Integrating Trustee Issues into a Balanced Response: Working Toward a Common Goal1

2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 655-661
Author(s):  
Heather A. Parker-Hall ◽  
Steve Hampton ◽  
James Haas

ABSTRACT In February 2002, a Unified Command (UC) comprised of the United States Coast Guard (USCG), the California Department of Fish and Game's Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR), and other state and federal agencies tested a sample of oil taken from the water near the wreck SS Jacob Luckenbach. Oil from this fifty-year-old wreck, submerged in 176 feet of water 17 miles off San Francisco, matched oil that had impacted thousands of birds and miles of shoreline since November 2001. It also matched oil from mystery spills in this area dating back to 1992. Now that the source of this extensive pollution was found, the next step seemed simple: remove the oil from the vessel. Yet there were many issues surrounding this vessel and its location that required significant cooperation with many agencies and trustees. The Luckenbach is an historic property, protected by the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). It is submerged in the Gulf of Farallones National Marine Sanctuary - one of the most biologically productive regions off the California coast and home to many sensitive resources including several listed species. The UC realized that dialogue with and among the natural resource trustee agencies was crucial to planning balanced operations that would remove the pollution source while providing the utmost protection available to the resources at risk A task force was formed that allowed trustees to engage in discussions about the tradeoffs of initiating removal as quickly as possible while balancing the risk of harm that any incidental release during operations may cause to their resources of concern. One of the most exciting benefits of this cooperative effort was the shift in thinking beyond just responding to the incident to advanced planning of a response that would best enhance restoration and long-term recovery. In many responses, it is not always clear that everyone has the same priorities: the USCG may focus on recovering oil and mitigating damage, the responsible party wants to minimize costs, and the trustees want to protect and restore their resources. In this case, the trustees and USCG were clearly working together toward common goals: removing a source of chronic oil pollution while minimizing environmental impacts from the response.

2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 649-653
Author(s):  
Lisa Symons ◽  
Heather A. Parker-Hall

ABSTRACT Since at least 1992, state and federal trustees have struggled to deal with episodic “mystery” spills that have impacted thousands of seabirds and compromised hundreds of miles of California coastline. In November 2001, another of these mystery events spurred the United States Coast Guard (USCG), state, and federal trustees to initiate a cooperative response and investigation. As impacts from the same oil type continued into January, it soon became evident that this oil most probably stemmed from a submerged source and not transient vessels. By February 2002, a source was identified for this and many of the previous mystery spills —the 1953 wreck of the cargo ship SS Jacob Luckenbach, fully fuelled and laden with materials for the Korean War effort. The vessel now sits in 176 feet of water, 17 miles off San Francisco Bay in the Gulf of the Farallones National Marine Sanctuary. The Luckenbach itself is an historic resource, protected by the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) 16 U.S.C.470 et seq and the National Marine Sanctuary Act (NMSA) 16 U.S.C. 1431 et seq. as amended by Public Law 106–513. The wreck rests in one of the most biologically productive regions of California, home to countless sensitive resources including several listed species, and is within a series of marine protected areas. The Unified Command (UC) comprised of USCG, California Department of Fish and Game's Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) and other state and federal agencies, were faced with an unusual set of challenges. First, finding accurate historical information about the vessel and its cargo, determining liability, and coordinating salvage and recovery operations complicated by both historical and ecological trustee issues during the Sanctuary's most biologically active and sensitive season. NOAA's National Marine Sanctuary Program (NMSP) played a particularly strong role in this response. Linked closely to the UC through NOAA's Scientific Support Coordinator, NMSP provided invaluable support in determining possible sources - engaged knowledgeable local divers in the process, located key historical documentation about the wreck, tracked down original owners and hull insurers, and assisted in the coordination of input from all trustees. Closely integrated coordination was a key factor in preparing for and determining the outcome of this response.


1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 635-638
Author(s):  
William C. Rogers ◽  
Jean R. Cameron

ABSTRACT Oil shipping companies operating on the West Coast of the United States are subject to international, federal, and state oil spill prevention and response planning regulations. Many companies wrote separate plans for each jurisdiction with the result that tank vessels carried several different plans on board and parent companies faced an administrative burden in keeping plans current. In June 1996, oil shipping company representatives proposed that the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force work with them to develop a format incorporating West Coast states' and U.S. Coast Guard contingency planning requirements. A workgroup comprised of representatives of the Task Force, industry, and the U.S. Coast Guard, working cooperatively, eventually proposed a voluntary integrated plan format based on the key elements of the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Response Plan. This format allowed correlation with state planning requirements as well as with the Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) required by international regulations. The U.S. Coast Guard, the Canadian Ministry of Transport, and all West Coast states have subsequently documented their agreement to accept vessel plans in this format, to coordinate review as needed, and to allow references to public documents such as Area Plans.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 445-449
Author(s):  
Kristy Plourde ◽  
CAPT Harlan

