The Independent Republican

This chapter sheds further lights on the dynamics of Delany’s controversial views on social equality and racial reconciliation; his prescriptions and strategies for attaining justice and equality; his views on the shortcomings of Radical Reconstruction; his persistent critique of the Black-Radical Republican Party alliance, his growing alienation from the party; and reactions of ideological opponents and former associates to his controversial and provocative political ideas. The documents expound on the circumstances leading to Delany’s brief alliance with South Carolina State Conservatives, Independents and Ex-Confederates. The alliance symbolized the utilitarian and conflicted nature of his political thought. The documents highlight as well Delany’s political and social conservatism and rationale for the decision to switch to the conservative Democratic Party. They attest to his commitment to racial cooperation, compromise and belief that severing ties with the Radical Republicans, deemphasizing social equality, and embracing the Democratic Party would advance the interests of blacks.

Documents in chapter three introduce readers to the intricacies and challenges of the first phase of Martin Delany’s entry into the politics of Reconstruction in South Carolina. They elucidate his political philosophy and visions; his advice to blacks on how best to maximize the benefits of their newly acquired citizenship rights; his ambivalent views on black political rights; his controversial stand on social equality; his scathing rebuke of black political aspirations and demands; and insistence that blacks attained some pre-qualification before aspiring for certain political positions. The documents also underscore the conflicting reactions of contemporaries to Delany’s controversial and at times provocative critiques of Radical Reconstruction. Ultimately, his advocacy of compromise, accommodation and racial reconciliation alienated him from the ruling radical Republican Party, prompting his decision to switch party allegiance and join the Democratic Party. The documents represent the conflicts Delany’s ideas provoked and the essential pragmatism of his thoughts.


Author(s):  
Lee Drutman

This chapter examines the paradox of partisanship. In 1950, the American Political Science Association put out a major report arguing for a “more responsible two-party system.” The two parties—the Democratic Party and the Republican Party—were then largely indistinguishable coalitions of parochial local parties, and the political scientists argued that too little, rather than too much polarization, was the problem. This sets up a paradox: Some party division is necessary, but too much can be deadly. Various traditions in American political thought have tried to resolve this paradox. Antipartisans have urged consensus above all. Responsible partisans have urged competition above all. Meanwhile, bipartisans have urged compromise above all. Consensus is impossible. However, both compromise and competition are essential to democracy. Only the neglected multiparty tradition can solve the paradox with the right balance of competition and compromise.


2003 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 91-108
Author(s):  
Robert P. Steed ◽  
Laurence W. Moreland

Paralleling developments in other southern states over the past three to four decades, South Carolina’s political system has undergone dramatic change. One of the more significant components of this change has been the partisan realignment from a one-party system dominated by the Democrats to a competitive two-party system in which Republicans have come to hold the upper hand. This increased electoral competitiveness has been accompanied by an increased organizational effort by both parties in the state. An examination of local party activists in 2001 points to a continuation of this pattern over the past ten years. In comparison with data from the 1991 Southern Grassroots Party Activists Survey, the 2001 data show the following: (1) the Republican Party has sustained its electoral and organizational gains of recent years; (2) the parties continue to attract activists who differ across party lines on a number of important demographic and socioeconomic variables; (3) there has been a continued sorting of political orientations and cues marked by sharply different inter-party ideological and issue positions; (4) the Democratic Party has become more ideologically homogeneous and more in line with the national party than previously; and (5) since 1991 perceptions of factionalism have declined in both parties, but still remain higher among Democrats than among Republicans.


2001 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Strate ◽  
Timothy Kiska ◽  
Marvin Zalman

At the November 1998 general election, Michigan citizens were given the opportunity to vote on Proposal B, an initiative that would have legalized physician-assisted suicide (PAS). PAS initiatives also have been held in Washington State, California, Oregon, and Maine, with only Oregon's passing. We use exit poll data to analyze the vote on Proposal B. Attributes associated with social liberalism—Democratic Party identification, less frequent church attendance, more education, and greater household income—led to increased odds of a “yes” vote. Attributes associated with social conservatism—Republican Party identification and frequent church attendance—led to decreased odds of a “yes” vote. Similar to the abortion issue, PAS's supporters strongly value personal autonomy, whereas its opponents strongly value the sanctity of life. Voter alignments like those in Michigan will likely appear in other states with the initiative process if PAS reaches their ballots.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 1031-1047
Author(s):  
Neil A. O’Brian

