Who brings home the pork? Parties and the role of localness in committee assignments in mixed-member proportional systems

2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (5) ◽  
pp. 488-500 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Gschwend ◽  
Thomas Zittel

The assignment of seats to specialized standing committees is a most consequential choice in legislative contexts. Distributive theories of legislative organization suggest that electoral incentives to cultivate personal votes result in the self-selection of legislators to committees best suited to please their constituents and, thus, to secure reelection. However, these theories discard the partisan basis of European parliaments and therefore fail to adequately assess the politics of committee assignments in these particular contexts. This article aims to explore the significance of distributive theories for the German case in differentiated ways and on the basis of a new and rich data set including statistical data for five legislative terms (1983, 1987, 1998, 2005, and 2009). It argues that in partisan assemblies, political parties might develop an interest in distributive politics themselves and might assign distinct types of legislators to distinct committees to seek personal votes contingent upon distinct electoral incentives. Particularly, we argue that Germany’s mixed proportional system provides incentives to parties to assign legislators with profound local roots to district committees best suited to please geographic constituents.

2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Naofumi Fujimura

Political parties are often faced with seemingly opposing goals when trying to secure members’ reelection and maintain party unity. On one hand, a party needs to fulfill members’ diverse electoral needs for their reelection, and on the other hand, the party must force members to vote in unison according to party lines for collective decisions. How does a party influence its members to take unified action while meeting their individual electoral needs? Through an analysis of the Japanese Diet, this study argues that parties attempt to achieve the reelection of their members and maintain party unity by manipulating legislative committee assignments and deliberations. In particular, the study demonstrates that a party shapes committees in a different way according to policy areas over which committees have jurisdiction. A party tends to accept its members’ requests for affiliation and allow their self-management in committees concerned with particularistic benefits so that they can deliver specific benefits to each electoral district. In addition, a party tends to assign members who have average policy positions in the party to committees concerned with general benefits to make policies that satisfy many constituencies.


2015 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 227-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fortunato Musella

IntroduzioneParty leaders have become more powerful and autonomous actors in recent years by developing a direct and personal relationship with citizens. As anticipated in the United States (Lowi, 1985), the rise of the ‘personal leader’ seems to have occurred in many European democracies, both in old parties and in more recently formed parties, with a widespread tendency for them to be promoted and controlled by individual leaders. Nevertheless, party leadership remains quite a neglected theme in political science. Through a data set including ~500 party presidents in 13 democracies, this article focusses on the personalization of party leadership by comparing Italy with other Western countries. More particularly, new procedures for the selection of party chairs, the centralization of power in political parties, and the new role of party leaders in the legislative/governmental arena are analysed, given their importance to such a process. The article summarizes new data on the party leaders’ characteristics, with regards to their political backgrounds, how they are elected, how long they stay in office, and whether they become prime minister or enter the executive. In this way, we are able to see how some new parties are created from the outset as highly personalized and centralized parties (Forza Italia being the paradigmatic case), whereas other older parties have also evolved in a personalized direction.


2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eva Østergaard-Nielsen ◽  
Irina Ciornei

A growing number of countries have granted their emigrant citizens the right to vote in homeland elections from afar. Yet, there is little understanding of the extent to which emigration issues are visible in the subsequent legislative processes of policymaking and representation. Based on an original data set of parliamentary activities in Spain, Italy, France and Romania, this article analyses why political parties pay attention to emigrants. To that end, we propose a conceptual framework which draws on both theories of issue salience and substantive representation. Bridging these two frameworks allows us bring in both parties (salience) and constituencies (representation) in the analysis of the linkage between electorates and parliaments at a transnational level. We test a series of hypotheses and find that parties are more likely to focus on emigration issues the stronger their electoral incentives and in the context of electoral systems allowing the emigrants to elect special emigrant representatives.


2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 35-52
Author(s):  
Kashif Rashid ◽  
Sardar M. N. Islam

An organization’s board is an important governance mechanism to incorporate corporate governance provisions in financial markets. Previous studies on board size and the value of a firm relationship (BVF) are inconclusive and lack a comparative and comprehensive analysis of this relationship which incorporates the role of additional factors present in the developing financial market. This study bridges the gap in the literature by providing some additional empirical evidence about the BVF relationship. This evidence is provided by performing a comparative and comprehensive analysis of the firms in developing and developed financial markets. Based on a sophisticated data set for the selected markets, two separate models are run and their results are compared. The results for this study suggest that in the developing market a bigger board improves the value of a firm, supporting the relevance of stewardship theory. On the contrary, in the developed market a smaller board improves shareholders’ value, supporting the agency theory. The study has reflected the differences in the efficiency of institutional framework and the sophistication of financial development in a selection of countries, in the results on the BVF relationship. Furthermore, these results make the applicability of different business theories explaining market operations in these markets different from each other. The results are innovative and valuable to academics, analysts and industry professionals in both developing and developed financial markets.