ABSTRACT On September 24, 1998, the T/V Command had a small spill in San Francisco Bay, California while taking on bunkers in Anchorage Nine. The cause was determined to be due to a small crack in the outer hull plating of the tank. The T/V Command departed on the evening of September 26 after completing temporary repairs required by the Captain of the Port (COTP)/Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC). The next morning, a large 10-mile by 2-mile oil slick was discovered just south of the entrance to San Francisco Bay. This triggered one of the largest, most far-reaching oil spill investigations ever. Since no one took responsibility for this spill, the U.S. Coast Guard accessed the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) and established a Unified Command with the state of California Department of Fish and Game, Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) to begin immediate cleanup. The Coast Guard and OSPR also began an aggressive joint investigation to track down the spiller. Hundreds of vessels had entered or departed San Francisco Bay during the 5-day window before the spill was discovered. The investigators were able to narrow the search and sample vessels. The Coast Guard Marine Safety Lab (MSL) and OSPR's lab were able to match the spilled oil to the T/V Command,. The Coast Guard tracked down the location of the T/V Command and began the first ever request for high seas boarding of a vessel for an environmental crime. A Coast Guard team from the USCGC Boutwell boarded the T/V Command 200 miles off Guatemala to begin the investigation. A follow-on multiagency team of investigators, led by the Coast Guard again, boarded the vessel in Panama. In a plea bargain agreement, the T/V Command's operator, master, and chief engineer pled guilty in federal court to criminal charges stemming from the spill on September 27, 1998, remarkably 1 year from the date of the original spill. The operator agreed to pay over $9.4 million dollars in criminal and civil penalties. This paper and presentation discusses the complexities of this international spill response investigation and events leading up to the settlement.


Author(s):  
Chrystin McLelland ◽  
Haley Kennard

Abstract: The Northwest Region (the states of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho) of the United States is home to 43 federally recognized treaty Tribes, who are resource co-managers within their traditional territories and have both decision-making power and sovereign legal rights. There is also a significant refinement and transportation of petroleum products (by rail, pipeline, and vessel) within this area and in our transboundary waters. In Washington alone, more than 20 billion gallons are moved through and across the state on an annual basis. The Northwest Area Committee (NWAC) and Region 10 Regional Response Team (RRT10), the federally mandated bodies which conduct oil pollution and hazardous materials spill response planning, are therefore robust and very active. Within the last decade, tribal engagement in the NWAC and RRT10 has expanded significantly; the RRT10 now has three official tribal members, and the NWAC has supported a Tribal Engagement Task Force for the past four years and is currently looking at transitioning it to a longer-term and more permanent sub-committee strategy. This presentation will discuss the following pieces of the efforts towards tribal engagement in the NWAC/RRT10: 1) The evolution of tribal engagement in the RRT10/NWAC and lessons learned from this process 2) A case study of the unique experience of the Makah Tribe's engagement with the greater response community including both becoming the first tribal member of the NWAC/RRT10 and the development of their memorandum of agreement with the US Coast Guard, and 3) Results from the 2019 Tribal Engagement Task Force's tribal feedback survey (sent out to all Tribes in the region) to identify barriers and strategies for improved meaningful tribal engagement. This reflects the commitment of the NWAC/RRT10 to improving tribal engagement by understanding; the results can not only inform partners in other regions but will inform the next phase of the NWAC/RRT10's approach to tribal engagement. The Northwest Area model for tribal engagement in oil spill planning, preparedness, and response is an important precedent for national and international engagement with Indigenous peoples in this arena.


