The Analytical Micro–Macro Relationship in Social Science and Its Implications for the Individualism-Holism Debate

2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (5) ◽  
pp. 474-500 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gustav Ramström
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Social Relationship ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Philosophy Of Biology ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Individual

This article argues that the tradition within the individualism-holism debate of importing arguments from the micro–macro discussion in other disciplines (e.g., philosophy of mind and philosophy of biology) significantly has hampered our understanding of the “individual-social” relationship. While, for example, the “neural-mental” and “atomic-molecular” links represent empirical “gives rise to” relationships, in the social sciences the micro–macro link is a purely analytical “qualifies as” type of relationship. This disanalogy is important, since it has significant implications for the individualism-holism debate: (a) it implies a phenomenally monist social ontology and (b) it disqualifies the notion of social macro causation.

Social Ontology and Model-Building: A Response to Epstein

2021 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 176-192
Author(s):  
Nadia Ruiz
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Model Building ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Model Construction ◽  
Ontological Commitments ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Social

Brian Epstein has recently argued that a thoroughly microfoundationalist approach towards economics is unconvincing for metaphysical reasons. Generally, Epstein argues that for an improvement in the methodology of social science we must adopt social ontology as the foundation of social sciences; that is, the standing microfoundationalist debate could be solved by fixing economics’ ontology. However, as I show in this paper, fixing the social ontology prior to the process of model construction is optional instead of necessary and that metaphysical-ontological commitments are often the outcome of model construction, not its starting point. By focusing on the practice of modeling in economics the paper provides a useful inroad into the debate about the role of metaphysics in the natural and social sciences more generally.

Bridging the gap between the social science and the social ontology of collective memory

2019 ◽  
pp. 175069801987608
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Blustein
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Collective Memory ◽  
Social Science Research ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Science Research ◽  
Margaret Gilbert ◽  
Social Media Site ◽  
The Social ◽  
Collective Remembering

It is commonplace to attribute memories to groups of individuals both large and small. Attributions of memories to groups are also found in social science research. This article proposes using philosophical accounts from the literature on social ontology to help clarify and deepen our understanding of how these terms are being employed in the social sciences. Two contrasting accounts of collective remembering are presented: the joint commitment account derived from the seminal work of Margaret Gilbert, and the participatory intentions account based on Christopher Kutz’s analysis of collective action. The implications of these accounts for clarifying notions of collective memory and remembering in the social sciences are explored through two case studies—one involving a social media site that promotes sharing of memories among users and the other concerning organizational remembering.

Theory and observation in social sciences

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Outhwaite
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Psychology ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Participant Observation ◽  
Social Anthropology ◽  
Philosophy Of Social Science ◽  
Self Reflection ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Individual

The concept of observation has received relatively little systematic attention in the social sciences, with the important exceptions of social psychology, social anthropology and some areas of sociological methodology such as ‘participant observation’. In a broader sense, however, concern with the relation between theory and ‘reality’, ‘data’, ‘empirical research’ and so on, has been a pervasive theme in the philosophy of social science and in the methodological self-reflection of the individual social sciences.

Instrumentalizing and Naturalizing Social Ontology: Replies to Lohse and Little

2020 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-39
Author(s):  
Richard Lauer
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Social World ◽  
Scientific Methodology ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Scientific ◽  
Science Methodology ◽  
Social Science Methodology ◽  
Made In

This article addresses Simon Lohse’s and Daniel Little’s responses to my article “Is Social Ontology Prior to Social Scientific Methodology?.” In that article, I present a pragmatic and deflationary view of the priority of social ontology to social science methodology where social ontology is valued for its ability to promote empirical success and not because it yields knowledge of what furnishes the social world. First, in response to Lohse, I argue that my view is compatible with a role for ontological theorizing in the social sciences. However, the view that results instrumentalizes social ontology. Second, in my response to Little, I argue that the same considerations I made in my article apply to naturalistic attempts to motivate a non-deflationary view, repeating some of the central issues of that article.

scholarly journals The Pandemic beyond the Pandemic: A Scoping Review on the Social Relationships between COVID-19 and Antimicrobial Resistance

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (16) ◽  
pp. 8766
Author(s):  
Luisa Toro-Alzate ◽  
Karlijn Hofstraat ◽  
Daniel H. de Vries
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Antimicrobial Resistance ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Health Systems ◽  
Scoping Review ◽  
Social Engagement ◽  
Social Relationship ◽  
Health Systems Strengthening ◽  
Infection Prevention And Control ◽  
The Social

The social sciences are essential to include in the fight against both public health challenges of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) and COVID-19. In this scoping review, we document what social science knowledge has been published about the social relationship between COVID-19 and AMR and which social science interventions are suggested to address this social relationship. We analysed 23 peer-reviewed articles published between 2019 and 2021. Results emphasize that changes in antibiotic prescription behaviour, misinformation, over-burdened health systems, financial hardship, environmental impact and gaps in governance might increase the improper access and use of antibiotics during the COVID-19 pandemic, increasing AMR. The identified social sciences transformation strategies include social engagement and sensitisation, misinformation control, health systems strengthening, improved infection prevention and control measures, environmental protection, and better antimicrobial stewardship and infectious diseases governance. The review emphasizes the importance of interdisciplinary research in addressing both AMR and COVID-19.

Symposium on explanations and social ontology 3: can we dispense with structural explanations of social facts?

