scholarly journals Exaggerated Meta-Perceptions Predict Intergroup Hostility Between American Political Partisans

Author(s):  
Samantha Moore-Berg ◽  
Lee-Or Ankori Karlinsky ◽  
Boaz Hameiri ◽  
Emile Bruneau

People’s actions towards a competitive outgroup can be motivated not only by their perceptions of the outgroup, but also by how they think the outgroup perceives the ingroup (i.e., meta-perceptions). Here we examine the prevalence, accuracy, and consequences of meta-perceptions among American political partisans. Using a representative sample (N = 1056) and a longitudinal convenience sample (N = 2707), we find that Democrats and Republicans equally dislike and dehumanize each other, but think that the levels of prejudice and dehumanization held by the outgroup party are approximately twice as strong as actually reported by a representative sample of Democrats and Republicans. Overestimations of negative meta-perceptions were consistent across samples, over time and between demographic subgroups, but were modulated by political ideology: more strongly liberal Democrats and more strongly conservative Republicans were particularly prone to exaggerate meta-perceptions. Finally, we show that meta-prejudice and meta-dehumanization are independently associated with desire for social distance from members of the outgroup party and support for policies that harm the country and flout democratic norms to favor the ingroup political party. This research demonstrates that partisan meta-perceptions are subject to a strong negativity bias, with Democrats and Republicans agreeing that the shadow of partisanship is much larger than it actually is, which fosters mutual intergroup hostility.

2020 ◽  
Vol 117 (26) ◽  
pp. 14864-14872 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samantha L. Moore-Berg ◽  
Lee-Or Ankori-Karlinsky ◽  
Boaz Hameiri ◽  
Emile Bruneau

People’s actions toward a competitive outgroup can be motivated not only by their perceptions of the outgroup, but also by how they think the outgroup perceives the ingroup (i.e., meta-perceptions). Here, we examine the prevalence, accuracy, and consequences of meta-perceptions among American political partisans. Using a representative sample (n= 1,056) and a longitudinal convenience sample (n= 2,707), we find that Democrats and Republicans equally dislike and dehumanize each other but think that the levels of prejudice and dehumanization held by the outgroup party are approximately twice as strong as actually reported by a representative sample of Democrats and Republicans. Overestimations of negative meta-perceptions were consistent across samples over time and between demographic subgroups but were modulated by political ideology: More strongly liberal Democrats and more strongly conservative Republicans were particularly prone to exaggerate meta-perceptions. Finally, we show that meta-prejudice and meta-dehumanization are independently associated with the desire for social distance from members of the outgroup party and support for policies that harm the country and flout democratic norms to favor the ingroup political party. This research demonstrates that partisan meta-perceptions are subject to a strong negativity bias with Democrats and Republicans agreeing that the shadow of partisanship is much larger than it actually is, which fosters mutual intergroup hostility.


2021 ◽  
pp. 136843022199008
Author(s):  
Ethan Zell ◽  
Christopher A. Stockus ◽  
Michael J. Bernstein

This research examined how people explain major outcomes of political consequence (e.g., economic growth, rising inequality). We argue that people attribute positive outcomes more and negative outcomes less to their own political party than to an opposing party. We conducted two studies, one before the 2016 U.S. presidential election ( N = 244) and another before the 2020 election ( N = 249 registered voters), that examined attributions across a wide array of outcomes. As predicted, a robust partisan attribution bias emerged in both studies. Although the bias was largely equivalent among Democrats and Republicans, it was magnified among those with more extreme political ideology. Further, the bias predicted unique variance in voting intentions and significantly mediated the link between political ideology and voting. In sum, these data suggest that partisan allegiances systemically bias attributions in a group-favoring direction. We discuss implications of these findings for emerging research on political social cognition.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isabel Bergeri ◽  
Mairead Whelan ◽  
Harriet Ware ◽  
Lorenzo Subissi ◽  
Anthony Nardone ◽  
...  

