War Is in the Error Term

1999 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 567-587 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik Gartzke

At least since Thucydides, students of international relations have sought rational explanations for the advent of war. Rationalist explanations assume purposive action; states are said to make reasoned decisions about the use of force. Although rationalist explanations have proven persuasive, durable, and offer the basis for cumulative theorizing, they also imply substantial limits on what we can know about war. I show that the most general rationalist explanation for war also dictates that the onset of war is theoretically indeterminate. We cannot predict in individual cases whether states will go to war, because war is typically the consequence of variables that are unobservable ex ante, both to us as researchers and to the participants. Thinking probabilistically continues to offer the opportunity to assess international conflict empirically. However, the realization that uncertainty is necessary theoretically to motivate war is much different from recognizing that the empirical world contains a stochastic element. Accepting uncertainty as a necessary condition of war implies that all other variables—however detailed the explanation—serve to eliminate gradations of irrelevant alternatives. We can progressively refine our ability to distinguish states that may use force from those that are likely to remain at peace, but anticipating wars from a pool of states that appear willing to fight will remain problematic. For example, we may achieve considerable success in anticipating crises, but our ability to predict which crises will become wars will probably prove little better than the naive predictions of random chance. The need for uncertainty to account for war means that the same conditions thought to account for war must also exist among states not destined to fight. Otherwise, states themselves will differentiate between opponents in a way that either removes the motives for war or restores uncertainty. It has long been accepted that social processes possess an element of uncertainty, but the centrality of uncertainty to rationalist explanations for war means that the advent of war is itself stochastic. War is literally in the “error term.”


2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathaniel Beck ◽  
Gary King ◽  
Langche Zeng

We address a well-known but infrequently discussed problem in the quantitative study of international conflict: Despite immense data collections, prestigious journals, and sophisticated analyses, empirical findings in the literature on international conflict are often unsatisfying. Many statistical results change from article to article and specification to specification. Accurate forecasts are nonexistent. In this article we offer a conjecture about one source of this problem: The causes of conflict, theorized to be important but often found to be small or ephemeral, are indeed tiny for the vast majority of dyads, but they are large, stable, and replicable wherever the ex ante probability of conflict is large. This simple idea has an unexpectedly rich array of observable implications, all consistent with the literature. We directly test our conjecture by formulating a statistical model that includes its critical features. Our approach, a version of a “neural network” model, uncovers some interesting structural features of international conflict and, as one evaluative measure, forecasts substantially better than any previous effort. Moreover, this improvement comes at little cost, and it is easy to evaluate whether the model is a statistical improvement over the simpler models commonly used.



2011 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 478-496 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesse C. Johnson ◽  
Tiffany D. Barnes

Do state leaders use force abroad to divert supporters’ attention from domestic economic problems? Many studies in international relations attempt to provide an answer to this question but the empirical findings are inconsistent. In this article we argue that it is necessary to consider variations in supporters’ perceptions of leaders’ control of the economy to understand leaders’ incentives to engage in the diversionary use of force. Leaders that are perceived to have high levels of responsibility for the economy will be more likely to use force abroad in the presence of domestic economic problems than leaders that are perceived to have lower levels of responsibility. When leaders are not perceived to have high levels of responsibility they do not have an incentive to use force abroad in the presence of domestic economic problems because the economic problems will not affect the probability that they will retain power. A directed dyad analysis of conflict initiation from 1950 to 1998 supports this hypothesis. This study improves our understanding of patterns of international conflict and, more specifically, the diversionary use of force, by demonstrating the contexts in which diversionary incentives will be strongest.



The history of war is also a history of its justification. The contributions to this book argue that the justification of war rarely happens as empty propaganda. While it is directed at mobilizing support and reducing resistance, it is not purely instrumental. Rather, the justification of force is part of an incessant struggle over what is to count as justifiable behaviour in a given historical constellation of power, interests, and norms. This way, the justification of specific wars interacts with international order as a normative frame of reference for dealing with conflict. The justification of war shapes this order and is being shaped by it. As the justification of specific wars entails a critique of war in general, the use of force in international relations has always been accompanied by political and scholarly discourses on its appropriateness. In much of the pertinent literature the dominating focus is on theoretical or conceptual debates as a mirror of how international normative orders evolve. In contrast, the focus of the present volume is on theory and political practice as sources for the re- and de-construction of the way in which the justification of war and international order interact. The book offers a unique collection of papers exploring the continuities and changes in war discourses as they respond to and shape normative orders from early modern times to the present. It comprises contributions from International Law, History and International Relations and from Western and non-Western perspectives.



