Social Cognition in the Real World: Reconnecting the Study of Social Cognition With Social Reality

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 144-158
Author(s):  
Katherine Osborne-Crowley
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Real World ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Ecological Validity ◽  
Social Cognitions ◽  
Cognitive Ethology ◽  
Social Success ◽  
The Poor ◽  
The Brain

The scientific study of social cognition is a growing field which promises to deliver valuable insights into how the brain underpins human’s social success. However, the poor ecological validity of many popular paradigms constrains the progress of social cognitive scientists. Highly simplistic and contrived stimuli are commonplace, despite the complexity and unpredictability of real-world social experiences. A shift toward a cognitive ethology approach would allow us to determine if, when, and how specific cognitive processes contribute to real-world functioning. This shift would enable us to break new ground in our understanding of the cognitions which underpin so much of the human experience. To address these questions, we must innovate and test social cognitions in dynamic, multimodal, context-embedded, and interactive environments. Furthermore, measuring responses dynamically and in terms of accuracy (rather than based on arbitrary criteria defined by the experimenter), would improve ecological validity. Finally, researchers should take into account sample diversity and participants’ motivation to ensure the generalizability of findings to everyday interactions. This article considers these issues in turn and outlines recent research which demonstrates how they might be overcome.

scholarly journals Common Brain Regions with Distinct Patterns of Neural Responses during Mentalizing about Groups and Individuals

2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (9) ◽  
pp. 1406-1417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Manuel Contreras ◽  
Jessica Schirmer ◽  
Mahzarin R. Banaji ◽  
Jason P. Mitchell
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Neural Responses ◽  
Physical Attributes ◽  
Medial Pfc ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

An individual has a mind; a group does not. Yet humans routinely endow groups with mental states irreducible to any of their members (e.g., “scientists hope to understand every aspect of nature”). But are these mental states categorically similar to those we attribute to individuals? In two fMRI experiments, we tested this question against a set of brain regions that are consistently associated with social cognition—medial pFC, anterior temporal lobe, TPJ, and medial parietal cortex. Participants alternately answered questions about the mental states and physical attributes of individual people and groups. Regions previously associated with mentalizing about individuals were also robustly responsive to judgments of groups, suggesting that perceivers deploy the same social-cognitive processes when thinking about the mind of an individual and the “mind” of a group. However, multivariate searchlight analysis revealed that several of these regions showed distinct multivoxel patterns of response to groups and individual people, suggesting that perceivers maintain distinct representations of groups and individuals during mental state inferences. These findings suggest that perceivers mentalize about groups in a manner qualitatively similar to mentalizing about individual people, but that the brain nevertheless maintains important distinctions between the representations of such entities.

The cognitive-emotional brain is an embodied and social brain

2015 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Kiverstein ◽  
Mark Miller
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Strong Support ◽  
Social Brain ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Integrated Processes

AbstractPessoa (2013) makes a compelling case for conceiving of emotion and cognition as deeply integrated processes in the brain. We will begin our commentary by asking what implications this view of the brain has for an ontology of cognition – a theory of what cognition is and what cognitive processes exist. We will suggest that Pessoa's book, The Cognitive-Emotional Brain, provides strong support for an embodied theory of cognition. We end our commentary by offering some speculation about how Pessoa's arguments naturally extend to social cognition.

Facial Feedback Effects on Impression Formation

1993 ◽  
Vol 77 (3_suppl) ◽  
pp. 1251-1258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hideki Ohira ◽  
Kiyomi Kurono
Keyword(s):  
College Students ◽  
Social Cognition ◽  
Facial Expressions ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Impression Formation ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Female College Students ◽  
Feedback Effects ◽  
Facial Feedback ◽  
Negative Facial Expression

Two experiments were conducted to examine effects of facial expressions upon social cognitive processes in which the impression of another person is formed. In each experiment, 30 female college students were induced to display or conceal their facial reactions to a hypothetical target person whose behaviors were mildly hostile (Exp. 1) or mildly friendly (Exp. 2), or their facial expressions were not manipulated. Displaying the facial expressions shifted the impression into the congruent directions with hedonic values corresponding to the facial expressions. Concealing the facial expressions, however, did not influence impression formation. Also, the positive-negative asymmetry was observed in the facial feedback effects, that is, the negative facial expression had a stronger effect on social cognition than the positive one.

scholarly journals Adolescent Social Cognitive Development

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victoria Guazzelli Williamson
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Current Knowledge ◽  
Developmental Trajectories ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Cultural Considerations ◽  
Stage Of Development ◽  
Social Cognitive Processes

