scholarly journals Optimal Allocation with Ex Post Verification and Limited Penalties

2017 ◽  
Vol 107 (9) ◽  
pp. 2666-2694 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tymofiy Mylovanov ◽  
Andriy Zapechelnyuk
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Allocation ◽  
Social Values ◽  
Optimal Mechanism ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
False Claim

Several agents with privately known social values compete for a prize. The prize is allocated based on the claims of the agents, and the winner is subject to a limited penalty if he makes a false claim. If the number of agents is large, the optimal mechanism places all agents above a threshold onto a shortlist along with a fraction of agents below the threshold, and then allocates the prize to a random agent on the shortlist. When the number of agents is small, the optimal mechanism allocates the prize to the agent who makes the highest claim, but restricts the range of claims above and below. (JEL D63, D82)

scholarly journals EX-POST EVALUATION DESIGN PROPOSAL FOR THE ROMANIAN YOUTH STRATEGY 2015-2020. AN ANALYSIS OF THE NGO SECTOR IMPACT ON THE RESULTS

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Delia – Simina DĂNILĂ ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
Social Values ◽  
Evaluation Process ◽  
Evaluation Design ◽  
Gender Perspective ◽  
Post Evaluation ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
The Social ◽  
Design Proposal ◽  
Youth Issue

Success or a lesson to learn? In this paper, I propose an evaluation design of the Romanian Youth Strategy 2015-2020 transformative effects, in which I argue for a participative evaluation process, promoting diversity, social justice, fairness and transparency. My focus is not only on the instruments for analyzing the objectives, results, resources and impact, but also on encouraging the development of the social values that are attached to this policy. The innovative elements of the suggested design are the introduction of the gender perspective and multiple discrimination and also the reflection on the influence of the NGO sector on the achieved results. It is expected this study to engage the evaluators and the readers interested in the youth issue in a debate for improving the process of assessing public policies and programmes.

scholarly journals Information design and sequential screening with ex post participation constraint

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 319-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tibor Heumann
Keyword(s):  
Lower Bound ◽  
Continuous Time ◽  
Information Design ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Optimal Mechanism ◽  
Sequential Screening ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Opt Out ◽  
Principal Agent Model ◽  
Participation Constraint

We study a principal–agent model. The parties are symmetrically informed at first; the principal then designs the process by which the agent learns his type and, concurrently, the screening mechanism. Because the agent can opt out of the mechanism ex post, it must leave him with nonnegative rents ex post. We characterize the profit‐maximizing mechanism. In that optimal mechanism, learning proceeds in continuous time and, at each moment, the agent learns a lower bound on his type. For each type, there is one of two possible outcomes: the type is allocated the efficient quantity or is left with zero rents ex post.

scholarly journals Experimentation, Patents, and Innovation

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daron Acemoglu ◽  
Kostas Bimpikis ◽  
Asuman Ozdaglar
Keyword(s):  
Simple Model ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Optimal Allocation ◽  
Success Probability ◽  
Transfer Of Knowledge ◽  
Allocation Of Resources ◽  
Ex Post

This paper studies a simple model of experimentation and innovation. Our analysis suggests that patents improve the allocation of resources by encouraging rapid experimentation and efficient ex post transfer of knowledge. Each firm receives a signal on the success probability of a project and decides when to experiment. Successes can be copied. First, we assume that signal qualities are the same. Symmetric equilibria involve delayed and staggered experimentation, whereas the optimal allocation never involves delays and may involve simultaneous experimentation. Appropriately designed patents implement the optimal allocation. Finally, we discuss the case when signals differ and are private information. (JEL D82, D83, O31, O33, O34)

Incentive for innovation and the optimal allocation of patents

2017 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 692-707 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kojun Hamada
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Optimal Allocation ◽  
Ownership Structures ◽  
Specific Investment ◽  
Specific Investments ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Joint Ownership

This article theoretically investigates how different ownership structures of patents affect ex ante and ex post incentives for innovation by applying a property rights approach. We explore a model in which two research laboratories invest in R&D to obtain an innovative patent, and after successfully obtaining the patent they determine an ownership structure for the patent. The two parties consider how the determined patent ownership would affect their noncontractible relation-specific investments for commercialisation. We demonstrate that joint ownership of a patent between two parties is optimal. More concretely, if a selfish (altruistic) relation-specific investment is more important than an altruistic (selfish) investment, a joint ownership with no (bilateral) veto is optimal to maximise the joint value. Moreover, when both parties do not commit themselves to joint ownership in advance, they have greater incentive to invest in R&D than committing, even if they understand that joint ownership is desirable ex post.

The Impact of Regret on Exports

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 192-205
Author(s):  
Udo Broll ◽  
Kit Pong Wong ◽  
Peter Welzel
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Risk Premium ◽  
Optimal Allocation ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Exchange Rate Uncertainty ◽  
Export Decisions ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Spot Exchange Rate ◽  
Regret Aversion ◽  
The Impact

Abstract We examine optimal production and export decisions of a firm facing exchange rate uncertainty, where the firm’s management is not only risk averse but also regret averse, i.e., is characterized by a utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex post suboptimal alternatives. Experimental and empirical results support the view that managers tend to be regret averse. Under regret aversion a negative risk premium need not preclude the firm from exporting which would be the case if the firm were only risk averse. Exporting creates an implicit hedge against the possibility of regret when the realized spot exchange rate turns out to be high. The regret-averse firm as such has a greater ex ante incentive to export than the purely risk averse firm. Finally, we use a two-state example to illustrate that the firm optimally exports more (less) to the foreign country than in the case of pure risk aversion if the low (high) spot exchange rate is more likely to prevail. Regret aversion as such plays a crucial role in determining the firm’s optimal allocation between domestic sales and foreign exports.