2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 458-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingvild Bode ◽  
John Karlsrud

Since the failures of the United Nations of the early 1990s, the protection of civilians has evolved as a new norm for United Nations peacekeeping operations. However, a 2014 United Nations report found that while peacekeeping mandates often include the use of force to protect civilians, this has routinely been avoided by member states. What can account for this gap between the apparently solid normative foundations of the protection of civilians and the wide variation in implementation? This article approaches the question by highlighting normative ambiguity as a fundamental feature of international norms. Thereby, we consider implementation as a political, dynamic process where the diverging understandings that member states hold with regard to the protection of civilians norm manifest and emerge. We visualize this process in combining a critical-constructivist approach to norms with practice theories. Focusing on the practices of member states’ military advisers at the United Nations headquarters in New York, and their positions on how the protection of civilians should be implemented on the ground, we draw attention to their agency in norm implementation at an international site. Military advisers provide links between national ministries and contingents in the field, while also competing for being recognized as competent performers of appropriate implementation practices. Drawing on an interpretivist analysis of data generated through an online survey, a half-day workshop and interviews with selected delegations, the article adds to the understanding of norms in international relations while also providing empirical insights into peacekeeping effectiveness.



Author(s):  
Christopher Daase ◽  
Nicole Deitelhoff

The present chapter turns from the justification of war (the use of force) to the justification of coercion. It proceeds on the assumption that to stabilize the current international order requires less ‘legitimate force’ and more ‘legitimate coercion’ since in most institutions the enforcement of norms—as the very basis of order—does not only or even primarily rely on physical force but on various forms of political and economic coercion. The chapter distinguishes various forms of coercion and reconstructs debates in International Law and International Relations with regard to their legality, legitimacy, and effectiveness. Doing so, Christopher Daase and Nicole Deitelhoff intend to broaden the debate on world order by redirecting the focus from the use of force to the use of less violent coercive measures. Specifically, the chapter introduces a concept of sanction as a means of communicating normative expectations to the normative community rather than executing punishments.



2021 ◽  
pp. 350-376
Author(s):  
Georg Sørensen ◽  
Jørgen Møller ◽  
Robert Jackson

This final chapter addresses a really big question: are international relations heading towards order or chaos? To answer this question, it interrogates the different IR theories presented in previous chapters. An initial section provides a conceptual map, based on a review of different understandings of the concept of world order. The chapter proceeds by discussing the effect of the rise of authoritarian power such as China, new challenges in established democracies, fragile states in the Global South, and the governance provided by international institutions. The chapter ends by arguing that the glass is at the same time half-full and half-empty: the world faces new and formidable challenges and we are very far from meeting current aspirations for world order; at the same time, global relations are much more ordered than they used to be just a few generations ago—and things are far better than many pessimists claim.



Author(s):  
Dayal Anjali ◽  
Howard Lise Morjé

This chapter discusses the origins of peace operations; their evolution alongside the growing international conflict management structures of the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations; and their core functions, composition, and efficacy. Although peace operations have roots in earlier forms of military intervention, their emergence as a dominant tool for conflict management is a distinct innovation of the same internationalist project that forged the UN. Their evolution lays bare the fundamental tensions between state interests and the liberal internationalist project of a ‘world organization for the enforcement of peace’, and their execution has defined the way wars are fought today. The chapter focuses on UN peace operations throughout because they are the modal type of mission in the world. It also discusses the use of force within peace operations, an issue of growing importance that highlights fundamental tensions in the authorization and execution of internationally-led efforts to maintain global peace and security.



Author(s):  
Paola Gaeta ◽  
Jorge E. Viñuales ◽  
Salvatore Zappalà

This chapter discusses the fundamental principles governing international relations. The principles represent the fundamental set of standards on which States are united and which allow a degree of relatively smooth international dealings. They make up the apex of the whole body of international legislation. They constitute overriding legal standards that may be regarded as the constitutional principles of the international community. These principles are: the sovereign equality of States; the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs; the prohibition of the threat or use of force; peaceful settlement of international disputes; the duty to co-operate; the principle of good faith; self-determination of peoples; respect for human rights; and the prevention of significant environmental harm. The discussions then turn to the distinguishing traits of the fundamental principles and the close link between the principles and the need for their co-ordination.



2019 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-15
Author(s):  
Benjamin O Fordham

This essay examines the relationship between history and the quantitative study of international conflict. The usual distinction between these two pursuits does not hold up to close scrutiny. In fact, both research communities are in the business of using theory to explain social processes that occur within historical bounds. Making these historical bounds explicit is an appropriate response to the nature of our subject matter. Doing so also has some important advantages, including more precise theory, higher quality data, better model specification, and the potential to help explain important historical events.



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