What explains the alignment of antiabortion positions within the Republican party? I explore this development among voters, activists, and elites before 1980. By 1970, antiabortion attitudes among ordinary voters correlated with conservative views on a range of noneconomic issues including civil rights, Vietnam, feminism and, by 1972, with Republican presidential vote choice. These attitudes predated the parties taking divergent abortion positions. I argue that because racial conservatives and military hawks entered the Republican coalition before abortion became politically activated, issue overlap among ordinary voters incentivized Republicans to oppose abortion rights once the issue gained salience. Likewise, because proabortion voters generally supported civil rights, once the GOP adopted a Southern strategy, this predisposed pro-choice groups to align with the Democratic party. A core argument is that preexisting public opinion enabled activist leaders to embed the anti (pro) abortion movement in a web of conservative (liberal) causes. A key finding is that the white evangelical laity’s support for conservative abortion policies preceded the political mobilization of evangelical leaders into the pro-life movement. I contend the pro-life movement’s alignment with conservatism and the Republican party was less contingent on elite bargaining, and more rooted in the mass public, than existing scholarship suggests.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (105) ◽  
pp. 78-86
Author(s):  
EKATERINA A. NIKONOVA

The article deals with the analysis of the balance of opinion in the newspaper, which is originally realized through editorial and op-ed genres. We analyzed 20 articles from “The Wall Street Journal” and “The New York Times” in the genres of editorial and op-ed about events in Afghanistan in August 2021, which were interpreted differently in mass media due to the role of the White House. The findings prove that in the context of new digital reality the op-ed has lost its original function of conveying alternative positions to the ones stated in the editorial; at the same time newspapers tend to advocate the positions shared by the political parties they have historically developed close relations with: “The Wall Street Journal” - with the Republican Party, “The New York Times” - the Democratic Party.


Author(s):  
Sheri Berman

The decline of the centre-left over the past years is one of the most alarming trends in Western politics. During the latter part of the 20th century such parties either ran the government or led the loyal Opposition in virtually every Western democracy. Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD), once the most powerful party of the left in continental Europe, currently polls in high 20s or 30s. The French Socialist Party was eviscerated in the 2017 elections, as was the Dutch Labour Party. Even the vaunted Scandinavian social democratic parties are struggling, reduced to vote shares in the 30 per cent range. The British Labour Party and the US Democrats have been protected from challengers by their country’s first-past-the-post electoral systems, but the former has recently taken a sharp turn to the hard-left under Jeremy Corbyn, while the latter, although still competitive at the national level, is a minority party at the state and local levels, where a hard-right Republican Party dominates the scene....


Author(s):  
Irwin L. Morris

Democrats once dominated the “Solid South.” By the turn of the 21st century, Republicans had taken control. We are in the midst of the dawning of new, more progressive era. Theories explaining Republican growth provide little guidance, but a new perspective—Movers and Stayers theory—explains this recent growth in Democratic support and the ways in which population growth has produced it. Migratory patterns play a significant role in southern politics. Young, well-educated in-migrants fostered Republican growth in the last century. Today, these increasingly progressive young, well-educated movers are growing the Democratic Party. Movers bring their politics to their new communities. Their progressivism fosters the same among long-term residents (stayers) in their new communities. But the declining communities they left show the effects of their exit. In our racialized partisan environment, white stayers respond to the threat of declining communities by shifting to the right and identifying with the Republican Party. Conversely, African Americans respond to community threat by maintaining their progressivism. Few Latinos live in declining communities; Latino stayers in fast growing communities become more Democratic. While movers of retirement age are more conservative than younger movers, they are more liberal than those who retire in place—not quite the demographic windfall Republicans in aging areas have hoped for. These dynamics are altering the southern political landscape, and differences between growing areas and declining areas are accelerating. Absent a wholesale reinvention of southern politics along the lines of class or (possibly) age, the current partisan trajectory does not bode well for Republicans. The COVID-19 pandemic will not change that.


2018 ◽  
pp. 73-101
Author(s):  
David A. Bateman ◽  
Ira Katznelson ◽  
John S. Lapinski

This chapter visits the internal tensions within the various southern Democratic parties, which successfully united competing factions around the cause of white supremacy but whose unity was always tense and insecure. It begins by detailing the process of “redemption,” in which the Democratic Party across the South wrested control of state legislatures and national representation from biracial coalitions organized primarily within the Republican Party. It then examines the structure of political conflict in Congress, the site where southern diversity was transformed into regional solidarity, to show that the familiar story of the Black Belt as the core of southern solidarity must be revised. Turning to the substantive bases for southern unity and diversity, the chapter identifies the issue areas that implicated distinctively southern priorities and arrayed the region's members in diverse coalitions with northern Democrats and Republicans. From this set, it selects for detailed examination legislation that reflected competing intraregional priorities.


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