The ‘Modern Approach’ to Statutory Interpretation and the Principle of Legality: An Issue of Coherence?

2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 397-425
Author(s):  
Dan Meagher
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Statutory Interpretation ◽  
Modern Approach ◽  
High Court ◽  
Ordinary Meaning ◽  
Interpretive Approach ◽  
Principle Of Legality

The ‘modern approach’ to interpretation requires that effect be given to the ordinary meaning of a statutory text in its wider context and with reference to its purpose. This article interrogates the interpretive approach used by the High Court in fundamental rights cases to assess its compatibility with this ‘modern approach’. It asks, specifically, whether the strict text-based approach used in these cases (which involves the application of the principle of legality) is sufficient to determine the meaning of ambiguous statutory texts. The argument made is that the coherent application of the ‘modern approach’ requires that this interpretive approach be justified.

Contextualism: ‘The Modern Approach to Statutory Interpretation’

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Barnes
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Court Cases ◽  
Statutory Interpretation ◽  
Modern Approach ◽  
High Court ◽  
Football Club ◽  
High Court Of Australia ◽  
Scholarly Attention

The widespread realisation that ‘[l]egislation is the cornerstone of the modern legal system’ (Justice McHugh) has brought increased judicial and scholarly attention to legislation’s partner, statutory interpretation. In CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384 the High Court of Australia referred to the ‘modern approach to statutory interpretation’. That modern approach has subsequently been called ‘contextualism’. The central questions addressed in this article are: what is contextualism? Is it principled? And is it a coherent general approach? After stating and illustrating key principles from six High Court cases, the author considers challenges to contextualism, including textualism and purposivism. Like the statutes it monitors, statutory interpretation may be ‘broad and deep and variegated’, as Lord Wilberforce once observed. But, at the same time, it is concluded that statutory interpretation does not lack a general approach that lends coherence to the interpretative enterprise – for contextualism performs this function.

The judicial evolution (or counter-revolution) of fundamental rights protection in Australia

2017 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-13
Author(s):  
Dan Meagher
Keyword(s):  
New Species ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
High Court ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Principle Of Legality ◽  
Clear Statement

This article suggests that the decision of the framers of the Australian Constitution to consciously reject American notions of formal rights guarantees has not, ultimately, proven decisive. In the absence of a constitutional (or statutory) bill of rights, the High Court has filled the lacuna in formal rights protection in Australia. The emergence of new species of (constitutionally valid) legislation, openly hostile to fundamental rights, has sparked this judicial evolution (or counter-revolution). The Court has used the method of clear statement required by the principle of legality to construct a common law bill of rights that is now, arguably, quasi-constitutional in strength.

The ‘Always Speaking’ Approach to Statutes (and the Significance of Its Misapplication in Aubrey v The Queen)

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Meagher
Keyword(s):  
Statutory Interpretation ◽  
Close Attention ◽  
Modern Approach ◽  
Difficult Question ◽  
Do So ◽  
Legal Meaning

This article clarifies the nature and scope of the ‘always speaking’ approach to statutes in Anglo-Antipodean law. To do so is important. For whilst it is now considered interpretive orthodoxy to treat statutes as ‘always speaking’, what that entails in terms of doctrine and application is not always clear. It is, however, recognised that whether or not a statute attracts the operation of the ‘always speaking’ approach can sometimes be a difficult question to answer. In order to do so judges have at their disposal the interpretive tools (and method) provided by the ‘modern approach’ to statutory interpretation. Indeed, in these cases maybe close attention to the contextualism which lies at the heart of the ‘modern approach’ is a more satisfactory way of determining the legal meaning of a statute than to presume that it is ‘always speaking’.

Verfassungsanalogien – Das Bundesverfassungsgericht an der Grenze der Verfassungsinterpretation

Der Staat ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-41
Author(s):  
Carsten Bäcker
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Federal State ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Sich Eine ◽  
Statutory Interpretation ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Federal Constitutional

