scholarly journals What does it take to make it to the polling station? The effects of campaign activities on electoral participation

2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 168-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Siim Trumm ◽  
Laura Sudulich
Keyword(s):  
Second Order ◽  
Electoral Participation ◽  
Relative Ability ◽  
General Elections ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Local Campaigns ◽  
Cost Of Voting

This study explores the extent to which campaign visibility facilitates electoral participation, using data from first- and second-order elections in Britain. Our contribution to the existing literature is threefold. First, we assess whether the effects of campaign effort are conditioned by marginality, finding that campaign mobilization gets out the vote regardless of the competitiveness of the race. Second, we look at the relative ability of different campaign activities to stimulate turnout, detecting significant differences. Third, we show that the effects of campaign effort on electoral participation are rather similar in first- and second-order elections. These findings suggest that a greater level of electoral information provided by campaign activities does reduce the cost of voting. Local campaigns play a key role in bringing voters to the polls in marginal and non-marginal races and at general elections as much as at second-order elections.

Turnout

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Bendor ◽  
Daniel Diermeier ◽  
David A. Siegel ◽  
Michael M. Ting
Keyword(s):  
Population Size ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Comparative Statics ◽  
Electoral Participation ◽  
Basic Model ◽  
Empirically Supported ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Cost Of Voting

This chapter focuses on voter participation, perhaps the most well-known anomaly for rational choice theory. The problem goes like this: in large electorates, the chance that any single voter will be pivotal is very small. Consequently, the cost of voting will outweigh the expected gains from turning out and few citizens will vote. This prediction is not consistent with some of the most easily observed facts about elections. The chapter introduces a basic model of electoral participation that focuses on voters’ turnout decisions under fixed candidate platforms. Contrary to the “paradox of turnout” raised by game-theoretic models of turnout, the model consistently generates realistically high levels of turnout. It also produces comparative statics, including those for voting cost, population size, and faction size, that are intuitive and empirically supported.

Voter Turnout and City Performance: Evidence from Italian Municipalities

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Lo Prete ◽  
Federico Revelli
Keyword(s):  
Voter Turnout ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Life Quality ◽  
National Elections ◽  
Mayoral Elections ◽  
Administrative Efficiency ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Bad Weather ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Cost Of Voting

Abstract Using data on mayoral elections in large Italian cities during the 2000s, we investigate whether and how voter turnout affects city performance across a number of dimensions. To address the issue of voter turnout endogeneity and identify the transmission mechanism, we exploit exogenous variation in participation rates in mayoral elections due to anticipated shocks (concurrence of local and national elections) and unanticipated shocks (bad weather on the day of the election) to the cost of voting. The results consistently point to a negative impact of voter turnout rates on indicators of urban environmental performance, life quality, and administrative efficiency. Interestingly, though, we find that only anticipated shocks to turnout affect the quality of elected mayors measured on a number of competence dimensions, compatibly with the hypothesis of a selection mechanism whereby parties choose candidates to maximize their chances of winning the elections based on their expectations on voter turnout rates (JEL D72, H72, C26).

Voting Lines, Equal Treatment, and Early Voting Check-In Times in Florida

2020 ◽  
pp. 153244002094388
Author(s):  
David Cottrell ◽  
Michael C. Herron ◽  
Daniel A. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Measurement Problem ◽  
Equal Treatment ◽  
Lower Probability ◽  
Ceteris Paribus ◽  
Administrative Records ◽  
Early Voting ◽  
Unequal Treatment ◽  
General Elections ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Cost Of Voting

Lines at the polls raise the cost of voting and can precipitate unequal treatment of voters. Research on voting lines is nonetheless hampered by a fundamental measurement problem: little is known about the distribution of time voters spend in line prior to casting ballots. We argue that early, in-person voter check-in times allow us identify individuals who waited in line to vote. Drawing on election administrative records from two General Elections in Florida—1,031,179 check-ins from 2012 and 1,846,845 from 2016—we find that minority voters incurred disproportionately long wait times in 2012 and that in-person voters who waited excessively in 2012 had a slightly lower probability—approximately one percent—of turning out to vote in 2016, ceteris paribus. These individuals also had slightly lower turnout probabilities in the 2014 Midterm Election, ceteris paribus. Our results draw attention to the ongoing importance of the administrative features of elections that influence the cost of voting and ultimately the extent to which voters are treated equally.