During adolescence, our bodies, brains, and behaviors undergo marked developmental changes. Adolescents often become increasingly aware of their social worlds and use this stage of development to develop skills to help them navigate this changing landscape. Up until recently, an overwhelming majority of research on social cognition–specifically on understanding the mental states of others–has focused on childhood. In this chapter, I demonstrate that adolescence is an important developmental period for the refinement and sophistication of social cognitive processes that began developing during childhood. I also discuss the development of more advanced and distinct social cognitive processes. Additionally, I review the available literature on the developmental trajectories of advanced social cognition across adolescence–including individual differences, cultural considerations, and implications for adolescent health and wellbeing. Finally, I describe how future research may begin to address current knowledge gaps on this topic.

scholarly journals Cognition, social cognition, and Self-assessment in schizophrenia: prediction of different elements of everyday functional outcomes

CNS Spectrums ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juliet Silberstein ◽  
Philip D. Harvey
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Interpersonal Relationships ◽  
Real World ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Negative Symptoms ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Social Outcomes ◽  
Self Assessment ◽  
Functional Deficits ◽  
Potential Factors

A growing body of research has shown that two domains of cognition, neurocognition and social cognition, predict different domains of real-world outcomes in people with schizophrenia. Social cognition has been shown to predict social outcomes but not non-social outcomes (e.g. living independently), and neurocognition provides minimal prediction of social outcomes (e.g. interpersonal relationships). The differing predictive value of neurocognition and social cognition has led to an exploration of potential factors that interact with cognition to influence everyday outcomes. Functional skills, negative symptoms, and self-assessment have shown particularly promising relationships with cognitive ability. Several consensus studies have pinpointed valid performance-based assessments. High-contact informant ratings have additionally been shown to be highly accurate. The emerging understanding of divergent patterns of predicting outcomes and reliable assessments present an opportunity to improve treatment targets and real-world outcomes for individuals with schizophrenia. In particular, a recently defined component of metacognition has shown particular promise. Introspective accuracy (IA) addresses how well individuals evaluate their own abilities. Emerging research has found that IA of neurocognitive ability better predicts everyday functional deficits than scores on performance-based measures of neurocognitive skills and has found that IA of social cognition accounts unique variance in real world disability above social cognitive abilities. Intriguingly, IA of neurocognition appears to preferentially predict non-social outcomes while IA of social cognition predicts social outcomes.

scholarly journals Mentalizing During Social InterAction: A Four Component Model

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haiyan Wu ◽  
Xun Liu ◽  
Cindy C. Hagan ◽  
dean mobbs
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Social Interaction ◽  
Real World ◽  
Dynamic Interaction ◽  
Component Model ◽  
Social Cognitions ◽  
Thought Processes ◽  
First Order ◽  
Four Component Model ◽  
Internal States

Mentalizing, conventionally defined as the process in which we infer the inner thoughts and intentions of others, is a fundamental component of human social cognition. Yet its role, and the nuanced layers involved, in real world social interaction are rarely discussed. To account for this lack of theory, we propose the Interactive Mentalizing Theory (IMT). We discuss the connection between mentalizing, metacognition, and social interaction in the context of four elements of mentalizing: (i) Metacognition - inference of our own thought processes and social cognitions and which is central to all other components of mentalizing including: (ii) first-order mentalizing – inferring the thoughts and intentions of an agent’s mind; (iii) personal second-order mentalizing - inference of other’s mentalizing of one’s own mind; (iv) Collective mentalizing: which takes at least two forms (a) vicarious mentalizing: adopting another’s mentalizing of an agent (i.e. what we think others think of an agent) and (b) co-mentalizing: mentalizing about an agent in conjunction with others’ mentalizing of that agent (i.e. conforming to others beliefs about another agent’s internal states). The weights of these four elements is determined by metacognitive insight and confidence in one’s own or another’s mentalizing ability, yielding a dynamic interaction between these circuits. To advance our knowledge on mentalizing during live social interaction, we identify how these subprocesses can be organized by different target agents and facilitated by combining computational modeling and interactive brain approaches.

Stories and the Promotion of Social Cognition

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 257-262 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond A. Mar
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Experimental Research ◽  
Real World ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Current Evidence ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Critical Questions ◽  
Lines Of Evidence ◽  
Neuropsychological Investigations

Engaging with fictional stories and the characters within them might help us better understand our real-world peers. Because stories are about characters and their interactions, understanding stories might help us to exercise our social cognitive abilities. Correlational studies with children and adults, experimental research, and neuropsychological investigations have all helped develop our understanding of how stories relate to social cognition. However, there remain a number of limitations to the current evidence, some puzzling results, and several unanswered questions that should inspire future research. This review traces multiple lines of evidence tying stories to social cognition and raises numerous critical questions for the field.

