scholarly journals Discourse of civil military relations in Nepal

Unity Journal ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 21-32
Author(s):  
Chiranjibi Bhandari ◽  
Rajendra Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Civilian Control ◽  
Multiple Perspectives ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Military Organizations ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Legal Provisions ◽  
Military Institution ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Impact

A sovereign nation –state requires a strong military institution and the Nepali Army demands its personnel’s obedience, loyalty, sacrifice and discipline to maintain command and control. However, as an established principle, civilian control of the military is desirable to the military control of the state. The concept of Civil Military Relations (CMR) is dynamic, evolutionary and country specific. Such a bond between an official security organization and the public in general change with regime shifts, external imperatives and technological innovations. The impact of regime changes and political movements has been observed in various aspects of politics, society in Nepal is not an exception. In this line, this article deals on the theoretical discourse of CMR, reviews the constitutional and legal provisions and examines the factors influencing CMR in Nepal from the period of modern nationstate formation to present days. Along with existing debates around the role of the Nepali Army in various non-military jobs, this paper proposes multiple perspectives on how different entities, including bureaucrats, politicians and military leaders perceive CMR. Likewise, the writers argue that sharing the responsibilities among the civil society, citizenry and military organizations is one of the most suitable approaches in response to balancing CMR in Nepal.

The New Civil-Military Relations

1961 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gene M. Lyons
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Minimum Cost ◽  
The United States ◽  
Fundamental Principle ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Military Establishment ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Historically the character of civil-military relations in the United States has been dominated by the concept of civilian control of the military. This has largely been a response to the fear of praetorianism. As recently as 1949, for example, the first Hoover Commission asserted that one of the major reasons for strengthening the “means of exercising civilian control” over the defense establishment was to “safeguard our democratic traditions against militarism.” This same warning was raised in the report of the Rockefeller Committee on defense organization in 1953. While the overriding purpose of the committee's recommendations was to provide “the Nation with maximum security at minimum cost,” the report made it clear that this had to be achieved “without danger to our free institutions, based on the fundamental principle of civilian control of the Military Establishment.” Finally, during the debate on the reorganization proposals of 1958, senators and congressmen used the theme of a “Prussianized” military staff to attempt to slow down the trend towards centralization in the military establishment.Despite this imposing support, the concept of civilian control of the military has little significance for contemporary problems of national security in the United States. In the first place, military leaders are divided among themselves, although their differences cannot be reduced to a crass contrast between dichomatic doctrines. Air Force leaders who are gravely concerned over the need to maintain a decisive nuclear retaliatory force are by now acknowledging the need to develop a limited war capability.

On Resignation

2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard H. Kohn
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
The Public ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Senior Officers ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Civilian Authority ◽  
The Military

Arguments in favor of the topmost senior officers exercising “principled resignation” in opposition to policies, decisions, or orders that they find immoral, unethical, or disastrous for the country weaken the military profession and endanger American national security. A member of the Joint Chiefs, a combatant commander, or a topmost war commander who “resigns” would be injecting themselves improperly into a policy role, opposing civilian authority, and undermining civilian control of the military. The act would be politicizing for the military and likely fail to change what the officer opposes. Most importantly, their act of personal conscience would poison civil–military relations long into the future; civilian trust in military subordinates not to undermine support for policies and decisions with the public and other political leaders would decline. Even more than today, they would choose their senior military leaders for compatibility and agreement above other traits.

scholarly journals Mutual Embeddedness: The Architecture of Civil-Military Relations in Vietnam

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Vuving
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Reciprocal Relationship ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Party Control ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
The Military

