Mirror Neurons Responding to Observation of Actions Made with Tools in Monkey Ventral Premotor Cortex

2005 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 212-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pier Francesco Ferrari ◽  
Stefano Rozzi ◽  
Leonardo Fogassi

In the present study, we describe a new type of visuomotor neurons, named tool-responding mirror neurons, which are found in the lateral sector of monkey ventral premotor area F5. Tool-responding mirror neurons discharge when the monkey observes actions performed by an experimenter with a tool (a stick or a pair of pliers). This response is stronger than that obtained when the monkey observes a similar action made with a biological effector (the hand or the mouth). These neurons respond also when the monkey executes actions with both the hand and the mouth. The visual and the motor responses of each neuron are congruent in that they share the same general goal, that is, taking possession of an object and modifying its state. It is hypothesized that after a relatively long visual exposure to tool actions, a visual association between the hand and the tool is created, so that the tool becomes as a kind of prolongation of the hand. We propose that tool-responding mirror neurons enable the observing monkey to extend action-understanding capacity to actions that do not strictly correspond to its motor representations. Our findings support the notion that the motor cortex plays a crucial role in understanding action goals.

2009 ◽  
Vol 364 (1528) ◽  
pp. 2311-2323 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. F. Ferrari ◽  
L. Bonini ◽  
L. Fogassi

The discovery of mirror neurons (MNs), deemed to be at the basis of action understanding, could constitute the potential solution to the ‘correspondence problem’ between one's own and others' action that is crucial for of imitative behaviours. However, it is still to be clarified whether, and how, several imitative phenomena, differing in terms of complexity and cognitive effort, could be explained within a unified framework based on MNs. Here we propose that MNs could differently contribute to distinct imitative behaviours by means of two anatomo-functional pathways, subjected to changes during development. A ‘direct mirror pathway’, directly influencing the descending motor output, would be responsible for neonatal and automatic imitation. This proposal is corroborated by some new behavioural evidences provided here. During development, the increased control of voluntary movements and the capacity to efficiently suppress automatic motor activation during action observation assign to the core MNs regions essentially perceptuo-cognitive functions. These functions would be exploited by an ‘indirect mirror pathway’ from the core regions of the MN system to prefrontal cortex. This latter would play a key role in parsing, storing and organizing motor representations, allowing the emergence of more efficient and complex imitative behaviours such as response facilitation and true imitation.


2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 975-989 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikolaas N. Oosterhof ◽  
Steven P. Tipper ◽  
Paul E. Downing

The discovery of mirror neurons—neurons that code specific actions both when executed and observed—in area F5 of the macaque provides a potential neural mechanism underlying action understanding. To date, neuroimaging evidence for similar coding of specific actions across the visual and motor modalities in human ventral premotor cortex (PMv)—the putative homologue of macaque F5—is limited to the case of actions observed from a first-person perspective. However, it is the third-person perspective that figures centrally in our understanding of the actions and intentions of others. To address this gap in the literature, we scanned participants with fMRI while they viewed two actions from either a first- or third-person perspective during some trials and executed the same actions during other trials. Using multivoxel pattern analysis, we found action-specific cross-modal visual–motor representations in PMv for the first-person but not for the third-person perspective. Additional analyses showed no evidence for spatial or attentional differences across the two perspective conditions. In contrast, more posterior areas in the parietal and occipitotemporal cortex did show cross-modal coding regardless of perspective. These findings point to a stronger role for these latter regions, relative to PMv, in supporting the understanding of others' actions with reference to one's own actions.


2021 ◽  
pp. 174569162199063
Author(s):  
Cecilia Heyes ◽  
Caroline Catmur

Ten years ago, Perspectives in Psychological Science published the Mirror Neuron Forum, in which authors debated the role of mirror neurons in action understanding, speech, imitation, and autism and asked whether mirror neurons are acquired through visual-motor learning. Subsequent research on these themes has made significant advances, which should encourage further, more systematic research. For action understanding, multivoxel pattern analysis, patient studies, and brain stimulation suggest that mirror-neuron brain areas contribute to low-level processing of observed actions (e.g., distinguishing types of grip) but not to high-level action interpretation (e.g., inferring actors’ intentions). In the area of speech perception, although it remains unclear whether mirror neurons play a specific, causal role in speech perception, there is compelling evidence for the involvement of the motor system in the discrimination of speech in perceptually noisy conditions. For imitation, there is strong evidence from patient, brain-stimulation, and brain-imaging studies that mirror-neuron brain areas play a causal role in copying of body movement topography. In the area of autism, studies using behavioral and neurological measures have tried and failed to find evidence supporting the “broken-mirror theory” of autism. Furthermore, research on the origin of mirror neurons has confirmed the importance of domain-general visual-motor associative learning rather than canalized visual-motor learning, or motor learning alone.


2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (S2) ◽  
pp. 2113-2113 ◽  
Author(s):  
A.M. Borghi ◽  
F. Binkofski

The ability to understand intentions of actions performed by others is one of the prerequisites for social interaction. This ability has been attributed to our capacity to mentalize others’ behaviour, by simulating or predicting their mental states that would cause that behaviour and make it comprehensible. Brain imaging studies revealed the so called “mentalizng network” including the pSTS/TPJ, the temporal poles and the medial prefrontal cortex. This network gets constantly activated anytime we try to take the perspective of others or try to simulate their state of mind. On the other hand the discovery of mirror neurons has provided an additional explanation for understanding of the content of actions. The functional properties of these neurons point out that action understanding is primarily based on a mechanism that directly matches the sensory representation of perceived actions with one's own motor representation of the same actions. We provide evidence that both systems interact closely during the processing of intentionality of actions. Thus mentalizing is not the only form of intentional understanding and motor and intentional components of action are closely interwoven. Both systems play an important role in the pathophysiology of schizophrenia.


