Anger, Anxiety, and Selective Exposure to Terrorist Violence

2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272110149
Author(s):  
Leonie Huddy ◽  
Oleg Smirnov ◽  
Keren L. G. Snider ◽  
Arie Perliger

We examine the political consequence of exposure to widely available video content of terror violence. In a two-wave survey of Americans, we assess who is exposed to, and seeks out, terror-related video content in the first wave and then observe who decides to watch raw video footage of the Boston marathon terror attack in the second. We focus centrally on anxiety and anger as differing emotional reactions to the threat of terrorism and document their influence on exposure to terror violence. Anxiety generates avoidance of violent terror content whereas anger increases its consumption. Moreover, we find that anger increases exposure to violent terror content and in addition enhances support for punitive and retaliatory anti-terrorism policy. We discuss the implications of our findings for the broader dynamics of terrorist violence and the emotional basis of selective news exposure.

Author(s):  
Tapiwanashe Miranda Sanyanga ◽  
Munyaradzi Sydney Chinzvende ◽  
Tatenda Duncan Kavu ◽  
John Batani

Due to the increase in video content being generated from surveillance cameras and filming, videos analysis becomes imperative. Sometimes it becomes tedious to watch a video captured by a surveillance camera for hours, just to find out the desired footage. Current state of-the-art video analysis methods do not address the problem of searching and localizing a particular object in a video using the name of the object as a query and to return only a segment of the video clip showing the instances of that object. In this research the authors make use of combined implementations from existing work and also applied the dropping frames algorithm to produce a shorter, trimmed video clip showing the target object specified by the search tag. The resulting video is short and specific to the object of interest.


2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Imad Bou-Hamad ◽  
Nadine A. Yehya

Partisan media are often accused of reinforcing partisan views and contributing to political polarization. Drawing on the literature on selective exposure and media effects, we survey a representative sample of 784 Lebanese citizens who consume partisan media in a highly polarized context. In the absence of centrist nonpartisan channels in Lebanon, we differentiate between extreme and moderate partisan channels and test the prevalence of partisan selective exposure among the viewers. Results show that partisan viewers exhibit partisan selective exposure when selecting channels to watch the news but not in case of entertainment. Neutral viewers avoided extreme partisan channels and were indifferent to the political leaning of the moderate partisan channels. In this study, we present profiling models that predict the likelihood of viewers to seek/avoid extreme and moderate partisan channels based on their political affiliation, religion, age, socioeconomic status, and gender.


2018 ◽  
Vol 34 (6) ◽  
pp. 894-917
Author(s):  
Richard S. L. Blissett

Research suggests that individuals may make choices about the information they consume that are influenced by what they already believe. In this study, I investigate this process in a particularly contentious policy arena: charter schools. What kinds of information are important to people as they evaluate charter school policy? Are their choices shaped by their prior beliefs? Overall, I find that indeed people tend to seek out information that aligns with their prior beliefs. Altogether, the results of this study suggest that the dynamics of selective exposure present in the political arena more broadly also exist within education policy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 130 (631) ◽  
pp. 2175-2206
Author(s):  
Sergio Currarini ◽  
Giovanni Ursino ◽  
A K S Chand

Abstract We consider a situation in which a decision-maker gathers information from imperfectly informed experts, receiving coarse signals about a uniform state of the world. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. We show that with two experts correlation unambiguously tightens the conditions on preferences for a truth-telling equilibrium. However, with multiple experts the effect of correlation on the incentives to report information truthfully can be non-monotonic: while little and large levels of correlation hinder truth-telling, intermediate levels may discipline experts’ equilibrium behaviour and foster truthful communication. We discuss the implications of our results for the political discussion in the presence of ‘selective exposure' to media, where similarity in preferences comes with higher correlation, and a trade-off between truth-telling incentives and informational content arises.


Author(s):  
Mariya Y Omelicheva ◽  
Lawrence P Markowitz

Abstract What are the conditions that obstruct the formation of a crime-terror nexus? To answer this question we carry out a quantitative and qualitative analysis of Russia's North Caucasus (2008–2016) where no durable crime-terror nexus materialized despite the presence of conditions conducive to the emergence of linkages between criminals and militants. We demonstrate how the sheer diversity and fluidity of violent actors, with some deeply immersed in the political, economic, and security institutions of the Russian state, fragmented the elements of a crime-terror nexus to such a degree that collaboration among them proved too difficult and costly. Our argument makes several contributions to analyses of the crime-terror nexus. First, our study illuminates the various actors within a purported nexus, demonstrating how cooperation between them may not be forthcoming. Second, our framework demonstrates how a multiplicity of the centers and agents of state power, both formal and informal, is intimately interwoven into the fragmented security landscape. Third, the diversity of the so-called terrorist and militant groups that are competing for power and resources call for rethinking and reconceptualization of what we call a “terrorist group” and the data that we use to study terrorist violence.


2018 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 92-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cameron Smith

I argue in this article that race – reconceptualised against the post-racial logic of racial neoliberalism as a material relationship rather than simply an identity – functions within the logic of radicalisation in Australian anti-terrorism to produce the conditions necessary for the reproduction of neoliberal capitalism. Taking theoretical cues from the arguments of David Theo Goldberg and Stuart Hall, I argue that the logic of radicalisation within this process mobilises the raced spectral figure of the essentially violent, extremist Muslim ‘other’ to two key ends: first, the invisibilisation of the political motivations and grievances underpinning the actions of those who commit terrorist violence; second, the reproduction of neoliberal capitalism through the fashioning of neoliberal subjectivities, the salving of collective anxieties at the effects of neoliberal restructuring via ‘authoritarian populism’, and the innovation of new – and augmentation of existing – opportunities for profit and accumulation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 94 ◽  
pp. 03002
Author(s):  
Yulia Eremenko ◽  
Anna Chentsova ◽  
Anastasiia Kuzmenko

It is proposed to use objective methods to assess the perception of visual political content for planning an effective communication strategy by the actors of political power Two experiments were conducted in the work. The first one investigates the visual attention and memorization of different types of political content (memes, photographs of political leaders, photographs of political events and posters) by young people based on the oculographic method. The second experiment is aimed at studying the emotional reactions of young people to the perception of political video content of different genres: humorous, video memes, speech of a political leader and disgusting video. An adapted version of the Differentiated Emotions Scale (DES) was used for the evaluation.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Ternovski ◽  
Joshua Kalla ◽  
Peter Michael Aronow

Recent advances in machine learning have led to the development of the “deepfake,” a convincingly realistic, computer-generated video of a public figure saying something they have not actually said. Policymakers have expressed concern that deepfakes could mislead voters and affect election outcomes, but existing research has found minimal persuasive effects. In this paper, we explore a downstream consequence of deepfakes: if voters are repeatedly warned of the existence and dangers of deepfakes, they may simply begin to distrust all political video footage – whether real or fake. Through two online survey experiments, we found that voters were unable to discriminate between a real video and a deepfake. Statements warning about the existence of deepfakes did not enhance participants’ ability to successfully spot manipulated video content. Instead, these warnings consistently induced participants to believe that the videos they watched were fake, even when the videos were real. The warnings were not specific to the video participants were watching; simply stating that deepfakes exist increased distrust of any accompanying video. Our findings suggest that even if deepfakes are not themselves persuasive, rhetoric about deepfakes can nevertheless be weaponized by politicians and campaigns to dismiss and disown real videos.


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