Can Russia Fight Organized Crime and Corruption?

2002 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-55
Author(s):  
Louise I. Shelley

The murder of Valentin Tsvetkov, the governor of Magadan in central Moscow in broad day light in October 2002 highlights that organized crime and corruption are still alive and well and highly destructive of life and governance in Russia (Wines, 2002). His murder once again raises the question, “Why has Russia not been able to stop organized crime and high level corruption?” The answer is that Russia docs not have the political will at the national, regional or local level to fight these problems. This is true because the Kremlin and economic elite push their personal interests over those of the state and the society. Structural problems such as low salaries of state personnel and the embedding of organized crime and corruption make reform very difficult.

1985 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 238-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean C. Oi

Despite its widespread currency in political science, the concept of clientelism has rarely found its way into the literature on communist systems. Students of communist politics regularly note the importance of personal ties, and many recognize the significance of informal bonds in economic and political spheres atalllevels of society. Some even apply the term “clientelism” to the political behavior they describe. Yet these studies are generally limited to elite-level politics, to factionalism, career mobility, recruitment patterns, and attainment of office at the top- to middle-level echelons of the bureaucracy.2Few have considered clientelism as a type of elite-mass linkage through which the state and the party exercise control at the local level, and through which individuals participate in the political system.


Author(s):  
Kvasha Oksana

Effective counteraction to corruption at all levels is not possible without the symbiosis of such components as influencing the causes and conditions of corruption, creating systemic anti-corruption legislation, its effective application to all without exception manifestations of corruption in all levels of state power. However, such a symbiosis can only produce a positive result if the political will of the state leadership is available. I would call it a "conditio sine qua non" (a condition without which there is) overcoming corruption in the country, because in Latin "conditio sine qua non" means "a necessary condition", a necessary condition for the result. Political will in combating corruption is not only the will of the political leader (head of state) as an individual, but also the will of individuals from his immediate environment. Only political will is capable of ensuring the effectiveness of all other necessary components of counteracting corruption. The political will of the leadership of the state is a conditio sine qua non of minimizing corruption in the country, that is, a condition without which effective counteraction to corruption and corruption crime in Ukraine is impossible. The presence of political will is a prerequisite in the chain of others who are not capable of effectively preventing the spread of corruption in the absence of political will of the government. No other political conditions, economic, social or legislative levers will succeed in reducing corruption. Therefore, a promising direction for further research on this issue is the development of a scientifically sound mechanism for political influence of the government on the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures in Ukraine.


Author(s):  
Basri Amin

This article examines student politics articulated by university students in contemporary Ternate, North Maluku. The involvement of students in the political arena in the region is mostly organized through regional (ethnic) organizations.The larger context of such political process is decentralisation, which make religional resource resources dominated by the state. At the same time competition among local elites and ethnic groups flourish. This is the main background of a new formation of group interests in local level -including local university students-- to gain group advantages. The case of Ternate, North Maluku, is an example of how groups of students organize their practical interests in the arena of politics by exploiting youth associations and ethnic organizations.Artikel ini mengkaji tentang politik yang diartikulasikan oleh kalangan mahasiswa dalam percaturan politik lokal di Ternate, Maluku Utara. Keterlibatan mahasiswa dalam arena kekuasaan di kawasan ini lebih banyak dilakukan melalui instrumen organisasi kedaerahan (etnis). Konteks besar yang menjadi landasan dari proses sosial ini adalah desentralisasi yang menempatkan sedemikian rupa sumberdaya pembangunan lebih banyak didominasi oleh negara, tapi pada saat yang sama perkembangan politik etnis terus menyertai persaingan kelompok dan elit lokal. Kasus Maluku Utara adalah sebuah contoh bagaimana kaum muda memainkan kepentingannya sendiri dalam percaturan kekuasaan dan dalam hal memanfaatkan kesempatan-kesempatan praktis untuk mereka.


2019 ◽  
Vol 82 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-95
Author(s):  
Simon Townsend

AbstractI argue that Nietzsche offers an account of how strong political states develop and how the highest forms of individuality emerge when the political will of these strong states weakens. Communities develop strength in proportion to the hostility of their environment. In order to flourish in a hostile environment, they must cultivate powerful and ambitious citizens by intensifying their most powerful drives, such as a lust for power. To control these citizens they must ruthlessly suppress individuality and allow these drives to be discharged in ways that do not threaten the community. This is achieved through an inflexible value system. When the political will of the state declines and this moral code weakens, the highest forms of individuality emerge. This account clarifies why Nietzsche tends to praise aristocratic states and brings into focus the obstacles to achieving the highest forms of human flourishing within a democratic state.


