Why the Basic Structure?

2012 ◽  
Vol 42 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 303-334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis-Philippe Hodgson

John Rawls famously holds that the basic structure is the ‘primary subject of justice.’ By this, he means that his two principles of justice apply only to a society's major political and social institutions, including chiefly the constitution, the economic and legal systems, and (more contentiously) the family structure. This thesis — call it thebasic structure restriction— entails that the celebrated difference principle has a narrower scope than one might have expected. It doesn't apply directly to choices that individuals make within the basic structure. Individuals can live up to the demands of justice simply by obeying whatever rules are set by, and by doing what is necessary to sustain, the basic structure; they needn't attempt to benefit maximally the worst off through their personal choices. Nor does the principle apply to interactions taking place beyond the basic structure, on the international stage. International actors can live up to the demands of justice by observing a comparatively modest ‘duty of assistance’ toward severely destitute societies; they needn't make it their aim to benefit maximally the world's poorest individuals.

Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman

Rawls says that there are two sources for the primacy assigned to the basic structure: the profound effects of basic social institutions on persons and their future prospects, and the need to maintain background justice. This chapter discusses the main reasons behind Rawls’s position that the basic structure of society is the primary subject of justice, and that the political constitution, property, and the economic system are the first subject to which principles of justice apply. First, the primacy of the basic structure is necessary for the freedom, equality, and independence of moral persons. Second, the basic structure’s priority is a condition of economic reciprocity and the just distribution of income and wealth. Third, the primacy of the basic structure is required by moral pluralism and the plurality of values and reasonable conceptions of the good among free and equal persons.


Author(s):  
Robert A. Schultz

As we saw from the last two chapters, the ethical IT professional is embedded in contexts of management, organization, and society. Ethical behavior for the IT professional is, therefore, impacted by the ethics of people and institutions in his or her environment. The primary term for ethical institutions is justice.1 In the next three chapters, we will examine the justice of institutions impacting the IT professional. The framework used will be that provided by the works of John Rawls (1999, 2001). Rawls’ work is based on the idea of a social contract, that a justly ordered society is one to which individuals can freely decide to obligate themselves. But our decision will very likely be biased if we base it on our current situation. So Rawls’ major addition is to say that the decision must be made prior to being in society, without knowledge of what our position will be in society, and it will be a decision we will be obligated to stick to and expect others to make and stick to as well. The basic principles for society chosen in this position (which Rawls calls the original position) will be the Principles of Justice. According to Rawls (1999, 2001), there will be two: 1. The First Principle of Justice or Greatest Equal Liberty: Society is to be arranged so that all members have the greatest equal liberty possible for all, including fair equality of opportunity. Each individual has basic liberties which are not to be compromised or traded off for other benefits. Besides the basic freedoms such as freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and so on, it includes equality of opportunity. Thus society’s rules are not biased against anyone in it and allow all to pursue their interests and realize their abilities. 2. The Second Principle of Justice or the Difference Principle: Economic inequalities in society are justified insofar as they make members of the least advantaged social class, better off than if there were no inequality. The social contract basis for this principle is straightforward: If you are entering a society with no knowledge of your specific place in that society, the Difference Principle guarantees that you will be no worse off than you need to be to keep the society functioning.


2013 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman

AbstractJohn Rawls says: “The main problem of distributive justice is the choice of a social system.” Property-owning democracy is the social system that Rawls thought best realized the requirements of his principles of justice. This article discusses Rawls’s conception of property-owning democracy and how it is related to his difference principle. I explain why Rawls thought that welfare-state capitalism could not fulfill his principles: it is mainly because of the connection he perceived between capitalism and utilitarianism.


1987 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
David O. Brink

Since his article, ‘Outline for a Decision Procedure in Ethics,’ John Rawls has advocated a coherentist moral epistemology according to which moral and political theories are justified on the basis of their coherence with our other beliefs, both moral and nonmoral (1951: 56, 61). A moral theory which is maximally coherent with our other beliefs is in a state which Rawls calls ‘reflective equilibrium’ (1971: 20). In A Theory of Justice Rawls advanced two principles of justice and claimed that they are in reflective equilibrium. He defended this claim by appeal to a hypothetical contract; he argued that parties in a position satisfying certain informational and motivational criteria, which he called ‘the original position,’ would choose the following two principles of justice to govern the basic structure of their society.


2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 449
Author(s):  
Rafael Soares de Lima ◽  
Murilo Chaves Vilarinho

Segundo John Rawls, uma sociedade justa é aquela em que há garantia da liberdade individual e da promoção e distribuição equitativa de oportunidades e recursos. O presente artigo objetiva abordar os princípios da justiça como equidade, em Rawls, enquanto instrumentos para a reflexão acerca das políticas públicas educacionais no Brasil, em especial o Plano Nacional de Educação (PNE). Metodologicamente, o estudo se baseia em pesquisa exploratória, bibliográfica e análise documental. Como resultados,  identifica correlações entre os objetivos do PNE, a manutenção das liberdades iguais e a maximização das expectativas dos menos favorecidos, bem como limitações em relação à distribuição equitativa de oportunidades de ocupação, no âmbito da estrutura básica da sociedade, com atenção especial para a educação.EDUCATION POLICY ACCORDING TO JOHN RAWLS’ THEORY OF JUSTICEAbstract According to John Rawls, a just society is one in which individual freedom and the promotion and equitable distribution of opportunities and resources are guaranteed. The present article aims to address the principles of justice as equity, in Rawls, as instruments for reflection on educational public policies in Brazil, especially the National Education Plan (PNE). Methodologically, the study is based on exploratory research, literature and document analysis. As a result, it identifies correlations between the objectives of the PNE, the maintenance of equal freedoms and the maximization of the expectations of the less fortunate, as well as limitations regarding the equitable distribution of occupation opportunities, within the basic structure of society, with special attention to the education.Keywords: Education. Public Policies. Theory of Justice. John Rawls.


Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman

This volume of essays addresses a wide range of issues in contemporary political philosophy, from the different branches of liberalism and their relation to capitalism, to the basic institutions of a liberal society that underwrite political and economic justice. Samuel Freeman is a leading political philosopher and one of the foremost authorities on the works of John Rawls. This volume contains nine of his essays on liberalism, Rawls, and distributive justice. Freeman organizes his chapters into a narrative arc: from liberalism as the dominant political and economic system in the Western world, to the laws governing interpersonal transactions in a liberal society, to the broad social and political structures that determine distributive justice. Freeman analyzes the primary differences between the classical and high liberal traditions; shows why libertarianism is not a liberal view; argues for the social rather than global bases of distributive justice; demonstrates why Rawls’s difference principle supports a property-owning democracy rather than welfare-state capitalism; and shows how Rawls’s liberal principles of justice and the difference principle are to be applied in both ideal and non-ideal circumstances, effectively responding to criticisms by Amartya Sen, G. A. Cohen, and others.


Author(s):  
Gina Schouten

This chapter begins the work of defending my own approach to justifying gender-egalitarian interventions. The first step is to defend against a line of thought according to which the interventions are categorically illegitimate due to the restriction of justice to institutions. The traditional liberal view holds that institutions and structural features of society are the primary subject matter of justice, and that principles of justice apply to individuals’ behavior only derivatively. Critics of this “basic structure” view maintain that it too narrowly construes the purview of justice, and that principles of justice can also apply directly to the behaviors of individual agents. If the basic structure view is vindicated, that would apparently condemn gender-egalitarian interventions as illegitimate on their face. I argue that some version of the restricted view is defensible, but that such a version will not categorically classify gender-egalitarian interventions as illegitimate.


2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-369 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Kaufman

John Rawls argues that it is possible to describe a suitably defined initial situation from which to form reliable judgements about justice. In this initial situation, rational persons are deprived of information that is ‘irrelevant from the standpoint of justice’. It is rational, Rawls argues, for persons choosing principles of justice from this standpoint to be guided by the maximin rule. Critics, however, argue that (i) the maximin rule is not the appropriate decision rule for Rawls's choice position; (ii) the maximin argument relies upon an imprecise account of the satisfactory minimum to be secured under the maximin rule; or that (iii) Rawls relies upon unrealistic assumptions about diminishing marginal value. These critics, I will suggest, argue from a number of assumptions that are confused or false. The satisfactory minimum that choosers in the original position – employing the maximin rule – seek to achieve is not a minimum level of primary goods, nor is the satisfactory minimum sought under the maximin rule supplied by the difference principle. I will argue that the maximin argument is more robust than has generally been recognized and that this argument performs a number of important functions in clarifying the nature and implications of Rawls's argument for justice as fairness.


MELINTAS ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 309
Author(s):  
Alfensius Alwino

Through the history of philosophy, the theme of justice has become a very important topic. Thinkers of the theories such as utilitarianism, intuitionism, eudaimonism, perfectionism, liberalism, communitarianism, and socialism have discussed the theme. As French philosopher Alain Badiou has pointed out, the central of political studies from the time of Plato to the present day is justice. The question is what is justice? For John Rawls, justice is the supreme virtue of human. In <em>A Theory of Justice</em>, Rawls asserts that justice is the first priority in social institutions, as is truth in the system of thought. A theory, however elegant and economical, must be rejected or revised if it is not true, so the laws and institutions, however efficient and neat, must be reformed or removed if it is unfair. Rawls criticizes the theory of justice in Lockean liberalism and Marxian socialism. Both theories of justice are very strong colouring the landscape of debate on the roots of thinking about justice. For Rawls, liberalism that accentuates basic freedoms can create inequality between people who have better abilities with less fortunate people. Similarly, socialism which accentuates equality ignores basic freedoms. The two theories of justice are considered ideological in the sense that there are hidden interests behind the jargons of freedom and equality. Rawls then develops an abstract theory of justice, in which the participants depart from a veil of ignorance, so that they are free of any interest and ambition. Here they might build a cooperative contract in a society governed by the principles of justice.


2018 ◽  
pp. 126-142
Author(s):  
Michał Kuzdak

The author discusses the topic of families, especially incomplete. The work is about the disorganization of the family structure, showing its causes and history. The article describes the dangers of modern family and relations on the parentchild line. The author refers to economic emigration as one of the reasons for the loosening of family ties and the cause of incomplete families.


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