Disorganization and Social Cognition: Data from the Italian Network of Research on Psychoses

2017 ◽  
Vol 41 (S1) ◽  
pp. S39-S40
Author(s):  
P. Rocca
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Social Functioning ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Indirect Effects ◽  
Negative Symptoms ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
The Core ◽  
Competing Interest ◽  
Socially Relevant ◽  
Multi Center Study

Social cognition (SC) refers broadly to the domains of cognitive functions that are employed in socially relevant situations. These disturbances have been found to be strongly related to disorganized and negative symptoms in schizophrenia. Each of the disorganization symptoms suggests a diminishment or absence of organization. There seems to be a loss of the ability to be directed toward or committed to a particular focal topic or goal. Such conditions are likely to impact patients’ drives or motivations to initiate goal-directed activities that could yield pleasurable opportunities. Moreover, it has been suggested that disorganized symptoms are an integral link in cognitive pathways, with connections between cognitive processes weakening as disorganized symptoms increase. Thus, it seems that when disorganized symptoms are present, people with schizophrenia are no longer able to effectively utilize the neurocognitive abilities necessary for performing social cognitive or metacognitive tasks. It is also in line with models of disorganization in schizophrenia (Bleuler, 1911) that a “loosening of associations”—similar to current conceptualizations of disorganized symptoms—is at the core of these cognitive disruptions. Previous research has linked disorganization to cognition (neurocognition and SC) and cognition to social functioning, although in separate studies. The present study was conducted to explore a model, where disorganization predicted social functioning both directly both through indirect effects on other determinants (neurocognition, SC and negative symptoms) in a large, and well-characterized sample of patients with schizophrenia recruited in the context of a multi-center study of the Italian Network for Research on Psychoses (NIRP).Disclosure of interestThe author declares that he has no competing interest.

scholarly journals S53. DELINEATING SOCIAL COGNITION IN AUTISM AND PSYCHOSIS

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (Supplement_1) ◽  
pp. S53-S53
Author(s):  
Tim Ziermans ◽  
Sophie van Rijn ◽  
Hilde Geurts ◽  
Lieuwe De Haan
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Cognitive Performance ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Ecological Validity ◽  
Autism Spectrum ◽  
Cognitive Profile ◽  
Self Report ◽  
First Episode ◽  
Relative Contribution ◽  
The Social

Abstract Background Impaired social cognition represents a common feature in both the autism and psychosis spectrum, but direct comparisons are sparse and assessments typically restricted to a few tasks with limited ecological validity. The first aim of the present study was to compare the social cognitive profile of young individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) or a first episode psychosis (FEP) with a group of typical comparisons (TC) on a comprehensive social cognition test battery. The second aim was to explore the relative contribution of autistic and psychotic traits to social cognitive performance across groups. Methods In total 90 young individuals (M = 21.9 y, SD = 3.1 y, range = 16–30 y, 67% male) were recruited. Groups (31 FEP, 21 ASD, 38 TC) were matched for age and sex. Social cognition assessment included measures for static and dynamic emotion recognition & social inference / Theory of Mind, social attention (eye-tacking), empathy and alexithymia. Autistic and psychotic traits were assessed with self-report questionnaires (AQ-28 & SPQ-br). Results Data collection is completed at the time of abstract submission and analyses are expected to be finalized in February 2020. Discussion Pending the outcome of our analyses, we expect our results will provide a more complete and detailed picture of shared and unique aspects in the social cognitive profile of autism and psychosis. In general we hypothesize that both ASD and FEP, on a group-level, will significantly underperform compared to TC, but that the respective trait dimensions will each explain a unique amount of variance in social cognitive performance.

scholarly journals Before and below ‘theory of mind’: embodied simulation and the neural correlates of social cognition

2007 ◽  
Vol 362 (1480) ◽  
pp. 659-669 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vittorio Gallese
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Language Processing ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Mirror Neurons ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Mirror Neuron System ◽  
Mirror Neuron ◽  
Embodied Simulation ◽  
Automatic Translation ◽  
The Brain

The automatic translation of folk psychology into newly formed brain modules specifically dedicated to mind-reading and other social cognitive abilities should be carefully scrutinized. Searching for the brain location of intentions, beliefs and desires— as such —might not be the best epistemic strategy to disclose what social cognition really is. The results of neurocognitive research suggest that in the brain of primates, mirror neurons, and more generally the premotor system, play a major role in several aspects of social cognition, from action and intention understanding to language processing. This evidence is presented and discussed within the theoretical frame of an embodied simulation account of social cognition. Embodied simulation and the mirror neuron system underpinning it provide the means to share communicative intentions, meaning and reference, thus granting the parity requirements of social communication.

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