1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 263-265
Author(s):  
Jon Neel ◽  
John Bones ◽  
Elizabeth Dimmick ◽  
Lynn J. Tomich Kent ◽  
Roger Dunstan ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT The States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force was established in 1989 to enhance spill coordination among the West Coast states and British Columbia, and to address a number of issues that became apparent during the Nestucca barge and Exxon Valdez oil spills. Task Force members are the directors of the oil spill prevention and response agencies in Alaska, British Columbia, California, Oregon, and Washington. The Task Force has become a national model for facilitating cooperation and building consensus between coastal states and provinces and their federal governments. In October of 1990, the task force issued a report containing a comprehensive set of recommendations addressing oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response. The group had achieved remarkable consensus, and many of the report's recommendations have been included in recent legislation enacted by the member states. The success of the task force's approach to regional coordination has also reduced the need for a proposed Pacific Oceans Resources Interstate Compact, which has been proposed to expand the states' role in areas of regulation that are otherwise federally preempted. The task force has become an effective mechanism for developing vigorous, productive relationships between government agencies, industry, and the public in both the United States and Canada. It has created important linkages between state/provincial and federal regulatory activities; for example, by providing input to Coast Guard and EPA rulemaking that implemented the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. It also assisted in assuring a well-coordinated international response to the July 1991 Tenyo Maru oil spill outside the Strait of Juan De Fuca between Washington and British Columbia. The task force is continuing to advance its goals of promoting public policy on oil spill prevention; cooperative management of major spills by government and industry; protection of the states/provincial rights and their natural and economic resources; and inter-governmental consistency in regulations adopted for oil spill prevention, contingency planning, and resource damage assessment.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 136-142
Author(s):  
Agnes M. Varghese ◽  
Misaki N. Natsuaki

In March 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared COVID-19 a pandemic. Among the massive shutdowns that occurred across the United States in response, all K-12 schools in California closed to protect the health of students. However, such a closure and its resulting consequences were associated with a host of negative mental health implications for youth. Furthermore, many of these youth may not have had adequate resources to tackle issues impacting their psyche in this unprecedented time. Social and emotional learning (SEL), a method in which children can acquire the knowledge and skills to understand and manage emotions, has a proven track record of positive social, emotional, educational, and career consequences. The California Department of Education should convene a task force to develop guidelines for local school districts that provide all K-12 students in the state with effective SEL to assist them in mental health recovery from the pandemic.


2021 ◽  
Vol 107 (2) ◽  
pp. 71-76
Author(s):  
Bruce M. Joab ◽  
James McCall ◽  
Michael J. Anderson, ◽  
Michael Ammann

The California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW) uses fiberglass material for forensic analysis of oil sheens, while the United States Coast Guard (USCG) method uses a tetrafluoroetheylene-fluorocarbon (TFE-fluorocarbon) polymer net. We performed a field trial of these two materials by sampling natural oil seeps, two in Santa Monica Bay, and three sheen areas in the Santa Barbara Channel. Though the fiberglass material did collect less mass on some trials, the forensic chemistry results demonstrated that both materials were satisfactory for purposes of chemical forensic analysis as each pair of the sampling materials yielded results that were consistent with a common oil seep source.


1994 ◽  
Vol 31 (03) ◽  
pp. 175-182
Author(s):  
Hans Hofmann ◽  
George Kapsilis ◽  
Eric Smith ◽  
Robert Wasalaski

The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 has mandated that by the year 2015 all oil tankers operating in waters subject to jurisdiction of the United States must have double hulls. This paper examines the Act and the status of regulatory initiatives it has generated. Guidance for new hull construction and retrofit of existing vessels is outlined, and both IMO (International Maritime Organization) and U.S. Coast Guard requirements are discussed. Finally, the structural changes necessary to convert the U.S. Navy's T-AO Class oil tankers to meet the requirements of the Act are specified and illustrated.


1969 ◽  
Vol 1969 (1) ◽  
pp. 145-149
Author(s):  
Seymour D. Selzer

Abstract The Delaware River Basin, in the area from Trenton, N.J., to Wilmington, Del, including the Philadelphia, Pa.–Camden, N. J. metropolitan area, is the site of one of the major municipal-industrial complexes in the United States. Enormous quantities of oil are transported, processed, and used in the area. There are continuous oil discharges in the form of wastes, as well as accidental spills, to the waters of the area. The Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC), in its comprehensive water resources management role, is concerned with all forms of oil pollution. The developing oil pollution control program in the Delaware River Basin includes a broad cooperative effort on the part of the Federal Government, the DRBC, the states, local agencies, and private interests. Included are preventive measures, such as special requirements in design and construction of petroleum handling and transportation facilities, and emergency planning at all levels, both public and private. An emergency alert system is operative, and a corrective action program is authorized and developing at the various levels of government and industry.


1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 761-765
Author(s):  
William Boland ◽  
Pete Bontadelli

ABSTRACT The Marine Safety Division of the 11th Coast Guard District and the California Office of Oil Spill Prevention and Response are pursuing new avenues to assure that federal, state, and local efforts in California achieve the goals of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the Lempert-Keene-Seastrand Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act of 1990. Coordination of the seven California area committees, publishing detailed area contingency plans, and the implemention of a memorandum of agreement on oil spill prevention and response highlight recent cooperative successes. In 1994 a joint Coast Guard/state/industry incident command system task force drafted an ICS field operations guide and incident action plan forms that meet National Interagency Incident Management System and fire scope ICS requirements.


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