Political regimes and deaths in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel Cepaluni ◽  
Michael T. Dorsch ◽  
Réka Branyiczki
Keyword(s):  
Instrumental Variables ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Political Regimes ◽  
Estimation Techniques ◽  
Policy Responses ◽  
Early Stages ◽  
Quantitative Examination ◽  
Per Capita

This article provides a quantitative examination of the link between political institutions and deaths during the first 100 days of the COVID-19 pandemic. We demonstrate that countries with more democratic political institutions experienced deaths on a larger per capita scale than less democratic countries. The result is robust to the inclusion of many relevant controls, a battery of estimation techniques and estimation with instrumental variables for the institutional measures. Additionally, we examine the extent to which COVID-19 deaths were impacted heterogeneously by policy responses across types of political institutions. Policy responses in democracies were less effective in reducing deaths in the early stages of the crisis. The results imply that democratic political institutions may have a disadvantage in responding quickly to pandemics.

Institutional Weakness and the Puzzle of Argentina's Low Taxation

2007 ◽  
Vol 49 (04) ◽  
pp. 115-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcus André Melo
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Political Instability ◽  
Gdp Per Capita ◽  
Political Regimes ◽  
Discount Rates ◽  
Tax Morale ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
Uncertain Future

AbstractCurrent explanations of taxation levels have identified a host of factors, such as levels of economic development and GDP per capita, tax handles, tax morale, and political regimes. But none of them can account for Argentina's exceptionalism. Using a “transaction cost politics” approach and the case of Brazil for comparison, this article argues that the key to explaining low taxation in Argentina is political instability. Systemic instability affects the tax behavior of governments. Facing an uncertain future, incumbent governments choose to extract resources from society through inflation rather than normal taxation. This article argues that political institutions, particularly federalism, contribute to instability and thereby reduce the discount rates of government policymakers.

scholarly journals Acemoglu Meets Lucas: Institutions, Human Capital and Economic Growth

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 98
Author(s):  
Suzana Quinet de Andrade Bastos ◽  
Fabio Gama ◽  
Tiana De Paula Assis
Keyword(s):  
Human Capital ◽  
Instrumental Variables ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Capital Accumulation ◽  
Ordinary Least Squares ◽  
Human Capital Accumulation ◽  
Institutional Performance ◽  
Accumulation Function ◽  
Endogenous Growth Model ◽  
Endogenous Process

This paper proposes a reinterpretation of Lucas endogenous growth model (1988), once we add an institutional component as one of its determinants. Firstly, the paper develops a theoretical model that links human capital and institutions. Our modelling strategy establishes the human capital accumulation function as being derived from an endogenous process in which the institutional performance is a booster for the economy’s growth. The essay uses a 40–country panel data of the years 2000, 2005 and 2010 and implements a Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) analysis – alongside instrumental variables (IV) – aiming to validate empirically the model proposed. We verify that Lucas’ model overestimates the human capital contribution as we evaluate the significant impact that economic and political institutions have on the capability of human capital foment growth. Additionally, our estimations also suggest that human capital is, effectively, institutionally driven and works as a channel for the institutions.

The Impact of Infrastructure on Growth in Developing Countries

2017 ◽  
pp. 40-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derya Yılmaz ◽  
Işın Çetin
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Instrumental Variables ◽  
Dynamic Panel Data ◽  
Gdp Growth ◽  
Per Capita Gdp ◽  
Gdp Growth Rate ◽  
Generating Capacity ◽  
Catch Up ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
The Impact

Infrastructure and growth nexus has been debated in the literature since 1980s. This debate has a vital importance for the sake of developing countries. These countries need to grow faster in order to catch-up their advanced counterparts. Thus, it is important to detect the effect of infrastructure on growth. Bearing in mind this fact, we develop a standard growth regression in this present chapter using per capita GDP growth rate as a dependent variable. Infrastructure is added to the model as an index constructed from the indicators of infrastructure: total electric generating capacity, total telephone lines and the length of road network. We also employ set of instrumental variables comprising 29 developing countries between 1990 and 2014. In order to estimate our dynamic panel data we prefer GMM estimators. According to our empirical analysis, we can claim that infrastructure has a positive and significant impact on growth. But this impact is smaller than the earlier studies predict.

scholarly journals The Long-Run Effects of Oil Wealth on Development: Evidence from Petroleum Geology

2019 ◽  
Vol 129 (623) ◽  
pp. 2745-2778 ◽  
Author(s):  
Traviss Cassidy
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Oil Production ◽  
Sedimentary Basins ◽  
Capacity Development ◽  
Fiscal Capacity ◽  
Internal Armed Conflict ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
Oil Wealth

