Philosophy, casuistry, and moral development

2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert K. Fullinwider

Moral educators have little to learn from the moral theories in which philosophers routinely trade. These theories — including those by Slote, Hume, and Kant — leave behind the concrete world in which the moral educator labors. As interesting as they may be, they merely devise alternative routes to the same destination — to the main general features of morality as we know it. It is not so much these general features but the particular forms of moral life under which children and their tutors live that give specificity to duties and rights, content to virtues, and shape to purpose. To navigate successfully through this stuff of moral life, the developing youth needs not only a good heart but a casuistical temper.

Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen

This chapter explores the role of particularities in moral thought and moral life and the forms of understanding of these particularities necessary in moral philosophy in order to substantiate the idea, developed in Chapter 3, that moral philosophy is a descriptive activity facing a dual task, both general and particular. The chapter falls into two parts. The first part is an investigation of the role of general principles in moral thought that aids an understanding of how far general descriptions (for example in the form of moral theories) may be of help to us in philosophy. The second part provides an understanding of the role of the particular in moral thought that serves to substantiate the claim that moral philosophy has to provide a substantial understanding of moral development, imagination, and discernment. This part also investigates whether the qualification of the role of general principles in moral thought can be reconciled with the idea that moral considerations are objective, universal, and absolute. The chapter concludes that moral philosophy should rediscover itself as one practice among others that aim to assist and improve moral life, while taking into account the most comprehensive understanding of human life.


Author(s):  
Holly M. Smith

Chapter 8 explores the Austere and Hybrid Responses to the problem of error. The two types of response are described in both ideal and non-ideal versions. Both are found wanting, but the Austere Response emerges as best. Codes endorsed by the Austere approach cannot be shown to meet the “goal-oriented” desiderata of maximizing social welfare, facilitating social cooperation and long-range planning, or guaranteeing the occurrence of the ideal pattern of actions. But Austere-endorsed codes do satisfy the conceptual desiderata for “usable” moral theories in the core (but not the extended) sense of “usability.” They are usable despite the agent’s false beliefs, and they provide agents with the opportunity to live a successful moral life according to the modest conception of this life. This chapter concludes that the only remedy for the problem of error is an Austere code containing a derivative duty for agents to gather information before acting.


Author(s):  
Kawtar Tani

Previous investigation into the morality of actions suggested that individuals' level of cognitive moral development, strongly influences their decisions regarding what is right or wrong, and focuses upon the rights, duties and obligations involved in a particular ethical situation. Using the cognitive moral development framework, this research sought to explore the moral reasoning behind aviation employees' intentions to report wrongdoing in the aviation context. Findings indicated that a significant association between participants' intentions to intervene in a wrongdoing situation, and their level of moral reasoning exists. Specifically, the modal level of participants' moral reasoning was consistent with the Conventional level of moral theories, and was higher for participants who stated that they would intervene, than for participants who stated they would not intervene in a wrongdoing situation.


Author(s):  
John C. Gibbs

Given this cognitive-developmental concern with superficiality-to-depth in moral judgment or understanding, Kohlberg was particularly concerned to discover and articulate an age trend and possible sequence of developmental advances or stages that may be universal. Our critique of Kohlberg’s theory notes that, although his specific stage typology was misguided, he almost single-handedly put cognitive moral development on the map of American psychology. He encouraged attention to the continued development of moral judgment beyond the childhood years. Finally, he speculated from case studies of mature moral thinkers in existential crisis that there may be a deeper reality (“cosmic perspective”), one that underlies profound moral perception and can support the moral life. Building from Kohlberg’s and others’ contributions, we propose in this chapter a new view of life-span sociomoral development.


Utilitas ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 251-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
SORAN READER ◽  
GILLIAN BROCK

In this article we argue that the concept of need is as vital for moral theory as it is for moral life. In II we analyse need and its normativity in public and private moral practice. In III we describe simple cases which exemplify the moral demandingness of needs, and argue that the significance of simple cases for moral theory is obscured by the emphasis in moral philosophy on unusual cases. In IV we argue that moral theories are inadequate if they cannot describe simple needs-meeting cases. We argue that the elimination or reduction of need to other concepts such as value, duty, virtue or care is unsatisfactory, in which case moral theories that make those concepts fundamental will have to be revised. In conclusion, we suggest that if moral theories cannot be revised to accommodate needs, they may have to be replaced with a fully needs-based theory.


Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen

This is a work in moral philosophy and its ambition is to contribute to a renewed understanding of moral philosophy, the role of moral theory, and the relation between moral philosophy and moral life. It is motivated by the belief that the lack of a coherent answer to the question of the role and status of moral philosophy and the theories it develops, is one of the most important obstacles for doing work in moral philosophy today. The first part of the book untangles various criticisms of the dominant view of moral theories that challenges the explanatory, foundational, authoritative, and action-guiding role of these theories. It also offers an alternative understanding of moral theory as descriptions of moral grammar. The second part investigates the nature of the particularities relevant for an understanding of moral life, both particularities tied to the moral subject, her character, commitments, and moral position, and particularities tied to the context of the subject, her moral community and language. The final part marks a return to moral philosophy and addresses the wider question of what the revised conception of moral theories and the affirmation of the value of the particular mean for moral philosophy by developing a descriptive, pluralistic, and elucidatory conception of moral philosophy. The scope of the book is wide, but its pretensions are more moderate, to present an understanding of descriptive moral philosophy which may spur a debate about the status and role of moral philosophy in relation to our moral lives.


2021 ◽  
pp. 153-190
Author(s):  
Philip Kitcher

One traditionally important part of education, broadly conceived, is to foster moral development. Drawing on the long history of moral life, and using examples of moral progress, the chapter elaborates an approach to moral decision-making. It argues that the method used must be collective. No individual, whether sage, priest, prophet, philosopher, or professional ethicist, has the final authoritative word. Rather, moral reform should emerge from the style of deliberation identified in Chapter 4. This perspective is used to suggest ways of helping the moral growth of children, adolescents, and adults. Chapters 3–5 thus combine in a synthetic picture of how two of the main goals of education—personal fulfillment and morally responsible citizenship—might be achieved together.


Author(s):  
John C. Gibbs

This chapter introduces not only the social perspective-taking central to morality, but also our theory-based exploration of moral development, behavior, and reality. Perspective-taking relates to both “the right” (justice, reciprocity, equality; Kohlberg’s theory) and “the good” (welfare, beneficence, empathy; Hoffman’s theory) of morality. The right (condition of reversibility) provides an objective basis for morality not recognized in relativistic moral theories such as Haidt’s (Chapter 2). The good may provide the broad moral referent for differentiated intuitions (e.g., loyalty, authority, purity) specified by Haidt. Chapters 3 and 4 address “the right” or the cognitive strand of moral motivation and development, whereas Chapter 5 addresses “the good” or the affective strand. Subsequent chapters (6 through 10) relate the theories of moral development to social behavior (prosocial, antisocial) as well as to a deeper reality of human connection


Author(s):  
Kawtar Tani

A previous investigation into the morality of actions suggested that individuals' levels of cognitive moral development strongly influence their decisions regarding what is right or wrong, and focused upon the rights, duties, and obligations involved in a particular ethical situation. Using the cognitive moral development framework, this chapter sought to explore the moral reasoning behind aviation employees' intentions to report wrongdoing in the aviation context. Findings indicated that a significant association between participants' intentions to intervene in a wrongdoing situation and their level of moral reasoning exists. Specifically, the modal level of participants' moral reasoning was consistent with the conventional level of moral theories and was higher for participants who stated that they would intervene than for participants who stated they would not intervene in a wrongdoing situation.


Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen

The chapter contributes to the development of a pluralistic conception of moral philosophy consisting of a diversity of descriptive activities by exploring one example of how to combine an understanding of the particulars of moral life with the more general and abstract insights traditionally developed in moral philosophy, namely via moral philosophy’s engagement with literature. The chapter is motivated by the argument that the irreducible role of the particular in moral life raises a demand for moral philosophy to interact with other disciplines which may serve as sources of knowledge about the particularities of moral life. It is argued that engagement with literature offers us knowledge by acquaintance and possibilities of moral cultivation, and that literature can be a suitable partner for moral philosophy in three activities that differ from the development of moral theories: namely in the exploration, the critique, and the development of moral life. The last type of activity, where literature is a partner for moral philosophy in initiating forms of moral change, is given special attention, and it is shown that this is an integrated part of moral philosophy, even if it is currently underexplored.


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