scholarly journals Freedom and Praxis in Plotinus’s Ennead 6.8.1-6

2020 ◽  
pp. e03031
Author(s):  
Bernardo Portilho Andrade

In this paper, I argue that Plotinus does not limit the sphere of free human agency simply to intellectual contemplation, but rather extends it all the way to human praxis. Plotinus’s goal in the first six chapters of Ennead 6.8 is, accordingly, to demarcate the space of freedom within human practical actions. He ultimately concludes that our external actions are free whenever they actualize, in unhindered fashion, the moral principles derived from intellectual contemplation. This raises the question of how the freedom of practical actions might relate to the freedom of intellectual contemplation. After considering two previously offered models – a model of double activity, and an Aristotelian model of practical syllogism – I offer a third alternative, namely a model of moral attunement, according to which our rational desires assume a kind of ‘care of the soul’ through active supervision. Practical life is thus imbued with freedom to the extent that the soul supervises its actions to conform to its will and choice of the good.

2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 427-447 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Levy

Whatever its implications for the other features of human agency at its best — for moral responsibility, reasons-responsiveness, self-realization, flourishing, and so on—addiction is universally recognized as impairing autonomy. But philosophers have frequently misunderstood the nature of addiction, and therefore have not adequately explained the manner in which it impairs autonomy. Once we recognize that addiction is not incompatible with choice or volition, it becomes clear that none of the Standard accounts of autonomy can satisfactorily explain the way in which it undermines fully autonomous agency. In order to understand to what extent and in what ways the addicted are autonomy-impaired, we need to understand autonomy as consisting, essentially, in the exercise of the capacity for extended agency. It is because addiction undermines extended agency, so that addicts are not able to integrate their lives and pursue a Single conception of the good, that it impairs autonomy.


Author(s):  
Sekou Toure

Most of the books of Islamic Creed found in Islamic heritage are characterized by their presentation of theology from the perspective of a particular sect out of the major Islamic sects. This methodology has given rise to serious and detrimental problems that affect the ummah (Muslim nation) up until this day, and from it stems the issues that divide the ummah. It is thus apparent that it is incapable of presenting the issues of theology from the perspective of that unites the Muslims. It is true that this methodology had been sound at one point during which it had to be applied; it had been the means of expression in dialogues and the way to answer questions related to pertinent matters of the time, as well as to address urgent new issues at that particular time. However, the goal of teaching Islamic Creed in this time of ours academically in specific is not based upon the instabilities and issues that it had once driven it. Hence, it is necessary to change the approach, methodology, and discourse to suit the change in impetus to and the goal of authoring such books, as well as the change in the general way of living of the people and their way of thinking. It is also worth noting that the universal moral principles associated with such changes do not necessarily contradict religion. This review undertakes a new book attempting to respond to a challenge resulted out of the classical discourses and arguments in presenting Islamic worldviews, and hence the reality of so-called Ahl Sunnah Wal Jama’ah


2006 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 256-275
Author(s):  
Christian Moe

The wars that dissolved Yugoslavia – were they religious wars? Why are conflicts increasingly coded as religious, rather than as, for example, social or ethnic? What constitutes a ‘religious’ or ‘holy’ war. This article attempts an inventory of important cat­egories and hypotheses generated in the relevant literature so far, with a few critical notes along the way. The author considers the role assigned to religion in structural, cultural, and actor-oriented explanations of the Yugoslav wars. Structural and cultural explanations downplay the role of human agency and, hence, of moral responsibility; actor-oriented approaches focus on it.


2002 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bhikhu Parekh

In This Article I Do Two Things. I Begin With A Brief Discussion of the nature of political community in general, and argue that a political community is defined and constituted by the common public commitments of its citizens. Its identity is political not ethnic or cultural in nature, an important distinction that is obscured by the term ‘national identity’ and often ignored in much of the discussion of it. Its identity has an inescapable moral content. Although the latter is often shared with other communities, what distinguishes a political community is the way in which it interprets and institutionally articulates these moral principles. I then apply this general analysis to Britain and suggest how we might best define its identity.


Author(s):  
Daniel R. Brunstetter

Jus in vi is the set of moral principles governing how limited force is used. Taking the traditionalist jus in bello principles as a starting point, this chapter interrogates what necessity, proportionality, and distinction look like in a limited force context and makes the case for the novel psychological risk principle by evaluating how concepts such as “excessive,” “military advantage,” and “harms” and “goods” fit into our thinking about vim. The keystone of jus in vi is the predisposition toward maximal restraint maxim. The chapter thus begins by making the case for why jus in vi principles should be more restrictive than their jus in bello counterparts. It continues by exploring how a circumscribed view of necessity sets the groundwork for constraining proportionality calculations and shaping the way we think about distinction in more restricted ways. The notion of jus in vi proportionality is then explored, with concerns about escalation and psychological risk driving the analysis. Drawing insights from revisionist just war theory to consider jus in vi distinction, the chapter concludes by making the case for affording greater protections to both combatants and non-combatants compared to standard just war accounts. Unlike war, in which almost any soldier can be targeted, in a context of limited force only those who are an active threat can be justly targeted. Both innocent non-combatants and non-threatening combatants should be preserved from the more predictable harms of limited force, though this differs depending on whether the use of limited force is protective, preventive, or punitive.


