No umbrella for the rain: Canadian implications following the global revolution in reconnaissance–strike technologies

Author(s):  
Marc Kieley

Global conflicts in 2020 have highlighted the unexpected employment of advanced ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles by developing military powers. The development of ballistic missiles by Iran, or the export of advanced drones by Turkey, are ultimately the result of the American-led revolution in military affairs that, during the Gulf War, established the potential of precision guided weapons and reconnaissance systems. In response, America’s competitors have adapted their military doctrines and developed weapons designed to both counter and copy the West’s technological advantages. As the Government of Canada implements its defence policy—Strong, Secure, and Engaged—it has promised to procure a ground-based air defence system for the Canadian Armed Forces. Careful consideration and analysis are required, however, to ensure that Canada procures the best possible solution given limited funding and a wide array of potential threats.

Author(s):  
Ina Kraft

This chapter provides an analysis of the changes that German defence has undergone since 1990. Two developments shaped German defence after the end of the cold war: First, the German armed forces changed owing to a radical downsizing, the end of conscription, and the modernization of equipment. Secondly, the style of German defence policy changed from reactive and norm-based in the 1990s to assertive, interest-based, and executive in the 2010s. The culture of military restraint—for decades a characteristic trait of German defence—waned. German military deployments abroad became more frequent and more serious. The leadership position Germany had taken in Europe during the Euro crisis and during the Ukraine conflict, as well as a domestic window of opportunity stemming from a favourable majority for the government parties in the parliament, serve as explanations for a more assured formulation of national security interests.


2009 ◽  
Vol 78 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-132
Author(s):  
Inger Österdahl

AbstractThe Swedish defence policy has undergone a dramatic shift in recent years from focusing on defending Swedish territory to focusing on making the world a better place. The questions asked in this article relate to the Swedish constitutional regulation of the use of the Swedish armed forces and the potential impact of the European Security and Defence Policy on the interpretation of the Constitution. A fundamental revision of a policy central to the identity of the state has taken place, and the constitutional regulation as such stays intact. The old constitutional rules also function in the new defence policy environment, but new practice may entail a new interpretation. Different aspects of the change in defence policy will be weighed in relation to the existing Constitution. The Constitution sets limits to when Swedish armed forces may be sent abroad, but it also provides the opportunities. In a time of internationalisation and active use of military means to accomplish things around the world, the enabling aspect of the Constitution becomes important. The constitutional regulation accords the government and Parliament a lot of freedom, indeed unlimited freedom as long as they agree. Under the Constitution any coalition, context or cause is just.


2021 ◽  
Vol 90 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-160
Author(s):  
Inger Österdahl

Abstract This article analyses the content of the mutual defence obligation contained in the EU Treaty Article 42(7) in relation to the Swedish constitutional rule on the sending of armed forces abroad and the emerging ’deepened defence cooperation’ between Sweden and Finland. The article tries to understand the prevailing Swedish position in legal terms and suggests an alternative flexible way on Sweden’s part of conceiving the binding force of Article 42(7). The question is whether the EU Treaty contains an international obligation of a quality to activate a provision in the Swedish Constitution entitling the government to decide on its own, without having to seek the otherwise necessary approval by Parliament, to send Swedish armed forces to other countries for instance on a mission of collective self-defence. The possibility of looking at the EU Treaty and the Swedish Instrument of Government in this way is not considered in any of the Swedish official inquiries into the Swedish security and defence policy of which there have been quite a few recently.


2018 ◽  
Vol 73 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-204
Author(s):  
Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé ◽  
Stéfanie von Hlatky

In the wake of the Canadian government’s pledge for a renewed role at the United Nations (UN) notably by reengaging in peacekeeping activities, this special issue focuses on Canada’s added value to peace operations. Our aim is to identify the goals, challenges, and stakes for Canada’s reengagement in peace operations as a central component of foreign and defence policy. One of the first questions to ask is how can Canada contribute to peace operations which are now characterized by more complex security environments, in a way that is consistent with its interests, resources, and capacity? The second question relates to Canada’s engagement in peace missions in the context of a continuously evolving technological landscape. Finally, we address defence planning, equipping the Canadian Armed Forces, and managing personnel, as they relate to UN operations. The time is ripe to revitalize the debate on peace operations and analyze Canada’s capacity in this area.


Significance This is the third and largest mass trial since the failed coup, and part of the largest legal process in Turkey’s modern history. Although the process aims to purge supporters of the so-called Fethullah Gulen Terror Organisation, it is also part and parcel of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s broader objective: to muzzle once and for all the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and exact complete and unconditional obedience from its senior officer class. Impacts Neighbours including Russia and Iran may seek to use divisions within the TSK to nudge foreign and defence policy closer to their interests. The government may increasingly use large-scale defence procurement contracts to press Western partners to reduce support for Syrian Kurds. The TSK will be a more pliable force working to advance Erdogan’s domestic and regional policy agenda with little opposition.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 1787
Author(s):  
Emily Hope ◽  
Bruno Gagnon ◽  
Vanja Avdić

As part of the Pan-Canadian Framework (PCF) on Clean Growth and Climate Change, the Government of Canada (GoC) introduced carbon pricing and is in the process of developing a Clean Fuel (CF) Standard. Both policies are key elements of the PCF and aim to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions through the use of lower carbon fuels, including bioenergy. Carbon pricing and the CF Standard are expected to increase the demand for biomass feedstocks, possibly threatening feedstock availability for existing forest industrial residues users, including composite panel manufacturers. To assess the potential impact of carbon pricing and the CF Standard on Canadian composite panel producers, a Monte Carlo-based model was developed to estimate possible increases in feedstock price-points that composite panel manufacturers may face as a result of increases in bioenergy consumption. Results suggest that the composite panel industry may be negatively impacted in the long-term (2030) by the relative price increase of fossil fuels covered by carbon pricing and additional revenues for biofuel suppliers from CF Standard credits, assuming no other adjustments to the market. Although these results are preliminary in that the analysis excludes external market factors that could influence the outcome, there is evidence that such policies have the potential to generate supply risks for the Canadian composite panel industry without careful consideration of the associated externalities.


2004 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 319-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandra Kok

Abstract Under the Government of Canada's Great Lakes Program, the Great Lakes Sustainability Fund and its predecessor programs (the Great Lakes Cleanup Fund and the Great Lakes 2000 Cleanup Fund) were established to implement cleanup actions and strategies that would contribute to the restoration of beneficial uses in environmentally degraded areas (known as Areas of Concern) in the Great Lakes basin. The Great Lakes Sustainability Fund is administered by Environment Canada on behalf of eight Government of Canada departments. Contributing to impaired beneficial uses are municipal wastewaters generated from the urban centres in the Great Lakes Areas of Concern. These municipal wastewaters include treated sewage and wetweather discharges of combined sewer overflows and stormwater runoff. This paper provides an overview of the Municipal Wastewater Program of the federal government's Great Lakes Sustainability Fund and highlights the progress made to date under the program towards wet-weather flow management and the Program's role in developing and demonstrating sustainable approaches and technologies in the Great Lakes Areas of Concern.


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