This chapter explores the architecture of civil-military relations in Communist Party-ruled Vietnam. Contrary to the dominant paradigm of civil-military relations in the West, civil-military relations in Vietnam follow a very different logic, that of the Leninist system. The relationship between the military and the party-state in Vietnam is characterized by mutual embeddedness. This is not a zero-sum game as the concept of civilian control implies. In the Leninist system, the military's politicization, political influence and involvement in politics are critical for the Communist Party's hegemony. The Party's absolute, direct, and comprehensive control of the military is the core of civil-military relations in the Leninist system. However, Party control is a reciprocal relationship that gives military leaders more say and more privileges than they would have under more democratic conditions. This reciprocity explains the system’s endurance as well as its internal stability. The Vietnam People's Army is deeply politicized and the political control of the military serves the interests of both the Party and the military leadership. Barring a major political reform in the Vietnam Communist Party itself, the Vietnam People's Army will remain more political than professional and commercial.

scholarly journals NEUČINKOVITOST VOJSKE KOT POKAZATELJ NEUSTREZNOSTI CIVILNEGA NADZORA (2)

2015 ◽  
pp. 11-23
Author(s):  
BRANIMIR FURLAN
Keyword(s):  
First Generation ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Methodological Framework ◽  
Military Effectiveness ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Impact

Prispevek je nadaljevanje analize o vzročno-posledični povezavi med civilnim nadzorom in učinkovitostjo vojske. V prvem delu je bil predstavljen teoretično- metodološki okvir analize, v tem delu pa avtor predstavlja rezultate raziskave o stanju civilno-vojaških odnosov v Republiki Sloveniji ter vplivih civilnega nadzora na učinkovitost Slovenske vojske. Raziskava je pokazala, da se v Sloveniji uveljavlja praksa civilnega nadzora nad oboroženimi silami po vzoru drugih demokratičnih držav, vendar problematika prve generacije civilno-vojaških odnosov še ni končana. Uveljavljanje nadzora v praksi zagotavlja podrejenost vojske civilnim oblastem, pri čemer mehanizmi nadzora ne krepijo sposobnosti Slovenske vojske, da učinkovito izpolni svoje poslanstvo. Posledično lahko povzročijo nezadovoljstvo vojske ali izgubo kredibilnosti v javnosti. This article is a continuation of the analysis of cause-effect relations between civilian control and military effectiveness. The first part presented the theoretical and methodological framework, while in the second part, the author presents the results of the study of civil-military relations in the Republic of Slovenia, focusing on the impact of civilian control on the effectiveness of the Slovenian Armed Forces. The study showed that the practice of civilian control over the armed forces in Slovenia follows the example of those in other democratic states. However, the issue of the first-generation civil-military relations has not yet been completed. The enforcement of civilian control in practice provides for a complete subordination of the military to civilian authorities; however, it does not contribute to the ability of the military to effectively execute its missions. Rather, civilian control can cause military dissatisfaction and reluctance, as well as loss of credibility with the society.

Civil-Military Relations

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Risa Brooks
Keyword(s):  
American Politics ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Strategic Assessment ◽  
American Society ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Civilian Leadership ◽  
The Military ◽  
Practical Implications

Civil-military relations are fundamental to the fabric of American politics. Throughout the country’s history, relations among military institutions, the civilian leadership, and American society have experienced periodic challenges and frictions. Since the late 1950s, sociologists, historians, and political scientists have sought to document and analyze these tensions. The issues include the perennial topic of how best to assure civilian control of the military; the nature and consequences of the gaps between American society and the military; the military’s involvement in politics; and the appropriate roles of civilian and military leaders in strategic assessment. This chapter explores these scholarly debates and discusses their practical implications for contemporary American civil-military relations.

Erosion of Civilian Control in Democracies: A Comprehensive Framework for Comparative Analysis

2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402198975
Author(s):  
Polina Beliakova
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Intrastate Conflict ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Large N ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Comprehensive Framework ◽  
The Military ◽  
New Framework

Civilian control of the military is a fundamental attribute of democracy. While democracies are less coup-prone, studies treating civilian control as a dependent variable mostly focus on coups. In this paper, I argue that the factors predicting coups in autocracies, weaken civilian control of the military in democracies in different ways. To capture this difference, I advance a new comprehensive framework that includes the erosion of civilian control by competition, insubordination, and deference. I test the argument under conditions of an intrastate conflict—a conducive environment for the erosion of civilian control. A large-N analysis confirms that while intrastate conflict does not lead to coups in democracies, it increases the military’s involvement in government, pointing to alternative forms of erosion taking place. Further case study—Russia’s First Chechen War—demonstrates the causal logic behind the new framework, contributing to the nuanced comparative analysis of civil-military relations across regimes.

