What Do Theory-of-Mind Tasks Actually Measure? Theory and Practice

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 384-396 ◽  
Author(s):  
François Quesque ◽  
Yves Rossetti
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Measure Theory ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Present Review ◽  
Functional Architecture

In recent decades, the ability to represent others’ mental states (i.e., theory of mind) has gained particular attention in various disciplines ranging from ethology to cognitive neuroscience. Despite the exponentially growing interest, the functional architecture of social cognition is still unclear. In the present review, we argue that not only the vocabulary but also most of the classic measures for theory of mind lack specificity. We examined classic tests used to assess theory of mind and noted that the majority of them do not require the participant to represent another’s mental state or, sometimes, any mental state at all. Our review reveals that numerous classic tests measure lower-level processes that do not directly test for theory of mind. We propose that more attention should be paid to methods used in this field of social cognition to improve the understanding of underlying concepts.

Mind, child’s theory of

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan M. Leslie
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Empirical Study ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Neurodevelopmental Disorder ◽  
Inductive Reasoning ◽  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Direct Access ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Preschool Period

Knowledge of other minds poses a variety of unusual problems due to the peculiarly private nature of mental states. Some current views, impressed by the contrast between the apparently direct access we have to our own mental states and the inaccessibility of others’ mental states, argue that we understand the mental states of others by imagining that they are our own by ‘simulation’. Other current views propose that we infer both our own mental states and the mental states of others by employing a set of conjectures arrived at through general inductive reasoning over experience: a ‘folk psychology’ or ‘theory of mind’. Experimental studies, by contrast, suggest that we possess an ‘instinct’ for comprehending the informational mental states of other minds. Children develop mental state concepts uniformly and rapidly in the preschool period when general reasoning powers are limited. For example, children can reason effectively about other people’s beliefs before they can reliably calculate that 2 plus 2 equals 4. In the empirical study of the ‘theory of mind’ instinct there have been three major discoveries so far: first, that normally developing 2-year-olds are able to recognize the informational state of pretending; second, that normally developing children can, by the age of 4 years, solve a variety of false belief problems; and lastly, that this instinct is specifically impaired in children with the neurodevelopmental disorder known as ‘autism’.

Neural Correlates of Mental State Decoding in Human Adults: An Event-related Potential Study

2004 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-426 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark A. Sabbagh ◽  
Margaret C. Moulson ◽  
Kate L. Harkness
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Right Hemisphere ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Event Related Potential ◽  
Neural Systems ◽  
Core Theory ◽  
Human Adults ◽  
The Right

Successful negotiation of human social interactions rests on having a theory of mind—an understanding of how others' behaviors can be understood in terms of internal mental states, such as beliefs, desires, intentions, and emotions. A core theory-of-mind skill is the ability to decode others' mental states on the basis of observable information, such as facial expressions. Although several recent studies have focused on the neural correlates of reasoning about mental states, no research has addressed the question of what neural systems underlie mental state decoding. We used dense-array eventrelated potentials (ERP) to show that decoding mental states from pictures of eyes is associated with an N270–400 component over inferior frontal and anterior temporal regions of the right hemisphere. Source estimation procedures suggest that orbitofrontal and medial temporal regions may underlie this ERP effect. These findings suggest that different components of everyday theory-of-mind skills may rely on dissociable neural mechanisms.

scholarly journals Neural correlates of theory-of-mind are associated with variation in children’s everyday social cognition

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (6) ◽  
pp. 579-589 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cora E Mukerji ◽  
Sarah Hope Lincoln ◽  
David Dodell-Feder ◽  
Charles A Nelson ◽  
Christine I Hooker
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
School Age Children ◽  
Cognitive Behavior ◽  
School Age ◽  
Temporoparietal Junction ◽  
False Belief Reasoning

ABSTRACT Theory of mind (ToM), the capacity to reason about others’ mental states, is central to healthy social development. Neural mechanisms supporting ToM may contribute to individual differences in children’s social cognitive behavior. Employing a false belief functional magnetic resonance imaging paradigm, we identified patterns of neural activity and connectivity elicited by ToM reasoning in school-age children (N = 32, ages 9–13). Next, we tested relations between these neural ToM correlates and children’s everyday social cognition. Several key nodes of the neural ToM network showed greater activity when reasoning about false beliefs (ToM condition) vs non-mentalistic false content (control condition), including the bilateral temporoparietal junction (RTPJ and LTPJ), precuneus (PC) and right superior temporal sulcus. In addition, children demonstrated task-modulated changes in connectivity among these regions to support ToM relative to the control condition. ToM-related activity in the PC was negatively associated with variation in multiple aspects of children’s social cognitive behavior. Together, these findings elucidate how nodes of the ToM network act and interact to support false belief reasoning in school-age children and suggest that neural ToM mechanisms are linked to variation in everyday social cognition.