Background COVID-19 case data underestimates infection and immunity, especially in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). We meta-analyzed standardized SARS-CoV-2 seroprevalence studies to estimate global seroprevalence. Objectives/Methods We conducted a systematic review and meta-analysis, searching MEDLINE, Embase, Web of Science, preprints, and grey literature for SARS-CoV-2 seroprevalence studies aligned with the WHO UNITY protocol published between 2020-01-01 and 2021-10-29. Eligible studies were extracted and critically appraised in duplicate. We meta-analyzed seroprevalence by country and month, pooling to estimate regional and global seroprevalence over time; compared seroprevalence from infection to confirmed cases to estimate under-ascertainment; meta-analyzed differences in seroprevalence between demographic subgroups; and identified national factors associated with seroprevalence using meta-regression. PROSPERO: CRD42020183634. Results We identified 396 full texts reporting 736 distinct seroprevalence studies (41% LMIC), including 355 low/moderate risk of bias studies with national/sub-national scope in further analysis. By April 2021, global SARS-CoV-2 seroprevalence was 26.1%, 95% CI [24.6-27.6%]. Seroprevalence rose steeply in the first half of 2021 due to infection in some regions (e.g., 18.2% to 45.9% in Africa) and vaccination and infection in others (e.g., 11.3% to 57.4% in the Americas high-income countries), but remained low in others (e.g., 0.3% to 1.6% in the Western Pacific). In 2021 Q1, median seroprevalence to case ratios were 1.9:1 in HICs and 61.9:1 in LMICs. Children 0-9 years and adults 60+ were at lower risk of seropositivity than adults 20-29. In a multivariate model using data pre-vaccination, more stringent public health and social measures were associated with lower seroprevalence. Conclusions Global seroprevalence has risen considerably over time and with regional variation, however much of the global population remains susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection. True infections far exceed reported COVID-19 cases. Standardized seroprevalence studies are essential to inform COVID-19 control measures, particularly in resource-limited regions.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 237802311881180 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan J. B. Mijs

In this figure I describe the long trend in popular belief in meritocracy across the Western world between 1930 and 2010. Studying trends in attitudes is limited by the paucity of survey data that can be compared across countries and over time. Here, I show how to complement survey waves with cohort-level data. Repeated surveys draw on a representative sample of the population to describe the typical beliefs held by citizens in a given country and period. Leveraging the fact that citizens surveyed in a given year were born in different time-periods allows for a comparison of beliefs across birth cohorts. The latter overlaps with the former, but considerably extends the time period covered by the data. Taken together, the two measures give a “triangulated” longitudinal record of popular belief in meritocracy. I find that in most countries, popular belief in meritocracy is (much) stronger for more recent periods and cohorts.


2006 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 493-494 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Brace ◽  
Kevin Arceneaux ◽  
Martin Johnson ◽  
Stacy G. Ulbig

2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Philippe Gauvin ◽  
Chris Chhim ◽  
Mike Medeiros

AbstractThe 2011 Canadian federal election results changed the face of federal politics in Quebec. In a sudden and spectacular reversal of electoral fortunes, BQ support crumbled while that of the NDP surged. While most commentators focused exclusively on the 2011 election itself to explain what had happened, we offer an interpretation that takes a longitudinal approach. Using data from the Canadian Election Study and political party manifestos from 2006 to 2011, we propose a three-dimensional proximity model of voter/party congruence to explore the evolution of the ideological stances of Quebec voters and parties. Empirical results suggest these ideological distances between the NDP and Quebec voters decreased over time, whereas the BQ has distanced itself from voters. Furthermore, ideological distances between party and voters are a significant predictor of vote.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 709-725 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nils M. Høgevold ◽  
Göran Svensson