scholarly journals The Degree of Military Political Autonomy during the Spanish, Argentine and Brazilian Transitions

1993 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Zaverucha
Keyword(s):  
Third World ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The Political ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Political Autonomy ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Third World ◽  
The Military ◽  
Democratic Country

The state of civil–military relations in the world, especially in the Third World, is very well summed up by Mosca's statement that civilian control over the military ‘is a most fortunate exception in human history’.All over the globe, the armed forces have frequently preserved their autonomous power vis-à-vis civilians. They have also succeeded in maintaining their tutelage over some of the political regimes that have arisen from the process of transition from military to democratic governments, as in Argentina and Brazil. Spain is a remarkable exception. Today, Spain, despite its authoritarian legacy, is a democratic country. The constituted civil hierarchy has been institutionalised, military áutonomy weakened, and civilian control over the military has emerged. Spain's newly founded democracy now appears quite similar to the older European democracies.

The Control-Effectiveness Framework of Civil–Military Relations

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florina Cristiana Matei ◽  
Carolyn Halladay
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Democratic Governance ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Century Model ◽  
Security Sector ◽  
Control Effectiveness ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Law Enforcement Officials ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Civil–military relations—particularly the principles and practices of civilian control of the security sector—have changed significantly since the 1990s as more and more states around the world seek to consolidate democracy. The scholarly focus and the policy that it informs remain stuck in a mid-20th-century model, however. While civilian control remains central, this civilian oversight must, itself, uphold the requirements of democratic governance, ensuring that the uniformed forces are well integrated into the democracy that they are sworn to protect. Moreover, this democratic civilian control also must ensure the effectiveness of the security sector in the sense that soldiers, law enforcement officials, and intelligence agencies can fulfill the range of their missions. Thus, democratic civilian control requires ongoing attention from both the civilian and the military sides.

Conclusion

2020 ◽  
pp. 283-298
Author(s):  
Risa Brooks
Keyword(s):  
Future Research ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Military Effectiveness ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Us Military ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Military Activity ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Relationship

The concluding chapter synthesizes insights from the individual chapters, identifying six overarching lessons: civilian control of the US military is complex and understudied; norms are essential for healthy civil-military relations; the relationship between society and the military is less than healthy; partisanship is corroding civil-military relations; public scrutiny of the military is essential to military effectiveness; and the fundamental character of civil-military relations is changing. In turn, it proposes several questions for future research, suggesting that more could be known about public accountability of military activity; the nature and measurement of military politicization; and changing actors and roles in civil-military relations.

US Civil-Military Relations in the Gray Zone

2020 ◽  
pp. 263-282
Author(s):  
Sarah Sewall
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The United States ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Gray Zone ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Civilian Leaders ◽  
The Face ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

This chapter argues that the changing character of conflict demands rethinking U S civil-military relations. The United States has long relied on a nuclear deterrent and conventional military superiority to defend itself, but its adversaries have changed the rules of the game to exploit civilian vulnerabilities in the U S homeland using non kinetic tools. To ensure continued civilian control of the military use of force and effective management of competition below the threshold of war, civilian leaders must assume greater responsibility for the political and operational management of hostilities in the Gray Zone. Because civilian leaders are underprepared for this new global competition, they will be tempted to default to conventional military solutions. Traditional civil-military frameworks did not envision permanent conflict or the centrality of civilian terrain, capabilities, and operational responsibilities. The United States needs civilian-led tools and approaches to effectively avoid the dual extremes of national immobilization in the face of non kinetic threats and inadvertent escalation of conflict without civilian authorization or intent. Civilian adaptation could also diminish the traditional role of the armed forces in defending the nation. The United States must rewire the relationship of the military and civilians through its decisions about how to manage Gray Zone competition.

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