1989 ◽  
Vol 31 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mats Lundahl

…widespread social evils are seldom unconnected with the selfish and brutal behavior of powerful groups and individuals…(Andreski, 1966)Most economic models do not explicitly incorporate the “state” or the “government” into their analyses. Instead, this entity is viewed as a deus ex machina which plans and directs economic policy according to notions of efficiency, growth, distributional justice, and so on, that form the central concepts of the models. Unfortunately, the same naive thinking permeates a good deal of public policy analysis. This is the case, for example, with issues of development and underdevelopment. Here, attention is concentrated on “technical,” or “economic,” solutions, while taking for granted, either implicitly or explicitly, the existence of the political will necessary to implement them.


2004 ◽  
Vol 177 ◽  
pp. 223-225
Author(s):  
Randall Peerenboom

Pitman Potter has provided the first book-length treatment in English of Peng Zhen, a seminal figure in the development of the legal system in China during the Mao and Deng era. Peng began his roller coaster career by rising through the party ranks to become party secretary of Beijing and party secretary of the Political-Legal Commission. He was then purged and expelled from the Politburo for opposing Mao. After Mao's death, Peng returned to power, regaining his seat on the Politburo, and serving in a variety of high-level positions, including secretary of the Political-Legal Committee and chairman of NPC Standing Committee.As Potter notes, the complexities of Peng's career, his view that the role of law must suit the needs of the time, and his own personality traits make it difficult to draw simple conclusions about his ideas on law and political authority. At times, Peng was a brutal enforcer of party policy who emphasized the subservience of law to party dictates. At other times, he boldly opposed Mao and later Deng and insisted that the party should be subject to legal constraints and refrain from interfering in day-to-day governance. A cynical reviewer could easily conclude that Peng adopted views based on what best suited his political position and personal interests at the time. Potter is somewhat more charitable, portraying Peng as a hardnosed pragmatist, willing to take a principled stand even at great personal expense when necessary, but also keen to keep up with the times.


2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne-Laure Mahé

AbstractThe concept of participation is a cornerstone of development and democracy discourses, but studies on participatory development rarely examine the political regimes those policies are embedded in. Yet, in authoritarian contexts, participation is ambiguous, potentially threatening—as it can be connected to democratic ideals—and it also can be used as a resource, a tool for domination. Through an analysis of participatory development projects implemented in Sudan, I explore how power relations are renegotiated at the local level. Relying on data collected during fieldwork in Khartoum and the state of North Kordofan, where the projects are located, I highlight the disconnect between the discourse surrounding the participatory devices, which establishes an horizontal relationship between citizens and the local government, and the actual practices that strengthen the latter's power. In doing so, the article challenges a linear, top-down conception of authoritarian power and reveals the tensions that exist between institutional levels.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ummu Salamah ◽  
Reinaldo Rianto

Abstract: The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia Year 1945 Article 29, paragraph 1 explains that "the State based on Almighty God". Normative-juridical provision has given legitimacy to the formalization of Islamic law for transformative integrated in the political system and constitutional law in Indonesia. Internalization of Islamic law into the legislation at the local level has opened the scope of the spirit of autonomy granted by the regions both general and specific. This spirit also later brings their initiative to roll Regional Regulation nuances of Islamic law, which of course raises the pros and cons in the community.Keywords: Legislation, Autonomous Region, FormalizationAbstrak: Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 pasal 29 ayat 1 menjelaskan bahwa “Negara berdasarkan atas Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa”. Ketentuan normatif-yuridis ini telah memberikan legitimasi bagi formalisasi hukum Islam untuk terintegrasi secara transformatif dalam sistem politik dan hukum ketatanegaraan Indonesia. Internalisasi hukum Islam ke dalam peraturan perundang-undangan di tingkat daerah telah membuka ruang adanya semangat otonomi yang diberikan oleh daerah-daerah baik yang umum dan khusus. Semangat ini pula yang kemudian melahirkan adanya inisiatif untuk menggulirkan Peraturan Daerah bernuansa syariat Islam, yang tentunya menimbulkan pro dan kontra di tengah kalangan masyarakat.Kata Kunci: Perda, Otonomi Daerah, Formalisasi


2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (5) ◽  
pp. 949-967 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yaffa Truelove

State quantifications of Delhi’s water supply proclaim some of the highest levels of access in urban South Asia. However, accompanying such representations are a number of discrepancies and ambiguities, suggesting an appearance of legibility is produced in the absence of data and key calculations. This paper examines the co-production of both knowledge and ignorance with regard to the city’s water, showing how their entanglement serves to powerfully shape both urban biopolitics and diffuse modalities of state power. First, I demonstrate that the appearance of legibility is maintained through fragmented measurement and bureaucratic practices that build material ambiguity into the system. Secondly, I examine the political, discursive and material effects of such illegibility, which include outcomes that are both arbitrary in nature (inadvertently allotting more water to one area versus another) and well as more deliberate (attributing blame for water wastage and loss to the very populations and urban spaces most excluded from the grid). Rather than a lack of intelligibility diminishing the powers of the state, the material ambiguity of Delhi’s waters furthers an everyday water politics of diffuse state power by which water is politicized at the local level while larger (infra)structural fixes are left off the table.


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