Armstrong's Materialism

1977 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 569-592
Author(s):  
George S. Pappas
Keyword(s):  
Central Nervous System ◽  
Nervous System ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Identity Theory ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Central State ◽  
The Central Nervous System ◽  
David Armstrong

Central-state materialism ( = CSM) is a very strong, but also very exciting theory of mind according to which each mental state is identical with a state of the central nervous system. CSM thus goes considerably beyond early versions of the identity theory of mind, since those early accounts (e.g., those of Place and Smart) held only that sensations are to be identified with neural events. CSM, by contrast, is a thesis about all mental states; every mental state is held to be a state of the central nervous system. In fact, as we will see shortly, CSM is an even more sweeping thesis than this formulation of it suggests, since it is not concerned simply with mental states.One prominent defender of CSM, David Armstrong, has maintained that CSM can be established by means of a two-step argument.

6.  Mental State Decoding in Dysphoric Individuals: The Role of Motivation

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brooke Sinclair
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Social Activity ◽  
Social Motivation ◽  
Underlying Mechanism ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Depression Symptoms ◽  
Clinical Conditions ◽  
Decoding Ability

Depression is associated with pervasive impairments in social and interpersonal functioning. Research demonstrates that individuals with depression have difficulty interacting with peers and show lower levels of social activity than do nondepressed individuals (Levendosky, Okun, & Parker, 1995). In addition, depressed individuals report that their social interactions are less supportive and less rewarding than those of non‐depressed individuals (Nezlek, Hamptom, & Shean, 2000). This reduced social competence may cause depressed individuals to disengage from social interaction, which may in turn exacerbate their state of depression (Rippere, 1980). It is thus important to understand and identify the mechanisms beneath these deficits.  Researchers commonly use the theory of mind framework to understand impaired social functioning in clinical conditions. Theory of mind refers to the ability to make judgments about others’ mental states to understand and predict their social behaviour. Research has found a relationship between theory of mind and dysphoria (i.e., elevated scores on a measure of depression symptoms, but not necessarily a diagnosis of clinical depression). Specifically, dysphoric individuals demonstrate enhanced mental state judgments (Harkness, Sabbagh, Jacobson, Chowdrey, & Chen, 2005).  My research investigates social motivation as an underlying mechanism for dysphoric individuals’ enhanced decoding ability. A sample of undergraduates will participate in a theory of mind decoding task following social, monetary or no motivation. I hypothesize that dysphoric individuals will make significantly more accurate judgments than non‐dysphoric individuals. Further, I predict that social motivation will enhance non‐dysphoric individuals’ sensitivity to others’ mental states.

scholarly journals On the lack of evidence that non-human animals possess anything remotely resembling a ‘theory of mind’

2007 ◽  
Vol 362 (1480) ◽  
pp. 731-744 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek C Penn ◽  
Daniel J Povinelli
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Compelling Evidence ◽  
Cognitive Agent ◽  
Experimental Protocols

After decades of effort by some of our brightest human and non-human minds, there is still little consensus on whether or not non-human animals understand anything about the unobservable mental states of other animals or even what it would mean for a non-verbal animal to understand the concept of a ‘mental state’. In the present paper, we confront four related and contentious questions head-on: (i) What exactly would it mean for a non-verbal organism to have an ‘understanding’ or a ‘representation’ of another animal's mental state? (ii) What should (and should not) count as compelling empirical evidence that a non-verbal cognitive agent has a system for understanding or forming representations about mental states in a functionally adaptive manner? (iii) Why have the kind of experimental protocols that are currently in vogue failed to produce compelling evidence that non-human animals possess anything even remotely resembling a theory of mind? (iv) What kind of experiments could, at least in principle, provide compelling evidence for such a system in a non-verbal organism?

scholarly journals Cognitive and affective theory of mind in Korsakoff’s syndrome

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (03) ◽  
pp. 128-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rolinda Drost ◽  
Albert Postma ◽  
Erik Oudman
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Anterograde Amnesia ◽  
Large Degree ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Healthy Controls ◽  
Korsakoff’S Syndrome ◽  
Korsakoff's Syndrome ◽  
Executive Deficits ◽  
And Gender

AbstractObjectiveKorsakoff’s syndrome (KS) is a chronic neuropsychiatric disorder characterised by severe anterograde amnesia and executive deficits. Theory of Mind (ToM) is the capacity to represent others’ mental states such as their knowledge, thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and intentions in order to explain and predict their behaviour. Surprisingly this topic has received hardly any attention in research on KS, although the severity of behavioural problems in KS suggest possible ToM difficulties. The aim of the present study was therefore to assess whether cognitive and affective ToM are impaired in patients with KS.MethodsWe examined 21 KS patients and 21 age- and gender-matched healthy controls on three standardised tests that assess cognitive and affective ToM, including the subtests of the mini-Social Cognition and Emotional Assessment battery and a specialised version of the Sally–Anne Test.ResultsKS patients showed largely impaired cognitive and affective ToM compared to healthy controls, as reflected in large effect sizes on both cognitive and affective ToM tests. Executive deficits explained problems in emotion recognition, but not other ToM aspects.ConclusionKS patients have large impairments in both cognitive and affective aspects of social cognition. Their ability to recognise emotions, take the perspective of others, and understand socially awkward situations is vastly compromised. The impairments in ToM functioning are to a large degree functionally discrepant from executive disorders that are commonly present in KS. This study therefore highlights the importance to properly index ToM functioning in neuropsychological assessments for individuals with a possible KS diagnosis.

