scholarly journals Transfer Pricing by Multinational Firms: New Evidence from Foreign Firm Ownerships

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 170-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anca D. Cristea ◽  
Daniel X. Nguyen

Using a firm-level dataset of Danish exports between 1999–2006, we find robust evidence for profit shifting by multinational corporations. Our triple difference estimations exploit the response of export unit values to acquisitions of foreign affiliates and to changes in statutory corporate tax rates. This identification strategy corrects for a downward bias resulting from firms adjusting arm's length prices to obscure transfer price manipulations. We find that Danish multinationals reduce the unit values of their exports to low tax countries between 5.7 to 9.1 percent. This difference corresponds to a tax revenue loss of 3.24 percent of Danish multinationals' tax returns. (JEL D21, D22, F14, F23, H25, H32)

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 500-505
Author(s):  
Sebastián Bustos ◽  
Dina Pomeranz ◽  
José Vila-Belda ◽  
Gabriel Zucman

This paper reviews common challenges of taxing multinational firms, using Chile as a case study. We briefly describe key international tax avoidance methods: profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions through transfer pricing and debt shifting. We discuss the prevalent policy to tax multinationals--the arm's length principle--and alternative proposals using apportionment formulas. Novel data from Chile show that multinationals make up a large share of GDP but report lower profit and effective tax rates than local firms. In 2011, Chile implemented a reform following OECD guidelines to enforce the arm's length principle. We discuss potential effects on tax collection and welfare.


Author(s):  
Daniel Godson Olika

International tax issues have never been at the forefront of international politics as they are today. This is due in large part to the realization that the current international tax system in existence allows multinational corporations to plan their taxes in such a way that they will be able to pay little or no taxes at all. They are able to do this through certain loopholes and gaps that currently exist in the system. These loopholes and gaps are seen as creating opportunities for taxpayers who are involved in cross-border activities to aggressively structure their activities to mitigate potential tax exposure or achieve no tax liabilities. They do this by exploiting; the hybrid-mismatch arrangements, shortcomings of the transfer pricing rules in jurisdictions where they operate and shifting profits from countries where their profits are made to countries with low tax rates. Consequently, some multinationals pay as little as five percent in corporate taxes, even as smaller domestic businesses pay up to 30 percent. The result of this activity is what is known as; base erosion and profit-shifting (BEPS) and it has the potential to deprive all countries of significant tax revenues. This rave debate and harsh criticism from the public influenced the intervention of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to start its now famous BEPS Project. The OECD BEPS Project aims to provide governments or tax administrators with clear international solutions for fighting aggressive corporate tax planning strategies that artificially shift profits to locations where they are subjected to more favourable tax treatment. This paper shall address the various strands of the BEPS debate, the OECD BEPS project, the impact of the project in Africa and Nigeria. The next section shall address the various strands of the debate.


2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (4) ◽  
pp. 766-778 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Liu ◽  
Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr ◽  
Dongxian Guo

This paper employs unique data on export transactions and corporate tax returns of UK multinational firms and finds that firms manipulate their transfer prices to shift profits to lower-taxed destinations. It shows that the 2009 tax reform in the United Kingdom, which changed the taxation of corporate profits from a worldwide to a territorial system, led to a substantial increase in transfer mispricing. It also provides evidence for a trade creation effect of transfer mispricing and estimates substantial transfer mispricing in non-tax-haven countries with low- to medium-level corporate tax rates, and in R&D intensive firms.


2017 ◽  
Vol 50 (14) ◽  
pp. 1998-2026 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mi Jeong Shin

Political science scholarship has found mixed evidence on the impact of partisanship on the taxation of firms. In this article, I show that although left-leaning governments set tax rates at higher levels than right-leaning governments, the difference in the effective tax rates paid by firms is much less dramatic between left and right governments. I argue that left-leaning governments maintain high tax rates, a visible policy their constituency supports, while allowing firms to transfer profits abroad to minimize their tax burden (transfer pricing). Constituency costs hinder them from cutting tax rates to avoid backlash from voters, but they impose fewer restrictions on profit-shifting to attract investment by multinational firms for economic growth. Data covering 19 advanced economies between 2006 and 2009 support my theoretical expectation. My analyses suggest that the effect of government partisanship on corporate tax policy can be ambiguous when political parties consider various policy tools.


Author(s):  
Igor Semenenko ◽  
Junwook Yoo ◽  
Parporn Akathaporn

Growing tax competition among national governments in the presence of capital mobility distorts equilibrium in the international corporate tax market. This paper is related to the literature that examines impact of international tax policies on corporate accounting statements. Employing international firm-level data, this study revisits the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis and documents that tax exemptions lowering effective tax rates relative to statutory rates increase pre-tax returns. This finding directly contradicts the implicit tax hypothesis documented by Wilkie (1992), who provided empirical evidence on inverse relationship between pre-tax return and tax subsidy. We also find evidences that relative importance of permanent versus timing component depends on the geography and that decline in corporate tax rates reduces impact of tax subsidies on profitability. Our findings suggest that tax subsidies play a different role than in 1968-1985, which was examined by Wilkie (1992). These results are consistent with the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis and income shifting explanation


