scholarly journals Eyes and the Mind: Psychophysiological Approach to Psychiatric Disorders through Visual and Ocular Functions Edited by Takuya Kojima & Eisuke Matsushima. Tokyo & Basel: Japanese Scientific Societies Press & Karger. 2000. 215 pp. (hb). ISBN 4-7622-2941-5

2002 ◽  
Vol 181 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-86
Author(s):  
Sean A. Spence
2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (7) ◽  
pp. 540-553 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Todeva-Radneva ◽  
Rositsa Paunova ◽  
Sevdalina Kandilarova ◽  
Drozdstoy St. Stoyanov

: Psychiatric diagnosis has long been perceived as more of an art than a science since its foundations lie within the observation, and the self-report of the patients themselves and objective diagnostic biomarkers are lacking. Furthermore, the diagnostic tools in use not only stray away from the conventional medical framework but also remain invalidated with evidence-based concepts. However, neuroscience, as a source of valid objective knowledge has initiated the process of a paradigm shift underlined by the main concept of psychiatric disorders being “brain disorders”. It is also a bridge closing the explanatory gap among the different fields of medicine via the translation of the knowledge within a multidisciplinary framework. : The contemporary neuroimaging methods, such as fMRI provide researchers with an entirely new set of tools to reform the current status quo by creating an opportunity to define and validate objective biomarkers that can be translated into clinical practice. Combining multiple neuroimaging techniques with the knowledge of the role of genetic factors, neurochemical imbalance and neuroinflammatory processes in the etiopathophysiology of psychiatric disorders is a step towards a comprehensive biological explanation of psychiatric disorders and a final differentiation of psychiatry as a well-founded medical science. : In addition, the neuroscientific knowledge gained thus far suggests a necessity for directional change to exploring multidisciplinary concepts, such as multiple causality and dimensionality of psychiatric symptoms and disorders. A concomitant viewpoint transition of the notion of validity in psychiatry with a focus on an integrative validatory approach may facilitate the building of a collaborative bridge above the wall existing between the scientific fields analyzing the mind and those studying the brain.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Vinod Kumar ◽  
Shree Raksha Bhide ◽  
Rashmi Arasappa ◽  
Shivarama Varambally ◽  
Bangalore N. Gangadhar

SUMMARY Meditation, a component of ashtanga yoga, is an act of inward contemplation in which the mind fluctuates between a state of attention to a stimulus and complete absorption in it. Some forms of meditation have been found to be useful for people with psychiatric conditions such as anxiety, depression and substance use disorder. Evidence for usefulness of meditation for people with psychotic disorders is mixed, with reported improvements in negative symptoms but the emergence/precipitation of psychotic symptoms. This article narrates the benefits of meditation in psychiatric disorders, understanding meditation from the yoga perspective, biological aspects of meditation and practical tips for the practice of meditation. We also explain possible ways of modifying meditative practices to make them safe and useful for the patient population and useful overall as a society-level intervention.


2020 ◽  
pp. 191-202
Author(s):  
Iris Berent

At the “age of the brain,” one would expect the public to view psychiatric disorders as “diseases like all others.” But mental illness still carries a significant social stigma that deprives them of employment, housing, and social opportunities. Invoking the brain as the source of disease helps reduce stigma, but it elicits curious fatalistic reactions. People believe that if the disease is “in the brain,” then it is more severe, incurable, and resistant to psychotherapy. And it is not only the general public that is taken by such misconceptions. Patients believe the same, and so do even trained clinicians. Why do psychiatric disorders elicit such persistent misconceptions? No one would shun a cancer patient because she has a tumor in her breast. Why shun the sufferer of a disorder that ravages the brain? And why believe brain diseases are incurable? This chapter traces the misconceptions of brain disorders to the core knowledge of Dualism and Essentialism. Dualism prompts us to presume that the mind and matter don’t mix and match; if the disease is “in your brain matter,” then, in our intuitive psychology, ephemeral “talk therapy” won’t do. Essentialism further compels us to believe that what’s “in” our material body is innate, hence, immutable, so biology is truly destiny. Thus, the same core knowledge principles that plague our self-understanding in health also derail our reasoning about psychiatric disease.


