Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia

2006 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas J. Christensen

This article explores two starkly contrasting analytic approaches to assessing the performance of U.S. security strategy in East Asia since 1991: a positivesum approach, emphasizing the danger of security dilemmas and spirals of tension, and a zero-sum approach, emphasizing power competition and the long-term dangers posed by China's rise. In the policy world, the differences between these apparently irreconcilable perspectives are not so clear. Certain policies—for example, maintaining a strong U.S.-Japan alliance—flow from either logic. Moreover, each approach sometimes counsels counterintuitive policy prescriptions that are generally associated with the other. Relatively assertive U.S. security postures apparently have furthered positive-sum regional goals by catalyzing China to adopt reassuring policies toward its neighbors as a hedge against potential U.S. encirclement. From a zero-sum perspective, the United States often competes more effectively for regional influence by cooperating with China than it would by seeking to contain China's economic growth and diplomatic influence.

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 444-464
Author(s):  
Sovinda Po ◽  
Christopher B. Primiano

In this article, drawing from both interviews and secondary sources, we examine why Cambodia welcomes the rise of China when other states appear to be less enthusiastic. Despite the alarm in the region at China’s assertiveness, Cambodia, unlike some other nation states, has chosen to bandwagon with China. While some states in the region are pursuing a mixed strategy of economic engagement with China on the one hand and security alignment with the United States on the other (i.e. hedging), which allows such states to be on good terms with both the United States and China, Cambodia has embraced China almost exclusively. Situating the issue within the IR literature of bandwagoning, balancing, and hedging, this article presents four variables explaining the motivations behind Cambodia’s bandwagoning policy towards China. Towards the end, we offer some suggestions for Cambodia to move forward.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-97
Author(s):  
Wai Ting

AbstractThe rise of China has aroused heated debates on whether the country would become the “revisionist” power in challenging the supreme position of the “status quo” power, the United States. This paper aims to examine whether the rise of China would, firstly, empower Beijing to solve the long-term crisis in the Korean Peninsula, and secondly, complicates the picture in solving the difficult historical and political issues in Sino-Japanese relations. It is argued that the increasing economic and military capabilities of China are not instrumental in fostering significant changes within North Korea and in monitoring the external behavior of its leaders. A more nationalistic China which lacks soft power also hinders a favorable solution to the challenges of Sino-Japanese relations.


Author(s):  
R. Evan Ellis

The national security challenge presented by the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) to the United States in the Western Hemisphere is principally long-term and indirect. It is a challenge that is widely misunderstood, and only partly related to the growing activities of P.R.C. armed forces in the hemisphere. The severity of the challenge, and its potential to transform from a difficult-to-define erosion of U.S. global position and long-term prosperity to an acute military threat, will depend, in part, on the adeptness of U.S. policymakers in navigating the landscape of threats and opportunities stemming from the rise of China as a dominant global actor. Whether U.S. policymakers are successful or not, China’s presence in the Western Hemisphere will likely continue to be a defining consideration for U.S. national security in the mid-21st century. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss that security challenge and the response of the U.S. to date, and to offer recommendations for U.S. policymakers.


This book demonstrates how structural and domestic variables influence how East Asian states adjust their strategy in light of the rise of China, including how China manages its own emerging role as a regional great power. The book notes that the shifting regional balance of power has fueled escalating tensions in East Asia and suggests that adjustment challenges are exacerbated by the politics of policymaking. International and domestic pressures on policymaking are reflected in maritime territorial disputes and in the broader range of regional security issues created by the rise of China. Adjusting to power shifts and managing a new regional order in the face of inevitable domestic pressure, including nationalism, is a challenging process. Both the United States and China have had to adjust to China's expanded capabilities. China has sought an expanded influence in maritime East Asia; the United States has responded by consolidating its alliances and expanding its naval presence in East Asia. The region's smaller countries have also adjusted to the rise of China. They have sought greater cooperation with China, even as they try to sustain cooperation with the United States. As China continues to rise and challenge the regional security order, the chapters consider whether the region is destined to experience increased conflict and confrontation.


2009 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARK BEESON

AbstractThe ‘rise of China’ is seen by some observers as a precursor of inevitable hegemonic competition in East Asia. At the very least, it seems likely that China’s influence in East Asia will grow at the expense of the United States. Whether this will eventually amount to a form of ‘hegemonic transition’ is far less clear. It is, therefore, an opportune moment to consider the relative strengths and weaknesses of China and the US in East Asia. This paper suggests that the nature of hegemonic competition and transition is more uncertain and complex than some of the most influential theoretical understandings of hegemony would have us believe.


Author(s):  
Wang Dong

This chapter addresses the impact of the rise of China on the growing U.S.–China regional competition. The rise of the Chinese economy has challenged U.S. market dominance in East Asia. In regional security affairs, China has also achieved noticeable gains vis-à-vis the United States; however, its strategic rise remains in its early stages. This distinction between the region's economic and strategic structure has created a great power dual structure in East Asia comprising an “Economic Asia” and a “Security Asia.” China has improved its economic presence in the region, promoting regionwide cooperation within Chinese-led institutions. In security affairs, it has also developed a more proactive policy, but it simultaneously acknowledges the United States as the region's dominant strategic power.


2007 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Siow Yue Chia

East Asia is catching up with the rest of the world in establishing regional trade arrangements (RTAs). This region is responding to pressures from globalization, regionalism in the Americas and Europe, the rise of China and India, improved political relations in the region with the end of the Cold War, as well as market-driven trade and investment integration and the emergence of production networks. ASEAN formed the first RTA in 1992, and by the turn of the decade, ASEAN was signing or negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs) with Japan, China, South Korea, India, Australia–New Zealand, and the European Union. It also entered into bilateral FTAs with the United States and countries in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. ASEAN is also considering an East Asian FTA. Can ASEAN remain in the driver's seat of regional integration and be an effective hub? The FTA proliferation also has important consequences and effects for East Asia and the world trading system.


2016 ◽  
Vol 226 ◽  
pp. 538-550 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Garver

The rapid growth of China's power combined with the intensification of rivalry between the United States and China over the past several years has triggered a re-thinking of US policy toward the rise of China. America's traditional policy of supporting China's rise as a rich, strong and peaceful country in hopes of building a cooperative and generally friendly relation with China over the long term, is being called into question. Critics charge that that traditional policy is backfiring, playing into Beijing's wiles and producing a China so powerful it could well become the greatest challenge to the United States in its history. Other analysts offer a less jaundiced view of China, but all manifest apprehension over whether China will use its growing power to challenge the US. Earlier iterations of a similar debate have come and gone, but the closing distance between US and Chinese military, economic and technological power has brought this debate much closer to the US mainstream. Indeed, one or two of these books may represent the mainstream of US thinking. Together, the four books lay out the topography of the US debate.


1994 ◽  
Vol 33 (4I) ◽  
pp. 327-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard G. Lipsey

I am honoured to be invited to give this lecture before so distinguished an audience of development economists. For the last 21/2 years I have been director of a project financed by the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research and composed of a group of scholars from Canada, the United States, and Israel.I Our brief is to study the determinants of long term economic growth. Although our primary focus is on advanced industrial countries such as my own, some of us have come to the conclusion that there is more common ground between developed and developing countries than we might have first thought. I am, however, no expert on development economics so I must let you decide how much of what I say is applicable to economies such as your own. Today, I will discuss some of the grand themes that have arisen in my studies with our group. In the short time available, I can only allude to how these themes are rooted in our more detailed studies. In doing this, I must hasten to add that I speak for myself alone; our group has no corporate view other than the sum of our individual, and very individualistic, views.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document