Author(s):  
Philipa Rothfield

This chapter draws on Deleuzian thought in order to think through the role of experience within dance and the activity of dancing more generally. It contrasts phenomenological approaches to dancing, which appeal to notions of subjective agency, with a Deleuzian re-reading of subjectivity. In the process, it refers to Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, using Nietzsche’s concept of force to account for the many ways in which forces combine to produce movement. The notion of force is able to explain the way action unfolds without being the product of human agency. It offers a way of rethinking phenomenological notions of agency. According to this account, relations of force underlie action, as well as the many modes of interiority (subjectivity). But these two kinds of formation (of force) are different in kind. They belong to differing types (of force). The pursuit of action, including the utilisation of experience in action, constitutes a certain type of ethos, which Deleuze calls the active type, whereas the formation of experience belongs to ‘the reactive apparatus’, that which reacts but does not act. The active type drives a wedge between the dancing and the dancer. Deleuze’s treatment of Nietzsche can be adapted to account for the variety of dance practices, their production of training and technique, custom and virtuosity. In particular, it is able to account for the specific ways in which postmodern dance displaces the subjectivity of the dancer.


2021 ◽  
pp. 45-51
Author(s):  
Iryna Kachur

The correlation between language and reality is investigated in this article. The question whether language shapes the way we think or it is the reality which defines what we say is highly disputable. Any language is a complex structure of vocabulary and grammar which serves as the main means of communication, and with the help of which people can render their thoughts, achieve their goals, or simply socialize. The influence of language on our way of thinking can be observed on the example of the process of word formation in different languages or the usage of specific words, which describe phenomena common to this or that culture. However, at the same time, the reality influences lexicon as well and plays a significant role in building a culture. Moreover, grammatical categories of time and gender, which differ from language to language, may also affect the way people perceive the world. As for the category of gender, it may restrict human beings in the choice of adjectives they attribute to different entities, depending on the word being masculine or feminine. Meanwhile, the very essence of time vary from language to language, depending on it, speakers may give prominence to different chunks of information expressed in a sentence. To achieve these not only grammatical structures but also certain words may be used. Due to the differences in world images that speakers of different languages have, some cultural misunderstanding may arise. It has to be mentioned that a culture is a combination of values, moral principles, customers and traditions of a nation which are reflected in its language. Moreover, great emphasis was put on the process of acquiring a new language which has the power to alter human perception of the universe. Therefore, learning a foreign language a person as well studies its culture and begins to see the world from a different perspective. Thus, language has an impact on the human perception of the world, but at the same time, the reality has an influence on what we say.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 446-462
Author(s):  
Hasnan Hanif

The conventional ethics concept has difference color with Islamic ethics on implementation in daily lives. The ethics in Islamic teaching follows the rule of valid and invalid (halal and haram) including the way of reaching, using, advertising and marketing of the product. The conventional ethics concept leads good and bad values in human perspective. Ethics was defined as an action that done based on the good moral principles where Akhlaq was being the main reference in doing of Islamic economics production. The foundation of Islamic ethics in advertisement is to follow the Sharia guideline that has been determined. The value of Islamic advertisement as follows: Shiddiq, (honest), Fathonah. (Clever). Amanah. (trusted) Tabligh. (delivered). Istiqomah. (consistent).


Author(s):  
Adam Cureton ◽  
Thomas E. Hill

Immanuel Kant defines virtue as a kind of strength and resoluteness of will to resist and overcome any obstacles that oppose fulfilling our moral duties. Human agents, according to Kant, owe it to themselves to strive for perfect virtue by fully committing to morality and by developing the fortitude to maintain and execute this life-governing policy, despite obstacles. This chapter reviews basic features of Kant’s conception of virtue and then discusses the role of emotions, a motive of duty, exemplars, rules, and community in a virtuous life. Kant thinks that striving to be more virtuous requires not only respect for moral principles and control of our contrary emotions, but also a system of legally enforced rules and communities of good persons. Exemplars and cultivated good feelings and emotions can be useful aids along the way, but Kant warns against attempting to derive one’s moral standards from examples or feelings.


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