Natural resources and the dynamics of civil war duration and outcome

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-148
Author(s):  
Hirotaka Ohmura

How do natural resources influence the duration of civil wars? Previous studies argue that resource wealth increases rebels’ motivation for private gain (motivation mechanism) and provides rebel leaders with sufficient funding opportunities to continue their insurrectionary activities (feasibility mechanism), thereby increasing the likelihood of prolonged conflict. While these two mechanisms are very important arguments for explaining the role of natural resources in the continuation of civil wars, there are not enough existing studies that analyze these two mechanisms separately. To examine the two mechanisms, this article introduces three important factors to the analysis: the lootability of natural resources, types of conflict termination, and power balance between government and rebels. Empirically, this article examines the effect of natural resources on conflict duration for the period of 1946–2003, using a competing risk modeling approach. Findings from the quantitative analysis reveal that lootable resources (onshore oil production) are negatively related to the duration of a civil war that ends in rebel victory and positively related to the duration of a civil war that ends in peace agreement when rebels have enough military capability. On the other hand, empirical analysis shows that non-lootable resources (offshore oil production) tend to reduce the duration of a civil war that ends in government victory.

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 128-147
Author(s):  
Brandon Prins ◽  
Anup Phayal ◽  
Ursula E Daxecker

Extant research shows that the presence of natural resources can prolong civil wars. But research also indicates that as rebel groups become stronger, conflicts tend to shorten. These studies suggest an unclear association among the three variables—resources, rebel strength, and conflict duration. If resources increase the fighting ability of rebels, then why do they not shorten conflicts? To understand this relationship, we examine incidents of maritime piracy, which unlike other resources are more clearly exploited by rebel groups rather than states and offer new insight on how this might affect the persistence of civil war. The findings suggest that the use of piracy by weaker rebel groups shortens conflict but prolongs it when exploited by stronger rebel groups. We think our conditional analyses allow us to discern insurgencies driven at least in part by greedy rebels and therefore better illuminate the causal process by which resource wealth prolongs civil war.


2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederic S. Pearson

AbstractRegardless of the types of civil conflict settlements, all parties generally enter into some sorts of tacit or direct bargaining in the course of civil conflict, namely, in steps toward peace. In contrast to a basically static framework employed in much of existing literature on civil war settlements and mediation, this article proposes a disaggregate approach to dynamic and multi-phase processes in civil conflict termination via negotiations. We illustrate a conceptual and theoretical framework to examine four steps in civil conflict settlements in a large-N research program. In so doing, we present an initial effort to construct a dyadic dataset isolating processes that allow civil conflict settlements to progress or regress between low and higher levels of agreement in the Asia-Pacific region from 1990 to 2005. We discuss a set of preliminary simple statistical results for the four distinct settlement phases in the context of conflict and rebel characteristics. Among the findings of note, third parties provide important assistance in nurturing successful negotiations especially in the context of waning insurgent strength. Peace proposals originate most frequently from governments, and seem to hinge especially on opponents’ battlefield advantages. Evidence of mutually hurting stalemates is also found. In the article’s conclusion we elaborate a long-term research agenda.


2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristin Fabbe ◽  
Chad Hazlett ◽  
Tolga Sınmazdemir

Civilians who have fled violent conflict and settled in neighboring countries are integral to processes of civil war termination. Contingent on their attitudes, they can either back peaceful settlements or support warring groups and continued fighting. Attitudes toward peaceful settlement are expected to be especially obdurate for civilians who have been exposed to violence. In a survey of 1,120 Syrian refugees in Turkey conducted in 2016, we use experiments to examine attitudes towards two critical phases of conflict termination – a ceasefire and a peace agreement. We examine the rigidity/flexibility of refugees’ attitudes to see if subtle changes in how wartime losses are framed or in who endorses a peace process can shift willingness to compromise with the incumbent Assad regime. Our results show, first, that refugees are far more likely to agree to a ceasefire proposed by a civilian as opposed to one proposed by armed actors from either the Syrian government or the opposition. Second, simply describing the refugee community’s wartime experience as suffering rather than sacrifice substantially increases willingness to compromise with the regime to bring about peace. This effect remains strong among those who experienced greater violence. Together, these results show that even among a highly pro-opposition population that has experienced severe violence, willingness to settle and make peace are remarkably flexible and dependent upon these cues.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 482-498
Author(s):  
Anup Phayal ◽  
T David Mason ◽  
Mehmet Gurses

Abstract Previous research has shown that the outcome of a civil war is related to conflict duration: military victory by either the government or the rebels occurs early if it occurs at all, and the longer a civil war lasts, the more likely it is to end in a negotiated settlement. The models of civil war duration and outcome that have produced these findings are built on characteristics of the civil war and less on attributes of the state itself, other than where the state lies on the Polity autocracy-democracy scale. We propose that how civil wars end varies not only between democracies and authoritarian regimes but among the different authoritarian regime types identified by Geddes, Wright, and Franz. The distinguishing attributes of these regime types—democracy, one-party, personalist, military, monarchical—should lead to different likelihood in defeating a rebel movement, being defeated by a rebel movement, and negotiating a peace agreement with a rebel movement. Results from a series of competing-risk models using the Uppsala–Peace Research Institute Oslo Armed Conflict Dataset demonstrate support for our claim that how civil wars end is partly a function of the characteristics of the regime.