Author(s):  
Gideon Goerdt ◽  
Wolfgang Eggert

AbstractThin capitalization rules limit firms’ ability to deduct internal interest payments from taxable income, thereby restricting debt shifting activities of multinational firms. Since multinational firms can limit their tax liability in several ways, regulation of debt shifting may have an impact on other profit shifting methods. We therefore provide a model in which a multinational firm can shift profits out of a host country by issuing internal debt from an entity located in a tax haven and by manipulating transfer prices on internal goods and services. The focus of this paper is the analysis of regulatory incentives, $$(i)$$ ( i ) if a multinational firm treats debt shifting and transfer pricing as substitutes or $$(ii)$$ ( i i ) if the methods are not directly connected. The results provide a new aspect for why hybrid thin capitalization rules are used. Our discussion in this paper explains why hybrid rules can result in improvements in welfare if multinational firms treat methods of profit shifting as substitutes.


Equilibrium ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 277-293
Author(s):  
Egidijus Kundelis ◽  
Renata Legenzova

Research background: The problem of base erosion and profit shifting by multi-national corporations has been debated from different perspectives because of its multiple impact on the key actors in the economy. Studies refer to its positive impact on companies via corporate taxes saved, but its negative impact on governments via reduced tax collection. A number of empirical studies conducted in different countries support the substantial BEPS impact on company performance, but report differences in its magnitude. Other authors claim that, despite a wide range of tax avoidance opportunities available, tax avoidance is limited due to institutional measures imposed (tax audits, penalties for non-compliance) and high implementation costs. A majority of the previous empirical research covered large countries (USA, Germany) or regions (e.g. Europe), but there is a gap in the re-search assessing the BEPS impact on multinational corporations’ subsidiaries’ performance in countries with lower corporate income tax rates such as the Baltic countries. Purpose of the article: To assess the impact of base erosion and profit shifting on multinational corporations’ subsidiaries’ performance in the Baltic countries. Methods: Empirical research is conducted based on the framework employed by Hines and Rice (1994) to measure BEPS impact on company performance. Regression analysis with fixed effects was applied to a sample of 3,422 Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian subsidiaries of multinational corporations, which are characterized by low corporate tax rates.  The data for the period of 2007–2015 was retrieved from the Amadeus database. Findings & Value added: The research revealed that Baltic countries’ tax differentials between multinational corporations’ parent and subsidiary countries might have a significant impact on the subsidiary’s financial performance. When the tax rate differences between Baltic and the foreign countries decrease by 1%, reported profits in Baltic countries increase by 2.3%, indicating profit-shifting behaviour. This is in line with the empirical literature and practices applied by multinational corporations. It is also in favour of anti-tax avoidance measures introduced by the EC to be adopted by Baltic and other EU countries.


Author(s):  
Canri Chan

This study investigated the effects of government regulations and incentives on the setting of transfer prices. I found significant main effects of both variables on transfer price choices. Transfer pricing is important, particularly for Multinational Corporations (MNCs), because of increased trends toward globalization of business activities and, simultaneously, decentralization. These trends have led to increased pressures for sound internal pricing systems, specifically transfer pricing, in order for organizations to ensure optimal and efficient allocations of organization resources and to provide profit performance measurements (Tang 1992). It has generally been recognized in the literature that in order to maximize after tax cash flows, MNCs shift profits from high to low tax jurisdictions. Governments in some countries, particularly those with high tax rates, are greatly concerned as to whether or not companies attempt to avoid tax liabilities via transfer pricing manipulation, specifically in terms of trying to shift profits to lower tax jurisdictions, and have enacted laws to limit transfer price choice.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 790-809 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niels Johannesen ◽  
Thomas Tørsløv ◽  
Ludvig Wier

Abstract This paper uses a global dataset with information about 210,000 corporations in 142 countries to investigate whether tax avoidance by multinational firms is more prevalent in less-developed countries. The paper proposes a novel approach to studying cross-border profit shifting, which has relatively low data requirements and is therefore particularly well-suited for the context of developing countries. The results consistently show that the sensitivity of reported profits to profit-shifting incentives is negatively related to the level of economic and institutional development. This may explain why many developing countries opt for low corporate tax rates in spite of urgent revenue needs and severe constraints on the use of other tax bases.


2011 ◽  
Vol 86 (3) ◽  
pp. 887-914 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer L. Blouin ◽  
Jana S. Raedy ◽  
Douglas A. Shackelford

ABSTRACT: This study jointly evaluates firm-level changes in investor composition and shareholder distributions following a 2003 reduction in the dividend and capital gains tax rates for individuals. We find that directors and officers, but not other individual investors, rebalanced their portfolios to maximize after-tax returns in light of the new tax rules. We also find that firms adjusted their distribution policy (specifically, dividends versus share repurchases) in a manner consistent with the altered tax incentives for individual investors. To our knowledge, this is the first study to employ simultaneous equations to estimate both shareholder and managerial responses to the 2003 rate reductions. We find that the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimates are substantially stronger than OLS estimates, consistent with our expectation that investor and manager responses are simultaneously determined. Failure to estimate systems of equations may account for some of the weak and conflicting results from prior studies of the 2003 rate reductions.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document