Bayesian estimation of total fertility from a population's age–sex structure

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 225-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl P Schmertmann ◽  
Mathew E Hauer

We investigate a modern statistical approach to a classic deterministic demographic estimation technique. When vital event registration is missing or inadequate, it is possible to approximate a population's total fertility rate (TFR) from information about its distribution by age and sex. For example, if under-five child mortality is low then TFR is often close to seven times the child/woman ratio (CWR), the number of 0–4 year olds per 15–49-year-old woman. We analyse the formal relationship between CWR and TFR to identify sources of uncertainty in indirect estimates. We construct a Bayesian model for the statistical distribution of TFR conditional on the population's age–sex structure, in which unknown demographic quantities in the standard approximation are parameters with prior distributions. We apply the model in two case studies: to a small indigenous population in the Amazon region of Brazil that has extremely high fertility rates, and to the set of 159 counties in the US state of Georgia. A statistical approach yields important insights into the sources of error in indirect estimation, and their relative magnitudes.

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl Schmertmann ◽  
Mathew Hauer

We investigate a modern statistical approach to a classic deterministic demographic estimation technique. When vital event registration is missing or inadequate, it is possible to approximate a population's total fertility (TFR) from information about its distribution by age and sex. For example, if under-five child mortality is low then TFR is often close to seven times the child/woman ratio (CWR), the number of 0--4 year olds per 15--49 year old woman. We analyze the formal relationship between CWR and TFR to identify sources of uncertainty in indirect estimates. We construct a Bayesian model for the statistical distribution of TFR conditional on the population's age-sex structure, in which unknown demographic quantities in the standard approximation are parameters with prior distributions. We apply the model in two case studies: to a small indigenous population in the Amazon region of Brazil that has extremely high fertility rates, and to the set of 159 counties in the US state of Georgia. A statistical approach yields important insights into the sources of error in indirect estimation, and their relative magnitudes.


2008 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katherine von Stackelberg ◽  
Donna Vorhees ◽  
Dwayne Moore ◽  
Jerome Cura ◽  
Todd Bridges

2021 ◽  
pp. 71-96
Author(s):  
Jakkie Cilliers

AbstractIn this chapter, Cilliers defines the demographic dividend and explains its relationship to economic growth, with a focus on the African continent. It first covers the fundamentals of the relationship between population and economics, then offers an in-depth discussion of two key concepts, the demographic transition and demographic dividend. The chapter demonstrates that sub-Saharan Africa’s high fertility rates are a drag on development rather than an advantage, as the region can only expect to enjoy a demographic dividend after mid-century. It then uses scenario analysis to demonstrate that, given the right policy conditions, Africa can accelerate population-driven economic growth by reducing its fertility rate through interventions in education, infrastructure, human capital and, most importantly, women’s empowerment.


Ultimately, the necessity to supply food, energy, habitat, infrastructure, and consumer goods for the ever-growing population is responsible for the demise of the environment. Remedial actions for pollution abatement, and further technological progress toward energy efficiency, development of new crops, and improvements in manufacturing processes may help to mitigate the severity of environmental deterioration. However, we can hardly hope for restoration of a clean environment, improvement in human health, and an end to poverty without arresting the continuous growth of the world population. According to the United Nations count, world population reached 6 billion in mid October 1999 (1). The rate of population growth and the fertility rates by continent, as well as in the United States and Canada, are presented in Table 14.1. It can be seen that the fastest population growth occurs in the poorest countries of the world. Despite the worldwide decrease in fertility rates between 1975–80 period and that of 1995–2000, the rate of population growth in most developing countries changed only slightly due to the demographic momentum, which means that because of the high fertility rates in the previous decades, the number of women of childbearing age had increased. Historically, the preference for large families in the developing nations was in part a result of either cultural or religious traditions. In some cases there were practical motivations, as children provided helping hands with farm chores and a security in old age. At present the situation is changing. A great majority of governments of the developing countries have recognized that no improvement of the living standard of their citizens will ever be possible without slowing the explosive population growth. By 1985, a total of 70 developing nations had either established national family planning programs, or provided support for such programs conducted by nongovernmental agencies; now only four of the world’s 170 countries limit access to family planning services. As result, 95% of the developing world population lives in countries supporting family planning. Consequently, the percentage of married couples using contraceptives increased from less than 10% in 1960 to 57% in 1997.


2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 1815-1837 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henning Bohn ◽  
Armando R. Lopez-Velasco

First generation immigrants to the United States have higher fertility rates than natives. This paper analyzes to what extent this factor provides political support for immigration, using an overlapping generation model with production and capital accumulation. In this setting, immigration represents a dynamic trade-off for native workers as more immigrants decrease current wages but increase the future return on their savings. We find that immigrant fertility has surprisingly strong effects on voter incentives, especially when there is persistence in the political process. If fertility rates are sufficiently high, native workers support immigration. Persistence, either due to inertia induced by frictions in the legal system or through expectational linkages, significantly magnifies the effects. Entry of immigrants with high fertility has redistributive impacts across generations similar to pay-as-you-go social security: initial generations are net winners, whereas later generations are net losers.


1990 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 149
Author(s):  
Donald F. Heisel ◽  
Ron J. Lesthaeghe

2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martha J Bailey

The 1960s ushered in a new era in US demographic history characterized by significantly lower fertility rates and smaller family sizes. What catalyzed these changes remains a matter of considerable debate. This paper exploits idiosyncratic variation in the language of “Comstock” statutes, enacted in the late 1800s, to quantify the role of the birth control pill in this transition. Almost 50 years after the contraceptive pill appeared on the US market, this analysis provides new evidence that it accelerated the post-1960 decline in marital fertility. (JEL J12, J13, K10, N31, N32)


2002 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kazem Mohammad ◽  
Farideh Khalaj Abadi Farahani ◽  
Mehdi Rahgozar ◽  
Mahmood Mahmoodi Farahani

This study focuses on the fertility levels and trends of Iranian women aged 10- 49 years during three decades, 1967-1996. Information was collected by interviewing a systematic cluster sample of 13,253 households. The basic date of concern was the date of each live born child for a sample of women in reproductive age and whether the live born was alive at the time of the study. The detailed nature of these data collected for each birth enabled fertility rates to be calculated for exact periods before the survey, for exact calendar years. Higher fertility rates were found for the period 10-15 and 15-20 years preceding the survey. These high fertility levels are probably due to some socio-economic changes in favor of higher level of fertility immediately after the 1979 revolution. However the results of the present survey show during 1967-1996, the TFR1 had dropped from 6.38 to 2.88 (an expected TFR based on fertility behavior during 1992-96). This decline was probably due to delay in marriage and policy changes in favor of population control particularly since 1987. Despite this potential fertility decline in recent years, Iran is expected to face a baby boom as the offspring who were born during the 1976-86 reach to the reproductive age in the coming decades.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dylan Connor

This article shows that parents reveal information about their fertility behavior through how they name their children. I arrive at this finding from detailed examination of the net fertility of 130,000 married couples in Ireland circa 1910, a country known for its historically high fertility rate. After stringently accounting for the occupation, religion and location of couples, I find higher fertility rates among couples who chose distinctly Catholic names and traditional names for their children, with the latter being particularly important. Exposure to towns and cities lowered net fertility and weakened preferences for traditional and Catholic names. Cumulatively, these findings highlight the role of traditional rural norms over explicitly religious influences in driving high fertility rates in Ireland. The impact of towns and cities in reducing net fertility suggests that Ireland’s sluggish urbanization was a key factor in its high historical fertility rate.


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