2014 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
James M. Kilner ◽  
Karl J. Friston

AbstractEver since their discovery, mirror neurons have generated much interest and debate. A commonly held view of mirror neuron function is that they transform “visual information into knowledge,” thus enabling action understanding and non-verbal social communication between con-specifics (Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004). This functionality is thought to be so important that it has been argued that mirror neurons must be a result of selective pressure.


Author(s):  
Vijay Iyer

A posited definition of improvisation encompasses such a broad range of human actions that it is helpful to consider both improvisation and rhythm in terms of embodied cognition and a notion of bodily empathy. This suggests a possible (though unstable and inconclusive) connection to action understanding, empathy, and mirror neurons, while acknowledging the latter’s disputed status. With or without mirror neurons, the concept of action understanding offers a reconsideration of improvisation and music cognition with or without bodies (i.e., live or recorded). The relationship of improvisation, rhythm, and embodiment to contemporary theories of expectation, speech, and the evolution of music are considered. Action understanding is posited as the foundation of both music cognition and the perception of improvisation, marking both processes as inherently intersubjective, even whether the other’s body is absent or fantasized (as is the case with recorded music).


1998 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 527-528 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giacomo Rizzolatti

The evolutionary continuity between the prespeech functions of premotor cortex and its new linguistic functions, the main thesis of MacNeilage's target article, is confirmed by the recent discovery of “mirror” neurons in monkeys and a corresponding action-observation/action-execution matching system in humans. Physiological data (and other considerations) appear to indicate, however, that brachiomanual gestures played a greater role in language evolution than MacNeilage would like to admit.


2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (S2) ◽  
pp. 2127-2127
Author(s):  
V. Gallese

Our seemingly effortless capacity of conceiving of the acting bodies inhabiting our social world as goal-oriented individuals like us depends on the constitution of a shared “we-centric” space. I have proposed that this shared manifold space can be characterized at the functional level as embodied simulation, a basic functional mechanism by means of which our brain/body system models its interactions with the world.The mirroring mechanism for action and other mirroring mechanisms in our brain represent sub-personal instantiations of embodied simulation. Embodied simulation provides a new empirically based notion of intersubjectivity, viewed first and foremost as intercorporeity. Embodied simulation challenges the notion that Folk-psychology is the sole account of interpersonal understanding. Before and below mind reading is intercorporeity as the main source of knowledge we directly gather about others.By means of embodied simulation we can map others’ actions onto our own motor representations, as well as others’ emotions and sensations onto our own viscero-motor and somatosensory representations. “Representation”, as used here, refers to a particular type of content, generated by the relations that our situated and inter-acting brain-body system instantiates with the world. Such content is pre-linguistic and pre-theoretical, but nevertheless has attributes normally and uniquely attributed to conceptual content.Social cognition is not only explicitly reasoning about the contents of someone else's mind. Embodied simulation, gives us a direct insight of other minds thus enabling our capacity to empathize with others.This proposal opens new perspectives on our understanding of autism and other psychopathological states such as schizophrenia.


2014 ◽  
Vol 369 (1644) ◽  
pp. 20130174 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Kraskov ◽  
R. Philipp ◽  
S. Waldert ◽  
G. Vigneswaran ◽  
M. M. Quallo ◽  
...  

Here, we report the properties of neurons with mirror-like characteristics that were identified as pyramidal tract neurons (PTNs) and recorded in the ventral premotor cortex (area F5) and primary motor cortex (M1) of three macaque monkeys. We analysed the neurons’ discharge while the monkeys performed active grasp of either food or an object, and also while they observed an experimenter carrying out a similar range of grasps. A considerable proportion of tested PTNs showed clear mirror-like properties (52% F5 and 58% M1). Some PTNs exhibited ‘classical’ mirror neuron properties, increasing activity for both execution and observation, while others decreased their discharge during observation (‘suppression mirror-neurons’). These experiments not only demonstrate the existence of PTNs as mirror neurons in M1, but also reveal some interesting differences between M1 and F5 mirror PTNs. Although observation-related changes in the discharge of PTNs must reach the spinal cord and will include some direct projections to motoneurons supplying grasping muscles, there was no EMG activity in these muscles during action observation. We suggest that the mirror neuron system is involved in the withholding of unwanted movement during action observation. Mirror neurons are differentially recruited in the behaviour that switches rapidly between making your own movements and observing those of others.


2016 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Bonini

Mirror neurons (MNs) are a fascinating class of cells originally discovered in the ventral premotor cortex (PMv) and, subsequently, in the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) of the macaque, which become active during both the execution and observation of actions. In this review, I will first highlight the mounting evidence indicating that mirroring others’ actions engages a broad system of reciprocally connected cortical areas, which extends well beyond the classical IPL-PMv circuit and might even include subcortical regions such as the basal ganglia. Then, I will present the most recent findings supporting the idea that the observation of one’s own actions, which might play a role in the ontogenetic origin and tuning of MNs, retains a particular relevance within the adult MN system. Finally, I will propose that both cortical and subcortical mechanisms do exist to decouple MN activity from the motor output, in order to render it exploitable for high-order perceptual, cognitive, and even social functions. The findings reviewed here provide an original framework for envisaging the main challenges and experimental directions of future neurophysiological and neuroanatomical studies of the monkey MN system.


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