Governance during Disasters: Intra-Governmental and Non-Governmental Coordination in the 2006 Guimaras Oil Spill

2010 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-152
Author(s):  
Rosalie Arcala Hall

The responses of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Petron, government line agencies, local government authorities and non-government organizations to the 2006 Solar I oil spill were moderated by their relative positions within overlapping and competing disaster-specific frameworks at the agency (PCG), local and regional levels. The regional Task Force Solar I Oil Spill (RTFSOS), once convened, overshadowed the other frameworks owing largely to national calamity funds channeled through its member line agencies. While the task force design allowed for better job delineation and horizontal coordination between a limited number of stakeholders, the framework nevertheless marginalized the PCG, local government authorities and NGOs while endowing Petron a legitimate basis for its involvement in response operations. The absence of a widely-accepted protocol for ameliorating the spill’s environmental and human health impact created tension between line government agencies and academic/research communities. Unlike other disasters, the prospect of financial largesse from the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, either as reimbursements for response activities and compensation for livelihood losses, animated stakeholder and local reactions.

1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 761-765
Author(s):  
William Boland ◽  
Pete Bontadelli

ABSTRACT The Marine Safety Division of the 11th Coast Guard District and the California Office of Oil Spill Prevention and Response are pursuing new avenues to assure that federal, state, and local efforts in California achieve the goals of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the Lempert-Keene-Seastrand Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act of 1990. Coordination of the seven California area committees, publishing detailed area contingency plans, and the implemention of a memorandum of agreement on oil spill prevention and response highlight recent cooperative successes. In 1994 a joint Coast Guard/state/industry incident command system task force drafted an ICS field operations guide and incident action plan forms that meet National Interagency Incident Management System and fire scope ICS requirements.


1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 635-638
Author(s):  
William C. Rogers ◽  
Jean R. Cameron

ABSTRACT Oil shipping companies operating on the West Coast of the United States are subject to international, federal, and state oil spill prevention and response planning regulations. Many companies wrote separate plans for each jurisdiction with the result that tank vessels carried several different plans on board and parent companies faced an administrative burden in keeping plans current. In June 1996, oil shipping company representatives proposed that the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force work with them to develop a format incorporating West Coast states' and U.S. Coast Guard contingency planning requirements. A workgroup comprised of representatives of the Task Force, industry, and the U.S. Coast Guard, working cooperatively, eventually proposed a voluntary integrated plan format based on the key elements of the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Response Plan. This format allowed correlation with state planning requirements as well as with the Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) required by international regulations. The U.S. Coast Guard, the Canadian Ministry of Transport, and all West Coast states have subsequently documented their agreement to accept vessel plans in this format, to coordinate review as needed, and to allow references to public documents such as Area Plans.


1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 263-265
Author(s):  
Jon Neel ◽  
John Bones ◽  
Elizabeth Dimmick ◽  
Lynn J. Tomich Kent ◽  
Roger Dunstan ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT The States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force was established in 1989 to enhance spill coordination among the West Coast states and British Columbia, and to address a number of issues that became apparent during the Nestucca barge and Exxon Valdez oil spills. Task Force members are the directors of the oil spill prevention and response agencies in Alaska, British Columbia, California, Oregon, and Washington. The Task Force has become a national model for facilitating cooperation and building consensus between coastal states and provinces and their federal governments. In October of 1990, the task force issued a report containing a comprehensive set of recommendations addressing oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response. The group had achieved remarkable consensus, and many of the report's recommendations have been included in recent legislation enacted by the member states. The success of the task force's approach to regional coordination has also reduced the need for a proposed Pacific Oceans Resources Interstate Compact, which has been proposed to expand the states' role in areas of regulation that are otherwise federally preempted. The task force has become an effective mechanism for developing vigorous, productive relationships between government agencies, industry, and the public in both the United States and Canada. It has created important linkages between state/provincial and federal regulatory activities; for example, by providing input to Coast Guard and EPA rulemaking that implemented the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. It also assisted in assuring a well-coordinated international response to the July 1991 Tenyo Maru oil spill outside the Strait of Juan De Fuca between Washington and British Columbia. The task force is continuing to advance its goals of promoting public policy on oil spill prevention; cooperative management of major spills by government and industry; protection of the states/provincial rights and their natural and economic resources; and inter-governmental consistency in regulations adopted for oil spill prevention, contingency planning, and resource damage assessment.


