scholarly journals Beijing's Policies for Managing Han and Ethnic-Minority Chinese Communities Abroad

2012 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 183-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
James To

The overseas Chinese (OC) form a vast network of powerful interest groups and important political actors capable of shaping the future of China from abroad by transmitting values back to their ancestral homeland (Tu 1991). While the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) welcomes and actively seeks to foster relations with the OC in order to advance China's national interests, some cohorts may be hostile to the regime. In accordance with their distinct demographic and ethnic profiles, the CCP's qiaowu ([Formula: see text], OC affairs) infrastructure serves to entice, co-opt, or isolate various OC groupings. This article summarises the policies for managing different subsets of OC over the past three decades, and argues that through qiaowu, the CCP has successfully unified cooperative groups for China's benefit, while preventing discordant ones from eroding its grip on power.

Since taking power in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party has consistently tried to enforce a monopoly on the writing and interpretation of history. However, since 1998 individual initiatives have increased in the field of memory. Confronting official amnesia, victims of Maoist movements have decided to write their versions of history before it is too late. This chapter presents a typology of these endeavours. Annals of the Yellow Emperor (Yanhuang chunqiu), an official publication, enjoyed some freedom to publish dissenting historical accounts but was suppressed in 2016. With the rise of the internet, unofficial journals appeared that were often dedicated to a specific period: Tie Liu’s Small traces of the Past (Wangshi weihen) published accounts of victims of the Anti-Rightist movement for almost a decade before the editor was arrested; Wu Di’s Remembrance (Jiyi) founded by former Red Guards and rusticated youth circulates on line. The third type is the samizdat: targets of repression during Mao’s reign recount their experience in books that are published at their own expense and circulated privately. Most of these “entrepreneurs of memory” are convinced that restoring historical truth is a pre-requisite to China’s democratization. Since Xi Jinping came to power, they have suffered repression.


2006 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 15-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael M. Sheng

In October 1950 the Chinese leader Mao Zedong embarked on a two-front war. He sent troops to Korea and invaded Tibet at a time when the People's Republic of China was burdened with many domestic problems. The logic behind Mao's risky policy has baffled historians ever since. By drawing on newly available Chinese and Western documents and memoirs, this article explains what happened in October 1950 and why Mao acted as he did. The release of key documents such as telegrams between Mao and his subordinates enables scholars to understand Chinese policymaking vis-à-vis Tibet much more fully than in the past. The article shows that Mao skillfully used the conflicts for his own purposes and consolidated his hold over the Chinese Communist Party.


1981 ◽  
Vol 87 ◽  
pp. 407-439 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart R. Schram

On 1 July 1981 the Chinese Communist Party celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of its foundation. To mark this occasion, the Party itself issued a statement summing up the experience of recent decades. It seems an appropriate time for outsiders as well to look back over the history of the past 60 years, in the hope of grasping long-term tendencies which may continue to influence events in the future.


2016 ◽  
Vol 08 (04) ◽  
pp. 38-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongnian ZHENG ◽  
Wen Xin LIM

China’s rule of law took an ugly turn in less than a year after the legal reform was announced. The country detained lawyers on 9 July 2015. The Chinese Communist Party seems to have inherited the "Rule of Man" from the past and acts like an "organisational emperor". While it took the West a few centuries to build its system of rule of law, it will take China even longer to do so.


Subject President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's grip on power in Algeria. Significance In the past three months, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika has dismissed ten generals in the armed forces and police. The scale of the turnover is unusual, as is the way in which the changes have been effected. The media have advanced various explanations: a cocaine-smuggling scandal, corruption charges or a routine rotation of officers. Questions have also arisen about what impact the dismissal of powerful security figures might have on the presidency itself, as Bouteflika’s supporters prepare the ground for him to secure a fifth term in an election scheduled for April 2019. Impacts A fifth term for Bouteflika will not lay to rest rivalries among powerful interest groups over the eventual succession. Activists and civil society members will organise more protests to express discontent with the presidency. If the cocaine smuggling claim is true, it may point to mafia-style networks deep within the security establishment.


Significance The goal is to ensure that Hong Kong’s formal political institutions are controlled by ‘patriots’ (meaning people who support the Chinese Communist Party) and end the obstruction (or threatened obstruction) seen in the city’s politics over the past decade. Impacts Beijing has lost faith in the current establishment, and is perhaps hoping for new, more competent pro-Beijing leaders to emerge. Hong Kong’s government may pursue a more active, interventionist economic policy to address cost-of-living issues. The next legislative elections, already postponed by a year to September 2021, may be postponed further. The reforms imply less tolerance of politicians who accept Hong Kong’s place within the Chinese state but favour political change in China.


Worldview ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 14-16
Author(s):  
Ross Terrill

Three propositions govern this essay. First, China feels more secure than at any point since 1949. Until the mid-1960's China felt a grave threat from the United States. For a period of several years, highlighted by the Cultural Revolution and crystallized at die Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1969, the Peking leadership felt danger alike from the U.S. and the USSR (and decided to defy bom simultaneously). From 1969 to 1972 the American threat was felt to be much diminished, but the Russian threat was felt to be fairly acute. Now, for the past three years or so China has felt a reduced danger from the North and, of course, a negligible danger from across the Pacific. (Hence its formal military budget shrinks.)


2013 ◽  
Vol 47 (6) ◽  
pp. 1941-1976 ◽  
Author(s):  
JONATHAN J. HOWLETT

AbstractIn May 1949 the Chinese Communist Party seized Shanghai. Rather than being elated at the prospect of harnessing the economic power of China's largest city to complete the revolution, the Communists approached it cautiously. How would the Chinese Communist Party set about transforming this free-wheeling port city with a ‘semi-colonial’ past into an orderly and socialist city? How would it balance ideology and pragmatism in reshaping Shanghai? This paper uses the takeover of two British companies as case studies to explore these issues at the ground level. It is argued that the means by which these companies were transformed tell us much about the Party and its state-building policies. When cadres entered foreign companies, their priority was not radical change and anti-imperialism, but rather fostering a sense of stability and unity to avoid disrupting production. Their gradual approach was due in large part to the Party's awareness of its own limited skills, resources and manpower, but also to its leaders and cadres recognizing that before they could remake Shanghai anew they had first to deal with the material and human legacies of the past.


2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 162-184
Author(s):  
Ying Miao

This article examines “core socialist values” as a part of the China Dream discourse, in the context of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s search for alternative sources of legitimacy. Using the “visualising our values” poster collection and the “China Dream Child” campaign as case studies, this article argues that such narratives form a crucial part of the CCP’s continuing legitimisation strategy, where the party emphasises its role in providing moral authority and guidance for the general public. In order to lay such claims, the narratives focus on romanticising and homogenising both the imperial and the socialist past, while projecting a strong sense of optimism for the future, based on similar hopes of continuity and homogeneity.


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