Analogien sind methodologisch hoch umstritten; sie bewegen sich an der Grenze der Gesetzesinterpretation. Dem methodologischen Streit um die Analogien unterliegt die Frage nach den Grenzen der Gesetzesinterpretation. In der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts finden sich eine Reihe von Verfassungsanalogien. Diese Analogien zum Verfassungsgesetz werden zwar nur selten ausdrücklich als solche bezeichnet, sie finden sich aber in einer Vielzahl von dogmatischen Konstruktionen in der Rechtsprechung – wie etwa der Erweiterung des Grundrechtsschutzes für Deutsche auf EU-Bürger oder der Annahme von Gesetzgebungskompetenzen des Bundes als Annex zu dessen geschriebenen Kompetenzen. Die Existenz derartiger Analogien zum Verfassungsgesetz verlangt nach Antworten auf die Fragen nach den Grenzen der Kompetenz zur Verfassungsinterpretation. Der Beitrag spürt diesen Grenzen nach – und schließt mit der Aufforderung an das Bundesverfassungsgericht, die Annahme von Verfassungsanalogien zu explizieren und die sich darin spiegelnden Annahmen über die Grenzen der Kompetenz zur Verfassungsinterpretation zu reflektieren. Constitutional analogies. The Federal Constitutional Court at the limit of constitutional interpretation From a methodological point of view, the use of analogies in legal argument is highly controversial, for they reach to the limits of statutory interpretation. Underlying the methodological dispute over analogies is the question of what the limits of statutory interpretation are or ought to be. A number of analogies from constitutional law can be found in the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court. Although these analogies to constitutional law are rarely explicitly designated as such, in the case law they can be found in a variety of dogmatic constructions – for example, in the extension of Germans’ fundamental rights protection to EU citizens, or the assumption of legislative powers of the federal state as an appendix to its written powers. The existence of such analogies to constitutional law calls for answers to the question of the limits of the power to interpret the Constitution. It is the aim of this article to trace these limits, and in its conclusion it calls on the Federal Constitutional Court to explicate the adoption of analogies in constitutional law and to reflect on the assumptions found therein – respecting the limits of the power to interpret the Constitution.

Effectiveness of EU law and protection of fundamental rights

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosaria Sicurella
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Critical View ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Significant Step ◽  
Principle Of Legality

The decision of the Court of Justice in the M.A.S. and M.B. case marks a very significant step forward in the Taricco saga. It clearly shows the intention of the European Court to tone down the confrontation with the Italian Constitutional Court, while at the same time maintaining the most relevant achievement of the decision in the Taricco case, that is to say the fact to consider Article 325 TFEU as having direct effect. The author expresses quite a critical view on the solution adopted by the ECJ which finally results in a sort of “flexibilization” of the principle of legality at EU level in order to meet some of the claims by the Italian Constitutional Court. In the author's opinion, such a solution risks to undermine the overall coherence and soundness of the protection of fundamental rights at EU level, although it can appear at a first glance to boost the legality principle. A better solution could have been to develop a different reasoning relying on rights in the Charter other that the nullum crimen principle, and avoid to touch at the well-established scope of this principle as established in Article 49 Charter and also in Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Judges and Human Rights: The Kenyan Experience

1991 ◽  
Vol 35 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 142-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gibson Kamau Kuria ◽  
Algeisa M. Vazquez
Keyword(s):  
Attorney General ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Other ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
High Court ◽  
Rules Of Procedure ◽  
Fundamental Rights And Freedoms ◽  
The Individual

On 4 July, 1989 in Maina Mbacha v. Attorney General the High Court of Kenya appeared to remove itself from its role of enforcing the Bill of Rights of Kenya. The court ruled “inoperative” section 84 of the Constitution of Kenya which grants original jurisdiction to the High Court to enforce Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Individual, section 70–83 (inclusive) (Chapter V). The provision was deemed “inoperative” in Kamau Kuria v. Attorney General, and this was upheld shortly thereafter in Maina Mbacha when the High Court found that no rules of procedure had been enacted to enforce the Bill of Rights and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Indeed, in the latter case the court dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction even though the case was before the court by virtue of the constitutional grant of “original unlimited jurisdiction”. As a matter of established law, the court can be approached by any available procedure when ruling to enforce established constitutional rights. Ordinary rights can be defeated for failure to follow procedure, but historically, procedural requirements often defer to constitutionally granted rights. Once the Bill of Rights was enacted in the Constitution, its enforcement became supreme to all other law, including procedural rules, for the supremacy clause of the Kenya Constitution states: “… if any other law became inconsistent with this Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail and the other law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void”

scholarly journals When Certainty and Legality Collide: The Efficacy of Interdictory Relief for the Cessation of Building Works pending Review Proceedings

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (5) ◽  
pp. 160
Author(s):  
Richard Summers
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Advanced Stage ◽  
Western Cape ◽  
Legal Certainty ◽  
High Court ◽  
Important Principle ◽  
Principle Of Legality ◽  
Building Plans ◽  
Practical Implications

Effective legal redress against unlawful building works or construction activities can be an elusive target.  Given the desirability of legal certainty attached to administrative decisions in terms of which building plans are approved, should the practical implications of this principle trump the equally important principle of legality?  This article examines the – at times – competing imperatives of certainty and legality in the context of several recent decisions of the Western Cape High Court that related to applications for interdictory relief for the cessation of allegedly unlawful building works.  The practical difficulties for an applicant in these circumstances are particularly acute when the relief is sought pending the final determination of an application for judicial review of the impugned administrative decision to grant building plan approval.  The article highlights the approach of the Western Cape High Court in three cases to invoking considerations of legality in circumstances where building works had reached an advanced stage and the respondent had effectively achieved what has been described as an "impregnable position".  The principal difficulty for an applicant lies in the fact that where interdictory relief is sought against building works that have reached an advanced stage, this potentially renders an eventual successful review application brutum fulmen.

