government and social capital as a game process of project construction from a micro perspective. This paper will fill this gap. This study firstly built an evolutionary game model of the government and investors based on new energy power construction PPP projects. Secondly, taking China’s typical new energy power construction PPP project–waste incineration power generation as an example, the system dynamics (SD) model was proposed to simulate the evolutionary process of game players’ behavioral strategies. Finally, the effects of key factors in the construction of PPP project on the strategies’ stability were studied. The results show that: (1) there is no evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the game system between the government and investors, and system evolution is characterized by periodic behavior. (2) When the government implements dynamic bounty measures, the system evolution process is still a closed loop with periodic motion. However, when the government implements dynamic punishment measures, there is a stable ESS in the hybrid strategy of the game system. (3) The government can increase unit fines when making dynamic strategic adjustments, which will not only promote the active cooperation of investors, but also reduce the probability of government supervision, thereby reducing costs.

scholarly journals Research on Green Construction Supervision Mechanism Based on Evolutionary Game

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 98
Author(s):  
Wei Wei ◽  
Zhongfu Qin
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Construction Enterprise ◽  
Construction Enterprises ◽  
Green Construction ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Game Player ◽  
Construction Supervision ◽  
Supervision Mechanism

<p><em>On the basis of the analysis of the game relationship between the construction enterprise and the supervision department, the evolutionary game model of the green construction supervision is established. By analyzing the unilateral stability of the game player, it is found that when the regulatory probability of regulatory authorities is maintained at the corresponding regulatory probability of the mixed strategy equilibrium point, the green construction probability of construction enterprises will evolve to 100%, and has good stability. According to this, the supervision mechanism of setting the threshold of supervision probability is put forward so as to realize full coverage of green construction.</em></p>

scholarly journals Evolutionary Process of Promoting Construction Safety Education to Avoid Construction Safety Accidents in China

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (19) ◽  
pp. 10392
Author(s):  
Feng Guo ◽  
Junwu Wang ◽  
Denghui Liu ◽  
Yinghui Song
Keyword(s):  
Construction Projects ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Construction Safety ◽  
Construction Workers ◽  
Safety Education ◽  
Behavior Strategies ◽  
The Government ◽  
Government Construction ◽  
Reward And Punishment

Construction safety is related to the life and health of construction workers and has always been a hot issue of concern for government and construction units. The government can use “construction safety education” to reduce the probability of safety accidents in the construction process and avoid the loss of life and property of construction workers. To encourage construction units to provide safety education for construction workers before construction starts and promote construction workers to actively participate in safety education. In this paper, a tripartite evolutionary game model of government–construction units–construction workers is established, and the factors affecting each party’s behavior strategy are comprehensively analyzed. Firstly, evolutionary game theory is used to investigate the influence of different behavior strategies among government, construction units, and construction workers on the behavior strategies of the other two parties. Secondly, according to the events in different situations, the influence of critical factors on the evolution process of the model is analyzed. On this basis, combined with the construction experience and construction data of actual construction projects, the established model and preliminary conclusions are verified. Finally, a sensitivity analysis of all parameters is carried out. The results show that: (1) The government’s enhancement of reward and punishment is conducive to promoting the choice of "providing safety education" for construction orders and the choice of “actively participating in safety education” for construction workers, but the excessive reward will lead to the government’s unwillingness of participation; (2) The reasonable reward and punishment mechanism set by the government must meet the condition that the sum of rewards and punishments for all parties is more significant than their speculative gains, to ensure the construction safety under the evolutionary stability; (3) Increasing welfare subsidies for construction workers who choose to participate in safety education actively is an effective way to avoid unwilling participation of construction workers.

scholarly journals The Influence of Government’s Economic Management Strategies on the Prefabricated Buildings Promoting Policies: Analysis of Quadripartite Evolutionary Game

Buildings ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (10) ◽  
pp. 444
Author(s):  
Yinghui Song ◽  
Junwu Wang ◽  
Denghui Liu ◽  
Yanru Huangfu ◽  
Feng Guo ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Management Strategies ◽  
Economic Benefits ◽  
Economic Losses ◽  
Economic Management ◽  
The Sustainable Development ◽  
Information Transparency ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Prefabricated Building

As an efficient measure to protect the environment and reduce energy consumption, promoting prefabricated buildings can lead to the sustainable development of the world economy and long-term economic benefits for society. Nevertheless, for China, it is immature because of the high cost and difficulties in the promotion. The government’s strategies in economy and management are crucial to promoting prefabricated building policies. This paper establishes a quadripartite evolutionary game model composed of construction units, property developers, homebuyers, and government departments under the government supervision system by analyzing the entire interest chain of prefabricated buildings projects. It aims to study the impact of government management and economic strategies on promoting prefabricated building policies. The results show that: (1) The government should ensure the construction safety of projects through mature supervision systems to reduce citizens’ resistant moods caused by project quality problems; (2) The government should improve the reward and punishment mechanism to motivate construction units and developers; (3) The government should invite supervision consulting companies to increase information transparency, avoiding the economic losses of the people and the obstruction of policy implementation caused by information imbalance.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game of Government Subsidy Strategy for Prefabricated Buildings Based on Prospect Theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Yu Liu ◽  
Dong Cai ◽  
Chunxiang Guo ◽  
Haizhen Huang
Keyword(s):  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Environmental Benefits ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Long Run ◽  
The Government ◽  
Prefabricated Building

Based on the prospect theory, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model of government and construction units for the problem of poor subsidy construction of government-subsidized construction units and uses the replication dynamic equation to analyse the strategic choice of evolutionary games. The research shows that the evolutionary game system of the construction unit and the government cannot meet the government incentives, and the construction unit also adopts the stable state of the prefabricated building. In the long run, the government subsidy cannot determine whether or not the construction unit will adopt the prefabricated building, and it is the construction cost of the prefabricated building that determines. Therefore, the government's work should shift from subsidies to targeted incentives forconstruction units to reduce the cost of construction of prefabricated buildings. The unit levies an environmental tax and appropriately restricts the income from the traditional cast-in-place construction units, and, on the other hand, it increases the popularization of low-carbon and environmental protection of the fabricated buildings, so that more consumers can recognize the environmental benefits brought by the assembled buildings. It provides a reference for the government to promote the development of prefabricated buildings.

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