Author(s):  
Samsul Samsul ◽  
Zuli Qodir

The purpose of this research is to find out what causes the weakening of the capital of Andi's nobility in Palopo City in the selection of candidates for mayor and what is the role of Andi's nobility in political contestation. This type of research is descriptive qualitative. The results showed that the capital owned by Andi's aristocracy in Palopo City was. First, the social capital built by Andi's nobility had not been carried out in a structured way from relations with the general public, community leaders, with community organizations, to officials in the bureaucracy and most importantly, Political parties. Second, economic capital is an important thing that used in the Mayor Election contestation in the City of Palopo, Bangsawan Andi figure who escaped as a candidate for mayor does not yet have sufficient capital in terms of funds. Third, the cultural capital owned by Bangsawan Andi, who escaped as a candidate for mayor, still lacked a high bargaining value in political contestation in Palopo City. Fourth, the Symbolic Capital is a capital that sufficiently calculated in the mayor election dispute in Palopo City, namely the title of nobility obtained from the blood of the descendants of the Luwu kings, only it must be accompanied by other capital to elected in political contestation.


2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 35-64
Author(s):  
Silvina Lilian Danesi ◽  
Ludovic Rheault

Latin American legislatures have gone largely unstudied, with the functioning of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies prior to the 1980s being an entirely unexplored subject. This paper fills that gap by examining the organization of the Chamber, with particular focus on its standing committee system from 1946 to 2001. We assess the portability of two U.S.-based theoretical approaches to legislative organization by applying them to committee assignments. An original data set of Argentine deputies was constructed and a way of measuring political power in committees was devised for this study. Despite weak democratic governments, military interventions, and changes to the electoral system, we find that ruling parties have consistently influenced the committee system, shaping its structure and securing an over-proportion of their deputies in key committee positions. These results support the applicability of the U.S. originated Cartel Theory of legislative organization to understanding and studying legislatures outside that country.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 96-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Barfort ◽  
Nikolaj A. Harmon ◽  
Frederik Hjorth ◽  
Asmus Leth Olsen

We study the role of self-selection into public service in sustaining honesty in the public sector. Focusing on the world’s least corrupt country, Denmark, we use a survey experiment to document strong self-selection of more honest individuals into public service. This result differs sharply from existing findings from more corrupt settings. Differences in pro-social versus pecuniary motivation appear central to the observed selection pattern. Dishonest individuals are more pecuniarily motivated and self-select out of public service into higher-paying private sector jobs. Accordingly, we find that increasing public sector wages would attract more dishonest candidates to public service in Denmark. (JEL D73, H83, J31, J45)


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 315
Author(s):  
Muhammad Bahrul Ulum

This paper aims to reassess the term “elected democratically” in Article 18 (4) of Indonesia’s revised 1945 Constitution which resulted in the competing interpretation over the appropriate method for selecting heads of regional governments in Indonesia. In fact, the flexibility of such a term was challenged and negotiated to formulate an appropriate mechanism to select heads of regional governments. In 2004, the Constitutional Court concluded that the legislative body was the ultimate institution to interpret “elected democratically” so that this institution can opt whether a regional head election or an indirect election to define such a term. While the regional head election was applied, including its dispute settlements over electoral results to the Constitutional Court, this Court considered a different argument. In 2013, the Constitutional Court reinterpreted such an article by highlighting that the regional head election should be exempted from the general election subjected to Article 22E (2) of 1945 Constitution. In 2014, President Yudhoyono’s rejection from his agreement after the enactment of the Selection of Heads of Regional Governments Bill put further juridical contentions in which the President finally revoked the adoption of the regional head voting by the Regional People’s Representative Council or Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD). As a consequence, the regional head election has been re-adopted and this regional election has remained to be expected to improve the performance of local democracy. The introduction of this direct election model at the regional level, however, questions the important role of political parties because the adoption of this election was substantially to answer public distrust against them. In particular, the debate whether political parties work becomes intense after non-party candidates are allowed to contest to this election.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (33) ◽  
pp. 112
Author(s):  
Samsul Rani

The phenomenon of 2018 regional elections can be seen in the selection of candidate pairs, party coalitions, and the delivery of political messages conveyed by political parties and candidate pairs, which have given birth to a variety of maneuvers, rivalries in the formulation of political strategies to support or subdue each other. This communication constellation has shaped the dynamics of Pilkada political communication in Indonesia. Of the 171 regions that held elections, 16 of them had a single candidate whose average candidate pair was supported by 6 to 12 political parties. The phenomenon of mutually changing pairs of candidates or revoking support has become a public concern in the elections. This can be caused by unfulfilled supporting requirements, lobbying from other parties, low electability, legal cases, and political dowry. The role of the mass media in Pilkada is very good, because the mass media has become an independent and transparent party, the news related to the Pilkada is published based on facts and data, it does not appear that mass media "fry" the issues so that the condition of the community is more conducive and the elections run safely.


1974 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Obler

Leaders and activists in most Western political parties, appreciating Schattschneider's adage1 that parties are controlled by those who control nominations to public offices, jealously guard their right to choose parliamentary candidates. They realize that candidates play a crucial role in shaping voters’ images of the parties as well as in formulating the party policies. Not surprisingly, candidates are usually recruited through rather oligarchical procedures. Extra-parliamentary party leaders normally pick the nominees in closed private meetings and then submit their choices to rank-and-file party members and/or delegates who nearly always grant their approval. Such procedures reduce the role of party members to one of docile acquiescence, and completely exclude party voters.


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