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to frame the development and directions of business sustainability efforts. Design/methodology/approach A qualitative study was undertaken with respect to a convenience sample of reputable companies in Norway, which have implemented significant business sustainability efforts within their organisations, their business networks, the marketplace and in the society, beyond the level of mere compliance. Findings Different directions are associated with the development of corporate efforts in connection with business sustainability. Business sustainability efforts are not static, but dynamic and based upon continuous flexibility to changes and adaptations over time. Research Limitations/implications The current study highlights the need for further research into the development and directions of corporate efforts in connection with business sustainability in the marketplace and society. A key suggestion for further research is to further explore the existence of other directions. Practical Implications The directions reported, provide a framework to assess the development or the status of companies’ business sustainability efforts in the marketplace and society. Corporate efforts in connection with business sustainability develop over time as experiences are gained and personal impressions move the identified directions forward. Originality/value This study contributes to seven interconnected directions of corporate efforts in connection with business sustainability that are both relevant and potentially fruitful to both scholars and practitioners.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (12) ◽  
pp. e0259473
Author(s):  
Marrissa D. Grant ◽  
Alexandra Flores ◽  
Eric J. Pedersen ◽  
David K. Sherman ◽  
Leaf Van Boven

The present study, conducted immediately after the 2020 presidential election in the United States, examined whether Democrats’ and Republicans’ polarized assessments of election legitimacy increased over time. In a naturalistic survey experiment, people (N = 1,236) were randomly surveyed either during the week following Election Day, with votes cast but the outcome unknown, or during the following week, after President Joseph Biden was widely declared the winner. The design unconfounded the election outcome announcement from the vote itself, allowing more precise testing of predictions derived from cognitive dissonance theory. As predicted, perceived election legitimacy increased among Democrats, from the first to the second week following Election Day, as their expected Biden win was confirmed, whereas perceived election legitimacy decreased among Republicans as their expected President Trump win was disconfirmed. From the first to the second week following Election Day, Republicans reported stronger negative emotions and weaker positive emotions while Democrats reported stronger positive emotions and weaker negative emotions. The polarized perceptions of election legitimacy were correlated with the tendencies to trust and consume polarized media. Consumption of Fox News was associated with lowered perceptions of election legitimacy over time whereas consumption of other outlets was associated with higher perceptions of election legitimacy over time. Discussion centers on the role of the media in the experience of cognitive dissonance and the implications of polarized perceptions of election legitimacy for psychology, political science, and the future of democratic society.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Estrella Gualda ◽  
Andre Krouwel ◽  
Marisol Palacios-Gálvez ◽  
Elena Morales-Marente ◽  
Iván Rodríguez-Pascual ◽  
...  

This article describes patterns of compliance with social distancing measures among the Spanish population during the coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. It identifies several factors associated with higher or lower compliance with recommended measures of social distancing. This research is part of a 67-country study, titled the International COVID-19 study on Social & Moral Psychology, in which we use a Spanish dataset. Participants were residents in Spain aged 18 or above. The sample comprises 1,090 respondents, weighted to be representative of the Spanish population. Frequencies, correlations, bivariate analysis, and six models based on hierarchical multiple regressions were applied. The main finding is that most Spaniards are compliant with established guidelines of social distance during the pandemic (State of Alarm, before May 2020). Variables associated more with lower levels of compliance with these standards were explored. Six hierarchical multiple regression models found that compliance with social distance measures has a multifactorial explanation (R2 between 20.4 and 49.1%). Sociodemographic factors, personal hygiene patterns, and the interaction between personal hygiene patterns and the support for political measures related to the coronavirus brought significant effects on the regression models. Less compliance was also associated with beliefs in some specific conspiracy theories with regard to COVID-19 or general conspiracy mentality (Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire, CMQ), consumption patterns of traditional mass media (television, paper newspapers, magazines, and radio) and modern means to get informed (online digital newspapers, blogs, and social networks), political ideology, vote, trust in institutions, and political identification. Among the future lines of action in preventing the possible outbreak of the virus, we suggest measures to reinforce trust in official information, mainly linked to reducing the influence of disinformation and conspiracy theories parallel to the pandemic.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-21
Author(s):  
Iswandi Iswadi