2002 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik Weber ◽  
Jeroen Van Bouwel
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Structural Explanation ◽  
Explanatory Pluralism ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Social Facts ◽  
Philip Pettit ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Right

Some social scientists and philosophers (e.g., James Coleman and Jon Elster) claim that all social facts are best explained by means of a micro-explanation. They defend a micro-reductionism in the social sciences: to explain is to provide a mechanism on the individual level.The first aim of this paper is to challenge this view and defend the view that it has to be substituted for an explanatory pluralism with two components: (1) structural explanations of P-, O- and T-contrasts between social facts are more efficient than the competing micro-explanations; and (2) whether a plain social fact (as opposed to a contrast) is best explained in a micro-explanation or a structural explanation depends on the explanatory interest. The second aim of the paper is to show how this explanatory pluralism is compatible with ontological individualism.This paper is motivated by our conviction that explanatory pluralism as defended by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit is on the right track, but must be further elaborated. We want to supplement their contribution, by (1) introducing the difference between explanations of facts and explanations of contrasts; (2) giving examples from the social sciences, instead of mainly from the natural sciences or common sense knowledge; and (3) emphasizing the pragmatic relevance of explanations on different levels –social, psychological, biological, etc. – which is insufficiently done by Jackson and Pettit.

Concrete Ontology: Comments on Lauer, Little, and Lohse

2020 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-47
Author(s):  
Harold Kincaid
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Revealed Preference ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Psychological Realism ◽  
Preference Theory ◽  
The Social ◽  
Empirical Social Science ◽  
Revealed Preference Theory ◽  
Is Value

I share with all the other authors the view that conceptual metaphysics without close ties to science is of minimal value, that this holds for much of current work on social ontology, and that if there is value in social ontology, it has to be in contributing to empirical social science. I do perhaps disagree with all three authors about making any blanket statements concerning either instrumentalism or realism about the social sciences and their ontologies. I argue and try to show instead that if there are fruitful questions of social ontology, they are probably mostly local empirical issues raised by specific pieces of social science. Certain kinds of pluralism and instrumentalism may well make sense in some situations. I illustrate with debates over the need for psychological realism and revealed preference theory in economics.

scholarly journals Lo natural, lo seglar y lo sobrenatural

2019 ◽  
pp. 27
Author(s):  
Gustavo Caponi
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Natural Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Scientific Research ◽  
Philosophy Of Biology ◽  
The Social ◽  
Biological Explanation

In Philosophy of Biology, but also in Philosophy of Mind, in Ethics, in Epistemology, and even in Aesthetics, the term naturalization is usually used in two different ways. It is often used in a meta-philosophical sense to indicate a way for doing philosophy that, in some way, would approximate this reflection to scientific research. But it is also often used in a meta-theoretical sense. In that case, it is used to characterize an explanatory operation proper to science. Sometimes, this scientific operation consists of explaining, in natural science terms, what was previously explained by recourse to the supernatural. Other times, this explanatory operation would result in a biological explanation of what, up to that moment, was explained above in terms of the Social Sciences. In the first situation, the natural is understood as the opposite of the supernatural; and science seeks to advance on that domain, producing cognitive progress. In the second situation, the natural is understood as the opposite of the secular; and Biology advances on that sphere, but not without running the risk of operating as an ideology capable of legitimating unjust and avoidable inequalities. This does not necessarily have to be so, but thought must guard against that risk. 

scholarly journals Mechanism-based Explanations versus Autonomy in the Social Sciences

2018 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ståle Gundersen
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Psychological Factors ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
The Social ◽  
Explanatory Depth ◽  
Underlying Mechanisms ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Social Level

Mechanism-based explanations are widely discussed in contemporary social science. A virtue of mechanism-based explanations is that they can tell us how social and psychological factors are related to each other and in addition provide explanatory depth. I will argue against an argument which contends that to describe underlying mechanisms at the individual level do not contribute to improve macro-explanations at the social level. However, the critics of the mechanism approach are right that under certain conditions there can be successful explanations without mentioning underlying mechanisms. Although the mechanism approach is a reductive strategy, it does not entail that the social sciences will lose their descriptively and explanatory autonomy. The debate about reductionism and explanation often take place at an abstract philosophical level, but it is argued that to what extent the mechanism approach will influence the autonomy of the social sciences is an empirical problem and cannot be decided a priori.

The Social Foundations of Positivism: The Case of Late-Nineteenth-Century Italy

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Dylan Riley ◽  
Rebecca Jean Emigh ◽  
Patricia Ahmed
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Symbolic Capital ◽  
Late Nineteenth Century ◽  
Social Foundations ◽  
The Social ◽  
Late Nineteenth

Abstract What social conditions produce positivism? One position, common to both positivists and some of their major critics, suggests that positivism is an “ideology” or “worldview” of industrial capitalism. Positivism therefore resonates with the basic experience of capitalism for all social groups. Intellectuals draw on this experience in formulating positivist social science. A second position suggests that positivism is a strategy of distinction by which intellectuals attempt to accumulate symbolic capital against their rivals. This position suggests that positivism is a resource for establishing a social science that imitates the methodology of natural science. Our article argues for a third view focused on the internal structure of the intelligentsia as a social group. Positivism could emerge in both industrial capitalist and preindustrial contexts; however, the types of positivism differ in these two cases because the structure of the intelligentsia differs. In preindustrial contexts, such as nineteenth-century Italy, which is the focus of our analysis, positivists claim an ontological continuity between natural and social sciences. In industrial contexts, on the basis of which most theories of positivism rest, positivists claim a methodological similarity between natural and social sciences. We conclude our analysis by reflecting on the implications of our study for work on positivism and social ontology in the social sciences.

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