2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 655-661
Author(s):  
Heather A. Parker-Hall ◽  
Steve Hampton ◽  
James Haas

ABSTRACT In February 2002, a Unified Command (UC) comprised of the United States Coast Guard (USCG), the California Department of Fish and Game's Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR), and other state and federal agencies tested a sample of oil taken from the water near the wreck SS Jacob Luckenbach. Oil from this fifty-year-old wreck, submerged in 176 feet of water 17 miles off San Francisco, matched oil that had impacted thousands of birds and miles of shoreline since November 2001. It also matched oil from mystery spills in this area dating back to 1992. Now that the source of this extensive pollution was found, the next step seemed simple: remove the oil from the vessel. Yet there were many issues surrounding this vessel and its location that required significant cooperation with many agencies and trustees. The Luckenbach is an historic property, protected by the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). It is submerged in the Gulf of Farallones National Marine Sanctuary - one of the most biologically productive regions off the California coast and home to many sensitive resources including several listed species. The UC realized that dialogue with and among the natural resource trustee agencies was crucial to planning balanced operations that would remove the pollution source while providing the utmost protection available to the resources at risk A task force was formed that allowed trustees to engage in discussions about the tradeoffs of initiating removal as quickly as possible while balancing the risk of harm that any incidental release during operations may cause to their resources of concern. One of the most exciting benefits of this cooperative effort was the shift in thinking beyond just responding to the incident to advanced planning of a response that would best enhance restoration and long-term recovery. In many responses, it is not always clear that everyone has the same priorities: the USCG may focus on recovering oil and mitigating damage, the responsible party wants to minimize costs, and the trustees want to protect and restore their resources. In this case, the trustees and USCG were clearly working together toward common goals: removing a source of chronic oil pollution while minimizing environmental impacts from the response.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2879-2894
Author(s):  
Christopher Klarmann ◽  
LCDR Johna Rossetti

ABSTRACT ID: 2017-101 – GIUEs: Developing Best Practices to Improve Marine Environmental Response Preparedness The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is authorized by the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990 to conduct Government Initiated Unannounced Exercises (GIUE), a cornerstone of the oil spill exercise cycle. These exercises are instrumental for USCG Captains of the Port (COTP) to evaluate industry preparedness for oil spill response by specifically testing a facility or vessel on notification procedures, response time, and deployment of facility-owned or Oil Spill Removal Organization (OSRO) equipment. Facility Response Plan holders and Vessel Response Plan holders are subject to these exercises under federal regulations 33 C.F.R. § 154 and § 155. In 2013, the USCG restructured their GIUE policy to provide better guidance for employees. This updated policy detailed how to properly plan and conduct a GIUE as well as established expectations following both satisfactory and unsatisfactory exercises. In this paper we will examine the changes that the USCG has made regarding its policy on planning and conducting GIUEs, describe how USCG field units are implementing the new policy, including how unsatisfactory GIUEs are addressed, and examine what commonalities, are being seen in GIUE unsatisfactory results. Finally, we will discuss how plan holders, OSROs, and regulatory agencies can work together to better prepare for responding to an environmental emergency when it occurs.


Author(s):  
Helkei S. Hemminger

Abstract # —1141278 — In 2018, the Canadian government purchased the Trans Mountain pipeline, running from Alberta to British Columbia, along with the plans for expansion. The expansion could triple the transport capacity from 300,000 to 890,000 barrels of oil per day, and would increase the tanker traffic in the inland waterways of the Salish Sea, an area known for its sensitive marine habitat, and narrow, difficult to navigate passages. The anticipated increase in tanker traffic in this busy waterway continues to raise concerns about the impact of an oil spill and the financial means to address related injuries, particularly to natural resources. The transboundary nature of any spill further complicates the situation vis-à-vis the applicable liability regimes and response resources. Under the Canada-United States Joint Marine Contingency Plan (“JCP”), the United States Coast Guard and Canadian Coast Guard acknowledge each country's responsibility to fund their own response actions and pursue reimbursement of those costs within their respective jurisdictions. The availability of funding for a response, and to compensate injured parties, however, including the limits of liability of the responsible party, differs under each regime, and could impact the nature and scope of a response. For spills into or posing a substantial threat to the navigable waters of the United States, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 governs and a national fund, the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (“OSLTF”), is immediately available to address an incident, including emergency restoration to natural resources. Canada's Marine Liability Act enables the Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund (“SOPF”) to pay claimants who have incurred damages as a result of oil pollution. Both countries' funds operate under the same principal—the polluter pays—but the compensation structure, and claims processes and procedures are entirely different. This paper provides an overview of these funding sources and claims procedures, comparing and contrasting the different systems. The discussion is meant to provide an overall understanding of potential funding pools available for spill responses under each scheme in order to facilitate transboundary spill planning and discussion.


1996 ◽  
Vol 33 (01) ◽  
pp. 35-40
Author(s):  
Matthew William Lake

Due to high vessel traffic and the presence of industry, oil pollution is often an overwhelming menace. Oil spills potentially may remain undetected for long periods of time, despite routine surveillance by the Coat Guard and other environmental agencies. A Channel Buoy Mounted Oil Sensor System capable of warning oil spill response units of the presence of oil immediately after a spill occurs would greatly increase the effectiveness of cleanup efforts. The Channel Buoy Mounted Oil Sensor System (CBMOSS) has been designed to detect oil spills and subsequently send an alarm via a VHF-FM transmitter. This alarm could be received by a centralized monitoring station. The CBMOSS consists of an infrared oil monitor, logic circuit, VHF transmitter, power unit, and an antenna. The system is designed to be mounted and powered by existing U.S. Coast Guard lighted buoys. The system is fairly low powered and capable of running off existing power sources aboard lighted buoys. Due to the utilization of off-the-shelf components and low cost electrical gear, this system is relatively inexpensive. Though the Channel Buoy Mounted Oil Sensor System is intended to be used on buoys throughout a body of water at locations where there is a high probability of an oil spill, the system has the potential for use as an oil spill sensing platform in other applications as well.


