Intentionality and the Experience of Time

KronoScope ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-39
Author(s):  
Arnold Modell

AbstractThis paper explores the experience of time from the perspective of a concept of intentionality derived from Thomas Aquinas. As action directed at some future goal is determined by memorial categories, intentionality contains within it reference to past and future time. Meaning is achieved through action into the world and in turn the self is altered by that action. As the world is essentially an unlabeled place, we organize experience by means of memorial categories. Memorial categories serve as relatively stable templates, modified by the recontextualization that follows from novel experiences. Thus, the sense of the permanence of the past, that gives time its direction, is a construction of our brain. The now moment of experience is not emotionally neutral; our relation between past and future time is mediated by means of feeling rhythmic synchrony, keeping in time with the other provides the earliest medium for emotional bonding.

2017 ◽  
Vol 41 (S1) ◽  
pp. S717-S717
Author(s):  
D.F. Burgese ◽  
D.P. Bassitt ◽  
D. Ceron-Litvoc ◽  
G.B. Liberali

With the advent of new technologies, the man begins to experience a significant change in the perception of the other, time and space. The acceleration of time promoted by new technology does not allow the exercise of affection for the consolidation of ties, relations take narcissists hues seeking immediate gratification and the other is understood as a continuation of the self, the pursuit of pleasure. It is the acceleration of time, again, which leads man to present the need for immediate, always looking for the new – not new – in an attempt to fill an inner space that is emptied. The retention of concepts and pre-stressing of temporality are liquefied, become fleeting. We learn to live in the world and the relationship with the other in a frivolous and superficial way. The psychic structure, facing new phenomena experienced, loses temporalize capacity and expand its spatiality, it becomes pathological. Post-modern inability to retain the past, to analyze the information received and reflect, is one of the responsible for the mental illness of today's society. From a temporality range of proper functioning, the relationship processes with you and your peers will have the necessary support to become viable and healthy.Disclosure of interestThe authors have not supplied their declaration of competing interest.


Author(s):  
Jennifer Hawkins

Chapter 12 explores radical personal change and its relationship to well-being, welfare, or prudential value. Many theorists of welfare are committed to what is here called the future-based reasons view (FBR), which holds (1) that the best prudential choice in a situation is determined by which possible future has the greatest net welfare value for the subject and (2) what determines facts about future welfare are facts about the subject and the world at that future time. Although some cases of radical change are intuitively prudentially good, many cases of really radical change are not. Yet FBR has trouble explaining this. Many people instinctively reach for the notion of identity to solve this problem—arguing that really radical change cannot be good because it alters who someone is. Yet, as the chapter argues, there are reasons to doubt that appeals to identity are appropriate. The chapter ends with the suggestion that prudential facts may explain why and when retaining identity matters, rather than the other way around, and points to a possible way forward for a theorist of welfare committed to FBR.


2016 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 363-378 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicklas Hållén

In Native Stranger: A Blackamerican’s Journey into the Heart of Africa (1992), Eddy L. Harris explores what it means to be the person he is. What, if anything, connects him to Africa? What is the relation between the person he knows himself to be, and the person others see? Searching for answers to his questions, he finds himself caught between his attempts to remain open to new ways of seeing and understanding the world, on the one hand, and succumbing to the pressures of monolithic narratives about African otherness, race, belonging, roots and the past, on the other hand. This tension gives rise to an ambiguity and a number of contradictions which make the text fold back on itself. His literary project therefore ultimately serves to raise questions not only about his own identity and place in the world, but also about the conditions of writing about the self. Central among the contradictions that permeate the text is a doubling of epistemological perspectives, which can be described as an effect of what W. E. B. Dubois famously termed double-consciousness. While Harris is able to use the contradictions that arise from his writing to explore and represent the complexity of the questions that are foregrounded in his text, he is unable to answer them. His project is in other words a kind of failure, but as this article argues, this failure is the price that Harris pays to access the full complexity of selfhood, beyond political and social narratives about collective identity and how the present is shaped by the past.


1979 ◽  
Vol 3 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 242-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Kuklick

Despite differences in coloration Miller and Benson are birds of a feather. Although he is no Pollyanna, Miller believes that there has been a modest and decent series of advances in the social sciences and that the most conscientious, diligent, and intelligent researchers will continue to add to this stock of knowledge. Benson is much more pessimistic about the achievements of yesterday and today but, in turn, offers us the hope of a far brighter tomorrow. Miller explains Benson’s hyperbolic views about the past and future by distinguishing between pure and applied science and by pointing out Benson’s naivete about politics: the itch to understand the world is different from the one to make it better; and, Miller says, because Benson sees that we have not made things better, he should not assume we do not know more about them; Benson ought to realize, Miller adds, that the way politicians translate basic social knowledge into social policy need not bring about rational or desirable results. On the other side, Benson sees more clearly than Miller that the development of science has always been intimately intertwined with the control of the environment and the amelioration of the human estate.


