scholarly journals Economists and White House Decisions

1992 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 65-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart E Eizenstat

While I served in the White House, [as Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and Policy and Executive Director of the White House Domestic Policy Staff from 1977–81], Ph.D. economists occupied the positions of Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Treasury, Director of the Council on Wage and Price Stability, the President's anti-inflation adviser, Chairman and Council Members of the Council of Economic Advisers, and many other senior positions throughout the government. Yet we presided over an economy with double-digit inflation and interest rates and a recession. Presidents of the United States and their White House Staff members expect economists to be omniscient prophets of the future course of the economy, unerring economic policy advisers, and teachers of the mysterious science of economics to often distracted pupils. They expect their economists to provide an economic blueprint for high growth, low inflation, and a guaranteed re-election—but without offending any important constituencies. What is the appropriate role for economists in the White House? What can they realistically be expected to do?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
William R. Clark ◽  
Vincent Arel-Bundock

Independent central banks are thought to be effective inflation hawks because they are run by technocrats with conservative monetary policy preferences. However, central bankers can only protect their independence by compromising with the elected officials who grant them their independence. Policy, therefore, is likely to be a weighted average of the preferences of the central bank and the government. Consequently, central bankers may be eager to help right‐wing governments stay in power and oppose the election of left‐wing governments. We show evidence from the United States that interest rates (a) decline as elections approach when Republicans control the White House, but rise when Democrats do; and (b) are sensitive to the inflation rate (output gap) when Democrats (Republicans) are in the White House. Thus, the Federal Reserve is a conditional inflation hawk. Since the Fed became operationally independent in 1951, the Republicans have exhibited a decided electoral advantage in presidential politics.


1939 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-66
Author(s):  
Lloyd M. Short

The preliminary report of the select committee of the United States Senate appointed to investigate the executive agencies of the government with a view to coordination, under authority of Senate Resolution 217, 74th Congress, passed February 24, 1936, was presented to the Senate by Senator Harry F. Byrd, chairman, on August 16, 1937. Except for a brief introduction by Senator Byrd, in which he states that his committee has reached no final conclusions and that it expects to continue its investigations, the document is given over entirely to the report prepared for the committee by the Brookings Institution. Dr. Moulton, president of the Institution, explains in a letter of transmittal the contractual arrangements under which the report was prepared and lists the staff members, regular and special, who participated in its preparation.


Author(s):  
David Shropshire ◽  
Jess Chandler

To help meet the nation’s energy needs, recycling of partially used nuclear fuel is required to close the nuclear fuel cycle, but implementing this step will require considerable investment. This report evaluates financing scenarios for integrating recycling facilities into the nuclear fuel cycle. A range of options from fully government owned to fully private owned were evaluated using DPL (Decision Programming Language 6.0), which can systematically optimize outcomes based on user-defined criteria (e.g., lowest life-cycle cost, lowest unit cost). This evaluation concludes that the lowest unit costs and lifetime costs are found for a fully government-owned financing strategy, due to government forgiveness of debt as sunk costs. However, this does not mean that the facilities should necessarily be constructed and operated by the government. The costs for hybrid combinations of public and private (commercial) financed options can compete under some circumstances with the costs of the government option. This analysis shows that commercial operations have potential to be economical, but there is presently no incentive for private industry involvement. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) currently establishes government ownership of partially used commercial nuclear fuel. In addition, the recently announced Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) suggests fuels from several countries will be recycled in the United States as part of an international governmental agreement; this also assumes government ownership. Overwhelmingly, uncertainty in annual facility capacity led to the greatest variations in unit costs necessary for recovery of operating and capital expenditures; the ability to determine annual capacity will be a driving factor in setting unit costs. For private ventures, the costs of capital, especially equity interest rates, dominate the balance sheet; and the annual operating costs, forgiveness of debt, and overnight costs dominate the costs computed for the government case. The uncertainty in operations, leading to lower than optimal processing rates (or annual plant throughput), is the most detrimental issue to achieving low unit costs. Conversely, lowering debt interest rates and the required return on investments can reduce costs for private industry.


Author(s):  
Dmitry M. Rozental

The article is devoted to the American-Venezuelan relations at the present stage. Their confusion is explained by the ongoing revision of US foreign policy under 46th President Joe Biden, the confrontation between Democrats and Republicans in Congress, and political and economic instability in the Bolivarian Republic. At the same time, an analysis of the main components of bilateral interaction can contribute to a better understanding of their features. Washington's pressure on Caracas takes place because of the domestic political reasons and the strategic objectives of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. In these conditions, the probability that the White House will continue the pressure on the government of Nicolas Maduro remains high enough.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-31
Author(s):  
Víctor Hugo Ramírez Lavalle

This article pays special attention to the genesis of relations and documents in the field of national security, which determine the relationship between Mexico and the United States, examines its framework and results, as well as the concept and constitutional foundations of national security and defense of Mexico.In this conceptual framework, it is noteworthy that in March 2021 the American delegation, headed by Roberta Jacobson, the former US Ambassador to Mexico, the White House Border Coordinator, arrived in Mexico. Both delegations announced that the talks would focus on ensuring orderly, safe and legal migration in the region and progress in implementing the Comprehensive Development Plan for the Northern Region of Central America, but in fact, the main subject of talks would was US national security. In other words, the regulation of migration flows from Mexico and the countries of the so-called Northern Triangle (Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador).The topics mentioned above are not new on the US-Mexico bilateral agenda, and in this regard, the government of President Biden seems to revise Donald Trump’s policy on migration, with a special focus on national security, using less aggressive rhetoric, without threats to continue the construction of the border wall, but, in turn, more rigid from a political point of view. In view of the above, it appeared appropriate to present the legal framework, set out primarily in the constitution, on which Mexico relies and which allows it to properly negotiate and at the same time have a clear vision on the current state of national security between the two countries.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-109
Author(s):  
Subhomoy Bhattacharjee ◽  
Dakshita Das