  The ideology contestation is basically a classic polemic, where after independence the ideology of Islam was confronted with nationalism and took root until now (reform). However, the momentum of the 2019 election political contestation was again marked by the struggle of ideology namely ideology of Islamism and nationalism. The polemic began with the emergence of religious issues that were raised on the surface of political actors as a hegemony in taking the sympathy of voters. The existence of religion as a central issue began in 2016-2017 related to the prosecution of Ahok who insulted religious values ​​(Islam), and among the political parties involved in the demonstrations namely PPP, PKS, PBB, and PKB. In that momentum the beginning of the revival of Islamic ideology as the power in defending Islamic sovereignty. Judging from the ideology of political parties in Indonesia in the 2019 election political contestation, the ideology of political parties based on the statutes and bylaws (AD / ART) that the ideology applied can be classified into three parts namely ideology Nationalism, Islamism, and Nationalist-Religious, and the three ideologies. This can be proven based on the results of a survey from Australia 2017-2018 based on the voters. However, political parties based on multiple ideologies, PAN, PKB and Democrats, each have priority orientation. PAN and PKB tend to polarize the values ​​of Islamism (religious), while Democrats are more dominated by nationalist issues. The concept of Islamic political ideology, in the context of political contestation in political party elections, is basically a necessity to implement the values ​​of ri'ayah, taqwin, irshad and ta'dib through political education, or campaign in elections to achieve mutual benefit, both parties whose ideology Islamism, nationalism and nationalist-religious, so as to build the moralistic side of society, and intelligence in responding to the issues that exist in the election apart from that, political parties in confronting political contestation the emphasis of the movement must reflect the value of poverty, the three ideologies have been packaged in the values ​​of Pancasila in the third principles of Indonesian unity.         Asbtak Kontestasi ideology pada dasarnya polemik klasik, dimana pasca kemerdekaan ideologi islam dihadapkan dengan nasionalisme dan mengakar sampai sampai saat ini (reformasi). Akan tetapi momentum pemilu 2019 kontestasi politik kembali diwarnai pergulatan ideology yakni ideology islamisme dan nasionalisme. Polemik tersebut berawal dengan mencuatnya isu keagamaan yang dimunculkan dipermukaan pelaku politik sebagai hegemoni dalam mengambil simpati  pemilih. Eksistensi agama sebagai sentral isu berawal tahun 2016-2017 terkait penuntutan terhadap ahok yang melecehkan nilai-nilai agama (islam), dan diantara partai politik yang terlibat dalam demonstrasi yakni PPP, PKS, PBB, dan PKB. Dalam momentum tersebut awal mencuatnya kembali ideologi islam sebagai of the power dalam mempertahan kedaulatan Islam. Menilik ideologis partai politik di Indonesia pada konstestasi politik pemilu 2019, ideology partai politik berdasarkan anggaran dasar dan anggaran rumah tangga (AD/ART) bahwa ideologi yang diterapkan dapat diklasifikasikan menjadi tiga bagian yakni ideology Nasionalisme, Islamisme, dan Nasionalis-Religius, dan ketiga ideology tersebut dapat dibuktikan dengan berdasarkan hasil survey dari asutralia 2017-2018 berdasarkan pemilih. Namun demikian partai poltik yang berasaskan ideologi ganda, PAN, PKB dan Demokrat, masing-masing memiliki kiblat prioritas. PAN dan PKB condong polarisasi nilai-nilai islamisme (religious), sedangkan Demokrat lebih didominasi oleh isu-isu nasionalis. Konsep ideology politik islam, dalam konsteks kontestasi politik dalam pemilu partai politik pada dasarnya sebuah keharusan mengimplementasikan nilai-nilai ri’ayah, taqwin, irsyad dan ta’dib melalui pendidikan politik, ataupun kampanye dalam pemilu guna mencapai kemaslahatan bersama, baik partai yang berideologi islamisme, nasionalisme dan nasionalis-religius, sehingga terbangun sisi moralistik masyarakat, dan kecerdasan dalam menanggapi isu-isu yang ada dalam pemilu. selain dari itu partai politik dalam menghadapi konstestasi politik penekanan gerakannya harus mencermikan nilai kemaslahan, ketiga ideology tersebut telah kemas dalam nilai-nilai pancasila pada sila ketiga persatuan Indonesia. 


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