PMLA ◽  
1967 ◽  
Vol 82 (1) ◽  
pp. 14-27
Author(s):  
Leon F. Seltzer

In recent years, The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade, a difficult work and for long an unjustly neglected one, has begun to command increasingly greater critical attention and esteem. As more than one contemporary writer has noted, the verdict of the late Richard Chase in 1949, that the novel represents Melville's “second best achievement,” has served to prompt many to undertake a second reading (or at least a first) of the book. Before this time, the novel had traditionally been the one Melville readers have shied away from—as overly discursive, too rambling altogether, on the one hand, or as an unfortunate outgrowth of the author's morbidity on the other. Elizabeth Foster, in the admirably comprehensive introduction to her valuable edition of The Confidence-Man (1954), systematically traces the history of the book's reputation and observes that even with the Melville renaissance of the twenties, the work stands as the last piece of the author's fiction to be redeemed. Only lately, she comments, has it ceased to be regarded as “the ugly duckling” of Melville's creations. But recognition does not imply agreement, and it should not be thought that in the past fifteen years critics have reached any sort of unanimity on the novel's content. Since Mr. Chase's study, which approached the puzzling work as a satire on the American spirit—or, more specifically, as an attack on the liberalism of the day—and which speculated upon the novel's controlling folk and mythic figures, other critics, by now ready to assume that the book repaid careful analysis, have read the work in a variety of ways. It has been treated, among other things, as a religious allegory, as a philosophic satire on optimism, and as a Shandian comedy. One critic has conveniently summarized the prevailing situation by remarking that “the literary, philosophical, and cultural materials in this book are fused in so enigmatic a fashion that its interpreters have differed as to what the book is really about.”


Author(s):  
Roman Szubin

The article is devoted to the search for a new space in the methodological studies on Russian literature. The author takes as its basis the method of hermeneutics  of words by Vardan Hayrapetyan. Especially the basic categories such as the world man (homo mundi), the Other and its variants: the self (rus. самость), otherness (rus. дру­гость), the alien (rus. чужесть) and two triads, which postulate two types of intellectual situations. In this regard, the author identifies the concept of the hybrid man of the hero of Russian literature in which a small person is a representative of an impersonal collective personality of the world man, home, family, ideas, etc. The author demonstrates the type of a hybrid man on the example of the protagonist of the novel by Vasily Shukshin Stepan Razin.


Adam alemi ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 90 (4) ◽  
pp. 3-10
Author(s):  
Dina Kazantseva ◽  

The essence of personality potential is one of the important characteristics of understanding a person as an integral being, creating an individual space of personal aspirations and values. The origins of the problem under consideration in various forms are present in the philosophical reflections of many researchers and have a long history. Even Socrates, Plotinus, Cicero, Thomas Aquinas drew attention to the deep foundations and spiritual essence of man, to the presence of virtues in a state of potential stagnation, to the need for their development in order to achieve the ideal of perfection. N. Kuzansky, S. L. Frank, P. I. Tillich noted the presence of latent force unfolding in time in living beings, the rejection of the self and introduction into something higher, the correlation of the divine and the human, the interconnection of things and events, etc. The modern world actualizes the solution to the problem, creating conditions for a deeper understanding of the potential, consideration of its integrity and the essential foundations of maximum realization. The crisis in all spheres of human life, economic, political, social, requires a quantum leap in understanding the potential and building, on the basis of modern studies of the phenomenon, new projects for transforming reality. In this regard, understanding the historical aspect of studying the logic of the genesis of potential makes an invaluable contribution to solving this problem. Understanding the depth of philosophical thought in a historical retrospective about the origin, emergence and existence of potential will allow you to connect the past and the present, as well as qualitatively advance into the future.


Author(s):  
Andrea Possamai

The present essay aims, on the one hand, to recall the reasons of anti-naturalism, intended in a metaphysical perspective, of a large part of medieval philosophical and theological reflection and, on the other hand, to show how the same type of problems, specifically those concerning the possible mutability or immutability of the past, can be employed in favour of various conflicting positions on the matter. To demonstrate this, reference was made to some thinkers who could represent emblematic positions on the theme, in particular: Pliny the Elder for the ancient world, Augustine of Hippo, Peter Damian, Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas for the medieval era.


Author(s):  
Sjoerd van Tuinen

THIS BOOK EXPLORES some of the implications of and opportunities within the speculative turn in continental philosophy from the perspective of art history. Speculation? Besides its only legitimate domain today, that of finance, is this not a thing of the past, when metaphysicians were used to making unverifiable claims about the nature of God, the World and the Self? From Kant to Wittgenstein, critical philosophy has taught us to remain silent on that of which we cannot speak. Likewise, art history has come a long way in establishing itself as a positive human science independent from its metaphysical beginnings. In both cases, enlightened, self-critical and self-reflective thought has worked hard on closing the door to ontology, on reducing the Ideas of reason to ideology and on limiting the domain of knowledge to phenomenal objects. Speculation, it seems, has not been ...


Author(s):  
George I. Mavrodes

Predestination appears to be a religious or theological version of universal determinism, a version in which the final determining factor is the will or action of God. It is most often associated with the theological tradition of Calvinism, although some theologians outside the Calvinist tradition, or prior to it (for example, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas), profess similar doctrines. The idea of predestination also plays a role in some religions other than Christianity, perhaps most notably in Islam. Sometimes the idea of predestination is formulated in a comparatively restricted way, being applied only to the manner in which the divine grace of salvation is said to be extended to some human beings and not to others. John Calvin, for example, writes: We call predestination God’s eternal decree, by which he compacted with himself what he willed to become of each man. For all are not created in equal condition; rather, eternal life is foreordained for some, eternal damnation for others. Therefore, as any man has been created to one or the other of these ends, we speak of him as predestined to life or to death. (Institutes, bk 3, ch. 21, sec. 5) At other times, however, the idea is applied more generally to the whole course of events in the world; whatever happens in the world is determined by the will of God. Philosophically, the most interesting aspects of the doctrine are not essentially linked with salvation. For instance, if God is the first cause of all that happens, how can people be said to have free will? One answer may be that people are free in so far as they act in accordance with their own motives and desires, even if these are determined by God. Another problem is that the doctrine seems to make God ultimately responsible for sin. A possible response here is to distinguish between actively causing something and passively allowing it to happen, and to say that God merely allows people to sin; it is then human agents who actively choose to sin and God is therefore not responsible.


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