There is not much new in the divide in economic literature between fiscal and monetary policy; what is new post-2008 is the emergence of the role of money supply and that of public debt to prominence as the instrument of choice for central banks and the government treasury. To a large degree, money supply and public debt now eclipsed the central role variables such as tax and interest rates had played in the setting of economic policies in countries both developed and developing. While literature is evaluating how the change in the role of these stock parameters to that of policy variables will play out, this article takes up the more mundane task of examining only one of them, which is public debt in the context of India. We believe that there is a key reason to do so. The Indian government has not used public debt as an active policy tool, so far, even as several countries have begun to do so ( Mohanty, 2012 ). Instead, it has held on to a general desideratum of the need to reduce it; borne out of the scare of the balance of payments crisis of 1991. But 25 years after the crisis, it is important to examine if there is a conscious understanding within the government for the need to measure and deploy public debt especially as the room for active deployment of other fiscal tools, namely taxation is circumscribed. By FY14 India’s public debt (centre and states combined), as percentage of GDP, stood at 66.7 per cent; it was 70.6 per cent in FY09. For the sake of comparison, the world’s most indebted countries include Greece, of course, with its general government net debt at 173 per cent of its GDP. Others in the top 20 include Italy, Egypt, Portugal, Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Japan and the United States of America. By current estimates, India does not rank amongst the most indebted countries of the world. But is the position, one of strength or of a passive arrival that offers little or no policy direction to the government? Moreover, this article also argues that in the absence of such direction, there has been a build-up of debt in the economy instead of a reduction. Most of that build-up has been sought to be balanced by recourse to non-tax revenue. As fresh options to tap non-tax revenue dry up, public debt could emerge as the new pressure point for the economy.


Author(s):  
David Fotouhi

This article explores the relationship between President James K. Polk’s progressive ambition in the national electorate and the geographic expansion of the United States, particularly with regard to the social and religious foundations for manifest destiny in the public conscience. The author finds that manifest destiny played a central role in President James K. Polk’s successful campaign for the White House as well as his handling of foreign and domestic affairs.


Worldview ◽  
1973 ◽  
Vol 16 (7) ◽  
pp. 15-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Berger

At a recent meeting of the editors of Worldview Richard Neuhaus enlivened the proceedings by another one of his acutely perspicacious political opinions. He opined that the White House appointment of General Haig proves that the United States is adopting the Peruvian military model of development. He is wrong. The true import of the Watergate affair is more sinister: The government of the United States is being taken over by multinational corporations under the control of the West German tourist industry.Any observer schooled in New Left methods of analysis should, of course, have suspected something like this from the beginning. Why alt these Germans? Only bourgeois social scientists can be satisfied with an explanation in terms of a Novaldan resurgence of ethnic genius.


2020 ◽  
pp. 223-238
Author(s):  
Victoria Phillips

Upon Graham’s return to the United States, the State Department declared her a “very valuable asset.” As the “First Lady” of modern dance, Graham had “made a positive contribution to overall Department of State foreign relations objectives.” Performances “convinced everyone that modern American culture had made an important contribution to the development of the twentieth century.” While photographs of Graham and Kissinger show a mutual if stiff respect, Graham’s principal alliance shifted to First Lady Betty Ford as Graham looked for White House invitations and financial support. Even as her company remained unstable, plagued by deficits that left it veering toward bankruptcy, Graham stayed on the government diplomatic resource list, and she tightened her alliance with the East Wing through to the West. As New York City veered toward bankruptcy, Graham staged lavish galas and star-studded events with Soviet defector and ballet star Rudolf Nureyev in tow. Betty Ford and Halston became key figures in her promotional efforts. Graham received the Medal of Freedom from Ford, but with his election loss to Jimmy Carter, Graham refocused her strategy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (11) ◽  
pp. 24-30
Author(s):  
I. Shumilina

In the early months of Joe Biden’s administration in the White House, Middle East issues were not identified as a priority of its foreign policy. Individual steps in this direction, however, suggest that the administration will adhere to the principal lines of conduct for the United States towards American partners and allies (Israel, the Arab monarchies of the Gulf and others), as well as towards the main conflict nodes in the region (Syria, Libya, Yemen). At the same time, it is also obvious that its tactical emphasis has shifted in its approach to a number of the most important problems of the region – in particular, the Palestinian-Israeli standoff (namely, restoration of relations with the government of Mahmoud Abbas) and the situation around Iran (return to the renewed nuclear deal – JCPOA) and Turkey (overcoming the cooling of relations with Ankara). Apparently, we can talk about Biden’s revival of the Middle East policy pursued under Barack Obama’s administration. This process is largely due to the domestic political calculations of the Biden team and the Democratic Party as a whole. The author of the article tries to assess the influence of American immigrant’s communities from the Arab countries and Turkey on Joe Biden’s Middle East policy.


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