Losing the Monopoly of Violence: The State, a Drug War and the Paramilitarization of Organized Crime in Mexico (2007–10)

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera ◽  
Michelle Keck ◽  
José Nava
Keyword(s):  
2002 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-55
Author(s):  
Louise I. Shelley

The murder of Valentin Tsvetkov, the governor of Magadan in central Moscow in broad day light in October 2002 highlights that organized crime and corruption are still alive and well and highly destructive of life and governance in Russia (Wines, 2002). His murder once again raises the question, “Why has Russia not been able to stop organized crime and high level corruption?” The answer is that Russia docs not have the political will at the national, regional or local level to fight these problems. This is true because the Kremlin and economic elite push their personal interests over those of the state and the society. Structural problems such as low salaries of state personnel and the embedding of organized crime and corruption make reform very difficult.


Author(s):  
Julián López Muñoz

Existe la necesidad de crear un concepto o definir, en términos jurídicos, el significado de crimen organizado, en sentido global. A pesar de que Naciones Unidas lo ha intentado, no todos sus países miembros han seguido el mandato. España ha incluido en su Derecho Penal un nuevo tipo delictivo: la organización y el grupo criminal. El orden público, como bien jurídico superior, se verá con esta medida protegido y también el Estado se verá defendido de la acción desestabilizadora procedente de la «gran criminalidad».There is a need to create a concept or define globally, in legal terms, the meaning of the organized crime. Despite the United Nations have attempted it, not all the Member Countries have followed their mandate. Spain has included in its Criminal Law a new category of offence: the criminal organization and group. The public order, as a superior legal right, will be protected by this measure and also, the State will be defended against the destabilizing action from the «great criminality».


Author(s):  
Mark Shaw ◽  
Tuesday Reitano

Organised crime and criminal networks are an outcome of Africa’s weak systems of state reach and governance, and in turn they further undermine effective state-building. Defining “organized crime” is challenging in the African context. African policy discussions did not use this term until recently, and it is so broad that it covers an enormous range of activity. Nevertheless, it is arguably now generally used and accepted, denoting organized illegal activities by a group of people over time that generate a profit. Such terminology is also now widely referred to internationally and in a UN Convention (which defines an “organized criminal group” but not organized crime itself) to which almost all African states have subscribed. The term “criminal networks” is often also used in African debates, denoting the more flexible and dynamic criminal arrangements that characterize the continent. Organized crime and criminal networks in Africa appear in many different forms, shaped largely by the strength of the state, and the degree that political elites and state actors are themselves involved in them. Broadly, organized crime can be said to occur along a continuum on the continent. On one side are well-established and -organized mafia-style groups such as the hard-core gangs of the Western Cape in South Africa or militia style operations engaged in ‘taxing’ local populations and economic activities, both licit and illicit. In the middle of the continuum, are relatively loose, and often highly effective, criminal networks made up both of Africans (West African criminal networks being the most prominent) and a range of foreign criminal actors seeking opportunities. On the other end, are sets of criminal style entrepreneurs, often operating as companies (the Guptas in South Africa, for example) but with a variety of forms of state protection. Illicit financial outflows in particular are a serious concern, but governance and regulatory reforms will be far more critical than the suppression of illicit markets themselves by law enforcement agencies, given also evidence that suggests a high degree of collusion between some African police and criminals in several illicit markets. Violence too remains a key tool for criminal control and advancement at all points along the spectrum, with the strength of the state and the collusion between state actors and criminal groups often determining the form, intensity and targets of that violence. That is one reason why the link between organized crime and conflict on the continent remains a concern, with actors (who in many cases exhibit criminal or mafia-style attributes) seeking to enhance their resource accumulation by control or taxation of criminal markets. Given this and other factors, the impact of organized crime on Africa’s development is severe, and although in some key markets the illicit economy provides opportunities for livelihood and a source of resilience, these opportunities are negated by the extent of environmental damage, the growth of drug use among the poor and marginalized, human rights abuses of migrants and those being trafficked, the violence engendered, and the economic distortions introduced.