scholarly journals Punishment Strategies across Societies: Conventional Wisdoms Reconsidered

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Ramzi Suleiman ◽  
Yuval Samid
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Strong Predictor ◽  
Social Environments ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
The World ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Cost

Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing cooperation was explained as deterrence of free riders by cooperative strong reciprocators, who were willing to pay the cost of punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as revenge by low cooperators against high cooperators suspected of punishing them in previous rounds. The present paper reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a public goods experiment with punishment, conducted by the authors on Israeli subjects (Study 1), and from a study published in Science using sixteen participant pools from cities around the world (Study 2), we found that: 1. The effect of punishment on the emergence of cooperation was mainly due to contributors increasing their cooperation, rather than from free riders being deterred. 2. Participants adhered to different contribution and punishment strategies. Some cooperated and did not punish (‘cooperators’); others cooperated and punished free riders (‘strong reciprocators’); a third subgroup punished upward and downward relative to their own contribution (‘norm-keepers’); and a small sub-group punished only cooperators (‘antisocial punishers’). 3. Clear societal differences emerged in the mix of the four participant types, with high-contributing pools characterized by higher ratios of ‘strong reciprocators’, and ‘cooperators’, and low-contributing pools characterized by a higher ratio of ‘norm keepers’. 4. The fraction of ‘strong reciprocators’ out of the total punishers emerged as a strong predictor of the groups’ level of cooperation and success in providing the public goods.

scholarly journals Electoral Incentives and the Allocation of Public Funds

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederico Finan ◽  
Maurizio Mazzocco
Keyword(s):  
Electoral System ◽  
Policy Reforms ◽  
Public Funds ◽  
Term Limit ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Projects ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The One ◽  
The Cost

Abstract Politicians allocate public resources in ways that maximize political gains, and potentially at the cost of lower welfare. In this paper, we quantify these welfare costs in the context of Brazil’s federal legislature, which grants its members a budget to fund public projects within their states. Using data from the state of Roraima, we estimate a model of politicians’ allocation decisions and find that 26.8% of the public funds allocated by legislators are distorted relative to a social planner’s allocation. We then use the model to simulate three potential policy reforms to the electoral system: the adoption of approval voting, imposing a one-term limit, and redistricting. We find that a one-term limit and redistricting are both effective at reducing distortions. The one-term limit policy, however, increases corruption, which makes it a welfare-reducing policy.

scholarly journals Analysis of Effects of Service Quality and Loyalty on Interest Rates of Basketball Athletes in Sahabat Basketball Club Yogyakarta

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-160
Author(s):  
Kukuh Hardopo Putro ◽  
Mohd Salleh Aman ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rates ◽  
Random Sampling ◽  
External Factors ◽  
Major Influence ◽  
Qualitative And Quantitative ◽  
Analysis Techniques ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Internal And External Factors ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Customer Trust

AbstractIn business, especially basketball experience an increased very rapidly, both in terms of quality and quantity in Yogyakarta. Customer as the facilities and services the user pays the cost, much influenced by several internal and external factors. These factors have a major influence on the process of the customer to pay a fee to join and dues in Basketball Clubs. This type of research is descriptive with mixed qualitative and quantitative approach, population in this study is the Athlete Club Basketball “Sahabat” of Yogyakarta, with the number of 20 people, the study sample was determined by random sampling. The technique of collecting data using questionnaires. SPSS.21 using data analysis techniques. While looking at the level of loyalty of respondents to the basketball club Yogyakarta “Sahabat”, 13 of 20 respondents said well (65%) and 7 respondents (35%) had middle loyalty. So from this study showed that customer trust is strongly influenced by the good facilities, appropriate tariffs, staff were nice, the service was very good, and therefore in this study obtained very significant results to customer satisfaction or athletes in the Club Basketball “Sahabat” of Yogyakarta.

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