2018 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huseyn Aliyev

Previous research on non-state actors involved in civil wars has tended to disregard the role of extra-dyad agents in influencing conflict outcomes. Little is known as to whether the presence of such extra-dyadic actors as pro-regime militias affects conflict termination and outcomes. This article develops and tests a number of hypotheses on the pro-government militias’ effect upon civil war outcomes. It proposes that pro-regime militias involved in intrastate conflicts tend to act as proponents of ‘no peace, no war’, favouring low-activity violence and ceasefires over other conflict outcomes. These hypotheses are examined using an expanded dataset on pro-government militias and armed conflict in a statistical analysis of 229 civil war episodes from 1991 to 2015. These findings shed new light on the role of extra-state actors in civil wars.


Author(s):  
Amy E. Eckert

The emergence of a new market for private force has altered many aspects of war fighting, including those pertaining to victory and post-conflict settings. While some literature suggests that private military companies (PMCs) can sometimes lead parties to negotiate a peace agreement more quickly, the value of this victory is open to debate. Empirical evidence and case studies of civil wars explored in this chapter suggest that the peace achieved through the use of PMCs is unlikely to endure or to bring substantial improvement to the lives of the most vulnerable victims of war—that is, instead of a positive peace, PMCs achieve a negative peace. Moreover, states often mortgage their natural resources to PMCs as a form of payment. In other words, both the war and the victory secure considerable benefits for PMCs and accomplish little for the civilian populations within war-torn states.


2021 ◽  
pp. 073889422110484
Author(s):  
Chelsea Estancona ◽  
Lindsay Reid

Why do governments choose to fund pro-government militias (PGMs) if doing so could extend costly civil conflict? While PGMs are active in a majority of civil wars, their impact on conflict termination remains poorly understood. We argue that the choice to fund PGMs is a strategic one for states and part of their efforts to influence wartime dynamics and conflict termination. We hypothesize that PGMs’ impact on conflict termination is conditional on whether they are government funded. Government-funded PGMs help states to ward off costly negotiations and encourage the rebellion's gradual dissolution. Using competing risks analyses on civil wars ending between 1981 and 2007, we find robust evidence that PGM funding affects conflict outcomes.


2018 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 451-470 ◽  
Author(s):  
Madhav Joshi ◽  
Jason Michael Quinn

Data on global foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows shows that civil war significantly deters investment, while post-civil war settings attract investment. Civil wars, however, can end in different ways (government victories, rebel victories, and various types of settlements) and firms should be attracted to terminations that reveal more information about the future political and economic stability of the nation. We argue that comprehensive peace agreements and their subsequent implementation convey the most relevant information to investors regarding the credibility of the conflict actors’ commitment to future peace and stability and should thus attract the most FDI. Analysis of FDI inflows to 73 post-civil war countries lends support to our argument. The policy implications of the study are straightforward: governments that wish to attract the maximum amount of FDI for economic reconstruction following a civil war should negotiate and implement a comprehensive peace agreement.


Author(s):  
Erin K. Jenne ◽  
Milos Popovic

In their seminal study “Resort to Arms,” Small and Singer (1982) defined a civil war as “any armed conflict that involves (a) military action internal to the metropole, (b) the active participation of the national government, and (c) effective resistance by both sides.” Internationalized civil wars constitute a newer classification, denoting a conflict involving organized violence on two or more sides within a sovereign state, in which foreign elements play a role in instigating, prolonging, or exacerbating the struggle. Small and Singer defined civil war as one in which a “system member” intervenes into a substate conflict involving organized violence. Although Singer and Small conceived “system members” narrowly as external sovereign states engaged in military intervention into the civil war in question, the definition has since been expanded by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) to include other foreign actors—such as nonstate or private actors, diasporas, IOs, corporations, or cross-border kin groups—any of which can intervene to intensify a domestic civil conflict. From superpower interventions during the Cold War to more recent conflicts in Syria and Ukraine, internationalized civil wars have garnered increasing scholarly attention, primarily because they tend to be far bloodier and more protracted than noninternationalized civil wars. How to end such wars is a problem long bedeviling the international community. Civil wars are already more difficult to end than interstate wars partly because there are more players to satisfy in civil war settings, with multiple conflict parties coexisting on a single territory, and multiple factions within each conflict party—each constituting a “veto player” that might plausibly spoil a peace agreement should the agreement not satisfy their needs. This problem is exacerbated by an order of magnitude when a civil war becomes internationalized. When outside actors get involved in a civil war, the number of veto players rises correspondingly to include not only domestic players and internal factions, but also the involved external players, which may include foreign governments, diaspora groups, foreign fighters, and/or transnational social networks. Managing or ending internationalized civil wars is thus a highly complicated balancing act requiring attention not just to internal, but also to external veto players represented by all involved parties both inside and outside the conflict state. The traditional methods of conflict management involve electoral engineering, power-sharing arrangements, or other peace deals that seek to satisfy the aspirations of involved internal parties, while ensuring that the peace deal is “self-enforcing.” This means that it will hold up even in the absence of outside pressure. In internationalized civil wars, however, conflict managers must also satisfy involved outside actors or otherwise neutralize external conflict processes. There are multiple methods for doing this, ranging from effective border control in cases of conflict spillover to decomposing internationalized conflicts into civil and international conflicts, which are solved separately, to outright peace enforcement involving international security guarantees.


1997 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 335-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara F. Walter

Unlike interstate wars, civil wars rarely end in negotiated settlements. Between 1940 and 1990 55 percent of interstate wars were resolved at the bargaining table, whereas only 20 percent of civil wars reached similar solutions. Instead, most internal wars ended with the extermination, expulsion, or capitulation of the losing side. In fact, groups fighting civil wars almost always chose to fight to the finish unless an outside power stepped in to guarantee a peace agreement. If a third party agreed to enforce the terms of a peace treaty, negotiations always succeeded regardless of the initial goals, ideology, or ethnicity of the participants. If a third party did not intervene, these talks usually failed.


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