Author(s):  
Sergey Maksimov ◽  
Yury Vasin

An intensive digitization of all social processes (including criminogenic ones) demanded such a degree of rapidity, effectiveness, efficiency and relevance for the decisions taken by modern states that could not be provided using the dominant model of state policy for combating crime. This new civilizational challenge is especially evident for the problem of counteracting organized crime. The authors conclude that the contemporary model of criminal policy against organized crime, whose main idea is a constant strengthening of liability for organized criminal activities, is undergoing a crisis. An indicator of this crisis is a recent amendment of Art. 210 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation by a norm that considerably limits criminal prosecution of owners, participants, beneficiaries and managers of judicial persons (or their divisions) for organizing a criminal group or participating in it if the corresponding judicial persons were not originally created with the purpose of committing grave or very grave crimes. The same norm limits criminal prosecution of the above-mentioned categories of physical persons if the latter did not possess direct knowledge of the criminal purposes for which such judicial persons were created. The authors believe that the crisis of the current model of combating organized crime is also proven by a lack of any significant correlation between the changes in the criminal legislation on liability for organized criminal activities during the last 24 years and changes in the intensity of the practice of its enforcement. This conclusion, according to the authors, makes it possible to infer that goals that the lawmakers set while trying to improve the effectiveness of combating organized crime were probably not achieved. The authors claim that the key causes of the unproductive reaction of lawmakers and law enforcers to the growing activities of organized crime, including its influence on the general state of law and order and the economic security of the state, include a selective post factum reaction to the growth of specific manifestations of organized crimes based on the intuitive trial and error approach. The authors suggest using the following ideas for the concept of an innovative model of influencing organized crime: it is necessary to use mathematical modeling of the planned amendments to criminal or other connected legislation and their influence both on the system of legal norms of the amended act and the system of legal norms as a whole, on the practice of law enforcement and criminal activity; the state should react to all the specific reasons for the initiation of criminal cases on organized criminal activities using automated systems of collecting, processing and evaluating information, making predictions of the changes in the intensity of organized criminal behavior; the causes and conditions of specific organized criminal infringements should be revealed and measures should be taken to eliminate them.


Author(s):  
Anna I. Efimova

This article aims at contributing to the current debate over the effects of illicit transnational activities on states. Recent avenues of conceptualizing transnational organized crime call for defining it as an economic activity with the scope of profit, rather than a criminal activity. Illicit transnational business activities largely follow the trends in development of legal business. The transnational criminal enterprises emerged in parallel to the growth of multinational corporations, making use of the same opportunities as legal business did. The article discusses violence by illicit enterprises and reviews current theoretical debate on the linkages between illicit enterprises and the state. The paper then proceeds with an empirical analysis of the effects of the presence of illicit enterprises on state weakness. We have hypothesized that weak states may have higher presence of criminal businesses. The findings generally confirm significant correlation between the two variables. State fragility is positively correlated with the presence of organized crime. Testing these results against empirical evidence partially confirms the findings. However, this correlation might be weakened by the observation that the presence of illicit enterprises alone does not determine state fragility or strength. 


2021 ◽  
pp. 81-104
Author(s):  
Mykola Bondarchuk

The purpose of the study is a comprehensive analysis of the measures taken by the relevant Soviet authorities in the USSR during the period of the new economic policy (NEP) in order to eliminate the manifestations of organized crime. Objectives of the study: to determine the main causes of banditry and its manifestations in Soviet Ukraine in the NEP; to explore the ways and methods of struggle of the Soviet power against it. The methodological basis of the study are general scientific (logical, comparative), and special historical methods (problem-chronological). They allowed to determine this period, in which the problem of organized crime is studied specifically, in chronological and logical order. Comparative analysis was used to study individual phenomena of this process. The study is also based on the principles of scientificity, historicism and objectivity. The scientific novelty of the study is that for the first time a comprehensive analysis of the manifestations of organized crime in Soviet Ukraine in 1921-1928 and ways to combat them was carried out. New archival documents on this issue and materials of periodicals of those years were put into scientific circulation. An attempt has been made to give an objective, unbiased assessment of these phenomena and the actions of the Soviet authorities in those years. Conclusions. The new economic policy of the Soviet state during the 1920's was implemented against the background of increasing manifestations of various social anomalies. The struggle against them took place in a difficult socio-economic situation in which the society found itself after the First World War. According to the analysis of the archival sources, the Soviet authorities attached great importance to these measures, and first of all to their termination. These problems were caused by various factors, but primarily by the destructive processes in society itself and the struggle of the Bolsheviks for the establishment of their power. This also applies to the events of the recent Civil War in the former Russian Empire and the state liberation struggle in Ukraine in 1917-1921. One of the main reasons for the growth of organized crime was a difficult economic situation caused by the effects of military communism. In the period under study, namely in the first half of the 1920's, the process of formation of the law enforcement system of the Soviet power took place. The main burden of responsibility for the state of the criminogenic situation in the country rested with the local police.


2018 ◽  
pp. 89-105
Author(s):  
Nenad Tešić

The author, in this paper, is looking for Ariadne’s thread, which would help us to find the way through the legal labyrinth composed of justified reaction of the state in the war against organized crime, from one side and what is considered an appropriate protection of secured creditor’s subjective rights, from the other side. He points out that in resolving a dilemma, does the mortgagee have the right to enforce its debt against the Republic of Serbia (right of pursuit), in case if the extended confiscation of property (proceeds of crime) includes subject-matter of mortgage, the court should take into account does the mortgagee know or should know about criminal origins of encumbered assets. The court should evaluate a good faith of the mortgagee, bearing in mind all the circumstances of the case, especially: 1) The moment of a mortgage establishment, i.e. whether the registration of mortgage is prior in time to the initiation of a property freezing procedure; 2) Overall business and other relations between mortgagee and mortgagor, i.e. are these parties associated in any other way? 3) Objective changes in the economic position of mortgagee and mortgagor, i.e.is the security agreement true or simulated, in particular, whether the value of the secured claim actually enhanced the property of the mortgagor and at what consideration.


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