Of Mental States and Machine Learning

2016 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 1362-1366 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Best ◽  
Samantha F. Warta ◽  
Katelynn A. Kapalo ◽  
Stephen M. Fiore
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Machine Learning ◽  
Social Cognition ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Response Times ◽  
Interdisciplinary Approach ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Human Robot Interaction ◽  
Robot Interaction ◽  
Machine Learning Classifiers

Using research in social cognition as a foundation, we studied rapid versus reflective mental state attributions and the degree to which machine learning classifiers can be trained to make such judgments. We observed differences in response times between conditions, but did not find significant differences in the accuracy of mental state attributions. We additionally demonstrate how to train machine classifiers to identify mental states. We discuss advantages of using an interdisciplinary approach to understand and improve human-robot interaction and to further the development of social cognition in artificial intelligence.

Mental terms in mothers' and children's speech: similarities and relationships

1992 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 617-631 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Furrow ◽  
Chris Moore ◽  
Jane Davidge ◽  
Lorraine Chiasson
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Mental Processes ◽  
Mental State Language ◽  
Mother And Child ◽  
Children's Attention ◽  
Children's Speech ◽  
State Language

ABSTRACTIn this study, mental terms in mothers' and their children's speech at two and three years of age were studied in order to examine the relationships between maternal and child use. Nineteen mother and child dyads were videotaped for one hour on each of two days when the children were 2;0 and again for two one-hour sessions on separate days when they were 3;0, and mental terms were noted. The utterances in which mental terms were used were coded for function. Results supported the existing picture of children's mental term use. Few terms appeared at 2;0, but many were used at 3;0 with think and know predominating. Mental terms occurred more commonly in utterances used to regulate the interaction between the participants than in utterances referring to mental states. Children's mental term use mirrored that of their mothers. Further, mothers' use of mental terms for particular functions when their children were 2;0 predicted their children's use at 3;0. While allowing no conclusions about causation, our findings suggest that the development of mental state language, and thus presumably a theory of mind, is fostered by the linguistic environment. Specifically, it is argued that the tendency of mothers to focus their children's attention on mental processes by talking about them and, more importantly, by using utterance types which conceivably direct the children to reflect on their own mental states, is associated with children's use of mental terms.

Brain activity during social cognition tasks in individuals with schizophrenia, their unaffected siblings, and healthy controls

2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (S2) ◽  
pp. 1397-1397
Author(s):  
D. de Achaval ◽  
M. Villarreal ◽  
E. Costanzo ◽  
J. Douer ◽  
K. Buglioni ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Inferior Frontal Gyrus ◽  
Emotion Processing ◽  
Group Analysis ◽  
Brain Structures ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Healthy Controls ◽  
Brain Lateralization ◽  
Measuring Signal

BackgroundSeveral studies have shown that patients with schizophrenia have impaired performance in various aspects of social cognition including emotion processing and theory of mind. Most available neuroimaging studies have compared patients and healthy controls during such mental.ObjectiveTo determine whether alterations in brain activation associated with social cognition reflects a heritable trait in schizophrenia.MethodsSixteen patients with schizophrenia (age 31.3 ± 6.5), 16 non-psychotic siblings (age 31.8 ± 3.5, 6 females) and 16 healthy subjects (age 30.1 ± 9.2, 6 females) underwent BOLD fMRI during emotion processing (Ekman Faces Test) and Theory of Mind (ToM) paradigms: Faces and Reading the Mind in the Eyes tasks. In all cases a gender condition was used as a control task. Random effects analysis was done for each task within groups, measuring signal changes between the target and control conditions of each paradigm, and later a group analysis was done.ResultsIn patients, social cognition tasks brought about activations in language areas (left inferior frontal gyrus and structures near tempo parietal junction). The intensity of the activations was minimum in the emotional processing task (basic emotions), and maximum in the detection of complex mental states in eyes. Healthy controls also activated symmetric brain structures on the right side. Unaffected siblings also showed bilateral activation in the same brain structures but asymmetrically distributed (left > right).DiscussionThese results support the idea that schizophrenia is an illness characterized by abnormalities in the process of brain lateralization.

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