scholarly journals NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE

2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-20
Author(s):  
LAURA-ROXANA POPOVICIU
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Criminal Liability ◽  
Fundamental Principle ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Economic Life ◽  
Professional Activity ◽  
Free Development ◽  
The Right ◽  
Principle Of Legality ◽  
Right Order

This article discusses the issue of one of the most important Latin expressions that establish at the level of general principle that no crime exists outside the law.The purpose of the criminal law being the defense against the offenses of the right order, ensuring this order implies a strict respect of the principle of legality.Part of the principle of legality, the legality of incrimination, was formulated among the first, by the Beccaria in Dei delitti e delle pene and proclaimed also in the Declaration of Human and Citizen Rights (1789).Subsequently, the principle of legality of incrimination was passed in most criminal codes and even in some constitutions.The Romanian penal code emphasizes that the incriminations can only take place by law, not by other normative acts.In our law, crime is the sole basis of criminal liability.The second part of the principle of legality stipulates the legality of the punishments, so that, the crime being the only theme of the criminal liability, at the time of the commission the sanction must also intervene. Only when the sanction intervenes, it must be taken into account in particular that by sanctioning the offenders and the way in which the punishments are enforced some fundamental rights of the person are restricted, such as: freedom of movement, enshrined in all democratic constitutions, free development of the personality of the man and of his participation in the social and economic life, in the family life, the interruption of the professional activity and not lastly the affectation of his dignity. Therefore legality is a fundamental principle of criminal law: the criminalization can only take place through a law, and the sanction only if it is provided by law.

scholarly journals Ordinary Causation: A Study in Experimental Statutory Interpretation

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
James A. Macleod
Keyword(s):  
Causal Attribution ◽  
Statutory Interpretation ◽  
Doctrinal Development ◽  
Ordinary Meaning ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
Prevention Act ◽  
Usage Patterns ◽  
Ordinary Usage ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
Causal Language

In a series of recent split decisions interpreting criminal and tort-like legislation, the Supreme Court has purported to give statutory causation requirements their ordinary, plain meaning. Armed with dictionaries, examples from everyday speech, and commonsense intuitions, the Court’s majority has explained that statutory phrases like “because of” and “results from” entail but-for causation as a matter of ordinary usage. There’s just one problem: The Court’s majority (and the many state and federal courts following its lead) is wrong on the facts—specifically, the facts about how people ordinarily interpret, understand, and use causal language. This Article considers a novel approach to ordinary meaning statutory interpretation, using these recent causation cases as a proof of concept: To find how people would ordinarily construe statutory language in context, ask a lot of people to apply the disputed language, and observe what they do. In short, to find public meaning, ask the public. As a demonstration, the Article reports the results of a nationally representative survey of nearly 1500 jury-eligible laypeople. It tests the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements about the ordinary meaning of causal language in Title VII, the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, the Controlled Substances Act, and jury instructions in similar criminal and statutory tort settings. The results reveal clear and consistent patterns of causal attribution and ordinary usage—patterns that squarely contradict the Court’s ordinary meaning determinations. The results also demonstrate that certain alternative causation standards, though rejected by the Court as inconsistent with ordinary linguistic, conceptual, and moral intuitions, come closer to tracking all three. These discoveries raise serious concerns about the outcomes in recent criminal and tort causation cases, and possibly about ordinary and plain meaning interpretation more broadly. After discussing the implications for causation doctrine and statutory interpretation, the Article considers whether similar experimental methodologies might shed light on additional interpretation controversies in criminal and tort settings, on theories of common law doctrinal development, and on philosophical analyses of causation in criminal and tort theory.

Lord Burrows on Legislative Intention, Statutory Purpose, and the ‘Always Speaking’ Principle

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Goldsworthy
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Practical Importance ◽  
Statutory Interpretation ◽  
Modern Approach ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Text Context

Abstract In his 2017 Hamlyn Lectures, Professor (now Lord) Burrows set out his opinions about statutory interpretation. Given his recent appointment to the UK Supreme Court, these opinions now have more practical importance than those of most academic theorists. One of his main theses is that the modern approach to statutory interpretation, which focuses on text, context and purpose, should not include any reference to legislative intention. He dismisses this as ‘an unhelpful fiction or mask that should be avoided altogether’. I show that this thesis is mistaken, internally inconsistent, and might in practice undermine sound interpretation based on fundamental constitutional principles.

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