Abstract We estimate the long-run effects of oil wealth on development by exploiting spatial variation in sedimentary basins—areas where petroleum can potentially form. Instrumental variables estimates indicate that oil production impedes democracy and fiscal capacity development, increases corruption, and raises GDP per capita without significantly harming the non-resource sectors of the economy. We find no evidence that oil production increases internal armed conflict, coup attempts, or political purges. In several specifications failure to account for endogeneity leads to substantial underestimation of the adverse effects of oil, suggesting that countries with higher-quality political institutions and greater fiscal capacity disproportionately select into oil production.

scholarly journals Income and Democracy: Comment

2014 ◽  
Vol 104 (2) ◽  
pp. 707-719 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Cervellati ◽  
Florian Jung ◽  
Uwe Sunde ◽  
Thomas Vischer
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Colonial History ◽  
Full Sample ◽  
Estimation Techniques ◽  
Income Per Capita ◽  
Heterogeneous Effects ◽  
Per Capita

Acemoglu et al. (2008) document that the correlation between income per capita and democracy disappears when including time and country fixed effects. While their results are robust for the full sample, we find evidence for significant but heterogeneous effects of income on democracy: negative for former colonies, but positive for non-colonies. Within the sample of colonies we detect heterogeneous effects related to colonial history and early institutions. The zero mean effect estimated by Acemoglu et al. (2008) is consistent with effects of opposite signs in the different subsamples. Our findings are robust to the use of alternative data and estimation techniques. (JEL D72, O17, O47)

Information, peer comparison and social interdependence: theorising the impacts of COVID-19 on Gulf domestic politics

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 423-430
Author(s):  
Justin J. Gengler
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Social Interdependence ◽  
Mena Countries ◽  
Policy Responses ◽  
Governance Indicators ◽  
Individual Comparison ◽  
Gulf States ◽  
Universal Nature

This article theorizes three layers of impacts of the Coronavirus crisis on internal GCC politics, and then identifies potential causal mechanisms operating at each level. A first and primary layer concerns governance, and revolves around the state’s performance in managing the virus outbreak. A secondary level relates to scarcity and inequality, and is linked to the state’s handling of economic and social knock-on effects of the pandemic. A tertiary level is connected to peer comparison, and involves GCC states’ (lack of) coordination of political responses at the regional or sub-regional level. Several key factors emerge from the investigation as potent catalysts for new political dynamics in the Arab Gulf states. One is the unusual availability and clarity of information about state performance surrounding Covid-19, which stands in stark contrast to the general lack of reliable governance indicators for GCC and other MENA countries. Another is the universal nature of the Coronavirus shock, which allows Gulf citizens and residents to make direct comparisons of state performance and policy responses that may reveal a disproportionately negative (or positive) personal or collective outcome. Third, the person-to-person transmission of Covid-19 shatters the traditional social and geographical segregation of Gulf societies, with once-isolated communities now directly and profoundly impacted by each other’s behavior, preferences, and incentives. Finally, variation in resource endowments and political institutions across the GCC precludes easy regional harmonization of post-Covid social and economic policy, once more inviting individual comparison with relatively advantaged or disadvantaged peers in neighboring states.

scholarly journals Political Institutions and Regimes since 1600: A New Historical Data Set

2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 495-520 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Rånge ◽  
Mikael Sandberg
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Historical Data ◽  
Political Regimes ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Monthly Data ◽  
Research Instrument ◽  
Nondemocratic Regimes ◽  
Yearly Data

A new data set provides vital information about the world’s political institutions, from 1789 on a monthly and yearly basis and from 1600 on a yearly basis. The yearly data set from 1600 has more than 90,000 country–year observations, and the monthly data set from 1789 more than 600,000 observations—by far the most comprehensive to date, offering several advantages over other available ones. The data set aggregates specific attributes to create nominal and ordinal rankings of political regimes on a scale of 1 to 1,000. In addition to supporting a rigorous classification of democratic and nondemocratic regimes, it allows researchers to trace institutional variations and to explore alternative ways of aggregating political institutions. As a research instrument, the MaxRange data set permits historically minded scholars to address a number of issues related to the dynamics of political institutions in an unprecedented manner.

Income and Democracy

2008 ◽  
Vol 98 (3) ◽  
pp. 808-842 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daron Acemoglu ◽  
Simon Johnson ◽  
James A Robinson ◽  
Pierre Yared
Keyword(s):  
Instrumental Variables ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Causal Effect ◽  
Statistical Association ◽  
The Past ◽  
Critical Junctures ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
Cross Country ◽  
Development Paths ◽  
Political Economic

Existing studies establish a strong cross-country correlation between income and democracy but do not control for factors that simultaneously affect both variables. We show that controlling for such factors by including country fixed effects removes the statistical association between income per capita and various measures of democracy. We present instrumental-variables estimates that also show no causal effect of income on democracy. The cross-country correlation between income and democracy reflects a positive correlation between changes in income and democracy over the past 500 years. This pattern is consistent with the idea that societies embarked on divergent political-economic development paths at certain critical junctures. (JEL D72, E21)

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