OPTIMAL MULTI-ATTRIBUTE AUCTIONS FOR DIVISIBLE GOODS

2011 ◽  
Vol 10 (05) ◽  
pp. 891-911 ◽  
Author(s):  
CONGJUN RAO ◽  
YONG ZHAO ◽  
YANG CHEN
Keyword(s):  
Utility Function ◽  
Optimal Allocation ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Procurement Auctions ◽  
Optimal Model ◽  
Procurement Auction ◽  
Auction Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Mechanism ◽  
Divisible Goods ◽  
Allocation Strategies

In this paper, the problem of multi-attribute procurement auction of divisible goods is investigated, and an optimal mechanism of multi-attribute auction, which enables negotiation on several attributes in addition to the price of a divisible good, is designed. First, several important assumptions of multi-attribute procurement auctions of divisible goods are given, and the buyer's utility function and the supplier's utility function are defined. Then, a set of sufficient conditions for feasible multi-attribute auction mechanism are given. Based on these conditions, an optimal model of multi-attribute procurement auction whose goal is to maximize the buyer's expected utility, is established. By solving this model, the optimal allocation strategies are obtained. Third, the properties of the optimal multi-attribute auction are discussed. Finally, a multi-attribute auction example about the steam coal procurement is given to show how to implement the optimal multi-attribute auction mechanism.

Political Activism and the Provision of Dynamic Incentives: Growing the Pie in the Battle for Redistribution

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antoine Camous ◽  
Russell Cooper
Keyword(s):  
Capital Accumulation ◽  
Optimal Allocation ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Political Activism ◽  
Income Taxes ◽  
Human Capital Accumulation ◽  
Dynamic Setting ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante

Abstract This paper studies the determination of income taxes in a dynamic setting with human capital accumulation. The goal is to understand the factors that support an outcome without complete redistribution, given a majority of relatively poor agents and the inability to commit to future taxes. All agents agree ex ante that limiting tax and transfers is beneficial but a majority favors large redistribution, ex post, at the time of the vote. In a political influence game, group activism limits the support for expropriatory taxation and preserves incentives. In some cases, the outcome corresponds to the optimal allocation under commitment.

scholarly journals The Impact of Sports Activities on the Decrease of PLWHA Stigma and Social Values

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 118-126
Author(s):  
Megia Erida
Keyword(s):  
Social Values ◽  
Well Being ◽  
T Test ◽  
Social Value ◽  
Validity And Reliability ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Sports Activities ◽  
Hiv Aids

Sports activities are activities that can be carried out by all groups with the aim of improving the quality of life in terms of physical fitness and psycho-social well-being. People who suffer from HIV/AIDS often get negative stigma and changes in social values. This study was aimed at determining the decrease in stigma and changes in the social value of PLWHA (people with HIV / AIDS) through futsal Rumah Cemara Bandung sports activities. The method used in this study was a comparative causal method (ex-post facto). Design of the study used criteria group. The technique of sampling in this study used convience sampling technique. The sample of this study consisted of 20 people divided into two groups: 10 PLWHA who were active in sports and 10 PLWHA who were not active in sports. Data collection process was conducted through face-to-face interview and structured questionnaire. Based on validity and reliability tests, researchers used an adopted  questionnaire and discussed the questionnaire with the expert. Data analysis was conducted by using SPSS version 23 employing independent sample T-test. The results of this study indicate a decrease in stigma and changes in social values seen from T test with tcount ttable. The conclusions from the Stigma calculation was 3.439 2.10092 and Social Value was 3.730 2.10092. The result concludes that sports activities have an effect on reducing the stigma and changes in the Social Value of PLWHA. 

Optimal Monopoly Mechanisms with Demand Uncertainty

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Peck ◽  
Jeevant Rampal
Keyword(s):  
Demand Uncertainty ◽  
Incentive Compatibility ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Individual Rationality ◽  
Optimal Mechanism ◽  
Monopoly Price ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Unit Demand ◽  
Profit Maximizing

This paper analyzes a monopoly firm’s profit-maximizing mechanism in the following context. There is a continuum of consumers with a unit demand for a good. The distribution of the consumers’ valuations is given by one of two possible demand distributions/states. The consumers are uncertain about the demand state, and they update their beliefs after observing their own valuation for the good. The firm is uncertain about the demand state but infers it from the consumers’ reported valuations. The firm’s problem is to maximize profits by choosing an optimal mechanism among the class of anonymous, deterministic, direct revelation mechanisms that satisfy interim incentive compatibility and ex post individual rationality. We show that, under certain sufficient conditions, the firm’s optimal mechanism is to set the monopoly price in each demand state. Under these conditions, Segal’s optimal ex post mechanism is robust to relaxing ex post incentive compatibility to interim incentive compatibility.

Practice, Social Values, Dynamics

1980 ◽  
Vol 25 (12) ◽  
pp. 1009-1010
Author(s):  
IVAN N. MENSH
Keyword(s):  
Social Values
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