1979 ◽  
Vol 1979 (1) ◽  
pp. 355-358
Author(s):  
Gordon D. Marsh ◽  
Lawrence A. Schultz ◽  
Frank W. DeBord

ABSTRACT As a part of its Arctic Pollution Response Research and Development Program, the U.S. Coast Guard in 1977 awarded a systems analysis contract to ARCTEC Incorporated to identify the pollution response system requirements for dealing with spills in ice-infested waters. A cold regions oil pollution response system was defined through an engineering and cost effectiveness analysis of six oil spill scenarios, selected to encompass the broad range of oil spill and environmental conditions likely to be encountered offshore Alaska. Also identified were modifications to the system required to extend the response capability to the seasonally ice-infested waters of the lower 48 states, including the Great Lakes, the northern rivers, and the northern coastal regions. Projections were made of the behavior of the spilled oil in ice-infested waters, and oil spill response scenarios were developed for three levels of spill response. Three distinctly different types of spill response operations were identified: (1) for a thick, stable, level shorefast ice situation; (2) for a dynamic, hum-mocky, heavily concentrated broken ice situation; (3) for the case of light broken ice and open water. The presence of ice was found to aid response efforts in some cases and to hinder or preclude response efforts in others. This paper discusses the three types of spill response required for cold regions and reviews the six Alaskan and three lower 48 scenarios used to define the system requirements.


1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald L. Ducey ◽  
Ann Hayward Walker

ABSTRACT The Department of Defense (DOD), operating through the Directorate of Military Support in the Department of the Army, supports state, local and other federal agency response operations in a wide range of natural and man-caused emergencies. Examples within the past six years include the Ashland Oil tank collapse in Floreffe, Pennsylvania, Exxon Valdez cleanup, Loma Prieta earthquake, hurricanes Hugo and Andrew, Mexico City earthquake, Armero (Columbia) volcanic eruption, and Puerto Rico floods and mudslides. From March 24 to September 27, 1989, the period of the Exxon Valdez initial cleanup operations, DOD provided military and civilian personnel, U. S. Navy ships for housing response workers, cargo and medical evacuation aircraft (fixed wing and helicopters), skimmers, modified dredges, landing craft, Dracones, Zodiak boats, radios, computers, and other miscellaneous equipment. This was in addition to assets of the Alaska Army and Air National Guard, which were committed by the governor. Support was provided to the U. S. Coast Guard on-scene coordinator and supervised by the Alaska Oil Spill Joint Task Force. The General Accounting Office, in its January 1990 report, Federal Costs Resulting from the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, estimated that DOD spent $62.8 million through September 30, 1989, the largest expenditure by any federal agency. Use of military resources is a realistic scenario in certain situations. Primary responders at the federal and state level should understand how to request and employ these assets. This paper provides a background on DOD support to disaster relief operations, and discusses the types of support available to agencies responding to natural or man-caused emergencies, request and approval mechanisms, the Department of Defense organization to provide support, and reimbursement of the department.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 459-461
Author(s):  
Leonard Rich

ABSTRACT The intent of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA90) is to ensure the U.S. Government is prepared to protect the environment from a catastrophic spill of the magnitude and complexity of the 1989 EXXON VALDEZ oil spill. The OPA90 legislation resulted in an overall restructuring and enhancement of the National Strike Force (NSF), and establishment of District Response Groups who are staffed and equipped with mechanical spill recovery assets and are prepared to take prompt actions to mitigate a worst case discharge scenario. During the early 1990s, over $31 million dollars worth of oil spill response equipment was acquired and placed at 23 locations throughout the United States. Since then, an additional $10 million dollars of environmental emergency response equipment has been added to the USCG'S inventory, and are now located at 16 additional sites. This paper will elaborate on the evolution of the USCG'S environmental emergency response capabilities. In terms of preparedness, it will explain how, where and why the Coast Guard has adjusted its resources and capabilities since the OPA90 legislation. The expanded mission requirements include; redistributing and adjusting the locations of the Vessel of Opportunity Skimming Systems, expanding functional use of the pre-positioned equipment for dewatering during shipboard fires, designing and implementing an offload pumping system for viscous oil at each NSF Strike Team, revisiting the condition and continued use of OPA90 procured first response “band-aid’ equipment, modifying the basic response equipment systems for fast current spill response, and the implementation of the Spilled Oil Recovery System. These actions reflect policy and mission adjustments influenced by an ever changing environment. The Coast Guard has re-organized from the bottom up to meet increased port security measures, and the capability to respond to all-hazard incidents. We must continue to maintain a high state of readiness in the oil spill response environment and accept the need to incorporate change to the equipment and the way we conduct our support to the American public.


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