China’s Security Challenge to the United States in Latin America and the Caribbean

Author(s):  
R. Evan Ellis

The national security challenge presented by the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) to the United States in the Western Hemisphere is principally long-term and indirect. It is a challenge that is widely misunderstood, and only partly related to the growing activities of P.R.C. armed forces in the hemisphere. The severity of the challenge, and its potential to transform from a difficult-to-define erosion of U.S. global position and long-term prosperity to an acute military threat, will depend, in part, on the adeptness of U.S. policymakers in navigating the landscape of threats and opportunities stemming from the rise of China as a dominant global actor. Whether U.S. policymakers are successful or not, China’s presence in the Western Hemisphere will likely continue to be a defining consideration for U.S. national security in the mid-21st century. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss that security challenge and the response of the U.S. to date, and to offer recommendations for U.S. policymakers.

Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig

This chapter analyzes the rise of China and the threat it poses to the United States and its allies. Some argue that we must begin to come to grips with what life will be like “when China rules the world.” Others maintain that the rise of China and decline of the United States could result in World War III. Fortunately, these predictions are much too dire. This chapter argues that a China led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is unlikely become the world’s leading state. Its autocratic model is not well suited to building a world-beating, innovation economy, to winning friends and allies around the world; or to constructing a lethal military force with global power-projection capabilities. China has a storied past, and it will likely always remain a great power, but it is unlikely to overtake the United States as the world’s leading state any time soon.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 544-561
Author(s):  
Bruna Bosi Moreira

The article aims to assess how the United States has managed the rise of China over the last decade. This is achieved first by addressing the question in a theoretical framework and, second, by making an empirical account on the issue. Therefore, the article contrasts mainly realist and liberal accounts on contention and engagement and applies them to Obama and Trump administration's foreign policies to China. To do that, the paper analyzes the National Security Strategies of both administrations, using the method of content analysis. The research's main result is that the rise of China and the threats to the United States hegemony have been major concerns since the Obama administration. What has changed with Trump in power, though, is the means employed to address the problem, with a shift from engagement rhetoric to an open call for contention. Besides, the paper evidences how this shift is accompanied by a change in the conditions for China’s rise.       Recebido em: fevereiro/2019. Aprovado em: setembro/2019.


2016 ◽  
Vol 226 ◽  
pp. 538-550 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Garver

The rapid growth of China's power combined with the intensification of rivalry between the United States and China over the past several years has triggered a re-thinking of US policy toward the rise of China. America's traditional policy of supporting China's rise as a rich, strong and peaceful country in hopes of building a cooperative and generally friendly relation with China over the long term, is being called into question. Critics charge that that traditional policy is backfiring, playing into Beijing's wiles and producing a China so powerful it could well become the greatest challenge to the United States in its history. Other analysts offer a less jaundiced view of China, but all manifest apprehension over whether China will use its growing power to challenge the US. Earlier iterations of a similar debate have come and gone, but the closing distance between US and Chinese military, economic and technological power has brought this debate much closer to the US mainstream. Indeed, one or two of these books may represent the mainstream of US thinking. Together, the four books lay out the topography of the US debate.


Author(s):  
I. Danilin

The “technological war” between the United States and China that started in 2017–2018 raises a number of questions about the future role of technological development as a factor in relations between superpowers. Analysis shows that for the United States this conflict is caused by changing balance of risks and benefits of the liberal model of globalization due to the rise of China`s power and growing geopolitical tensions between the two nations. In this context, emerging, especially digital, technologies appear to be a new battlefield between superpowers. Within the realist framework, actors consider emerging technologies as a key factor for strengthening their global postures. This, among other things, contributes to securitized technological agenda and strengthens its geopolitical dimension. Neo-technonationalism has become the platform that integrates different processes and goals into new U.S. policy. Although historically neo-technonationalism took its roots in Asia, the evolving market situation prompted the United States to rethink existing approaches and to upgrade the techno-nationalist dimension of its policy. Considering similar policies of China and the EU (i. e. the European digital sovereignty policy), this trend shapes new realities of technological “blocs”, the struggle for expansion of technological platforms, and technological conflicts. Taking into account prospective development needs of the global economy and future specification of mutual interest areas, as new digital technologies mature, the ground for normalizing the dialogue between the superpowers will emerge. However, at least in the U.S.–China case, this issue will be complicated by geopolitical contradictions that leave little room for any serious compromise.


Author(s):  
Paul K. MacDonald ◽  
Joseph M. Parent

This chapter asks the central question, outlines the three main arguments, and explains the value added of the work. It underscores why the question matters to theories of international politics and policy debates on the rise of China and the decline of the United States. It also defines decline and retrenchment,relates retrenchment to a spectrum of grand strategies, and provides a map of the rest of the book.


2020 ◽  
pp. 205-229
Author(s):  
D. Hugh Whittaker ◽  
Timothy J. Sturgeon ◽  
Toshie Okita ◽  
Tianbiao Zhu

Compressed-development influences increasingly flow from developing to developed countries. Reversing our lens to look at the United States and Japan, we observe that the technological and organizational changes that have spurred compressed development in recent developers are also responsible for changes in industry structure, rising inequality, and employment duality in developed economies. A ‘Red Queen’ effect sees developed countries running faster and undertaking parallel socioeconomic changes to stay in the same privileged place. In some ways ‘we are all compressed developers now’. Looking ahead, and returning to our dyadic pairs, the chapter further considers how the ‘digital economy’ may affect developing–developed country interrelations, and whether we are finally entering an age of ‘great convergence’ with the rise of China and a more multipolar economic and geopolitical structure.


2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 444-464
Author(s):  
Sovinda Po ◽  
Christopher B. Primiano

In this article, drawing from both interviews and secondary sources, we examine why Cambodia welcomes the rise of China when other states appear to be less enthusiastic. Despite the alarm in the region at China’s assertiveness, Cambodia, unlike some other nation states, has chosen to bandwagon with China. While some states in the region are pursuing a mixed strategy of economic engagement with China on the one hand and security alignment with the United States on the other (i.e. hedging), which allows such states to be on good terms with both the United States and China, Cambodia has embraced China almost exclusively. Situating the issue within the IR literature of bandwagoning, balancing, and hedging, this article presents four variables explaining the motivations behind Cambodia’s bandwagoning policy towards China. Towards the end, we offer some suggestions for Cambodia to move forward.


2001 ◽  
Vol 100 (649) ◽  
pp. 355-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Stern

America's goal must be to prevent future strikes by its enemies. The United States cannot afford to allow an emotional desire for quick retribution to override its long-term national security interests. It would not be difficult to make things worse rather than better.


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