2010 ◽  
Vol 41 (6) ◽  
pp. 1143-1150 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. S. Kendler ◽  
P. Zachar ◽  
C. Craver

This essay explores four answers to the question ‘What kinds of things are psychiatric disorders?’Essentialist kindsare classes whose members share an essence from which their defining features arise. Although elegant and appropriate for some physical (e.g. atomic elements) and medical (e.g. Mendelian disorders) phenomena, this model is inappropriate for psychiatric disorders, which are multi-factorial and ‘fuzzy’.Socially constructed kindsare classes whose members are defined by the cultural context in which they arise. This model excludes the importance of shared physiological mechanisms by which the same disorder could be identified across different cultures. Advocates ofpractical kindsput off metaphysical questions about ‘reality’ and focus on defining classes that are useful. Practical kinds models for psychiatric disorders, implicit in the DSM nosologies, do not require that diagnoses be grounded in shared causal processes. If psychiatry seeks to tie disorders to etiology and underlying mechanisms, a model first proposed for biological species,mechanistic property cluster(MPC)kinds, can provide a useful framework. MPC kinds are defined not in terms of essences but in terms of complex, mutually reinforcing networks of causal mechanisms. We argue that psychiatric disorders are objectively grounded features of the causal structure of the mind/brain. MPC kinds are fuzzy sets defined by mechanisms at multiple levels that act and interact to produce the key features of the kind. Like species, psychiatric disorders are populations with central paradigmatic and more marginal members. The MPC view is the best current answer to ‘What kinds of things are psychiatric disorders?’


2015 ◽  
Vol 38 (6) ◽  
pp. E2 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel R. Cleary ◽  
Alp Ozpinar ◽  
Ahmed M. Raslan ◽  
Andrew L. Ko

Fossil records showing trephination in the Stone Age provide evidence that humans have sought to influence the mind through physical means since before the historical record. Attempts to treat psychiatric disease via neurosurgical means in the 20th century provided some intriguing initial results. However, the indiscriminate application of these treatments, lack of rigorous evaluation of the results, and the side effects of ablative, irreversible procedures resulted in a backlash against brain surgery for psychiatric disorders that continues to this day. With the advent of psychotropic medications, interest in invasive procedures for organic brain disease waned. Diagnosis and classification of psychiatric diseases has improved, due to a better understanding of psychiatric patho-physiology and the development of disease and treatment biomarkers. Meanwhile, a significant percentage of patients remain refractory to multiple modes of treatment, and psychiatric disease remains the number one cause of disability in the world. These data, along with the safe and efficacious application of deep brain stimulation (DBS) for movement disorders, in principle a reversible process, is rekindling interest in the surgical treatment of psychiatric disorders with stimulation of deep brain sites involved in emotional and behavioral circuitry. This review presents a brief history of psychosurgery and summarizes the development of DBS for psychiatric disease, reviewing the available evidence for the current application of DBS for disorders of the mind.


1996 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
Perminder Sachdev

Objective: A critical examination of the term ‘organic’ in psychiatry and its proposed alternatives. Method: An examination of the published literature on the concepts of ‘organicity’ in mental syndromes, and of the mind-brain problem. Results: The term ‘organic’ presents a number of problems, some of which can be described as those of historical schism, duality, method, practice, scholasticism and semantics. The currently available alternatives are not without their difficulties, and examples are provided. Conclusion: Whether the term ‘organic’ is retained or replaced, we are condemned to an unsatisfactory position while we await a radically new paradigm to understand the role of neurobiological and psychosocial factors in psychiatric disorders.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-5
Author(s):  
Gulbahar S Sidhu ◽  
Deepali Gul

Psychiatric disorders have a history as old as mankind. The ancient literature is replete with vivid descriptions of various afflictions of the mind. Throughout history, the human intellect has assiduously tried to classify illnesses on the basis of common features between them. In fact, this tendency to classify extends far beyond the realms of illnesses to include virtually all phenomena that occur around us.  Could poetry help in rediscovering this lost essence? This is the basic question that this research paper attempts to answer.


1988 ◽  
Vol 33 (5) ◽  
pp. 412-414
Author(s):  
John M. Morihisa

Recent advances in the clinical neurosciences have begun to expand and change our understanding of how the brain functions. As further neuroscientific principles are delineated we may gain insights into the underlying pathophysiology of some psychiatric disorders and through this new understanding we may be able to define new therapeutic interventions. Two illustrative examples of neuroscientific research are discussed and reviewed both in terms of the promises and dangers inherent in these new approaches to the mind.


Sociologija ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 274-285
Author(s):  
Gorica Djokic

Neurobiologically spoken, the supstrate of the mind is formed by neuronal networks, and dysregulated neurocircuitry can cause psychiatric disorders. Psychiatric disorders are diagnosed by symptom clusters that are the result of abnormal brain tissue, and/or activity in specialized areas of the brain. Dysregulated circuitry results from abnormal neural function, or abnormal neural connections from one brain area to another, which leads to neurotransmitter imbalances. Each psychiatric disorder has uniquely dysregulated circuitry and thereby unique neurotransmitter imbalance, such as: prefrontal cortical-limbic pathways in depression or prefrontal cortical-striatal pathways in schizophrenia ie. serotonin-norepinephrin-dopamin imbalance in depression, or dopamine hyperactivity in schizophrenia. Biological psychiatry has completely changed the farmacological treatment of psychiatric disorders, and new foundings in that field are supportive to futher more neuropsychopharmacological and nonpharmacological therapy studies, whish has as a result more safe and effective therapy for psychiatric disorders.


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